١٦٠ سند از مکاتبات وزارت امور خارجه آمريکا که در آنها از "ايران" نام برده شده است
منتشر شده توسط ويکى‌ليکز تا روز ٤ دسامبر ٢٠١٠
(تا اين روز فقط ٦٨٣ سند از کل ٢٥١ هزار سند منتشر شده است)

هر نامه با يک خط افقى جدا شده است. در زير هر خط افقى لينکى هست که شما را به اصل نامه در سايت ويکى‌ليکز ميرساند.
اولين سطر مربوط به هر نامه به ترتيب اين اطلاعات را در خود دارد:
شماره مرجع، تاريخ اصل نامه، تاريخ انتشار در اينترنت، طبقه‌بندى، و نام واحدى که نامه را ارسال کرده است.

در متنى که ملاحظه ميکنيد چند کلمه کليدى براى سهولت جستجوى شما رنگى شده‌اند، اين رنگها را ما اضافه کرده‌ايم و در اصل نامه‌ها نيست:
ايران   عراق   اسرائيل   افغانستان   احمدى‌نژاد   رفسنجانى   موسوى   خامنه‌اى   سبزها   هسته‌اى
براى يافتن کلمات کليدى ديگر از جستجوگر تارنمايتان استفاده کنيد.
سايت راديو زنان، استکهلم، ٤ دسامبر ٢٠١٠


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Reference ID     Created Released     Classification     Origin
07KABUL2998     2007-09-08 14:02     2010-12-02 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Kabul

VZCZCXRO1879
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2998/01 2511423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081423Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0072
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 002998

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-82 POLAD

EO 12958 DECL: 07/10/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, ECON, IR, AF
SUBJECT: BOUCHER AND KARZAI, SPANTA ON JIRGAS, DRUGS, ECON
COOPERATION, GOVERNANCE, IRAN
Classified By: Charge Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher’s August 27 meetings with President Karzai, Foreign Minister Spanta, Lower House Speaker Qanooni and National Security Advisor Rassoul spanned a range of key topics. Boucher, Karzai and Rassoul agreed to focus on themes of economic cooperation, intelligence- sharing, refugees, controlling illicit border traffic, and engaging the tribes during the upcoming trilateral meeting between Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte, Rassoul, and Pakistani National Security Advisor Aziz. Karzai’s vision of a UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan largely mirrors U.S. thoughts on the issue. Discussion of counternarcotics and governance led Karzai to make a pitch for the international community to give the Afghan government room to do governance “the Afghan way.” Boucher pressed Spanta and Qanooni to ensure that Iran’s role in Afghanistan is limited to a constructive one. End Summary.

------
JIRGAS
------

¶2. (C) Karzai seemed pleased when Boucher shared that the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan jirga had been portrayed favorably in the U.S. media. Karzai commented that six months would be an ideal time frame after which to host the next jirga in Pakistan. Both agreed that the Afghan jirga was an important confidence-building measure, but Boucher expressed his hope that the next jirga in Pakistan might produce more concrete agreements. He raised the upcoming visit of Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte as an opportunity to capitalize on the momentum of the jirga and ensure continued progress towards the next one. Boucher raised the idea of having the Afghan and Pakistani National Security Advisors meet together with Negroponte during his visit to Jalalabad near the Afghan-Pakistani border and proposed that the three work together to identify specific issues where the greatest cooperation is needed (such as economic cooperation, intelligence-sharing and controlling illicit border traffic). Boucher also pushed for a discussion of how to engage the tribes along the border, whose buy-in is essential to the staying power of any future jirga agreements. Karzai, Spanta and Rassoul were each on board with this.

¶3. (C) Karzai shared that there was a recent gathering of Pakistani tribal chiefs in Peshawar during which the chiefs expressed a desire for the same rights and freedoms as ordinary Pakistani citizens. However, Karzai noted that these same tribes had recently refused to celebrate Pakistani Independence Day. Karzai said the Pakistani government needed to pull tribal leaders into a system of formal representation, while Boucher noted that Pakistani Interior Minister Sherpao did not think a political party system within the Tribal Areas would be feasible in the near term.

¶4. (C) In a separate discussion with Boucher, National Security Advisor Rassoul said Karzai had initiated the process of finalizing the list of participants in the commission that will implement the agreements from the first jirga. Boucher seconded Sherpao’s desire to see a commission comprised of those “who can get things done.” In an encouraging sign, Rassoul acknowledged that Sherpao had been a very helpful partner in the lead-up to, execution of and follow-up to the first jirga. Rassoul stated that the first task would be to work on the continuation of dialogue with the “opposition,” including Taliban. Boucher pushed specifically for the jirga commission to identify who the opposition is and relayed Sherpao’s interest in bringing those “who are not part
KABUL 00002998 002 OF 006
of the Taliban but sympathetic to them into the jirga process.” Both agreed that Afghanistan’s official reconciliation process (commonly referred to as “PTS”) is not appropriate for high-level leaders and large groups, so the jirga commission could play a role in defining a more appropriate process for people in this category.

¶5. (C) Boucher shared his opinion that Pakistan is “making a real effort now by going after the hardest targets, including Pakistani and Arab insurgents,” which has already yielded results. Rassoul noted that his government is considering using the Provincial Communications Center model (currently used to coordinate information among the Afghan National Security Forces at the provincial level) to set up a nexus for intelligence-sharing between the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Pakistan is concerned about Baluch rebels who are operating in and supported from Afghanistan, and Boucher stressed the importance of the Afghan government doing all it can to crack down on this.

¶6. (C) During the meeting with Spanta, the Foreign Minister indicated that while he had been skeptical about the jirga himself, he had considered it a major success in the end. He said that the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs was sending five newly appointed diplomats to Pakistan for training -- a significant goodwill gesture following the jirga, as Afghanistan has refused educational assistance from Pakistan in the past. Spanta said Musharraf’s appearance at the end of the jirga was a real high point. Boucher emphasized that it was Karzai’s urging that changed Musharraf’s mind. Boucher clarified that Musharraf’s initial decision not to attend was not a snub to the jirga itself but a cautionary move by Musharraf, who feared the Pakistani Supreme Court would rule to allow former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to return to Pakistan. Spanta conceded that, “We know Sharif is bad news. He is the author of Islamic radicalism in our region.” Boucher agreed that Sharif could return to lead a movement that is pro-Islam, anti-Musharraf and anti- U.S.

----------------
UN SPECIAL ENVOY
----------------

¶7. (C) When Boucher asked Karzai his thoughts on the best role for a UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Karzai stated, “If it would be a UN Envoy that would bring better coordination among the international community at capitals and also cause better coordination in Afghanistan, and within the Alliance on Afghanistan, then good. But if it is someone who would set up a parallel government of internationals, then no.” At one point Karzai stated, “I do not want a stronger UN,” then clarified that “I want the UN to be a stronger coordinator of the international community, yes, but not a parallel government in Afghanistan.” (Note: The British have indicated their vision of a Special Envoy who would be based in and work primarily in Afghanistan, whereas the U.S. and Afghan sides envision an envoy who would spend a great deal of time fund-raising and coordinating donor strategies in donor country capitals. End note.)

¶8. (C) During his meeting with Rassoul, Boucher commented that the French government had been considering running a Provincial Reconstruction Team and that the French Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs plan to visit Afghanistan soon. Boucher, Rassoul, and the Ambassador discussed future prospects for other donor country involvement in Afghanistan, noting that the Canadians were “iffy” and that the Dutch may leave after 2009. The British, French, Australians and U.S. will likely stay
KABUL 00002998 003 OF 006
for longer periods. Rassoul asserted the importance of “Afghanizing” the war in Kandahar both in order to reduce Canadian casualties, which might encourage the Canadians to stay longer, and to prepare the Afghan National Army and police for Canada’s likely withdrawal. Boucher noted that after a withdrawal of maneuver troops, the Canadians may still be willing to run a Provincial Reconstruction Team focused on development, as well as the training and equipping of Afghan National Security Forces. Boucher noted that as 2009 is an election year, it would be good to encourage donor countries to stay throughout 2009- 2010. He also expressed hope that efforts to engage Pakistan now would increase security significantly in the next year or two, perhaps encouraging other countries to stay present in Afghanistan.

------------------------------------
LOOKING AHEAD ON ERADICATION EFFORTS
------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Boucher noted that the UN Office of Drugs and Crime had released its latest assessment of drug production in Afghanistan. He highlighted the report’s findings that while the number of poppy-free provinces had increased from six to thirteen, overall production in Afghanistan had increased by 34 per cent, particularly in Helmand. Karzai reiterated his position against an aerial eradication campaign. When Boucher asked Karzai for his thinking on ground-based spray, Karzai replied, “We have not said no, but we’re not saying yes either. We would have to inform the population and do it in a way that does not create enmity.” The Ambassador noted the difficulties in relying on manual eradication and pointed out that 16 of the 135 eradicators had been killed last year. Boucher assured Karzai that the aerial spray decision was one for another year. “Another few years,” Karzai interjected. Boucher planted the idea of eventually doing aerial spray in Taliban controlled areas and manual eradication in those parts still loyal to the central government. Karzai gave no immediate reaction.

-------------------------------------------
KARZAI ON DOING GOVERNANCE “THE AFGHAN WAY”
--------------------------------------------

¶10. (C) The discussion on increased drug cultivation in Helmand sparked Karzai’s thoughts on establishing and maintaining central government authority in the provinces. According to Karzai, “The question is why do we have Taliban controlling these areas now when two years ago I had control of Helmand? When Sher Mohammad was governor there, we had girls in schools and only 160 foreign troops. The international community pushed me to remove him and now look where we are.” Referring to Sher Mohammad, Karzai retorted, “My question for you is, do you want a bad guy on your side or working for the Taliban? Where Afghans are in charge, drugs are less but where the international community is in charge, drugs are up.” The Ambassador countered that the scenario is more accurately read as the international community has invested its resources and manpower in the tougher provinces where, not coincidentally, the Taliban have stepped up their counterinsurgency and drug cultivation efforts to discredit both the Afghan government and international community. Karzai conceded but added that the Afghan people do not see it that way from the ground.

¶11. (C) Pressing the issue more firmly, Boucher asked Karzai whether it is possible to have the Afghan government in control using good guys, rather than the likes of Sher Mohammad as its agents. “Yes, but that is a gradual process,” said Karzai. Maintaining that
KABUL 00002998 004 OF 006
“the most important thing is bringing the tribes to our side,” he explained that the problem with the international community’s approach to date is that “You are trying to pick and choose tribal chiefs (who will expand the presence of the central government into rural areas), but that is not how the tribal system works. A tribal chiefdom is jealously guarded. It cannot be taken by force and it cannot be imposed from the outside. When we distort tribal structures, the vacuum is filled by the Taliban, and that is exactly what has happened in Helmand and Uruzgan.” He noted that Kandahar is an exception because of his outreach to all the tribal chiefs there. According to Karzai, “the people in Helmand and Uruzgan are uneducated, so you have to fight the Taliban with local ingredients,” unlike in more developed Kandahar. He added, “We cannot bring tribal chiefs on board with governors because we say to them that we want you to support the governor, but we single out particular chiefs and say we don’t want them involved in the process. Whether we like it or not, we have to work with these people.” Karzai and Rassoul both indicated that Karzai is currently focused on an outreach campaign to win backing from tribal leaders in Helmand.

--------------------------------------------- ------
ROLE OF IRAN, LOCAL OPPOSITION MUST BE CONSTRUCTIVE
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶12. (C) Boucher informed Karzai that he would meet with Lower House Speaker Qanooni later that day. Boucher told Karzai that his message to Qanooni would be: “Political opposition is okay, but it has to be constructive.” Karzai’s advice was to remind Qanooni that he would not hold his position without U.S. backing. As the conversation turned to political parties, Karzai commented, “I will not be a political party man, but I will support parties,” presumably referring to his rumored alliance with the newly formed Republican Party.

¶13. (C) During the meeting with Qanooni, Boucher emphasized that Iran and Russia should not be given inroads for influence in a way that would disrupt the system. Boucher clarified that while Iran’s investment in cultural and educational institutions was acceptable, its role in smuggling weapons into Afghanistan was not. Qanooni responded by assuring Boucher and the Ambassador that Afghanistan continues to see the U.S. as its “long-term partner.” Stressing that “We are not asking Afghans to choose sides,” Boucher expressed U.S. understanding for Afghanistan’s need to cultivate cooperative economic, business, cultural, and “normal” political relationships with Iran but reiterated that the line should be drawn at any activities that are disruptive to the establishment of a strong central government in Afghanistan. Qanooni indicated that, aside from Iran and Russia, people allied with the Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin party continue to seek more positions of influence within the Afghan government administration.

¶14. (C) Pointing out that, “The security problems in southern Afghanistan are spreading to the north,” Qanooni added that, “While others think the security situation will remain in control, I and other members of Parliament have some concerns.” He pointed to recent Taliban activity in Kapisa, Nuristan, and Baghlan as evidence of this. “Only Panjshir is protected,” he stated. When Boucher asked how Taliban are able to operate in the north, where Pashtuns are a minority, Qanooni insisted that the Taliban have located and begun to infiltrate the predominantly Pashtun districts which are scattered around the north.

¶15. (C) Qanooni mentioned the formation of a special committee from the Lower House that will be
KABUL 00002998 005 OF 006
investigating why decisions made by Parliament are not implemented by the executive branch. (Note: He was referring primarily to the decision of Parliament to impeach Foreign Minister Spanta and Minister of Refugees Akbar. Karzai mentioned that the Palace has also established a committee of six ministers to settle the issue with Parliament. End note.)

¶16. (C) The topic of Iran also surfaced during Boucher’s meeting with Spanta, who acknowledged, “We agree with the U.S. and U.K. that Iran is engaged in a lot of interference, but our interest in dealing with Iran is to be careful not to open a second front along the Iranian border with Afghanistan.” Spanta noted the Afghan government’s recent decision to reject a Memorandum of Understanding on military cooperation proposed by Iran. Spanta also shared that Karzai had raised the issue of Iran’s involvement in smuggling weapons into Afghanistan with Iranian President Ahmedinejad, who Spanta said, “denied it, of course, but the point was made.” Spanta noted that Iran was primarily invested in supporting political parties, mobilizing Shia mullahs, influencing the Afghan media, and providing material support to the Taliban. He added that Iran is funding the completion of a railway that will go from Iran into Afghanistan and end outside Herat City. Spanta expressed his uncertainty about the complicity of the Iranian Foreign Minister in providing material support to the Taliban, stating that “He promised me he is not involved, but said that he is involved in supporting political parties in Afghanistan.”

¶17. (C) Spanta commented that his biggest problem is that Iran continues to send back Afghan refugees - both those who are registered and those who are not - and added that Iran does not coordinate with the Afghan government on the forced returns.

-----------------------------
REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
-----------------------------

¶18. (C) Spanta explained that Afghanistan continues to work with Pakistan on transit trade and updating their formal treaty from the 1960’s. They would also like to address this in the framework of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Afghan Commerce Minister Farhang will travel to Pakistan shortly in hopes of making some progress. Spanta moved next to a request for U.S. financial assistance for the upcoming conference of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), October 16-20, 2007 in Herat, which is focused on regional economic cooperation between Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. Boucher promised to pass on the request but cautioned Spanta that the prospects were not good given how soon the conference would take place and the lack of U.S. membership in the organization.

¶19. (C) Boucher stressed to Karzai and Spanta the need to follow-up on the success of the Tajik- Afghanistan bridge opening with a trucking and transit agreement that allows Afghan and Tajik vendors and distributors to transport their goods across the border. The Ambassador pitched the idea of a truck leasing consortium project that would allow small- scale distributors, who could not afford to own trucks, to rent them when transporting their products. Both Karzai and Spanta welcomed the idea. Spanta noted that Afghan Commerce Minister Farhang will soon travel to Pakistan to discuss similar issues.

¶20. (C) Spanta also noted that the Chinese are increasingly interested in becoming a regional economic partner as well as knowing more about what the larger international community is doing to invest in Afghanistan.
KABUL 00002998 006 OF 006

¶21. (C) Note: Renewed focus on regional economic cooperation will be part of the agenda for the upcoming Afghanistan Ministerial Meeting on September 23 (co-chaired by President Karzai and Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon) that will precede the UN General Assembly. The October 3 meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board will also focus on regional economic cooperation. This will be an important follow-up to the success of the Tajik- Afghanistan bridge opening and an opportunity to capitalize on the momentum of the jirga, with economic cooperation presenting a clear win-win for all parties involved. End note.

¶22. (SBU) The Office of the Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs has cleared this cable. DELL


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08LONDON929     2008-04-01 09:09     2010-12-02 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN     Embassy London

VZCZCXRO9905
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLO #0929/01 0920958
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 010958Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8089
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0605
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0787
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0653
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0515
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1127
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000929

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 03/28/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, IZ, AF, IS, IR, PK, UK
SUBJECT: DAVID CAMERON TELLS JOHN MCCAIN TORIES WON’T BREAK
WITH HMG WHERE TROOPS ARE CONCERNED

Classified By: Ambassador Robert H. Tuttle for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Conservative party leader David Cameron told Senator John McCain the Tories won’t break ranks with HMG on policies affecting British troops in battle. Cameron and Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague told McCain and Senators Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham that Prime Minister Gordon Brown had no political support to increase British troops in Iraq. McCain said Basrah was “quiet for all the wrong reasons.” (This conversation took place March 20 before the recent surge of violence in Southern Iraq.) McCain thanked Britain for its support. The Senators also discussed Afghanistan, Pakistan and Israel with Conservative leaders. End Summary.

Participants
------------

¶2. (U) Senators John McCain, Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham, accompanied by the Ambassador, Senate staff Richard Fontaine and Dan Serchuk, and Poloff Kirsten Schulz met March 20 in David Cameron’s House of Commons office. Cameron had assembled an eager group from his front bench including Hague, Shadow Chancellor George Osborne, Shadow Defence Minister Liam Fox, as well as Chief of Staff Edward Llewellyn, former party leader Michael Howard, and Dame Pauline Neville-Jones. The room was packed and the atmosphere collegial.

McCain’s Assessment of Iraq
--------------------------

¶3. (C/NF) Senator McCain said the situation in Iraq had improved. He warned that Al Qaeda would put up a fight in Mosul and the Iranians were “not going to go quietly into the night.” Maliki, McCain told the group, was weak but getting better. In Anbar province, he added, there was a demand for elections. McCain praised General Petraeus and the quality of the military leadership and mentioned Petraeus’ upcoming congressional testimony. Cameron asked what the American troop numbers were likely to be. McCain said the U.S. would “stick at 180,000” and noted, “it’s not the number of troops, but the number of casualties” which is of import. Al-Qaeda, said McCain, had taken to using suicide bombers and now to deploying women bombers. He said one woman was asked why she had tried to become a suicide bomber. She replied, “because my husband told me to.”

Cameron Asks McCain for Appraisal of Basrah
-------------------------------------------

¶4. (C/NF) Cameron asked McCain what he thought was happening in the south of Iraq. McCain said he was very worried. He said it was like “Chicago in the 20’s” and “could go at any time.” The Iranians were there and the Iraqis were likely to find “the going to be extremely difficult.” “Just because its quiet,” said McCain, “doesn’t mean it’s good. It is quiet for all the wrong reasons.”

Pledge on Troops
----------------

¶5. (C/NF) Cameron and Hague told the Senators that the Conservatives would never take a policy position that would undermine British policies where troops are involved. Hague noted the Conservatives largely share the Labour foreign policy agenda. Cameron said Prime Minister Brown did not have the political support to increase the British troop presence in Iraq, saying “that moment has passed.” Hague seconded Cameron’s assessment. Cameron asked McCain whether the British plans for a further draw-down should not go forward, given that HMG could not both maintain a presence in Iraq and build up its role in Afghanistan. In response, McCain thanked Cameron and for Britain’s contribution in Iraq and Afghanistan.
¶6. (C/NF) McCain said he understood the Prime Minister intended to withdraw British troops prior to the next election. Hague confirmed Brown politically could not do otherwise. “I understand that,” said McCain, “the British people have my gratitude for all that you have done.”

Israel
------
LONDON 00000929 002 OF 002

¶7. (C/NF) McCain told Cameron that Israel’s Prime Minster Ehud Omert was “still paying the price for Lebanon.” Cameron asked whether Quartet Leader Tony Blair was optimistic. McCain said he admired Blair for his steadfastness, but what McCain had noticed in international relations was the tendency of statesmen to be optimistic once they become negotiators.

Iran
----

¶8. (C/NF) McCain told Cameron he saw an increasing, and increasingly damaging role, for Iran in regional affairs. This included an increase in activity in Iraq and in arming Hezbollah. McCain said he advocated gathering Europe to “cut off all credit” to Iran. Not just Europe, but other like-minded nations such as Japan, should be encouraged to take collective action on such matters, he said. Hague responded that he and the Conservatives had been pushing for this for the last two years. Hague and Cameron alleged that the release of the National Intelligence Assessment had set back this effort.

Afghanistan and Pakistan
------------------------

¶9. (C/NF) Cameron told McCain that he and his party focused on Afghanistan as the key foreign police issue. This was due, not least, to the timeline for when the Conservatives might come into office (2010 or 2009 at the earliest) and the fact that British troops were meant to be out of Iraq by then. Cameron also raised Pakistan, noting that 60,000 individuals travel to Pakistan from the UK each year and that this has implications for the UK’s own significant domestic “terror threat.” Cameron said he was interested in exploring the idea of whether ISAF and Enduring Freedom operations could be combined, as well as whether an increase in military presence was required or an enhanced civilian presence was more important. McCain replied that Afghanistan is complicated by the uncertainty in Pakistan. “We all like Karzai,” he said, “but his is a very weak government.” Cameron said NATO troop capacity was “patchy” and there appeared to be perpetual problems with shortages of air transport support. McCain said he was worried about Pakistan. “If they don’t cooperate and help us, I don’t know what we are going to do,” he said. He added, “Waziristan hasn’t been ruled for 2,000 years.” On a positive note, McCain praised the fighting capacity of Afghans, whom he called “great fighters.” Cameron said each year he met with Karzai, and each year he had the sense Karzai’s sphere of influence was shrinking.

¶10. (U) CODEL McCain did not clear this cable.
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm Tuttle


/tag/IR_0.html


09ASTANA95     2009-01-20 05:05     2010-12-02 21:09     SECRET     Embassy Astana

VZCZCXRO0320
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHTA #0095/01 0200556
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 200556Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4366
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 1049
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0447
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0238
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1153
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0622
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0537
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2460
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2132

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000095

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, NEA/IR

EO 12958 DECL: 01/19/2029
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF, IR, RS, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: CENTCOM CDR PETRAEUS MEETS PRESIDENT
NAZARVAYEV, JANUARY 14

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D)

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: President Nazarbayev told CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus:
-- the situation in Afghanistan greatly worries him; the Taliban should never be allowed to become a coalition partner in the Afghan government;
-- Iran cannot be allowed to become a nuclear state, but the United States needs to talk directly with Tehran, and he is willing to be helpful;
-- Kazakhstan will never again be “colonized,” but has excellent relations with Russia and China
-- the West has underestimated the depth of Russia’s wounded pride, but he is willing to be helpful if the Obama administration has “a wise response” to Russia. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) U.S. Central Command Commander General David Petraeus met with Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev on January 14 for twice the scheduled time, 70 minutes. The U.S. side included Major General Robert Allardice (CENTCOM J5), POLAD Michael Gfoeller, and the Ambassador (note taker). Security Council Secretary Kaibek Suleymenov, Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Khairat Sarybay, and Magzhan Ilyassov of the presidential administration accompanied President Nazarbayev.

AFGHANISTAN

¶3. (S) General Petraeus thanked President Nazarbayev for the recent formal ratification of the long-existing over-flight and divert agreements, as well as for Kazakhstan’s willingness to participate in the Northern Distribution Network for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. He briefed the president on Iraq and Afghanistan. Nazarbayev responded, “Afghanistan greatly worries us. I am often in touch with (Afghanistan President Hamid) Karzai. He says the situation is good and the economy is growing; but I know he controls only 30% of his territory, and if the Afghan economy is growing, it’s based on drugs. We are already providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, but we need better security in Afghanistan if we are to do more. The United States and Kazakhstan have a common interest in strengthening Afghanistan.” Nazarbayev said he knows Karzai wants to involve the Taliban in his government and commented, “That would be greatly dangerous.” General Petraeus explained that Karzai’s position is more nuanced: the goal would be to break up the Taliban and reconcile some, “but we have no illusion that Mullah Omar could ever join the government.” Nazarbayev replied, “If there’s a chance to break up the Taliban, that’s fine; but the Taliban leadership will never change its position.”

¶4. (S) Nazarbayev told General Petraeus, “You’re aware of Afghan history; no foreign country ever succeeded in invasion. Afghans have to govern themselves.” Calling the situation in Afghanistan “very complicated,” Nazarbayev said he knows some the potential candidates to succeed Karzai, but none of them could unify and lead Afghanistan. “Karzai is weak, but it’s better to keep him on.” Nazarbayev added he’s heard Karzai claim the Taliban are trained in Pakistan and said he accepts that as credible. Nazarbayev added Central Asia needs a common policy on Afghanistan, “but that hasn’t happened.” He alluded to Uzbekistan’s support for the ethnic Uzbek leader Dostum.

IRAN

¶5. (S) Nazarbayev judged that Iran is a problem in the region, and General Petraeus fully agreed. Nazarbayev said, “I have good contacts among the leadership in Iran. I’ve tried to explain to them that Kazakhstan was once nuclear but
ASTANA 00000095 002 OF 003
fully gave up that status. I tell them it would be to their benefit to be non-nuclear. That would draw new assistance and investment.” General Petraeus said he again fully agreed with the president, but noted Iran’s policy is determined by the Revolutional Guard al-Quds Force commander, not by President Ahmedinejad or the Foreign Ministry. Nazarbayev noted he had once talked to Ahmedinejad for two and a half hours about such issues, “but in the end I realized I had just wasted my time.” He said Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameni told him that even if Iran compromises on the nuclear issue, the United States would always find another reason to criticize “because they hate us -- all the United States wants is to conquer the entire region and steal the oil.” General Petraeus interjected, “We could have bought all the oil in the region for 100 years for what we’ve spent in Iraq!” Nazarbayev, looking a bit amused, said, “I know. I’m just telling you what he said.” Without specifying his interlocutor, Nazarbayev said he’d asked if Tehran is willing to talk to the United States, “and they said yes. I conveyed this to President-elect Obama during our (post-U.S. election) phone call.” General Petraeus commented the United States had had three rounds of talks with Iran about Iraq but had gotten nowhere. Nazarbayev said, “I have no illusion U.S. negotiations with Iran would be easy or fast, but we cannot let Iran have nuclear weapons. I want to be helpful with Iran.”

¶6. (S) Nazarbayev added he has discussed Iran’s nuclear ambitions with Russian President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin: “I emphasize to them a nuclear Iran is in no one’s interests.” General Petraeus responded that it’s important to get Russia to be helpful with Iran: “They seem conflicted. Sometimes they help; sometimes they send weapons.” Nazarbayev said, “I told Obama that he has a good chance to have good relations with Mevedev. That’s important for us, too, since Russia and Kazakhstan are neighbors.”

RUSSIA

¶7. (S) General Petraeus told President Nazarbayev Kazakhstan’s special relationship with Russia is not a problem for the United States. “It’s not a zero-sum game for us. You can have good relations with Russia and China as well as with us.” Nazarbayev said he fully agreed, adding, “I tell Russia and China we have our own resources. We are Kazakhs. We were colonized for over 500 years, first by the Golden Horde, then by the western Chinese, then by Russia. We’ve been independent for only 17 years, and we do not want to be colonized again. We will never be ‘under’ Russia or China. We have enough resources and a reasonably educated population to make our own choices. We want stability, development, and cooperation. We all have to have Russia ‘inside the tent.’ I’d like the United States and the European Union to help with this.”

¶8. (S) Nazarbayev said the West had made real mistakes after the collapse of the Soviet Union by not treating Yeltsin with respect. He said Yeltsin had once gone to the NATO-Russia Council where he had been “teased.” Nazarbayev explained Russia has great, but now injured, pride. It was once a great empire, and Russian soldiers had played a large role in winning the Great Patriotic War (WW II), but the West seems to refuse to understand this. For Russia, maintained Nazarbayev, “face” is everything. Nazarbayev said he had frequently told President Medvedev that being an energy superpower is not enough; it’s essential to develop international leadership with a spirit of cooperation. Nazarbayev said Medvedev was “almost there,” but then the “Georgia mistake happened.” Nazarbayev concluded, “If the new U.S. administration has a wise response to Russia, I’d be glad to help” with the relationship.

¶9. (S) NOTE: While waiting for Nazarbayev to enter the meeting room, General Petraeus ask Foreign Policy Adviser Sarybay why Kazakhstan had moved its capital from Almaty to
ASTANA 00000095 003 OF 003
Astana. Sarybay answered, “There are probably 20 different reasons people give. In fact, in the first few years of independence, several maps appeared that made our northern border unclear, and so the President ‘planted the flag.’” This is the first time we are aware that a senior official has confirmed Nazarbayev moved his capital to prevent Russian nationalists from annexing the northern third of Kazakhstan, which hotheads, including some in the Duma at that time, claimed was historically part of Russia. END NOTE.

¶10. (S) COMMENT: Nazarbayev looked as fit as ever and was very well-briefed, discussing details of the U.S.-Kazakhstan military relationship without notes. He was not shy that he sees himself as an international statesman. We know he was genuinely pleased with President-elect Obama’s telephone call, and we judge his offers to be helpful for the United States with Iran and Russia are genuine. END COMMENT.

¶11. (U) General Petraeus has cleared this cable. HOAGLAND


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09KABUL495     2009-03-03 12:12     2010-12-02 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Kabul

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PP RUEHWEB

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P 031208Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7606
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T KABUL 000495

NOFORN
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
EO 12958 DECL: 03/04/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, AF, IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN INFLUENCE AT PARLIAMENT

Classified By: CDA Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Iranian government officials routinely encourage Parliament to support anti-Coalition policies and to raise anti-American talking points during debates. Pro-Western MPs say colleagues with close Iranian contacts accept money or political support to promote Iran’s political agenda. Some staff members believe Iranian intelligence officials have infiltrated the Parliament’s legal and information technology support offices, compromising the professional staff’s legal advice and the legislature’s electronic communications. Allegations are difficult to verify and may be inspired more by conspiracy theories and inter-ethnic rivalries than actual facts. However, the number of MPs willing to tell us of first-hand encounters with Iranian agents appears to confirm a dedicated effort by Iran to influence Afghan attitudes toward Coalition forces and other issues. End Summary.

Iranian Embassy Relations with Parliament
-----------

¶2. (S/NF) Iranian Embassy officials exploit contacts with a number of Afghan politicians to influence Parliament’s agenda. Many MPs accuse Hazaras, who like Iran’s leaders are mostly Shia Muslims, of having the closest ties with Iran. Moderate Hazaras insist Iranian outreach influences only conservative Hazaras, many of whom received religious educations or lived in Iran while in exile. MPs single out Sayed Hussein Alemi Balkhi (Kabul), Ahmad Ali Jebraili (Herat), and Ustad Mohammad Akbari (Bamyan) as the Hazara MPs who receive the most support from Iran. The Iranian Embassy has also cultivated deep relations with members of opposition groups (including the United Front), Tajik Sayeds, and MPs from Herat and other western provinces.

¶3. (S/NF) Iranian Embassy officers frequently visit Parliament, but rarely sit in the public gallery and usually avoid high-traffic morning hours, according to Parliament watchers. After Iranian-influence allegations exploded a few years ago, the Iranian Embassy began hosting MPs more often at off-site meetings, where other MPs suspect payments are delivered in exchange for commitments to advocate Iranian policies.

¶4. (S/NF) According to several contacts, Iran’s top policy goals in Parliament are: increasing criticism of civilian casualty incidents caused by Coalition forces, encouraging the Afghan Parliament to “legalize” foreign forces, advocating rights for Shia (including a separate judicial system), promoting “Persian culture,” and limiting Western support to Afghan media. These subjects often dominate parliamentary debates, even when not on the official agenda.

Iranian Official Hands Over Talking Points to Deputy Speaker
-----------

¶5. (S/NF) Lower House Deputy Speaker Mirwais Yaseni (Nangarhar, Pashtun) told PolOff an Iranian intelligence officer visited his office in mid-February, coinciding with the visit of Iran’s vice president to Kabul, to pressure him to allow a debate on the status of Coalition forces that would push other scheduled items from the 2/17 agenda (Speaker Yunus Qanooni was out of town, leaving Yaseni to chair the session). The intelligence officer offered to provide “support” to Yaseni if he cooperated. Yaseni declined, only to face the wrath of MPs Balkhi and Akbari, who raised the issue during debate on another item. When Yaseni suggested the MPs wait for a better time to discuss foreign forces, Balkhi accused the deputy speaker of “betraying his country” and being a Western puppet. Yaseni said Balkhi’s and Akbari’s remarks were identical to the talking points provided to him by the Iranian official earlier that day.

¶6. (S/NF) Other MPs have described similar interactions with Iranians they believe to be embassy-based intelligence officers. Some believe Iranian officers work in conjunction with Karzai’s Palace staff to stir up heated reactions from MPs following civilian casualty incidents. Pro-Western MPs worry that Iran exploits such incidents to decrease public support for Coalition troop presence. The Iranian Embassy plays a lower-key role on social issues, paying MPs to support Persian cultural programs and oppose Western countries’ support to local media. Despite Iran’s ambitious lobbying efforts, there are limits to MPs’ willingness to toe the Iranian line. A Lower House debate last November on water rights quickly struck a nationalistic tone, with several MPs accusing Iran of “stealing Afghanistan’s water.” No MP spoke up to disagree.

Suspicions With Staff, Too
----------

¶7. (S/NF) Parliamentary staffers believe the Iranian Embassy has planted moles in Parliament’s legal and information technology offices. An employee in the Lower House’s legal affairs and research office told PolOff last fall that his new supervisor was editing the staffer’s responses to questions from MPs to reflect Iran-friendly interpretations of Afghan law. Lower House Secretary General Gulam Hassan Gran has repeatedly complained to PolOff that most IT staffers have been trained in Iran and pass electronic communications to the Iranian Embassy. As a result, Gran and other Pashtun staff refuse to use Parliament’s email system. Gran’s deputy keeps a list of MPs who criticize the U.S. and analyzes trends in anti-U.S. rhetoric.

Comment
----------

¶8. (S/NF) If Iranian efforts to influence MPs are as dedicated as some believe, it means the Iranian government has successfully identified and exploited Parliament’s greatest strength: the bully pulpit. The four-year-old Parliament has often struggled to find its role and usually comes out on the losing end in battles with the judicial and executive branches. Still, MPs have been quick learners when it comes to using the media to draw attention to their causes, even if their views are at times incoherent or serve no other purpose than to bad-mouth the government or political rivals. Iran has deftly taken note, forgoing attempts to influence actual legislation and instead exploiting MPs’ proclivity for media coverage. By strong-arming MPs to incorporate Iranian talking points into their public statements, Iran has opened a potential channel to influence public and elite opinion against U.S. goals and policies for Afghanistan. At a minimum, Iranian interference has helped keep Parliament bogged down in unproductive debates and away from more pressing matters. DELL


/tag/IR_0.html


10KABUL436     2010-02-03 13:01     2010-12-02 21:09     SECRET     Embassy Kabul

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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000436

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS PREL, IR, AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN’S OUTLOOK ON IRAN: A KARZAI INSIDER’S
VIEW

KABUL 00000436 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: D/Ambassador Ricciardone; Reasons (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: President Karzai’s Chief of Staff and former Ambassador to Iran, Omar Daudzai, offered the Palace’s outlook on Iran’s role in Afghanistan. Daudzai suggested that Karzai could provide “an open door” for the United States to engage Iran, at such time as the U.S. may judge this useful. Daudzai had found in Iran that paradoxically, the Iranian people hate foreigners, except for Americans; but that the Iranian revolution survives on its animosity towards the United States. He said that the Iranians no longer deny their support for the Taliban. While there is room for “indirect” U.S.-Afghan cooperation on Afghanistan, Daudzai cautioned that at best the Iranians would only “tolerate” our presence in Afghanistan. End Summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
We Can Help Open the Door to Iran
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶2. (S) At a meeting within the GIRoA with COS Daudzai, D/Amb. Ricciardone asked for Afghanistan’s outlook on the anti-coalition Jundullah organization (Septel), and Karzai’s and Daudzai’s assessments of Afghanistan’s interests with Iran. Daudzai confirmed February 2, that only he and President Karzai had any substantial political engagement with the Iranian government. Karzai does pay close attention to Iran, Daudzai said, and he suggested that Karzai could help “open a door” for the United States to engage Iran “perhaps after Ahmadinejad leaves the scene,” or at any time the USG may judge useful. He explained that Karzai had maintained excellent relations with Iran and Khatami personally, and that Karzai had obtained the former Iranian president’s support for Daudzai’s appointment as Afghan Ambassador to Tehran. Relations had become more complicated with Ahmadinejad’s election. Daudzai went on to serve about a year and a half in Tehran, from 2004-2005.

¶3. (S) D/Amb. Ricciardone posited that, while President Obama and Secretary Clinton had made clear the United States’ willingness to discuss our differences with the Iranians, Iran evidently is not ready to engage with us. Even though we believe that many Iranians desire more normal relations with the United States, the Iranian government appears out of touch with its people, in particular an increasingly angry middle class.

¶4. (S) Daudzai related that after the first and only time he was “summoned to the MFA” for a complaint on alleged GIRoA support for Jundullah (Septel), and his categorical denial later proved true, he developed excellent relations with Iranian officials. Nonetheless, living in Tehran had been “challenging”. At first, Iranian intelligence shadowed Daudzai’s every move; after he told the Iranians that he was annoyed that he was being followed, the Iranians became more subtle in their approach. He was astonished that while there were no Sunni mosques in Tehran, an estimated 30 to 40 percent of its population was Sunni (combining Iranian and Afghan Sunnis residing there). He established an informal mosque in the basement of the Afghan Embassy, an act that drew much appreciation from the Sunni population.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Iranian People Dislike Foreigners, Except Americans
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶5. (S) Reflecting on his time in Tehran, Daudzai said he had reached two main conclusions: 1) “Common” Iranians hate foreigners, except for Americans, whom they “miss”. To illustrate, he said that even his wife’s doctor told her, “Please tell the Americans to bring their soldiers to our country next.” 2) paradoxically, the Iranian revolution lives on its animosity towards the United States. If this animosity ends, then the revolution will end. The national leadership knows this and thus do all they can to sustain “the revolution.” While Daudzai did not foresee that the Iranian revolution would end under Ahmadinejad’s tenure, he predicted that Ahmadinejad’s influence over the remainder of his term would wane. Therefore, he said, it was opportune to now start “preparing the ground” for U.S. relations with Iran under a better leader who would replace Ahmadinejad even though the Supreme Leader really “calls the shots.” Daudzai said that Iran’s “real” Foreign Minister is not Motaki, but rather Ali Akbar Velayati, who reports to the Supreme Leader.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Two Sides of Iranian Influence in Afghanistan
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶6. (S) Daudzai said Iran’s influence in Afghanistan, like
KABUL 00000436 002.2 OF 002
Pakistan’s, has been both helpful and hurtful. (Last year, Daudzai had acknowledged that Iran paid limited amounts of money to the Palace only episodically and unpredictably. He contrasted this with sustained U.S. financial support to Afghanistan with far more than the Iranians’ occasional cash payment.) Iran and Pakistan each had supported their own favored Afghan Mujahedin groups against the Soviets, largely along religious affiliations. Likewise, in the current conflict, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were each supporting their “preferred” Taliban groups. This time, however, Iran’s support was driven by “a war of objectives” not religious sympathies: Iran would even support Sunni Taliban to counter Western influence in Afghanistan, so long as the Taliban factions they supported were not affiliated with Mullah Omar.

¶7. (S) Daudzai said that two years ago when he raised with the Iranians their support for Afghan Taliban, they had flatly denied any involvement. However, over the past half year, the Iranians, including their Ambassador in Kabul, no longer deny this assertion -- now they remain silent, he said. Daudzai attributed the Iranian change in posture to their awareness that the GIRoA has evidence of Iranian support for some Taliban elements.

¶8. (S) Daudzai said that on occasion, young Afghan males are allowed to cross into Iran, where they are recruited and trained before returning to Afghanistan to fight against the GIRoA and Coalition Forces. The Iranians also recruit Afghan university students and graduates. Daudzai said that approximately 7,000 Afghans hold Iranian university degrees, including three of President Karzai’s cabinet picks, who “fortunately” Parliament did not confirm. He claimed that Iran is also offering three-year visas to Afghans who deposit USD 100,000 in an Iranian bank account.

¶9. (S) According to Daudzai, Iran grooms thousands of Afghan religious scholars. After completing their education in Iran, they return to Afghanistan to work in Madrassas, where they continue to receive “support packages” from Iran. The support package included a monthly salary. Daudzai claimed that a man named Ibrahim directed this program from the Supreme Leader’s office. He also asserted that in addition to financing Afghan religious leaders, Iran had provided salary support for some GIRoA deputy ministers and other officials, including “one or two even in the Palace.” Daudzai claimed that some of these officials had been relieved of their duties because “you can’t be an honest Afghan if you receive a (Iran) package.”

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.S.-Iranian Convergence of Interests is Complicated
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶10. (S) Daudzai opined that there could be room for indirect, but not direct, cooperation between Iran and the U.S. regarding Afghanistan. Iran at best would “tolerate” the U.S. participation in an area of common interest here, he said. He would reflect further on the subject and would look forward to continuing the conversation. Eikenberry


/tag/IR_0.html


09PARIS1228     2009-09-09 10:10     2010-12-02 15:03     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7118
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0387
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7262

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001228

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2019
TAGS: PREL IR FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE-IRAN: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE ROOT OF
BAIL SET FOR KAKAVAND, PER PRESIDENCY ADVISOR

REF: A. A. PARIS 01205
¶B. B. BAGHDAD 02397

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone
for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

¶1. (C) We met with Elysee strategic affairs advisor Richier
September 4 to follow up on reports that a French judge had
released Iranian national Majid Kakavand on bail and subject
to determination of a pending U.S. extradition request. In
previous conversations about the fate of French citizen
Clothilde Reiss and her release to French embassy custody in
Tehran, Richier had assured us that France had no intention
to negotiate with Iranian authorities on a prisoner exchange
and that President Sarkozy himself had been apprised of and
rejected an Iranian effort to seek the release of Kakavand.
(ref. a)

¶2. (C) Responding to Pol M/C,s questions, Richier told us
that the Elysee had been taken completely by surprise by the
judge's decision. The prosecutor in the case had
consistently argued for holding Kakavand, but the judge had
determined that Kakavand "presented little chance for flight"
and had agreed to release him on 200,000 euro bond.
According to Richier, the Elysee reacted quickly and strongly
to news of the decision on August 28 and that there were very
sharp exchanges between the Office of the President (Elysee)
and the Justice Minister, but that the government cannot
reverse the judge,s decision. However, Richier assured us
that French authorities are keeping a close eye on
Kakavand,s whereabouts to prevent or interrupt possible
flight. They have established what Richier called "tight"
surveillance on Kakavand. Proving the point, Richier
telephoned to a colleague in one of the services who
confirmed that Kakavand was currently in buildings owned by
Iran and managed by the Iranian Embassy, located in Paris.
Richier added his own private observation that the way in
which the judgment was rendered in this case implies that the
request for extradition will be approved, although we must
wait until October for that decision.

¶3. (C) Comment: The French have been concerned, from the
beginning of their hostage case, about possible Iranian
pressure to exchange Iranian prisoners for French or U.S.
nationals held in Iran. Embassy Baghdad reporting (ref. b)
suggests that is exactly what Iran plans to do. Obviously
the French judge,s decision to grant Kakavand a temporary
release complicates the situation. However, Sarkozy,s
public tone and Richier,s strong comments, suggest that
France will make every effort to keep Kakavand under close
surveillance, pending a decision on the extradition request.
RIVKIN


/tag/IR_0.html


09ANKARA226     2009-02-11 13:01     2010-12-01 23:11     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Ankara

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DE RUEHAK #0226/01 0421303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111303Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8757
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1961
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 1397
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1592
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4298
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0391
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3282
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0229
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 5366
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC

Wednesday, 11 February 2009, 13:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000226
SIPDIS
Note - PII information removed from original message.
SENSITIVE
LONDON FOR GAYLE
BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
ASHGABAT FOR INGBORN
BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY
BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE
DUBAI FOR IRPO
EO 12958 DECL: 06/02/2019
TAGS CASC, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PREL, SCUL, SNAR, SOCI, IR,
TU, IQ
SUBJECT: ELDERLY AMERICAN SMUGGLED OUT OF IRAN
Classified By: DCM;DOUG SILLIMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B,D)
¶1. (C) Summary: American citizen Hossein Ghanbarzadeh Vahedi appeared in the Ankara Consular section around noon on January 9, 2009. Mr. Vahedi, age 75, told Conoff he had paid smugglers $7500 to take him across the Iranian/Turkish border after having been held against his will in Iran for seven months. Although suffering some aches and pains, he appeared to be in good health after a harrowing three-day journey from Tehran to Ankara that included a 14-hour mountain climb on horseback in freezing temperatures. Embassy staff provided immediate consular assistance and worked with Turkish authorities to prevent his deportation back to Iran. Consular officers escorted Vahedi to the Ankara airport where he departed on January 13. End summary.
----------
Background
----------
¶2. (SBU) On January, 7, Embassy Bern alerted posts in the region that American citizen Hossein Ghanbarzadeh Vahedi, DPOB xx/xx/1933 was trying to escape from Iran and could possibly surface in Iraq. Vahedi, a dentist from Los Angeles, instead appeared at the Ankara Consular Section around noon on January 9, 2009. Although visibly shaken,Vahedi said he had no major physical problems, but he did break down a few times when explaining his ordeal. He told Conoff that he had enough medication and declined local medical attention preferring to wait until he was back in the United States.
¶3. (SBU) Vahedi has been a resident, then citizen of the United States since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Aside from this trip, he has only returned to Iran once about ten years ago and did not encounter any problems on that visit. At his wife’s urging to visit his parents’ gravesite in Iran, he traveled to Tehran in early May 2008 where he spent four weeks with family and friends without incident. However, after clearing customs at Tehran airport on June 6, he heard his name called on the public address system with instructions to report to a separate office. At this office, GOI authorities confiscated his passport and told him he would not be leaving Iran. When Vahedi pressed as to the reason, he was dismissed with instructions to follow-up at the Islamic Revolution Court.
------------------------
Seven-Month House Arrest
------------------------
¶4. (SBU) Thus began a seven-month ordeal in which Vahedi appeared almost daily at the court to request that his passport be returned. During this de facto house arrest, Vahedi did contact Elizabeth Bucher, the Deputy Head of the Foreign Interest Section at the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran. He reported that Ms. Bucher was very kind and helped him get his heart medications, but was unable to help him depart the country. He lived with friends and relatives staying only a few days with each to avoid them being implicated in his problems.
¶5. (SBU) Vahedi believed his passport was confiscated for two reasons, the first being simple extortion. It was made clear to him informally by the authorities at the court that if he paid a $150,000 fine the process would move more quickly. Secondly, he was told by GOI officials that he should use his influence to pressure his American citizen sons to terminate one of their business ventures. Vahedi’s sons are the owners of Concertino Productions, a Los Angeles-based entertainment company that promotes, among other things, the popular Persian pop singers Kamran and Hooman. In addition to American performances, the duet has performed in Dubai and other middle-eastern venues. According to Vahedi, while the singers are simply Persian pop singers, they have gotten crowds riled up with occasional anti-regime rhetoric. Also included in these performances are female dancers whose costumes would not raise an eyebrow in most countries, but are perceived as immoral by the conservative elements inside Iran.
¶6. (SBU) Vahedi did not trust that paying the fine would expedite the return of his passport unless he also convinced his sons to cancel the next Dubai performance of Kamran and Hooman. Vahedi spoke of a third party who was pulling the strings within the Iranian government, particularly in regard to his son’ business. He repeatedly told the officials of the Islamic Revolution Court that his children had lived in America all of their lives and as such he exerted no control over their strong, typically American independent behavior.
---------------
No Empty Spoons
---------------
¶7. (C) Vahedi spoke bitterly about his former country, especially its lack of a fair judicial system and widespread corruption. He told Conoff that all government employees receive free sugar, rice, and cooking oil to ensure their loyalty to the regime. He also said anyone with any authority lives by the “why should I put an empty spoon into my mouth” philosophy. Vahedi reported that regime spies were omnipresent including taxi drivers, hotel clerks, and restaurant workers. He also said it was common knowledge that all new Iranian-made cars had a “Khamenei tax” in the amount of $3100 that was earmarked for a fund for South Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria. At his daily appearances at the court, he came to know the intimate details of the lives of many of the other visitors, some of whom told Vahedi they had no idea where their loved ones were, or if they were even alive. Vahedi also helped one woman whose drug-addicted husband was incarcerated by paying her rent for the months he was there. Vahedi reported seeing Iranian citizens watch helplessly as their family members were hauled off in shackles without any official charges levied against them.
-----------------------
Picking the Best Option
-----------------------
¶8. (C) Vahedi realized that this situation was not going to change and alluded to people who knew of his situation from his daily appearances at the court approaching him with departure options. Vahedi said he studied the four most common illegally used routes out of Iran. The first was crossing as a stowaway on a merchant ship across the Persian Gulf into the UAE. Vahedi dismissed this plan because he thought the heavy shipping traffic was too dangerous and they risked being boarded by the Iranian Navy who were patrolling the area. The second option was overland through Baluchistan but Vahedi could not obtain enough facts about the execution of that plan to seriously consider that route. The third choice was to enter Iraq heading to Karbala and try to make contact with a member of the American military stationed there. Vahedi seriously considered this option, but feared being discovered by the Iraqis before he could make contact with an American soldier. That left only the last option: over the mountains on horseback from Urmia to the Turkish border.
¶9. (SBU) In spite of temperatures hovering around zero degrees Fahrenheit, Vahedi chose the early part of January because it coincided with the Shia commemoration of Ashura and he thought it likely the police would be more preoccupied. In the weeks prior to his departure, this 75-year old man trained for strength and altitude by climbing in the hills north of Tehran. To protect his family and friends from retribution by the GOI after his absence was noted, he spoke to none of them of his escape plans. On January 7 Vahedi boarded a bus from Tehran to Urmia, a city in the northern range of the Zagros Mountains in West Azerbaijan, Iran. He used his California driver’s license as identification at each of the approximately 20 stops the bus made. At Urmia, he and a pre-arranged car and driver drove into the foothills of the mountains where he met two men with a single horse who would escort him through the mountain to the Turkish border.
-----------------
Over the Mountain
-----------------
¶10. (C) The two escorts were paid $5000 at the beginning of the journey and the three set out as soon as it was dark. For all his planning, Vahedi did not have clothing appropriate for the weather and had a very difficult time with the cold. At one point during the 14-hour ride, the escorts had to physically hug him to keep him warm. As an inexperienced rider hours into the climb Vahedi lost his concentration and fell off the horse tumbling into the woods. He told Conoff that at this point, he really believed he was going to die by freezing to death on a mountainside. However, his only partially-paid escorts came to his aid and put him back on the horse. Although he had thought he would be able to walk part way, the altitude proved too much for him and his only choice was to remain on the horse. Vahedi said that he believes they were following known dug smuggling routes, evidenced by the way the horse knew exactly which way to turn. Vahedi said the horse often led the escorts, even going off the normal path in what seemed to be the wrong direction. Knowing that he escorts could also be trying to smuggle drugs on this trip, he covertly went through the one pack they had thrown on the horse and said he found nothing.
¶11. (SBU) Once over the Turkish border they were met on schedule by a man Vahedi described as about 25 years old. During the handover, Vahedi paid out another $2500 but was unsure how the three escorts split that payment. The Turkish escort then brought Vahedi into a home where he was fed and given time to rest and warm up. In the early evening he was driven to Van, a major city in eastern Turkey, and waited there at the bus station for the 0200 bus to Ankara. Vahedi said he maintained a very low profile and did not talk to anyone during the 10-hour bus trip. He arrived at the Consular section around noon on Friday, January 9.
--------------------
Deportation Conflict
--------------------
¶12. (C) As Vahedi had entered Turkey illegally, Conoff worked with GOT officials to ensure his deportation back to America. Initially the Chief of the Foreigner’s police within the Ministry of Interior in Ankara told Conoff that because “we knew Vahedi was coming” he intended to deport him back to Iran. Post is aware that Iranian and Iraqi citizens have been deported back to those countries in a fairly brutal manner. According to UNHCR some have been taken by bus in the middle of the night to the southern Turkish border and released. Police have then allegedly shot into the air forcing the deportees to run across the border into Iraq or Iran with no food or water to sustain them.
(13) (C) Post contacted Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, who subsequently exerted pressure on the Ministry of Interior to allow this 75-year old American citizen to be deported back to the United States. Consular staff assured his security during the four days it took to work through the departure arrangements and accompanied him through the police and court proceedings and finally onward to the airport. Vahedi told Conoff he had never done anything illegal in his life and that he was ashamed to be seen in policy custody. Vahedi departed Turkey at 4:00 p.m. on January 13.
-------
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) The problems Vahedi faced as a result of entering Turkey illegally highlights the tough stand this government takes on illegal entry. This is particularly true with Iranian and Iraqi nationals, even those who may also carry American citizenship. Ensuring Vahedi’s return to the United States, vice deportation to Iran required the intervention of the embassy’s front office.
Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Jeffrey


/tag/IR_0.html


09BAGHDAD1103     2009-04-24 16:04     2010-12-01 23:11     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Baghdad

VZCZCXRO8610
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1103/01 1141618
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241618Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2829
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

Friday, 24 April 2009, 16:18
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001103
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR
NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/23/2029
TAGS PREL, PTER, PINR, MOPS, ECON, ETRD, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN IN IRAQ: STRATEGY FOR PRESSURING IRGC-QF
REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 150 B. 07 BAGHDAD 488 C. BAGHDAD 289
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Quds Force (IRGC-QF) officers are active in Iraq, conducting traditional espionage and supporting violent extremists as well as supporting both legitimate and malign Iranian economic and cultural outreach. Iraqis and their government have demonstrated increasing willingness to push back against malign Iranian influence in the last year. Working with the Iraqis, we have succeeded in stopping some IRGC-QF activity through military operations and diplomatic engagement, while we prevented some IRGC-QF officers from entering Iraq through explicit warnings that we would target them unilaterally. However, under the Security Agreement effective January 1, all operations in Iraq must be conducted in conjunction with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and our previous unilateral warnings carry less weight. As Coalition Forces continue the period of responsible drawdown, we will rely increasingly on the GOI to keep the pressure on the IRGC-QF. We intend to support the GOI in these efforts through continued diplomatic engagement, intelligence sharing, and our security partnership of Coalition Forces working by, with, and through the ISF. End summary.
-----------
Background:
-----------
¶2. (S/NF) IRGC-QF leadership took advantage of the vacuum which surrounded the fall of Saddam Hussein and the entry of Coalition Forces into Iraq in 2003, using the opportunity to send operatives to Iraq when little attention was focused on Iran. In January 2007, Coalition Forces raided an unofficial Iranian consulate in Erbil, detaining five Iranians who claimed to be diplomats but in reality held no diplomatic status. They were suspected of operations aimed at killing Coalition and Iraqi security forces (refs A and B). The original targets of the raid, IRGC-QF officers Abbas Hoseyni (of the Erbil office) and Hormat Faruqi (of the Sulaimaniyah office), escaped and fled to Iran. The Iranian government immediately pulled back most IRGC-QF officers from Iraq and shuttered its “consulates” in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah until mid-2007; consulates in Basrah and Karbala remained open. Since 2007, Iran has submitted diplomatic visa applications for Hoseini and Faruqi to return to Iraq. In 2008 the Embassy and MNF-I convinced the GOI not to approve these applications, making it clear if they returned to Iraq, they would be targeted by Coalition Forces.
¶3. (S/NF) Since 2008, the MFA has passed names of Iranians applying for diplomatic visas to the US Embassy for vetting. Background checks have revealed that about 20 percent have possible ties to the IRGC or Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) (ref C). The MFA has informed us that it denies visas to all new suspected intelligence officers, but we have not been able to verify such claims. In January 2009, the MFA passed a list of 35 names to the USG of Iranian diplomats already in country before the vetting process began. Of those, eight had ties to IRGC or MOIS.
--------
Strategy
--------
¶4. (S/NF) As U.S. forces continue a period of responsible draw down, we will seek to ensure that the GOI understands that IRGC-QF activity harms Iraq -- which should be self-evident if the IRGC-QF continues to conduct malign activity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure. Qactivity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure. Engagements with political and security leadership at the national and provincial level, intelligence sharing, and security cooperation will be key to explaining the dangers of IRGC-QF activity and providing Iraqis the information they need to defend their own interests. The following are diplomatic, political, military, intelligence, and public information options which either the GOI can pursue unilaterally, or in concert with the USG, to target IRGC-QF activity in Iraq.
---------
Diplomacy
---------
BAGHDAD 00001103 002 OF 003
¶5. (S/NF) We intend to continue working closely with the MFA to deny visas to Iranian intelligence officers. We may also consider suggesting that the MFA use another diplomatic tool, albeit one with more consequences -- the “persona non grata” designation. The MFA may be reluctant to take this step because Iraqi diplomats in Iran would face retaliation and the dispute would inevitably become public. Since the fall of Saddam, the GOI has avoided most public disagreements with Iran.
--------------------
Security Partnership
--------------------
¶6. (S/NF) The role of the ISF in countering IRGC-QF in Iraq is critical, yet complex. We can encourage the Iraqi Army to take the lead on kinetic action against IRGC-QF agents, with Iraqi police monitoring and reacting to suspicious activity at the local level. We intend to continue to strengthen our partnership with the ISF to counter pro-Iranian elements who have infiltrated the security forces such as Kata’ib Hizbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. While the US combat mission will end by August 31, 2009, we will continue to assist the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with training, equipment, mentoring and other bilateral military-to-military programs and engagements. Military sales, such as the recent Iraqi interest in purchasing F-16s and plans to transition from AK-47 to M-4 rifles, will increase US influence through training and support in Iraq for years to come, although the MOD will continue to consider weapons purchases from other sources as well.
---------------
Border Controls
---------------
¶7. (S) The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) can help limit IRGC-QF activity by combating smuggling and scrutinizing people and cargo crossing legitimate routes from Iran into Iraq. XXXXXXXXXXXX corruption at the ports of entry (POEs), unwillingness of inspectors to do their jobs, and poor leadership and professionalism at the supervisory level keep the DBE from being fully effective. The USG can assist, however. Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), which checks travelers’ biographic data, is already in use at many land and air POEs around Iraq. Additional training at sea ports, airports, and land borders could help Iraqi officials detect smugglers of cash, weapons, weapons components and other contraband. An Iranian IRGC-QF officer was briefly detained at Baghdad International Airport in November 2008 when his name was flagged in PISCES. In January 2009, KRG’s Minister of the Interior Karim Sinjari praised PISCES and asked for the system at two more land border entry points the KRG shares with Iran, Khalil Ibrahim and Hadjer Meran.
¶8. (S) As of April 2009, there were 200 PISCES units in operation at 15 different POEs in Iraq. Current guidance states that every traveler entering or exiting Iraq is processed through PISCES. On occasion however, travelers will pay a small “fee” to enter or exit without going through PISCES. If a potential match is found to someone on the “stop list,” the screen freezes, and only INIS can unlock the screen and conduct a secondary inspection. INIS notifies the GOI or USG when the identity of a wanted person is confirmed. PISCES is operated by Immigration officers assigned to the Department of Travel and Nationality, and the GOI will continue to use PISCES after the military drawdown. Collection and storage of biometric data is another tool the QCollection and storage of biometric data is another tool the GOI is already using at POEs, although Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) system is run by U.S. forces and will not stay in Iraq after their departure.
¶9. (S/NF) A timely example of cooperation with DBE in countering Iranian lethal aid smuggling occurred April 14. A DBE brigade in Maysan Province, partnered with Multi-National Division-South (MND-S) forces, captured an unmanned boat carrying explosive devices floating in the Huwayza Marsh. The patrol found three explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) and other military equipment. MND-S said it was the first time the DBE had reported success against this type of smuggling.
--------------------
Intelligence Sharing
--------------------
BAGHDAD 00001103 003 OF 003
¶10. (S/NF) Coordinating with GOI intelligence agencies to stop IRGC-QF activity is complicated by the fact that the Iraqi intelligence establishment is extremely fragmented. Intelligence offices affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), DBE, and the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs (MSNSA) do not trust each other and often work in opposition. The USG could further assist Iraqi intelligence by negotiating and approving a bilateral US-Iraqi intelligence sharing agreements and further providing the GOI with intelligence that demonstrates the involvement of IRGC-QF officers in lethal assistance to extremists. US Forces in Iraq have established positive relationships with their ISF counterparts and are developing appropriate intelligence-sharing mechanisms. The USG can also assist the GOI to further develop its intelligence infrastructure to monitor malign Iranian influence and counter the IRGC-QF. INIS currently interacts closely with the Office of Regional Affairs (ORA). The establishment of a Defense Attach’s Office at the Embassy will also help facilitate intelligence sharing and is under consideration by Chief of Mission.
-------------------
Public Information
-------------------
¶11. (S/NF) Highlighting nefarious Iranian activity to GOI leadership and the Iraqi public has had a significant impact on increasing GOI willingness to confront Iran, as well as public rejection of Iranian attempts to dominate Iraq’s political and economic sectors. Provincial elections demonstrated that perceived fealty to Iran is a political liability for Iraqi politicians, and they are increasingly sensitive to it. Continued USG assistance in uncovering and publicizing Iranian attempts to influence events in Iraq will make the country a much more inhospitable environment for IRGC-QF operatives.
-------
Comment
-------
¶12. (S/NF) The Iranian government may sense that the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq presents an opportunity to expand IRGC-QF activity, although the broader regional dynamic will undoubtedly also influence Iranian decision making. Without the ability to conduct unilateral military action against IRGC-QF operatives in Iraq, we will leverage our evolving diplomatic, intelligence, security, and military partnerships with Iraq to maintain pressure. Many USG agencies will be involved in assisting the Iraqis in this critical area, and must actively engage in order to counter IRGC-QF officers and their lethal aid. BUTENIS


/tag/IR_0.html


09MOSCOW2734     2009-11-05 17:05     2010-12-01 23:11     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0259
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #2734/01 3091741
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051741Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5314
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002734

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ETRD, SENV, IR, AF, UK, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: MOVING BEYOND BILATERAL ISSUES, MILIBAND
REOPENED DIALOGUE

Classified By: Political MC Susan M. Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ).

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) During Foreign Secretary Miliband’s November 1-2 visit, he put an end to the “period of standoff,” but had little concrete to show for his visit. In pushing a new framework for cooperation, he set aside the most contentious issues and focused primarily on the international agenda during his meetings with Russian FM Lavrov -- START Follow-on, Iran, Afghanistan, Middle East peace, and non-proliferation -- resulting in three joint statements. Miliband also met with Gorbachev and Russian business leaders and political notables. Moscow had some lingering hesitancy, with Medvedev and Putin declining meetings, due in part to concerns based on previous interaction between Lavrov and Miliband, and a desire to avoid giving Miliband a success that he could use in a potential run to head EU foreign policy. End Summary.

Ending the “Period of Standoff”
-------------------------------

¶2. (C) On November 1-2, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband ended the five-year hiatus in bilateral visits. In his discussions with Russian FM Sergey Lavrov, Miliband was able to set a new pattern for addressing contentious bilateral issues in the future, while forging ahead on the international agenda. While the Russian press has hailed this as a “reset,” it comes after the slow build up of bilateral contacts at all levels, and is therefore less of a breakthrough than a symbolic final hurdle.

¶3. (C) While the visit succeeded in reestablishing constructive dialogue, President Medvedev and PM Putin had rebuffed British Embassy feelers for meetings with the Foreign Secretary. According to British diplomats, the Russians were unsure that the visit wasn’t going to be another round of “slapping them around the face.” The diplomats also credited Medvedev as the driving force in ending the “period of standoff.”

¶4. (C) During his two-day stay, Miliband dined with Lavrov on Sunday, followed on Monday by working meetings with Lavrov and First Deputy PM Igor Shuvalov. Miliband also met with Mikhail Gorbachev, lunched with select eminent politicians and held separate round-tables with Russian NGOs and the British business community (including TNK-BP). Miliband and Lavrov issued three joint statements regarding the 2010 Review Conference for nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Afghanistan, and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).

International Agenda
--------------------

¶5. (C) START Follow-On: Lavrov was reportedly upbeat regarding START follow-on negotiations. According to British diplomats, Lavrov said the key issues involved conventional weapons on ICBMs, verification, and the “numbers gap,” which was being narrowed. Following this treaty, Lavrov suggested multilateral negotiations on further reductions involving the P5, the D3 (Israel, India, Pakistan) as well as “dormant” nuclear powers such as Japan. He also called for close Russian-British cooperation across the arms-control agenda: the NPT, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. CFE was not discussed. The sides issued a joint statement on the NPT, calling for efforts to ensure the 2010 review conference reinvigorated and strengthened it, and noting that an “agreement before the end of the year on a new legally binding treaty to further reduce Russian and U.S. strategic offensive weapons will be a major contribution to this shared endeavor.” The statement also said that both sides were committed to “ensuring the IAEA has the necessary authority and capacity to assure compliance with non-proliferation obligations.”

¶6. (C) Iran: Lavrov claimed Russia had no prior knowledge of the Qom facility and said the S300 deal was in a “holding pattern.” Regarding the IAEA negotiations, Lavrov agreed with Miliband’s call for continued unity among the 5 plus 1 group and was ready to discuss the substance of a “freeze for freeze” deal. According to British diplomats, Lavrov was slippery about sanctions, saying “we’re ready to consider applying sanctions if necessary, but it’s too early.” Lavrov reportedly added that if sanctions are agreed at the UNSC, there shouldn’t be additional unilateral sanctions and sanctions should be limited to “officials” and the nuclear program.
MOSCOW 00002734 002 OF 003

¶7. (C) Afghanistan: Lavrov conveyed that Russia wanted NATO to stay and to succeed. He made the usual pitch for formal CSTO consultations with NATO and for Russia to have a seat at the table of “troop contributing” countries. In the joint statement, the sides condemned the Taliban’s attempts to disrupt the Afghan electoral process and destabilize the country. The statement “noted” the Afghan government’s attempts to reintegrate former fighters, but said that the two governments remained committed to UNSCR 1267. The UK and Russia also made a non-specific commitment to explore opportunities for cooperation in counter-narcotics, which British diplomats said will be pursued at the working level.

¶8. (C) MEPP: The joint statement urged “Israel to immediately end all settlement activities, including in East Jerusalem, and to allow access to the Gaza Strip.” The statement also endorsed the work of the U.S. and the Quartet and restated support for the Russian Moscow conference proposal. British diplomats, however, said that it was clear GOR officials knew the conference would not happen soon.

¶9. (C) NATO/European Security: Miliband reaffirmed that Georgia and Ukraine remained on the NATO membership track and rejected Russia’s concept of a “sphere of privileged interests.” Lavrov was on the defensive and sought to redefine privileged interests to mean closer bilateral relations, which Russia sought to develop with a range of countries, not just those in the CIS. Miliband rebuffed Lavrov’s calls for a new European security treaty, saying he understood Russia feels uncomfortable but that it was too early for a new treaty; he urged Russia to work this through the OSCE’s “Corfu process.”

¶10. (C) WTO/Climate Change: Deputy PM Igor Shuvalov told Miliband that he had offered the U.S. a return to the bilateral negotiating track to facilitate Russis’s WTO accession. Shuvalov proposed this during his September visit to Washington, but claimed that the U.S. refused. Miliband lobbied Shuvalov to increase Russia’s carbon-reduction commitments from its current offer of 15 percent by 2020. Shuvalov said the Russian position was not cast in stone, but the GOR did not want to be tied to targets that would then restrict the expected surge in Russia’s economic growth in the coming decade.

Bilateral Issues
----------------

¶11. (C) In addition to the joint statements, some progress was made on bilateral economic ties. Foremost was the November 5 visit of Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin to London as part of the bilateral financial working group, during which Kudrin is expected to pitch the sale of Eurobonds to fill part of Russia’s projected 2010 budget deficit. The sides had to “agree to disagree” on the more thorny bilateral issues that have poisoned the relationship for the past five years: the British extradition request for Andrey Lugovoi related to the murder of former FSB officer Aleksadr Litvenenko (Nov. 1 was the third anniversary of the murder), and Russian extradition requests for Russian tycoon Boris Berezovskiy and Chechen leader Akhmed Zakayev. Lingering in the background were the tit-for-tat expulsions of British and Russian diplomats over the “rock incident,” the closure of the British Council’s offices in St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg, the handling of the TNK-BP management dispute, and the prior harassment of British diplomats by Nashi youth activists at the presumed behest of Russian officials. That said, British diplomats noted that Lavrov and Miliband agreed to step up cultural relations (especially in 2011) to make up for the decrease in British Council programs. British diplomats believed that there was an understanding that the British Council would take the lead in these activities, but the technicalities were not discussed.

Comment
-------

¶12. (C) While Russia and the UK found some common ground during Miliband’s visit, there was a lingering hesitancy on the Russian side, demonstrated by the lack of solid deliverables and the unavailability of the tandem, Putin and Medvedev. The GOR could have gone further in offering the UK transit (either land or air) to support British operations in Afghanistan, but hedged. Although Miliband’s visit followed many working-level and even senior-level meetings on the sidelines of international conferences, it was clear that the GOR lowered expectations in the event the tone of the visit returned to that following the 2008 Georgian-Russian war. The Russian press added into the mix the possibility that
MOSCOW 00002734 003 OF 003
Miliband was in Moscow to demonstrate that he could talk to “even the most difficult of partners,” thereby burnishing his credentials for a future post with the EU. If that was the case, the GOR has done little to assist him. Beyrle


/tag/IR_0.html


09STATE28302     2009-03-24 21:09     2010-12-01 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Secretary of State

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8302 0870151
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 242145Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 7721-7722
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0298-0299

S E C R E T STATE 028302

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CAPTION ADDED

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL MASS ETTC TU VE IR
SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF UAVS FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA

REF: A. ANKARA 3
¶B. ANKARA 126

Classified By: EUR/PRA Dir. Anita Friedt,
Reason 1.4 (b), (c) and (d)

----------
BACKGROUND
-----------

¶1. (S//NF) Venezuelan officials expected to receive a
shipment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and related
material from Iran, via Turkey, by May 2009. As of early
March, Venezuelan officials believed that the equipment would
be repackaged and labeled as electronic equipment, then
transported overland from Iran to Turkey. Once in Turkey,
the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime vessel for
continued shipment to Venezuela. The U.S. believes this
shipment constitutes arms and related materiel, which Iran is
prohibited from transferring pursuant to UN Security Council
Resolution 1747, paragraph 5.

¶2. (S) This case appears to be similar to one from January
2009 where Iran attempted to ship drums of nitrate and
sulphite chemicals and dismantled laboratory instruments,
which could possibly be used for making bombs to Venezuela
via Turkey. In response to U.S. concerns that the shipment
may have been a violation of UNSCR 1747, Turkish officials
inspected the cargo and made a decision to return it to Iran.
(REFS A and B)

--------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------

¶3. (S) Drawing from the points in paragraph 5, which may be
left as a nonpaper, post is instructed to approach
appropriate-level Turkish officials and request that they
investigate this activity, and if the cargo is found to be in
violation of UNSCR 1747 that the GOT use all available means
to prevent the transshipment of this cargo and detain it.

----------
OBJECTIVES
----------

¶4. (S) Post should seek to achieve the following:
-- Provide Turkish officials with information regarding
Iran,s attempt to ship unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
related material to Venezuela via Turkey;

-- Emphasize to the Turkish officials that UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran
from transferring any arms or related materiel;

-- Emphasize that these goods are produced by an Iranian
entity listed in the Annex to UNSCR 1747.

-- Urge the Government of Turkey (GOT) to take action against
this shipment pursuant to UNSCR 1747 and possibly 1737, and
in accordance with the GOT's laws and authorities;

-- Thank the GOT for its willingness to interdict and take
positive action with regards to a similar shipment in
January. As a NATO Ally, we try to provide Turkey with as
much info as possible on these issues, which could help lead
them to take action in detaining shipments; and
-- Emphasized that, should we receive additional information
regarding this shipment, we will provide it as expeditiously
as possible.

------------------------
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
------------------------

¶5. (S//REL Turkey) Begin talking points/non-paper:

--We would like to share some information with you in an
effort to highlight a transfer of proliferation concern and
to ensure that Iran does not make use of your territory to
transfer items proscribed by UN Security Council resolutions
1737, 1747, and 1803.

-- The U.S. has information indicating that Venezuelan
officials expected to receive a shipment of UAV and
UAV-related equipment from Iran by May 2009.

-- As of early March, Venezuelan officials believed that the
equipment would be repackaged and labeled as electronic
equipment, then transported overland from Iran to Turkey.
Once in Turkey, the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime
vessel for continued shipment to Venezuela.

--Venezuelan officials assessed that a shipment of
electronics coming from Turkey to Venezuela would be less
alerting than a shipment directly from Iran.

--We believe these items are military UAVs and related items,
constituting arms and related materials and are thus captured
by UNSCR 1747 and subject to the asset freeze called for in
UNSCR 1737.

-- UN Security Council Resolution 1747, paragraph 5,
prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring any
arms or related materiel. It also requires all states to
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and
whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of
Iran.

--This system is produced by the Qods Aviation Industries.

-- Qods Aeronautics Industries (aka Qods Aviations
Industries) is designated in the Annex to UNSCR 1747 and as
such these items would be subject to the asset freeze
provision of UNSCR 1737 regardless of whether the item is
MTCR- controlled or otherwise prohibited in paragraphs 3 or 4
of the resolution.

-- As such, we request your assistance in preventing the
transfer of goods in violation of UNSCR 1747 and 1737.

-- Additionally, it is possible that some UAV-related
equipment may be MTCR-controlled, per MTCR Item 12.A.1., if
the equipment is designed or modified to support other
Iranian UAVs that meet the Item 1.A.2. or 19.A.2. criteria.
Such items are included in document S/2006/815, the list of
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to
ballistic missile programs. Transfer of these items would be
a violation of UNSCR 1737 per paragraph 3.

-- We deeply appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued
cooperation, support and willingness to enact prompt and
thorough efforts in promoting interdictions designed to
prevent the transfer of sensitive materials by Iran.

END POINTS.

---------------------
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
---------------------

¶6. (U) Post is instructed to report results of its efforts
as soon as possible.

-----------------
POINTS OF CONTACT
-----------------

¶7. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are and
Margaret Mitchell, ISN/CATR (mitchellmt2@state.gov) and Matt
Hardiman, EUR/PRA.

¶8. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. Please
slug all responses for ISN, EUR, NEA, IO, WHA, and T.
CLINTON


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09CARACAS1296     2009-10-07 19:07     2010-12-01 20:08     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Caracas

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019
TAGS: ECON ENRG KNNP VE IR


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08OTTAWA918     2008-07-09 18:06     2010-12-01 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Ottawa
Appears in these articles:
nytimes.com

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000918

C O R R E C T E D COPY//SUBJECT LINE//////////////////////////////////

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS IR PK AF CA
SUBJECT: COUNSELOR, CSIS DIRECTOR DISCUSS CT THREATS,
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN

REF: A. OTTAWA 360
¶B. OTTAWA 808
¶C. OTTAWA 850
¶D. OTTAWA 878

OTTAWA 00000918 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons, 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS) Director Judd discussed domestic and foreign terror
threats with Counselor of the State Department Cohen in
Ottawa on July 2. Judd admitted that CSIS was increasingly
distracted from its mission by legal challenges that could
endanger foreign intelligence-sharing with Canadian agencies.
He predicted that the upcoming release of a DVD of
Guantanamo detainee and Canadian citizen Omar Khadr's
interrogation by Canadian officials would lead to heightened
pressure on the government to press for his return to Canada,
which the government would continue to resist. Judd shared
Dr. Cohen's negative assessment of current political,
economic, and security trends in Pakistan, and was worried
about what it would mean for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.
Canada has begun formulating an inter-agency Pakistan
strategy, and CSIS had agreed to open a channel to Iran's
intelligence service which Judd has not yet "figured out."
(Septel will cover Dr. Cohen's discussions regarding Pakistan
and the OEF and ISAF missions in Afghanistan.) End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Counselor of the Department of State Eliot Cohen
and CSIS Director Jim Judd in Ottawa on July 2 discussed
threats posed by violent Islamist groups in Canada, and
recent developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. (CSIS is
Canada's lead agency for national security intelligence.)
Director Judd ascribed an "Alice in Wonderland" worldview to
Canadians and their courts, whose judges have tied CSIS "in
knots," making it ever more difficult to detect and prevent
terror attacks in Canada and abroad. The situation, he
commented, left government security agencies on the defensive
and losing public support for their effort to protect Canada
and its allies.

Legal Wrangling Risks Chill Effect
----------------------------------

¶3. (S/NF) Responding to Dr. Cohen's query, Judd said CSIS
had responded to recent, non-specific intelligence on
possible terror operations by "vigorously harassing" known
Hezbollah members in Canada. According to Judd, CSIS'
current assessment is that no attack is "in the offing" in
Canada. He noted, however, that Hezbollah members, and their
lawyers, were considering new avenues of litigation resulting
from recent court rulings that, Judd complained, had
inappropriately treated intelligence agencies like law
enforcement bodies (refs A and C). The Director observed
that CSIS was "sinking deeper and deeper into judicial
processes," making Legal Affairs the fastest growing division
of his organization. Indeed, he added, legal challenges were
becoming a "distraction" that could have a major "chill
effect" on intelligence officials.

¶4. (S/NF) Judd derided recent judgments in Canada's courts
that threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence-
Qthat threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence-
and information-sharing with Canada. These judgments posit
that Canadian authorities cannot use information that "may
have been" derived from torture, and that any Canadian public
official who conveys such information may be subject to
criminal prosecution. This, he commented, put the government
in a reverse-onus situation whereby it would have to "prove"
the innocence of partner nations in the face of assumed
wrongdoing.

¶5. (S/NF) Judd credited Prime Minister Stephen Harper's
minority Conservative government for "taking it on the chin
and pressing ahead" with common sense measures despite court
challenges and political knocks from the opposition and
interest groups. When asked to look to the future, Judd
predicted that Canada would soon implement UK-like legal
procedures that make intelligence available to "vetted
defense lawyers who see everything the judge sees."

OTTAWA 00000918 002.2 OF 003

Terror Cases and Communities Present Mixed Pictures
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶6. (C/NF) Judd commented that cherry-picked sections of the
court-ordered release of a DVD of Guantanamo detainee and
Canadian citizen Omar Khadr (ref D) would likely show three
(Canadian) adults interrogating a kid who breaks down in
tears. He observed that the images would no doubt trigger
"knee-jerk anti-Americanism" and "paroxysms of moral outrage,
a Canadian specialty," as well as lead to a new round of
heightened pressure on the government to press for Khadr's
return to Canada. He predicted that PM Harper's government
would nonetheless continue to resist this pressure.
¶7. (C) The Director mentioned other major cases that also
presented CSIS with major legal headaches due to the use of
intelligence products in their development: Momin Khawaja has
been on trial for his role in an Al Qaeda UK bomb plot since
June 23 in the first major test of Canada's 2001
Anti-Terrorism Act, and Canada's ability to protect
intelligence supplied by foreign government sources (ref D);
the trial of the first of the home-grown Toronto 11 (down
from 18) terror plotters, which is also now underway; and,
the prosecution of Global Islamic Media Front propagandist
Said Namouh, who was arrested in Quebec in 2007 for
conspiring to conduct bombings in Austria and Germany.

¶8. (C) Judd said he viewed Khawaja and his "ilk" as
outliers, due in part to the fact that Canada's ethnic
Pakistani community is unlike its ghettoized and poorly
educated UK counterpart. It is largely made up of traders,
lawyers, doctors, engineers, and others who see promise for
themselves and their children in North America, he observed,
so its members are unlikely to engage in domestic terror
plots. He said that therefore CSIS main domestic focus is
instead on fundraising and procurement, as well as the
recruitment of a small number of Canadian "wannabes" of
Pakistani origin for mostly overseas operations.

Pakistan and Afghanistan
------------------------

¶9. (C) Turning to Pakistan, Counselor Cohen briefed his
recent trip to Islamabad and Peshawar, noting his alarm at
the degrading economic, political, and security situation
there, and its implications for Pakistan, Afghan, and
regional stability. Judd responded that Dr. Cohen's sober
assessment tracked with CSIS' own view of Pakistan, and that
"it is hard to see a good outcome there" due to that
country's political, economic, and security failures, on top
of fast-rising oil and food prices. Canada does not have an
explicit strategy for Pakistan, Judd said, but Privy Council
Deputy Secretary David Mulroney (who leads the interagency on
Afghanistan) now has the lead on developing one (septel).
Dr. Cohen remarked, and Judd agreed, that it would be
necessary to avoid approaching Pakistan as simply an adjunct
to the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan.

¶10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being "high-five mode" on
Q10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being "high-five mode" on
Afghanistan, Judd asserted, due in part to Karzai's weak
leadership, widespread corruption, the lack of will to press
ahead on counter-narcotics, limited Afghan security force
capability (particularly the police) and, most recently, the
Sarpoza prison break. He commented that CSIS had seen
Sarpoza coming, and its link to the Quetta Shura in Pakistan,
but could not get a handle on the timing.

Iranian Outreach
----------------

¶11. (S/NF) Judd added that he and his colleagues are "very,
very worried" about Iran. CSIS recently talked to Iran's
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) after that
agency requested its own channel of communication to Canada,
he said. The Iranians agreed to "help" on Afghan issues,
including sharing information regarding potential attacks.
However, "we have not figured out what they are up to," Judd
confided, since it is clear that the "Iranians want ISAF to
bleed...slowly."

OTTAWA 00000918 003.2 OF 003

¶12. (U) Dr. Cohen has cleared this message.

Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada

WILKINS


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07PARIS921     2007-03-09 16:04     2010-12-01 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR EUN NATO ETRD ECON UNO IR PHUM
KDEM
SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NICOLAS SARKOZY OR
SEGOLENE ROYAL

REF: A. PARIS 777
¶B. PARIS POINTS OF 3/6

Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign policy has not and probably will not
play a prominent role in the French presidential election
campaign, and neither Nicolas Sarkozy nor Segolene Royal has
enunciated a fleshed out foreign policy vision. (This
message does not discuss emerging "third man" centrist
Francois Bayrou, whose views fall somewhere between those of
Sarkozy and Royal.) While it is likely that French policy
overall under a Sarkozy or Royal presidency would be largely
marked by continuity, signs are already emerging that the two
candidates would -- initially at least -- adopt somewhat
different approaches to the U.S., the Transatlantic
relationship, and Europe. Sarkozy favors a relationship of
confidence with the U.S. based on trust and with each side
free to disagree (a position which is hurting him with
voters), whereas Royal's natural reflex is to adopt a more
distant and critical approach. If both worry that a NATO
built on global partnerships risks undermining the UN,
Sarkozy at least explicitly endorses a transatlantic alliance
built on shared values and emphasizes the complementarity of
NATO and the EU. If not inherently more pro-European than
his counterpart, Sarkozy's prescription for moving Europe
forward on the basis of a simplified treaty is generally
considered as more realistic (i.e., attuned to European
realities) than Royal's for a new treaty with an enhanced
"social(ist)" dimension.

¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: Both candidates favor restoring the
place of human rights and democratization as a foreign policy
standard, although it is not clear to what extent this would
mean increased criticism of Russia or China in practice.
Sarkozy is more openly supportive of Israel than Royal (which
could make a difference with respect to current GOF
consideration of contacts with a Palestinian NUG), but both
see resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the key
to increased stability across the Middle East. Both
candidates are committed to France's current policy on
Lebanon, although without the intensive personal engagement
of Chirac. Sarkozy is tough on Iran, and Royal was initially
tougher -- but she has moderated her tone of late, perhaps
under the influence of new advisors. Chirac's departure
might open the way for either Sarkozy or Royal to engage more
positively on Iraq reconstruction. We would expect both to
remain serious about NATO's engagement in Afghanistan. On
Africa, while Sarkozy and Royal alike would put an end to the
Chirac model of personal diplomacy with his counterparts, it
is not clear what this would mean in practice. Chirac's
departure will offer a welcome opportunity to reevaluate
French policy in Africa in particular, including current
troop deployments. END SUMMARY.

INTRODUCTION -- IT'S ABOUT THE DOMESTIC AGENDA
--------------------------------------------- -

¶3. (C) Foreign policy issues so far have not played a
prominent role in the French presidential election campaign,
and there is little chance this will change substantially in
coming weeks. French voters are focused primarily on whether
and to what extent France needs to reform in order better to
adapt to globalization, particularly with respect to the
price to be paid in lost jobs and social protections. From a
U.S. perspective, of course, what counts most will be the
foreign policy orientation of the new president. Both the
leading candidates -- Nicolas Sarkozy of the Union for a
Popular Movement (UMP) and Segolene Royal of the Socialist
Party (PS) -- have in recent weeks outlined views on foreign
policy and defense issues (refs A and B) and offer some clear
indications of what can be expected. (This message does not
discuss centrist Francois Bayrou, the "third man"
neither-Sarkozy nor-Royal candidate whose views fall
somewhere between those of Sarkozy and Royal, although he is
widely regarded as the most pro-European of the three.)

¶4. (C) Sarkozy is above all a pragmatist (witness his recent
reversal on Airbus, where he originally favored a business
approach to the issue that he quickly dropped for more state
intervention in response to popular pressures). In contrast,
Royal leaves an impression of greater rigidity and
ideological orthodoxy. This said, neither Sarkozy (although
he came close in his recent press conference, ref A) nor
Royal (despite her remarks on defense, ref B) has delivered a
formal address on foreign and security policy, and it also
bears repeating that what the candidates say in the heat of
an election campaign may differ substantially from what they
might actually do or not do once elected. It is likely that

PARIS 00000921 002 OF 005


French policy under a Sarkozy or Royal administration would
largely be marked by continuity. We believe nonetheless that
it is possible to draw a few preliminary conclusions about
each candidate's leanings or "reflexes," particularly with
respect to the U.S. and the transatlantic relationship;
market liberalization; Europe, human rights and
democratization; and Africa.

FRENCH-U.S. AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
---------------------------------------

¶5. (C) As their public positioning makes clear, Sarkozy and
Royal differ perhaps most in their approaches to the United
States, primarily in tone if not substance, although the one
invariably bleeds into the other. Beginning with his
September 2006 visit to the U.S., Sarkozy has deliberately
and systematically spoken in favor of putting the U.S.-France
relationship on a new footing based on mutual confidence and
trust. Not only in response to (demagogic) accusations from
the left that this shift risked turning him into an American
"poodle," Sarkozy at the same time has made clear that the
relationship would have to be based on equality, with France
also free to differ with the U.S. -- he cited his opposition
to Turkey's EU accession as one salient example. Significant
is not that Sarkozy has abandoned Gaullism -- he has not --
but that he has attempted to define it in a way that is more
explicitly America-friendly or at least America-compatible.
Above all, he has spelled out the need for active engagement
with the U.S. at all times; the assumption is that France
should be able to work together with the U.S. unless, in a
given situation, our views are fundamentally incompatible.
In cases of disagreement (e.g., Iraq), the clear implication
is that France would stand aside rather than actively seek,
as Chirac did in 2003, to marshal a coalition against the
United States. Sarkozy's pro-Americanism is an electoral
liability for him, and his opponents, Royal foremost among
them, are using it as a campaign issue against him.

¶6. (C) Royal has yet to enunciate with anything approaching
the same degree of clarity the kind of relationship she would
seek with the U.S., owing at least partly to her relative
inexperience. But she leaves the lingering impression of
someone who reflexively wants to keep her distance from the
U.S. In part this is the product of a lack of direct and
personal experience with the United States. It also reflects
the accumulated weight of traditional leftist preconceptions
-- not to say prejudices -- of the U.S. as a hegemonic and
unilateral power (leaving aside hot-button and publicly
popular issues such as environmentalism, climate warming,
globalization, and our more limited social safety net).
Emblematic of this distancing has been the relatively greater
difficulty we have had in setting up meetings with her and
her staff, or her initial inclination -- before she abandoned
the idea altogether -- to travel to the U.S. and meet only
with certain members from the Democratic Party and none from
the Administration. Moreover, in her public utterances,
Royal has explicitly accused the U.S. for contributing to
global instability. The clear implication is that the French
role in international affairs, more than working with the
U.S., should consist of presenting alternatives to our vision.

NATO AND THE EU
---------------

¶7. (C) These differences of approach are well illustrated in
the candidates' attitudes toward the NATO Alliance and
European Security (ESDP). As Chirac before them, Sarkozy and
Royal alike object to NATO's evolving global role, and both
cite the argument that the U.S. vision for NATO, through
global partnerships and assuming out-of-theatre missions that
go beyond its traditional military role, could lead NATO to
become a competitor for the UN. Both candidates also insist
on the importance of increased EU autonomy and cooperation on
defense (ESDP), as well as on the capability of taking
independent action outside NATO. But they appear to differ
significantly in their basic attitudes toward the Alliance.
Sarkozy explicitly referred to the transatlantic relationship
as indispensable for being based on common values; he also
called for retiring old arguments over the pre-eminence of
the one the other, calling them mutually complementary and
noting that not all EU member states are NATO Allies and vice
versa (which may also be convenient in the case of Turkey).
Although committed to the idea of a political Europe as
independent actor, Sarkozy's envisions Europe acting jointly
with or in parallel with the U.S., but not as an alternative
or counterweight to the U.S. Royal's departure point is that
Europe needs to evolve and to reinforce its security
capabilities in order to present an potential alternative to
the U.S., although beyond her distaste for the use of

PARIS 00000921 003 OF 005


military force, she has offered few prescriptions as to how
that would occur.

¶8. (C) The two candidates also differ with respect to the
importance of defense. While Royal and Sarkozy have voiced
support for maintaining defense expenditures at two percent
of GDP, Sarkozy insisted that it should be "at least" two
percent. In public debates and discussions, Royal has
moreover indicated a willingness to reassess France's defense
budget and programs, most notably questioning the need for
the construction of a second aircraft carrier. Sarkozy, for
his part, has made it clear he supports a strong defense and
that the planned construction of a second carrier must go
forward.

FRANCE AND EUROPE
-----------------

¶9. (C) Sarkozy does not have a reputation as an avid
pro-Europeanist, and he has not hesitated on occasion, like
Chirac, to blame the EU for some of France's problems, mainly
in connection with trying to prevent the migration of money
and jobs to the newer member states with fewer social
protections, or promoting a level of political control over
European monetary policy. He has criticized "fiscal dumping"
by newer member states with lower cost and other barriers to
investment. Sarkozy has also advocated EU-wide coordination
on domestically sensitive issues such as immigration. Royal
represents a party that traditionally is viewed as more
pro-European, although many of her positions do not differ
dramatically from Sarkozy's on the surface (although Sarkozy
has been much more strident in calling for a coordinated EU
immigration policy). However, mainly to satisfy that part of
her electorate which voted against the EU constitutional
treaty despite its pro-European tradition, Royal has put more
stress on promoting a more "social" Europe that would adopt
EU-wide standards for social protections and labor rights.

¶10. (C) Indeed, where the candidates diverge most is in the
remedies they would prescribe for overcoming the current
impasse on the EU constitutional treaty. There is already
evidence that Sarkozy's pragmatic proposal for a "simplified
treaty" (formerly referred to as a mini-Treaty) that would
focus on institutional reforms and not require ratification
through popular referendum has made inroads even with the
Germans, notwithstanding the official German position on
retaining the existing draft constitutional treaty. By
contrast, the Germans have privately expressed to us, and
French press reports corroborate this view, considerable
concern over Royal's calls for a new referendum on an
improved treaty, which they see as a recipe for another
French rejection. Royal has argued that a referendum could
be successful if a revised treaty were to include additional
social protections, but it seems likely that this would make
the treaty unacceptable to a number of other European
partners (in particular the UK), and would lengthen the
negotiating process in any case. In sum, although Royal may
be more pro-European in theory, in practice Sarkozy seems
more likely to move the European project forward over the
short term.

FREE MARKET LIBERALISM
----------------------

¶11. (C) Although Sarkozy is viewed by many French voters as
a radical free-market "liberal," in fact his differences with
Royal may be less significant than labels would indicate. As
the Airbus controversy has shown, Sarkozy does not hesitate
to shed his free-market rhetoric when he believes the market
is not looking after France's interests. Both Sarkozy and
Royal support "economic patriotism," even if Sarkozy
rhetorically speaks more of European than strictly French
champions. That said, partly out of necessity in order to
help reduce France's high debt, Sarkozy would remain more
interested than his Socialist counterpart in privatization of
state-owned enterprises. Unlike Royal, he also supports
cutting corporate tax rates, cutting all payroll taxes on
overtime beyond the statutory limit of 35 hours, and ending
France's two-tiered labor market as a means of tackling
France's chronic unemployment. As noted earlier, however,
Sarkozy's "liberalism" has often in the past been trumped by
political expediency -- which would likely be the hallmark of
a Sarkozy presidency. His demand for more European-wide
coordination on fiscal policy as a means of reducing
relocation of French jobs to other EU member countries is
emblematic of bending liberal principle to accommodate French
interests.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION

PARIS 00000921 004 OF 005


--------------------------------

¶12. (C) Both Sarkozy and Royal have called for restoring
more prominence to human rights and democratization as a
means of remaining true to France's heritage and its
universal mission. How far either candidate would be
prepared to make transformational diplomacy a cornerstone of
his or her foreign policy in reality remains an open
question, however. It is likely that Royal would take a more
principled approach to human rights questions than her
counterpart, and it is telling that Sarkozy justified his
criticism of Russia's human rights record in Chechnya
primarily by arguing that, in the modern media age, it is no
longer possible to hide human rights violations as before,
which in turns creates public pressures that cannot be
ignored. At this stage of the campaign, the jury is still
out on whether human rights considerations would become a
main driver of French foreign policy. What seems certain is
that neither Sarkozy nor Royal will be driven by the
sometimes sentimental approach of Chirac, whose admiration
for countries with their own long histories and traditions
(e.g., Russia and China) with a skepticism of the
applicability of Western notions of democracy and human
rights to other countries and civilizations.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFGHANISTAN
-------------------------------

¶13. (C) Similar considerations also apply toward both
candidates' likely approaches to the Middle East and Africa.
Sarkozy differs dramatically from Royal in his insistent
emphasis on the need to take Israeli security interests into
account. This might eventually affect Sarkozy's policy on
dealing with a Palestinian national unity government, where
the GOF of late has argued that it would be a mistake to
isolate Hamas completely if it fails to explicitly accept the
Quartet conditions. Sarkozy has indirectly criticized Chirac
for his overriding attachment to maintaining stability for
its own sake, which encourages authoritarian rule. That
said, both candidates accept the conventional wisdom that the
key to resolving the range of conflicts and tensions in the
Middle East is to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.

¶14. (C) Both candidates are also committed to maintaining
current French policy toward Lebanon, although neither will
be driven by Chirac's loyalty to the memory of former PM
Rafic Hariri -- both in terms of personal involvement, and
Lebanon's centrality to French policy on the Middle East.
Sarkozy and his foreign policy advisors are tough-minded on
Iran. Royal initially was tougher, demanding that Iran be
prevented from developing a civilian nuclear capacity, as
permitted under the NPT. This demand was notably absent from
her most recent foreign policy remarks. (This may reflect
increasing influence of former Foreign Minister Hubert
Vedrine, who is far more dovish with regard to an Iranian
nuclear capability, including military.) We would expect
Sarkozy or Royal to maintain France's commitment to NATO's
engagement in Afghanistan. Finally, Chirac's departure from
the scene should result in greater openness to opportunities
to assist in Iraq's reconstruction.

AFRICA
------

¶15. (C) On Africa, both candidates have indicated that they
would like above all to change the manner in which France
does business in Africa, with Sarkozy going so far as to
stress France's desire to reduce its military footprint
(except in coordination with the AU or under the authority of
the UN). But this does not mean withdrawal, and France will
continue to want to leverage its influence to the greatest
extent possible -- perhaps through an increased EU role --
even as it competes with the growing influence of the U.S.
and China. But both candidates understand they will no
longer be able to rely (nor do they appear to want to) on the
kinds of personal relationships that Chirac developed over
many years with a number of African leaders. The departure
of Chirac will allow the French foreign policy establishment
a welcome opportunity to reevaluate French policy toward Cote
d'Ivoire, Chad, and the Central African Republic.
Inevitably, troop redeployments across Africa will come under
consideration.

NEITHER QUITE WHAT HE/SHE SEEMS
-------------------------------

¶16. (C) Whoever is finally elected, we believe that the
bilateral U.S.-France relationship will eventually settle

PARIS 00000921 005 OF 005


into a kind of normal balance based on our enduring shared
interests and values and the intertwined nature of our
economies on the one hand, and the requirement of a distinct
French voice and authentically independent positions in the
international arena, on the other. In the case of Sarkozy,
we believe it will be important not to set our expectations
too high, since even his pragmatism will always be tempered
by the Gaullist imperative of a French "difference," in
particular vis-a-vis the U.S. As for Royal, although we
would expect her, at least initially, to maintain more of a
distanced approach to the U.S., there is no reason to believe
that she would be anything but pragmatic over the longer
term. In all likelihood, her personal comfort level would
rise with increased contact and experience, and foreign
policy under a Royal presidency would be characterized by the
signature French mix of strategic convergence with the U.S.,
heavily marked by strategic differences and tactical
disagreements.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON


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09LONDON2768     2009-12-10 16:04     2010-11-30 23:11     CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN     Embassy London

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EO 12958 DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, MARR, AF, UK, PK, IR, IN, CH, RS,
SA, NATO
SUBJECT: SHADOW DEFENSE MINISTER FOX PLEDGES CLOSE U.S.-UK
COOPERATION IF TORIES GAIN POWER

Classified By: Ambassador Louis Susman for reasons 1.4 b and d

¶1. (C/NF) Summary. During a December 9 meeting with the Ambassador, Shadow Secretary of State for Defense Liam Fox affirmed his desire to work closely with the U.S. if the Conservative Party wins power in next year’s general election. He highlighted the importance of the U.S.-UK Defense Trade and Cooperation Treaty insofar as it advances the goal of U.S.-UK interoperability. The Treaty “means a lot to us,” Fox emphasized, adding that “we (Conservatives) intend to follow a much more pro-American profile in procurement.” Fox, who accompanied Conservative Party leader David Cameron on a December 4-6 visit to Afghanistan, (septel) expressed confidence regarding U.S. leadership in Afghanistan and optimism about the way forward. (Note: In a December 8 Chatham House speech, Fox affirmed the importance of the Afghanistan mission and analyzed challenges facing NATO.) Fox predicted that negotiations with Iran would fail; he stated that the U.S. and UK should work together to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. He faulted the Labour government for policies which reinforce the Indian government’s long-held view that HMG’s foreign relations on the subcontinent are “skewed to Pakistan.” End Summary.

U.S.-UK Interoperability
------------------------

¶2. (C/NF) Ambassador Susman met December 9 with Liam Fox, Shadow Secretary of State for Defense. (Mike Threadgold, Head of Fox’s Private Office, and U.S. Embassy Political Officer Chris Palmer attended the meeting as notetakers.) Fox, a committed Atlanticist, underscored his desire to work closely with the U.S. if the Conservative Party wins power in next year’s general election. He affirmed that when Winston Churchill first raised the notion of the “special relationship” it was as a wartime leader. The special relationship will remain strategically central to UK foreign policy regardless of which party is in power in the UK, Fox underlined. However, the relationship will be especially close in the defense sphere under Tory leadership, Fox stated. He affirmed his desire to increase joint defense procurement with the United States. Increasing U.S.-UK “interoperability is the key” since the U.S. and UK will continue to fight together in the future.

¶3. (C/NF) Fox stressed that the U.S.-UK Defense Trade and Cooperation Treaty (Note: SFRL hearings on the Treaty were to be held December 10) is extremely important insofar as it advances the goal of interoperability. Fox expressed appreciation for the Ambassador’s update regarding the likelihood of Senate approval of the Treaty soon. The Treaty “means a lot to us,” Fox emphasized, adding that “we (Conservatives) intend to follow a much more pro-American profile in procurement. The key is interoperability.” Fox asserted that some within the Conservative Party are less enthusiastic, asserting that “we’re supposed to be partners with, not supplicants to, the United States.” Fox said he rebuffed these assertions, and he welcomed the Ambassador’s reassurance that senior U.S. leaders value the UK as an equal partner.

Afghanistan
-----------

¶4. (C/NF) Fox, who accompanied Conservative Party leader David Cameron on a December 4-6 visit to Afghanistan (septel), expressed confidence regarding U.S. leadership in Afghanistan and optimism about the way forward. He noted that he hoped to meet with NSA Jones, Ambassador Eikenberry, and General Petraeus during the December 11-13 Regional Security Summit in Bahrain. Fox also stated that he planned to meet DASD Flournoy in Washington December 18; Fox will visit Washington and New York December 17-20. (Note: In a December 8 Chatham House speech (see paragraph 9), Fox affirmed the importance of the Afghanistan mission to the NATO Alliance and the importance of explaining to the British people with “clarity, conviction, and consistency” “what the national security threats are that compel us to be in Afghanistan.” End Note.)

Iran
----

¶5. (C/NF) Turning to Iran, Fox observed that there are three possible outcomes in Iran: regime change, behavioral change for the regime’s leaders, and “a change of leadership within
the regime.” The first two options “won’t happen” soon, although we could be “in the beginning of the end game.” When regime change comes it will likely be a “bloody end,” Fox stated. The regime’s strong hold on power, its implacable hatred of the U.S. and Israel, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stranglehold on the economy make it extremely unlikely that the regime will change from within, he said. He predicted that international negotiations with Iran would fail. He said that Iran’s Independence Day in February would provide the next opportunity for the international community to evaluate the strength of Iran’s internal opposition, based on the size of demonstrations. Fox stated that he had recently met with a group of wealthy, Iranian expatriates, most of whom expressed support for Iran’s obtaining a nuclear bomb. “Persian nationalism” more than Islamic fundamentalism is the basis of Iranian popular support for a nuclear weapons program.

¶6. (C/NF) The U.S. and UK need to work together to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, Fox said. He expressed support for the establishment of a U.S. nuclear umbrella in the Middle East. Russia would play a more constructive role in regard to Iran if it began to fear “encirclement” by China and Iran. China could be more helpful under the right circumstances, Fox said. (Note: Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague told the Ambassador in a subsequent meeting (septel) that in his view China would probably not be more helpful in regard to Iran in the foreseeable future, although Russia would likely play a more constructive role. End Note.)

India-Pakistan
--------------

¶7. (C/NF) Turning to India, Fox criticized the Labour government for policies which reinforce the Indian government’s long-held view that HMG’s foreign relations on the subcontinent are “skewed to Pakistan.” Fox predicted this would not be a factor under a Conservative government, since the Conservatives are “less dependent” than the Labour Party on votes from the British-Pakistani community.

NATO
----

¶8. (SBU/NF) During his meeting with the Ambassador, Fox touched on the future of the NATO Alliance, affirming the importance of the ongoing strategic transformation debate and the future of NATO. Fox focused on NATO in a December 8 Chatham House speech on “The Way Forward for NATO.” In those remarks, Fox asserted that “NATO’s mission in Afghanistan has created further debate on NATO’s role and even of NATO’s survival as a defense alliance.” The speech highlights that “neither the financial burden nor the fighting burden is properly shared between NATO allies” and that the pending Strategic Concept should address collective responsibilities. Fox’s speech affirms the importance of strategic nuclear forces to the Alliance, as stated in the 1999 Strategic Concept; the speech commits a future Conservative government to “maintaining Britain’s round-the-clock, independent, submarine-based, and strategic nuclear deterrent.” The speech concludes that, despite its shortcomings, NATO is a “necessity” and “in order to successfully face the threats of the 21st century, NATO is the only way forward.” (Note: The full text of the speech is available at www.chathamhouse.org.uk End Note.)
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
Susman


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07ISLAMABAD1583     2007-04-10 12:12     2010-11-30 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Islamabad

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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 7003
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RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 5533
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 0912
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 1994
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EO 12958 DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PK, AF, IZ, IR, ID, MY, SA, LE
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF TELLS MCCAIN: DON’T PULL OUT OF IRAQ
WITHOUT TRIPARTITE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
REF: ISLAMABAD 1517

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Peter Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) On April 3, President Musharraf met with Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and Representative Richard Renzi (R-AZ), Musharraf’s third U.S. Congressional delegation of the day (reftel). The group,s discussion focused on Iraq, the broader Middle East, and the Pak-Afghan border region.

--------------------------------------------- --
Muslim countries should play lead role in Iraq And help solve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute
--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (C) Musharraf noted that he and many Middle Eastern leaders were worried that a premature pull-out of U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq would spread sectarian strife throughout the Gulf region. Musharraf underlined the importance of increasing the capacity of the Iraqi armed forces and police. He noted there could be little improvement in the situation in Iraq without broader political participation from the Sunnis. Musharraf agreed with Senator McCain that Muslim countries needed to lead efforts to help Iraq’s Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds reach political consensus before a major withdrawal of coalition troops. Musharraf said he understood U.S. public opinion was against prolonging U.S. presence in Iraq, but hoped U.S. leadership could communicate the importance of the mission in Iraq. Turning to the future of Iraq, Musharraf hoped that Muslim peacekeeping troops (including Pakistanis) could replace U.S. forces under a United Nations umbrella.

¶3. (C) Conflicts outside Iraq also contributed to the unstable situation in the region, Musharraf said. Musharraf noted that in addition to Saudi King Abdullah,s work in forging an Arab consensus on Iraq, he was working on building consensus within the Muslim world on the Palestinian issue ) work that was slowly but surely bringing Syria back into the Arab fold. Alluding to his own outreach to the moderate Muslim world, Musharraf noted there was space for non-Arab nations to play a role on Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and that Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia had agreed to form a united voice to help promote peace in the region. Musharraf said he was the first non-Arab leader invited to address the Arab League Summit.

¶4. (C) Musharraf said he believed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad could play a positive role in both Iraq and Lebanon, and that Assad could be “handled” if the U.S. understood his issues: &If you want him to play ball, he needs comfort on other fronts -- namely, the Golan Heights.8 Turning to another Iraqi neighbor, Musharraf agreed with the delegation that Iran could not be allowed to create further divisions in Iraq.

-------------------------------------
The Pak-Afghan border: Past decisions created present security problem
-------------------------------------
¶5. (C) When asked for his views on Afghanistan, Musharraf
ISLAMABAD 00001583 002 OF 003
said Pakistan was facing the fallout from security decisions made in the 1980s. People who came to fight with the mujahideen against the Soviets settled in Pakistan’s tribal areas and now had families. These people -- mostly Uzbeks and Arabs -- developed links with al Qaeda. Recently, tribal groups in both South and North Waziristan were taking action against Uzbeks and other foreigners because of the foreigners, cruel and high-handed behavior. Pakistan’s military provided covert support in the form of arms and ammunition. Musharraf reported that in South Waziristan, a large group of foreign militants were surrounded on a ridge and would soon surrender.

¶6. (C) Originally, Musharraf said, the Taliban movement was a reaction against growing tribalism and warlordism in Afghanistan. Since Russia and India supported Afghanistan’s (ethnic Tajik) Northern Alliance, Pakistan’s natural ally was the (ethnic Pashtun) Taliban. This all changed after 9/11, Musharraf said, and Pakistan had captured and killed hundreds of al Qaeda fighters near Tora Bora.

--------------------------------------
We’re Going After Militants: Bin Laden May Be Here, But Mullah Omar’s Not
--------------------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) Echoing similar statements he,d made during an earlier meeting with CODEL Tierney (reftel), Musharraf said that although he had no direct evidence, he thought al Qaeda leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were hiding in Bajaur Agency, since it was in (Afghan militant leader) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s territory and bordered Afghanistan’s Konar province. The landscape in videos of Bin Laden and Zawahiri looked similar to Bajaur, Musharraf said, and the area provided comfort, high mountains, positive support, and an absence of U.S. troops in neighboring Konar.

¶8. (C) Musharraf voiced concern over Afghan President Karzai,s frequent pronouncements about Pakistan’s &failure8 to capture Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Balochistan’s capital Quetta. &Let me tell you,8 Musharraf emphasized, &Omar would be mad to be in Quetta -- he has too many troops to command in southern Afghanistan to make it feasible. In fact, the only parts of Balochistan where there are Pakistani Taliban are in the province’s Afghan refugee camps, which we are planning to shut down.8 Musharraf said that most Pashtuns in Balochistan were traders and had no reason to join the Taliban. &They want roads to increase their trade, not to fight.8 The same could not be said for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Musharraf said.

¶9. (C) Musharraf said the Taliban were mainly in Afghanistan. Karzai,s policies, Musharraf believed, alienated Afghanistan’s Pashtuns by favoring (ethnic Tajik) Panshiris. After Coalition forces joined the Northern Alliance to oust the Taliban government, there was no change in the ethnic makeup of the victors when it came to planning. Panshiris were disproportionately represented in the government, even though they had never ruled before and were, Musharraf believed, the natural enemy of the country’s majority Pashtuns.
ISLAMABAD 00001583 003 OF 003

--------------------------------------
A New Strategy in the Tribal Areas And the Ethnic Dimension in Afghanistan
--------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Turning to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Musharraf stated that Taliban militants from Afghanistan drew support from Pakistan for re-supply, hospitals, recruitment, and indoctrination of new troops. Musharraf emphasized military force alone could not deny terrorists safe haven in the Tribal Areas over the long term. That was why, Musharraf explained, Pakistan was pursuing a four-pronged strategy that included military, political, development, and administrative elements. The fencing of the Pak-Afghan border in some parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas would reduce some cross-border movement, he said, but it was not enough. Musharraf described development as the most forward-looking ) and in some ways most complex ) part of the strategy. Pakistan was looking for U.S. assistance and expertise.

--------------------------------------------- ---
Pakistan’s Taliban Problem Is An Extremism Issue
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶11. (C) One of Pakistan’s biggest concerns, Musharraf said, was the spread of talibanization, especially into settled and urban areas. Countering talibanization required a well thought out strategy to cleanse society of the Taliban culture and to encourage moderation. Modernization and economic development were the way forward, Musharraf noted. Talibanization was even spreading to Islamabad, as you could see by the recent events at the Red Mosque (reported septel).

--------------------------------------------
Afghanistan’s Poppy Industry Should Go Legal
--------------------------------------------
¶12. (C) In response to McCain’s question about whether Musharraf was worried Afghanistan would become a narco-state, Musharraf answered that he was, especially because if it did it would affect Pakistan. Musharraf thought Afghanistan could follow the example of other countries -- such as India -- where narcotics were purchased legally and channeled into the international pharmaceutical industry. It was a $500-600 million annual industry, Musharraf said, and the profits made from legal poppy sales could go toward poverty alleviation instead of to the Taliban. BODDE


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07PARIS1844     2007-05-10 09:09     2010-11-30 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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DEPT ALSO FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PREL FR EUN IR AF NATO IZ TU UNO LE YI RS
UNMIK
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON FOREIGN
POLICY: FIVE IMMEDIATE ISSUES

REF: A. PARIS 1789
¶B. PARIS 921
¶C. PARIS 777
¶D. PARIS 1817
¶E. EMBASSY PARIS DAILY SIPRNET REPORTS

Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign policy played only a negligible
role in the presidential election campaign that concluded May
6, and Sarkozy has relatively little experience in foreign
affairs, despite his tenures as Interior and Finance
Minister. Nonetheless, Sarkozy's personality is such that he
will want to take the stage at the June 6-8 G8 and June 21-22
European summits as a full partner. Instinctively
pro-American and pro-Israeli, Sarkozy is fiercely opposed to
Turkish EU membership. He has promised that his approach to
foreign affairs will be different from Chirac's in its
emphasis on human rights, and has identified Europe, Africa
and the U.S. as his three immediate priorities. That said,
generally speaking, continuity will prevail, reflecting the
non-partisan, consensus support that French foreign policy
has enjoyed during the Fifth Republic. On Europe, his goal
is, by overcoming the current institutional crisis, to
re-impart momentum to European integration and make the EU a
major player on the world stage. On Africa, Sarkozy
advocates increased developmental aid as the offset for
regulating immigration (important for his domestic agenda)
and has repeatedly called for action on Darfur. He has
called for a "Mediterranean Union," to include Turkey and
Israel, as Europe's institutional link to the Middle East and
North Africa. With the U.S., he seeks a relationship based
on renewed confidence and trust that still allows for honest
differences of perspective; most recently, he has pointed to
global climate change (septel) as his major area of policy
difference with the U.S.

¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: The Deputy Secretary's May 16
meetings in Paris will occur the same day President-elect
Sarkozy assumes office (Sarkozy himself will therefore be
unavailable). Beyond welcoming the prospect of improved
U.S.-French relations, the Deputy Secretary can use his visit
to send a message on five key U.S. foreign policy concerns.
We can welcome Sarkozy's willingness to take a tough line on
Iran, but also will need to impress on him the stakes in
Afghanistan and the importance of France remaining a key
partner there. On Iraq, we can expect Sarkozy to drop the
needling rhetoric on a horizon for U.S. withdrawal, but
having told the President he "wants to help the U.S. get out
of Iraq," we should press him to offer a specific, symbolic
proposal -- such as active French engagement with friendly
Arab governments -- to associate France with our efforts
there. In assuring Sarkozy of strong U.S. support for a
strong Europe, we need to stress the importance we attach to
keeping Turkey's EU accession negotiations going. Finally,
we should stress the importance of a united front against
Russia as Kosovo goes before the UNSC. END SUMMARY.

A NOVICE IN FOREIGN POLICY
--------------------------
¶3. (C) A presidential election campaign dominated by the
domestic change and reform thematic left very little room for
foreign policy. Sarkozy has little foreign policy experience
and speaks only very limited English. Given his strong
character and action-oriented agenda, and his desire to put
France back on center stage, we can nonetheless expect
Sarkozy to move quickly to assert himself as an equal partner
at the upcoming June 6-8 G8 Summit in Germany and the June
21-22 European Council meeting in Brussels. (See ref A for a
discussion of Sarkozy's views on economic and trade issues.)

U.S.-FRIENDLIER, BUT STILL A GAULLIST
-------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Most voters went to the polls May 6 convinced that
President-elect Sarkozy would seek a better relationship with
the U.S., which he explicitly affirmed in his May 6
acceptance speech. Sarkozy's opponents had attempted to use
his September 12, 2006 meeting with President Bush to suggest
that Sarkozy was a U.S. "poodle" who would have supported the
U.S. intervention in Iraq, unlike President Chirac. In a
recent press conference on foreign policy (ref B), Sarkozy
made clear he had supported Chirac's decision. Then and in
his post-election remarks, he nonetheless highlighted the
need for a friendlier tone and more confidence in the
U.S.-French bilateral relationship (and in NATO-EU
relations), in a way that also preserves Gaullist (and EU)
freedom of action. In effect, Sarkozy has already shifted

PARIS 00001844 002 OF 004


the focus of U.S.-French "differences" from Iraq and the
Israeli-Palestinian relationship to climate change and
Turkish membership in the EU (see also refs B, C and D).

EU TOP IMMEDIATE PRIORITY
-------------------------
¶5. (C) Sarkozy's first foreign policy priority will be to
impart new momentum to the EU and show that France is back as
a key EU player. Sarkozy no doubt knows already that his
idea of a simplified treaty is acceptable to London and
Berlin as the best means to avoid new referenda, and he will
move quickly to ensure that a process can begin by the end of
the German EU Presidency that would conclude at the latest by
the end of the French Presidency in December 2008, in advance
of European parliamentary elections in early 2009. Immediate
progress on this front would go a long way to overcome the
sense of malaise and indirection stemming from President
Chirac's failure to push through the referendum on the
Constitutional Treaty in May 2005. Sarkozy wants a European
Union that is a veritable player on the world stage, with
coherent policies to guarantee its energy supplies and create
buffers against globalization while harnessing its creative
energies.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND DARFUR
------------------------------
¶6. (c) Sarkozy lacks the web of personal relationships with
African (and Middle Eastern) leaders that, in particular,
Chirac used to direct French foreign policy. Sarkozy intends
to make a virtue of his less personalized approach, reviewing
France's exposure based on a hard-headed re-evaluation of
French national interests. Sarkozy has identified Africa as
one of his three foreign policy priority areas (along with
the EU and U.S.), in line with his domestic campaign focus on
uncontrolled immigration to France. His interest in
development assistance for Africa appears aimed primarily at
offsetting Africans' concern over Sarkozy's domestic
political goal of reducing immigration from Africa -- and as
part of a more comprehensive international effort to address
conditions in Africa that give rise to mass emigration from
the continent. A review of French national interests may
augur a lessening of French military engagement across Africa
or an increased desire to see the EU take over some of its
missions. Sarkozy has called repeatedly for action on
Darfur, including prosecution of Sudanese leaders by the
International Criminal Court, but it is unclear at this stage
what concrete steps he might otherwise propose.

MEDITERRANEAN UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST
---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) We can expect Sarkozy to push hard his signature
"vision" issue, the idea of a "Mediterranean Union," to
include Turkey and Israel, which would supersede the EU
Barcelona process and create an area modeled after, and
having a privileged partnership with, the European Union.
Sarkozy has bluntly declared that pursuing Middle East peace
is not incompatible with ensuring Israel's security, while
assuring nervous Arab leaders -- most recently Egyptian
President Mubarak -- that his policies toward the Middle East
would be largely in synch with Chirac's. On the whole, it
seems likely that continuity will prevail, although the
traditionally pro-Arab MFA may have to accommodate Sarkozy's
greater emphasis on Israel's security needs. It remains to
be seen to what extent Sarkozy will attempt to leverage his
pro-Israel orientation for more leverage for France and/or
the EU in the Middle East peace process.

MORE HUMAN RIGHTS
-----------------
¶8. (C) Sarkozy has indicated very publicly -- enough so that
it is reasonable to assume that he will follow through --
that he intends to place more emphasis on human rights
issues. He has made clear that he would be less likely than
Chirac to accommodate even Russia or China in the name of
realpolitik, citing the situation in Chechnya and his
opposition to lifting of the EU arms embargo on China. A
consistent emphasis on human rights could have a significant
impact on French policy in Africa and the Middle East.

IMMEDIATE MESSAGES: IRAN, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN,
EU/TURKEY, KOSOVO/RUSSIA
--------------------------------------------
¶9. (C) We believe that, beginning with the May 15-16 visit
to France of the Deputy Secretary, the USG should reach out
quickly to engage the new French government. Beyond
welcoming prospects for an improved U.S.-French relationship,
we need to send messages on the following five key issues:

PARIS 00001844 003 OF 004


Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, EU/Turkey, and Kosovo/Russia. If
time permits, the Deputy Secretary may also wish to review
the state of play on Darfur.

-- IRAN: Sarkozy views Iran as the most serious
international threat, and he will be at least as tough-minded
a partner as Chirac has been. He has expressed a willingness
to tighten financial sanctions against Iran. While he
prefers acting under the authority of the UNSC, we believe he
could support resorting to measures outside the UN framework
if necessary. The late-May consideration of next steps in
the UNSC offers a first opportunity to work with the new
government, and to test and shape its approach.

-- AFGHANISTAN: MFA Political Director Araud has underscored
the need for the USG to engage the new government to dispel
the widespread impression, shared by Chirac, that Afghanistan
may be a losing cause. Under the impact of the Taliban
kidnapping of French citizens, Sarkozy recently stated that
France's role in Afghanistan -- now that the anti-terrorism
campaign has largely ended and French Special Forces
withdrawn from OEF -- was no longer "decisive" and that
French forces would not remain there permanently. The
Taliban threat against the life of the one remaining French
hostage is still directly tied to a demand for France's
military withdrawal form Afghanistan. We will need to
impress on Sarkozy the importance of French perseverance over
the mid-term (including through more purposeful public
statements about the stakes there) and, as the French have
stressed to us on Bosnia or Kosovo, the importance of "in
together and out together," which also applies to national
caveats on the use of forces.

-- IRAQ: Chirac's departure from the scene should enable
France to put U.S.-French differences not only aside, but
behind us. Sarkozy, like most other French politicians, has
said he would have handled our differences in a less
confrontational matter. This does not change the fact that
he (now, in any case) believes Chirac made the right decision
in opposing the war. Moreover, concern about feeding the
"President Bush's poodle" accusation might militate against
any dramatic public change in GOF policy, at least in the
immediate future, with French parliamentary elections
looming. That said, we should take him at his word that he
"wants to help the U.S. get out of Iraq." Our goal in the
near term should be to push the French toward a more positive
declaratory policy, working with the new government to
identify a symbolic turning of the page on France's "let the
U.S. live with it" attitude of the Chirac/Villepin years.
One possibility would be active French engagement on Iraq
with Arab governments of the region.

-- EU/TURKEY: Publicly and privately, we should encourage
France to reassume its rightful place in Europe, as part of
our broader message that a re-invigorated Europe is in the
U.S. interest. If we decide to participate in an ESDP police
mission in Kosovo, we should use this as an example -- one
for them to follow -- of choosing the institutional framework
for joint action to match the needs of the situation. Luc
Ferry, a former Education Minister, political commentator and
close friend of Sarkozy's, has urged that we attempt to
change Sarkozy's opposition to Turkey's EU membership. While
a change of heart appears extremely unlikely given Sarkozy's
political identification with opposition to Turkish
membership and his categorical statements on the issue, we
should seek to persuade him to temper his post-election
rhetoric, allow accession negotiations to proceed, and at
least not close the door dramatically and completely at this
time.

-- KOSOVO/RUSSIA: We should stress the importance of a
united front in the UN Security Council on Kosovo's
independence. We would welcome a more active French role in
persuading Russia not to veto a UNSC Resolution.

ENGAGING THE SARKOZY ADMINISTRATION
-----------------------------------
¶10. (C) We will know more about the likely foreign policy
orientations of the new Sarkozy government once he names a
foreign minister and key advisors are in place. We would
expect him to designate someone of proven competence (such as
former FM Alain Juppe, Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie,
or former FM Michel Barnier). There is no reason to believe
that Sarkozy will come into office with the intent of
seriously challenging the Gaullist consensus underlying
French foreign policy. The MFA will work overtime to ensure
continuity in French policy positions. Over time, and as he

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gains experience, Sarkozy is certain to assert his authority
over foreign policy more directly. It still remains to be
seen whether Sarkozy will create -- as proposed by Pierre
Lellouche -- the French equivalent of a National Security
Council that would supplant the Presidential diplomatic cell
and assume a larger role in coordinating French foreign
policy; we have no indication Sarkozy has personally signed
on to such a move. It is also unclear whether the
Presidency's Africa Cell, which has long enjoyed a privileged
position, will survive in its present form. Sarkozy's desire
to move away from Elysee-centered personal diplomacy with
African leaders may mean the days of this bureaucratic
post-colonial throwback may be numbered.

¶11. (C) Although Sarkozy will initially be focused on
domestic reforms and relaunching the EU, he will also grasp
every opportunity to showcase his leadership of a
re-invigorated France on the international scene, confident
of its place in the world. This entails -- and he will not
be shy about repeating this point publicly -- establishing a
relationship of trust and working together productively with
the United States. The Deputy Secretary's May 15-16 visit
will offer the first occasion to make our views known to the
new Administration, as it comes into office (unfortunately,
this also means that Sarkozy himself will be unavailable for
meetings). The Defense Secretary's June 5-6 visit to France
will offer an excellent opportunity to engage the leaders of
the newly-constituted government.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON


/tag/IR_0.html


07PARIS4357     2007-10-26 10:10     2010-11-30 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 11 PARIS 004357

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
NSC FOR NSA HADLEY
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR, NEA, SA, EAP, PM, E, EB, G, WHA, AND AF

EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2017
TAGS PREL, OVIP, NATO, UNO, YI, RS, IR, IS, LE, FR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SARKOZY’S FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE
U.S.: POLICY COORDINATION WITH A SELF-CONSCIOUSLY INDEPENDENT FRANCE

Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton for reasons 1.4. (b) & (d) .

¶1. (SBU) Introduction and Summary: The Nicolas Sarkozy who arrives in Washington November 6 is in robust political health. He completely dominates the politics of France. All the levers of institutional power in a highly centralized state are at his disposal. He remains committed to a revitalization of France, through a reform of policies and laws that have acted as a break on French economic growth. The challenge now is to put his ideas and programs into effect. Off to a quick start this summer, with the implementation of a first series of reform measures, Sarkozy is now beginning to feel the full force of French resistance to change. His public support as reflected in the polls is high, but has slipped of late. The political impact of the first direct challenge, last week’s national transportation strike, is not yet clear, but strikes in other sectors are threatening, raising the possibility of the kind of crisis atmosphere Sarkozy had hoped to avoid, given his electoral mandate and professed openness to dialogue. The image of a well-oiled, disciplined machine has suffered, as Sarkozy has repeatedly rebuked members of his team, including his own Prime Minister, raising questions about a thin-skinned and authoritarian personal style. The concentration of power and decision-making in the Presidency has made for uneven decision-making and follow-through. The prospect of slower domestic and international economic growth and a tight GOF budget have narrowed his room for maneuver. His appointment to the cabinet of women and minority representatives and the more populist style of his Presidency have been well-received, but his omnipresence and hyper-activity risk overexposure and Sarkozy-fatigue. Finally, freshly divorced from Cecilia, he is deprived of someone who (by his own account) was crucial to his personal equilibrium and served as a valued political sounding board.

¶2. (SBU) While not central to his Presidential campaign, Sarkozy has quickly asserted French leadership in Europe and staked out new positions and a role for France on the most pressing international issues. He believes that a relationship of trust and close cooperation with the U.S. enhances France’s ability to make an impact -- toward the achievement of what are in most cases common objectives. After five months in office he (and his foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner) have begun to make their mark. They have overseen a dramatic shift in French policy on Iraq, reversed declining French support in Afghanistan, have set in motion a possible “return” to NATO, toughened France’s approach to Iran and also Russia, and promised a new one toward Africa. The top foreign policy issue for Sarkozy is the environment, which he has embraced as a headline issue, linking foreign and domestic policy. Sarkozy and Kouchner also assign priority to Kosovo, Lebanon, and Darfur. Sarkozy’s decision to assist the Dutch in Afghanistan is the latest illustration of a willingness to push a cautious bureaucracy and military and to break the mold of Chirac-era policy. Despite, and perhaps because of, convergence with the U.S. on key issues, and the dramatic improvement in the tone of the relationship, Sarkozy has identified specific areas of disagreement with the U.S.

¶3. (C) We continue to believe that Sarkozy represents an important opportunity. Energetic, in full command at home, he is determined to make a mark on the international scene. As distinct from Chirac, who advocated multi-polar containment of U.S. hegemony, Sarkozy is well-disposed personally to the U.S. He wants close policy cooperation with us, but in a relationship that gives France its full due as an independent player. “Alliance, not alignment” is the way he usually puts it, although he is not beyond striking a more defiant pose, as recently in Moscow, when he stated publicly that he would not be a “vassal” of the U.S. He will also continue to highlight differences on selected issues --

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such as the environment, GMOs and Turkey’s relationship with Europe -- as demonstrations of France’s independent policy course. His emphasis of French independence makes less controversial at home both the warming up of the bilateral relationship and the bold policy decisions in such areas as Iraq, NATO, and Afghanistan. A distinct French approach, supportive on many issues, but not in lock-step, is in our interest. A partner with the international bone fides that France retains, as a leading European power close to but proudly independent of the U.S., is one that can enlarge our ability to effect positive outcomes internationally.

¶4. (U) In addition to setting the scene for Sarkozy’s first official visit to Washington, this message iterates the state of play in a long list of issues where opportunities and challenges abound in U.S.-France relations. End Summary
PART ONE: SARKOZY FIVE MONTHS INTO HIS PRESIDENCY

¶5. (SBU) Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to Washington follows an exceptionally long “state of grace” (as the French call a political honeymoon), one that only began to peter out in October, the fifth month of Sarkozy’s Presidency. Through the summer and well into the new French political year that begins in September, Sarkozy seemed incapable of a political misstep. His poll ratings set records both vertically (level) and horizontally (durability). For a politician long attacked as an extremist and a divider, this was no small feat.

¶6. (SBU) Sarkozy’s success is attributable to several factors. While Candidate Sarkozy ran a hard right election campaign geared to winning over the 15-20 percent of the votes that Jean-Marie LePen’s National Front had captured in recent years, President Sarkozy quickly made clear he wanted to be a President of all the French, not just the political right. He also made clear that his ambition would not be satisfied with his election to the Presidency. He was determined to use the office to get France moving again -- unleashing its economic potential, allowing it to surmount long-term budgetary, financial and social challenges. He would do this by making good on his program of concrete reform measures, which had received a mandate from the French electorate.

¶7. (SBU) Immediately after his election in May, Sarkozy embarked on a policy of inclusiveness (“ouverture”), bringing in leading figures of the opposition, including the Socialist Party (such as Foreign Minister Kouchner), the non-Gaullist center-right, and civil society. In addition, he shattered the white-male cast of previous French governments with his appointments of women and minorities, including to key ministries. On the strength of his electoral mandate, and with this inclusiveness as cover, Sarkozy moved swiftly, and with virtually no Socialist opposition, to implement his reform program, moving five major pieces of legislation through Parliament by early October. Sarkozy seemed well on his way to proving that France could embrace change, and that he could imprint on it the “culture of results” that would be the basis for less painful, self-renewing change in the future.

¶8. (SBU) Over the past few weeks, shadows have entered this unnaturally bright picture. Current polling suggests that while support for Sarkozy remains at historically high levels (in the low 60’s, depending on the poll), there has been a slow erosion in his standing, which has perhaps accelerated in the past few weeks. In the first serious push-back against a key reform, French public transport unions engaged in a country-wide strike on October 18 over the generous pensions available to public transport workers. Sarkozy

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insists that this time unions will not be able to scuttle this or any other part of the government’s reform program -- while continuing to stress the need for dialogue, not government fiat, as the mode of action. However, international economic uncertainty affords Sarkozy far less room for maneuver as he seeks to reduce both government expenditures and taxes to unleash economic activity, while not fatally exacerbating France’s already alarming debt situation.

¶9. (SBU) Sarkozy’s unexpected willingness to compromise on several of his reform measures may signal recognition of the hard economic realities. However, he risks diminishing this image of determination and command -- key components of his political success thus far. Sarkozy appeared critical of both his Finance Minister and his Prime Minister in turn when the former called for “greater rigor” in state spending and the latter described the state as “bankrupt” in parliamentary hearings. Sarkozy, fearing that alarmist pronouncements could undermine the public’s confidence, risks creating an impression of friction and hesitation at the top. Sarkozy’s close personal association with policy reform has reduced his ability to cast aside the Prime Minister or other officials should his policies lose public support.

¶10. (SBU) The transport unions are but one of the constituencies Sarkozy will offend in shaking the French economy loose from policies that have held back growth and bloated public spending. As he pushes for reforms that make it easier to fire workers, shrink the size of the state (whose spending represents 52 percent of GDP) by cutting the civil service, and open up retail markets to more competition, he can expect further pushback from well-entrenched constituencies. Sarkozy has set in motion a series of negotiations on these issues that ultimately could lead to important systemic change. But the real impact will only become clear once the negotiations conclude -- probably in early 2008 -- and the government is forced to make politically difficult decisions.

¶11. (SBU) France’s broader economic environment will not make the reform process any easier. Having promised the electorate measures that would bring an extra percentage point of growth to the economy, the Sarkozy government finds itself at a delicate point in the business cycle. The government has already scaled back earlier 2007 growth estimates, and most private sector economists believe the government’s 2008 estimates are inflated. Although the fiscal stimulus from tax cuts passed this summer may give the president a short-term boost, he is unlikely to enjoy the political benefit of a strong growth environment in which to pursue his supply-side reforms. He has also promised the French people increased purchasing power, which will be hard to achieve. Some of this he blames on the strength of the dollar.

¶12. (SBU) Sarkozy is keen on unleashing market forces to reinvigorate the French economy, but he is less than laissez-faire when it comes to restructuring French industry. The French state owns a far smaller share of the economy than was once the case, but it still has effective control of energy and other key sectors. Sarkozy’s industrial policy seems to be based on facilitating the emergence of key French firms as leaders in their industries in Europe and globally. While European experience with national champions industrial policies is shaky, the French have done comparatively well of late. Sarkozy does not hesitate to reduce state ownership in these deals. The merger of Gaz de France with Suez creates a European giant in gas and energy but also reduces the French stake in its gas company from 80 percent to 30 percent.

¶13. (SBU) At the macroeconomic level, Sarkozy has been highly critical of the European Central Bank’s tight money, strong Euro policy and he is all but ignoring previously
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agreed Eurozone commitments to brining budgets back into balance. In both cases, Eurozone partners have little recourse and France can ride for free on the budget discipline of its partners, at least for a while. In the meantime, the President’s approach plays well at home, and often appears designed for domestic consumption.

¶14. (SBU) The U.S.-French economic relationship remains robust, with over $1 billion in commercial transactions per day taking place between the two countries’ firms. During President Sarkozy’s visit, CEOs from some of the most important of these will meet, for the first time in several years as the French-American Business Council (FABC) to exchange views on policy priorities. U.S. firms have been almost unanimously positive about the Sarkozy government. Nonetheless there are a number of regulatory unknowns that could potentially impact U.S. commercial interests. Among these are the GOF’s evolving views on genetically-modified organisms, IPR in the digital environment and pricing policy as it relates to pharmaceutical spending.

¶15. (C) On permanent overdrive and intense in the best of times, Sarkozy’s recent divorce raises questions about his ability to maintain his equilibrium and focus. Sarkozy has himself spoken of his dependence on Cecilia -- “my source of strength and my Achilles Heel,” as he put it. During their separation in 2005, a highly irritable, darker Sarkozy came into view -- the same one that reappeared at the Lisbon Summit the day after the announcement of the divorce. How much Cecilia really anchored him, personally and politically, should soon become evident, but we are betting on Sarkozy’s ability to bounce back.

¶16. (C) Notwithstanding the debate swirling around him and his slight decline in the polls, Sarkozy’s political health remains strong. He controls all the main levers of power: the Presidency, the Parliament, the dominant political party, and the omnipresent agents of the French state. The opposition Socialists are in disarray, incapable for the moment of taking unified policy positions. Sarkozy is in a position to reassert French leadership in Europe and in international affairs generally. He (and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner) have also begun to make their mark, unevenly, on French policy. The foreign policy equivalent of his domestic “rupture” are his Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and possibly NATO. On Iraq, Sarkozy and Kouchner have made a dramatic difference, offering political support and associating France with reconstruction efforts -- and prompting surprisingly little opposition or criticism. On NATO, Sarkozy has challenged his bureaucracy -- and the U.S. -- to find a way to fashion a win-win approach for NATO and ESDP that would entail a full French “return” to NATO, although the specifics of Sarkozy’s conditions have not yet been worked through. Sarkozy will be calculating the political cost of any shift on NATO, knowing that he would be breaking a foreign policy consensus that has long enjoyed the support of the Gaullist right, much of the center, and all of the left. Other issues already showing Sarkozy’s imprint include: Russia, where he is less willing to accommodate and is increasingly concerned about Russian intentions and objectives; the Middle East, where he has introduced a new emphasis on Israel’s security into the inhospitable ground of France’s “politique Arabe”; and, Africa, where Sarkozy appears intent on finally making a break from France’s post-colonial reflexes and relationships. Other high priority issues which Sarkozy will also want to discuss include his top issue, climate change, along with Iran, Kosovo, Burma, Darfur, counterterrorism and climate change. Sarkozy’s approach to these and other international issues of concern to both France and the U.S. are discussed in the second section of this cable.

PART TWO:
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KEY POLICY ISSUES: WHERE THEY ARE AND WHERE WE WANT THEM TO BE

¶17. (C) The White House has already publicly enumerated key topics on the visit agenda: Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East Peace, Lebanon, Darfur, Burma, Kosovo, counterterrorism, and the promotion of democracy. Herein follows a snapshot of where the French are on each of them and on some additional areas, and where we would like to move them. Our list is topped by thee priority policy issues -- Iraq, NATO, and Russia -- sufficiently sensitive not to have been publicly highlighted in the White House announcement, along with Afghanistan, followed by climate change, which will likely be highest on Sarkozy’s list.

¶18. (C) Iraq: The sudden and dramatic French decision, days following the President’s meeting in Kennebunkport, to break with previous policy and reengage with Iraq has uncertain paternity -- with both Sarkozy and Kouchner claiming credit. Following Kouchner’s three-day visit to Iraq in August, the GOF has already hosted both President Talibani and FM Zebari. Last week, Sarkozy told Talibani that France wanted to help Iraq across the board -- politically, diplomatically, educationally, and culturally. French assistance will not include any commitment of French troops in Iraq, but it could include training for Iraqi security/police units as well as counterterrorism forces. The French have promised other, initially symbolic measures such as opening a diplomatic office in the northern city of Irbil and aid for a hospital in the same area. Kouchner has already pressed the EU to become more active in multinational efforts at reconstruction, which France would like the UN to head up. Any U.S. diplomatic conference or initiative could garner French support: Kouchner plans to attend the upcoming ministerial meeting in Istanbul of Iraq’s “neighbors.” In fact, the French are just starting to figure out how they can best help Iraq, especially to relieve what they see as a harsh humanitarian situation. Sarkozy would likely be open to detailed discussion on this topic: Given his and Kouchner’s identification with the new policy, and abiding lack of enthusiasm in at least parts of the bureaucracy, he is in fact the best place to start. Regarding the U.S. role, Sarkozy and Kouchner do not share their predecessors’ fixation on our continued troop presence. They understand and acknowledge the reality that a hasty pullout of U.S. troops would lead to a worsening, not a lessening, of the violence with potentially grave implications for the larger region. We should push Sarkozy to implement humanitarian and reconstruction programs in Iraq, starting with an already promised medical clinic in the Kurdish north, as soon as possible.

¶19. (C) Iran: Sarkozy’s blunt language on the “unacceptability” of a militarily nuclear Iran, and the need to maintain maximum pressure on the Iranian regime over its nuclear program has only been exceeded by that of his foreign minister. The degree to which France has taken a public lead with the EU to press for additional European sanctions should the UNSC be unable to act has been as impressive as has Sarkozy’s willingness to confront Russian President Putin over this issue. French officials make the point that Paris has a “normal” diplomatic relationship with Tehran despite sharp disagreements on the nuclear question. In this context, the French have particularly valued their quiet dialogue over Lebanon, which has convinced them that, by contrast with Syria, Iran has no interest in renewed internal violence that might accompany failure to elect a new president. Sarkozy has proven impervious to Iranian blandishments aimed at softening France’s position or even to break it away from the P-5 1 group, much to Iran’s chagrin. The meetings with Sarkozy offer an opportunity to bolster France’s tough line, and it can be expected that Sarkozy will want to get a sense from the President of his analysis of our

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ability to influence Iranian choices, and how best to maintain international pressure toward that end. Having just met with Israeli PM Olmert to discuss the same issue, Sarkozy will be keen to understand the limits of our patience while we pursue the diplomatic track, which, like us, France prefers to exhaust before considering military options.

¶20. (C) NATO: In one of his first acts as President, Sarkozy launched a defense “white paper” commission to review France’s defense and security priorities; one component of the report (expected in March 2008) is a review of France’s relationship with NATO. The defense white paper could set the stage for a possible full re-integration into the NATO military command. President Sarkozy and Defense Minister Morin launched a public debate over a deeper French role in the Alliance in September in two major foreign policy speeches. Sarkozy clarified that French rapprochement to NATO would be tied to two conditions:
1) strengthening European defense structures by developing Europe’s own capabilities to plan and carry out defense and security operations, and
2) seeking French representation in the highest “decision making posts of NATO.” The MFA and defense establishment uniformly caution us against raised expectations, with some in the Sarkozy Administration (reportedly including Prime Minister Fillon) concerned that abrupt moves toward NATO could be controversial domestically. All, beginning with Sarkozy, argue that, at a minimum, ESDP needs to be strengthened in parallel. The idea seems to be that a French embrace of NATO will ease U.S. concerns about a more robustly structured European defense, while progress on that front will help ease opposition at home to France’s “return” to NATO. Sarkozy will likely use his speech before Congress to further refine his public approach, casting France’s willingness to move ahead in terms of working with the U.S. as an independent ally and partner (not automatically “aligned” to U.S. positions). We believe this visit offers an unprecedented opportunity to identify with Sarkozy the common ground on which a mutually beneficial “bargain” on NATO and European defense might be elaborated. In addition to addressing the substance of Sarkozy’s two “conditions,” we will want to learn how open he is to modifying France’s narrowly military, Europe-focused vision of NATO, and whether he will be on a sufficiently fast track to implement or in some way foreshadow elements of a “bargain” at Bucharest in April.


¶21. (C) Afghanistan: After a moment of hesitation during his Presidential campaign, Sarkozy now publicly highlights the importance of French efforts in Afghanistan. France has recently stepped up military commitments by deploying 3 additional Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to complement the 2,000 military personnel (ISAF and OEF) now deployed (largely in and around Kabul). Significantly, Sarkozy recently responded positively to the Dutch Prime Minister’s pleas for a French presence in Uruzgan, needed to secure parliamentary approval for renewing the Netherlands’ participation in ISAF. In agreeing to deploy a French OMLT, Sarkozy again demonstrated his willingness to move ahead of more cautious advisors and a bureaucracy that prefers slow adaptation to bold moves. France has taken other decisions to bolster its presence in Afghanistan including moving six French Mirage planes from Dushanbe to Kandahar. On September 10, the French and Germans reaffirmed plans to support the German-led EU police training mission in Afghanistan despite delays. On July 30, SACEUR officially requested six medium-lift helicopters to provide rotary-wing support in ISAF (to replace the U.S. helicopters which are scheduled to depart early 2008). France is considering still this request. We should use the opportunity of the visit to persuade the French to broaden and deepen their efforts in Afghanistan, including by standing up a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). We understand the Presidency favors this proposal, while civilian leadership at the MOD opposes a French PRT. Sarkozy may echo recent MFA and MOD

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calls for a more “comprehensive Afghanistan strategy,” integrating military support and civilian reconstruction, and including a timeline for shifting the burden from the international coalition to the Government of Afghanistan.

¶22. (SBU) Environment/Climate Change: Climate Change: On his election day, Sarkozy called for a greater U.S leadership role on climate issues. He will want to come out of his meeting with the President able to say that he again pushed the President to lead. The Embassy, backed closely by Washington agencies, has impressed on not only Sarkozy and his staff, but also officials across France that the U.S. has been leading and continues to lead in the fight against climate change. We’ve impressed on them -- and Sarkozy should be told again -- that the U.S. has spent $37 billion in the past six years -- more than any other country -- for climate science and energy research. We’ve developed new international partnerships, part of a real strategy of international engagement to reduce carbon emissions. We’ve shown the French that even with considerably greater economic and population growth than in Europe, we’re doing a better job at reducing both energy intensity and carbon emissions. After the President’s Major Economies Meeting (MEM) in late September in Washington, French officials offered to host the next meeting while expressing some disappointment with both the lack of agreement on a post-Kyoto emissions goal and U.S. reluctance regarding market-based cap and trade measures. Areas of potential conflict include concerns that a failure for a broad adoption of similar carbon reduction schemes will put European industry at a competitive disadvantage and the possible French advocacy of a European imposed carbon tax on imported goods. Despite extensive U.S.-French collaboration in developing next generation climate-friendly technologies, the French also criticize what they see as U.S. over-reliance on yet-to-be-developed technologies (carbon capture and storage, second generation bio-fuels, and advanced nuclear) to address emissions. France is skeptical that China and India and other major emerging economies will take steps to reduce emissions unless the U.S. moves first. This is an opportunity to convince Sarkozy that we take this issue seriously and have a concrete plan to make real progress.

¶23. (C) Democracy Promotion/Burma: Under President Sarkozy, the French position on Burma has converged with that of the U.S. France vigorously condemned the regime’s crackdown on peaceful protesters; pushed through as UNSC president a presidential statement supporting the democracy movement; supported toughening EU sanctions; and, bilaterally pressed ASEAN members to take a tougher stand on Burma. FM Kouchner will have visited ASEAN countries and China in the week before Sarkozy’s visit to Washington to push the Burmese leadership to reconcile with Aung San Suu Kyi and the political opposition. While Sarkozy seems forward-leaning (he reportedly considered French disinvestment before being dissuaded by advisors), thus far France remains unprepared to implement unilateral sanctions. Sarkozy, however, has urged French companies to freeze future investments. In our efforts to work with France to promote democracy, we should appeal to Sarkozy to redouble French efforts within the EU to push for tough sanctions against the Junta and for measures in support of the democracy movement.

¶24. (C) Russia: During his first presidential visit to Russia on October 9-10, Sarkozy’s advisors were reportedly struck by Putin’s defiant and distrustful attitude toward the U.S. and his “revisionist” desire to dismantle or undermine the perceived anti-Russian institutional framework -- regional and international -- that has prevailed since the fall of the Soviet Union. Sarkozy made little or no progress with Putin on a broad range of topics including Iran, missile defense, Georgia and Kosovo. Sarkozy’s positions tracked with U.S. views except on Georgia, where he favors future status that is short of NATO membership. Sarkozy’s visit to Moscow highlights a sea-change in Franco-Russian relations

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from the Chirac era. Sarkozy has abandoned Chirac’s notion of Russia as a counterweight to the U.S., and does not shy away from directly addressing difficult issues, including democracy, human rights and rule of law problems in Russia, Chechnya and energy policies. Sarkozy, for example, took the unprecedented (for a French President) step of visiting human rights activists while in Moscow. France is concerned about both Putin’s increasingly authoritarian style and Russia’s increasing willingness to defy international opinion, as on CFE and Georgia. Sarkozy is also less willing than Chirac to allow energy security and trade priorities to dominate France’s appoach. That said, the French never fail to remind us of Russia’s relative proximity and France’s and Europe’s need to come to terms with a newly assertive Russia. Sarkozy will want to address how the U.S. can work with France, in cooperation with its major European partners, to find a new modus vivendi with Russia. We should use the meetings with Sarkozy to solidify a common approach of tough engagement with Russia and highlight the need for the closest cooperation on four related subjects: Georgia, Kosovo, Missile Defense and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.

¶25. (C/NF) Georgia: In Moscow October 9-10, Sarkozy told Putin that France opposes full NATO membership for Georgia (although we have been assured he did not address MAP for Georgia with him). High-level French interlocutors have emphasized in recent meetings that France remains open to “something less than membership.” The GOF has maintained that NATO membership “should not create new lines of division” and that territorial conflicts should be resolved prior to membership -- and that Georgia does not meet these criteria. France is considering whether NATO could offer Georgia a different kind of status and a different approach to regional security, possibly combined with incentives including abolishing visas with the EU. While we are aware of reports that Sarkozy told Georgian President Saakashvili that he supports MAP for Georgia, the GOF continues to oppose MAP which would, in its view, create additional tensions with Russia and exacerbate Georgia’s problems with its separatist regions. It also talks about the need to define the territorial limits of NATO and its Article 5 collective security obligations.

¶26. (C) Kosovo: This is an opportunity for the President to reaffirm Sarkozy’s commitment to an independent Kosovo. Sarkozy has stated numerous times that he supports Kosovo’s independence and has instructed FM Kouchner to actively seek EU consensus on the matter. The French also remind us from time to time that Kosovo is a European issue which Europeans bear primary responsibility for solving. The GOF is pessimistic that Serbia and Kosovo will come to a status agreement and is working closely with the U.S. and the Contact Group on post-December 10 actions. The French remain concerned that while EU member-states may agree to not publicly oppose Kosovo’s independence, the EU may fail to reach consensus on a legal basis for an ESDP mission in Kosovo. The GOF has accepted UNSCR 1244 as a basis for an international force in Kosovo and agrees with the U.S. that it would not be advantageous to seek a new UNSCR. Sarkozy lobbied Putin in Moscow for more Russian flexibility, but received no commitments. The U.S. and EU, Sarkozy will argue, must publicly demonstrate that a good faith effort was made to come to an agreement. The French are not prepared to recognize independence before the end of 2007 and are hopeful that the U.S. will assist in convincing the Kosovars that it is in their interest to be patient with the EU. Sarkozy will likely ask that the U.S. work closely with Kosovar authorities to take a coordinated (U.S, EU, Kosovo) approach to Kosovo’s now almost inevitable unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), and avoid dramatic rhetoric that will further embarrass Serbia, encourage similar UDIs by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and put internal political pressure on EU states like Greece and Cyprus to publicly oppose Kosovo’s

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independence.

¶27. (C) Missile Defense: The French agree that Russia’s objections to the planned system are politically driven, reflecting a Russian view of its relationship with its former satellites that is at once “revisionist” but is also informed by real fears of NATO encirclement. The GOF is interested in U.S. plans for NATO to adopt a complementary system to protect the exposed southern flank of Europe from short- and medium-range threat, although it has warned that there is “not one Euro” allocated to pay for such a system. Sarkozy will be interested in learning of the status of U.S.-Russian discussions and our analysis of prospects for bringing Moscow around to support a cooperative effort. We should urge Sarkozy to use his leadership position in Europe to promote understanding of the true nature and scope of the MD initiative, one that in no way threatens Russia.

¶28. (C) CFE: The French government remains concerned over the Russian threat to suspend participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in December and strongly supports a unified Allied position in support of the U.S. “parallel actions” plan. FM Kouchner recently wrote to Secretary Rice to propose an informal CFE seminar in Paris on
SIPDIS November 5-6 to promote constructive dialogue leading to a comprehensive political solution. These efforts are seen as key to keeping allied solidarity and building pressure on Russia to recognize the consequences of pulling out of a major arms control treaty. Despite these efforts, the French are increasingly pessimistic; Political Director Gerard Araud was told recently in Moscow that “the decision was already made” by Putin and the MOD to suspend participation, due in part to Russian views that it is “humiliating” to have flank limits imposed on Russian forces within its own borders. We should welcome French initiatives to help resolve the CFE issue and continue our close collaboration.

¶29. (C) Lebanon: Sarkozy has not been as closely associated as FM Kouchner with French efforts to help Lebanon elect a new president and emerge from its present political crisis, but he has played a key supporting role. Initially unimpressed with the March 14 majority leaders he met, Sarkozy?s view of Saad Hariri has improved with subsequent meetings. After their last session, Sarkozy authorized announcement of France?s tranche of more than $6 million for the Special Tribunal, which France had been withholding pending a formal request for contributions by the UN Secretary-General. Our close consultations with the French
SIPDIS over Lebanon continue, although we differ over tactics and the risks attached to any strategy that would allow the majority to elect a president via simple majority. The French emphasize finding a “consensus” candidate acceptable to all Lebanese and external parties and place more trust than we believe wise in Lebanese parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, despite his association with the pro-Syrian minority. While the French have revived limited contact with Syria to discuss Lebanon, we do not believe they intend to go further at this stage. We will want to discuss with Sarkozy how to keep pressure on the Lebanese to elect a president by the November 24 deadline without compromising the gains we have made over the past two years in terms of reducing Syrian influence and reasserting Lebanese independence. We will want to impress on him that the election of a President -- whether by majority of consensus -- by November 24 is a must; fear of the repercussions of election of a President by a “mere” majority should not be ruled out if it is the only way to prevent a void that the Syrians would only be too happy to fill.

¶30. (C) Middle East Peace Process: Sarkozy will want to hear about our efforts to convene a regional meeting in support of Israeli/Palestinian efforts at achieving a two-state solution. The French have generally supported our efforts and not tried to get out in front. They are,
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however, eager to play some sort of role. Sarkozy has taken to using his bona fides as a “friend of Israel” to call on it for more “creativity” and “gestures” toward the Palestinians in the run-up to the meeting. The GOF recently announced its intention to host a donor’s conference for humanitarian assistance to help the Palestinian people -- as an end in itself and in support of the political process. Sarkozy will mostly be in a listening mode, though as someone who has sought since taking office to underscore his readiness to listen at least as attentively to the Israeli point of view as the Arab one.

¶31. (C) France-EU: President Sarkozy was instrumental in re-activating the moribund political reform process in the European Union with the June negotiation for a shortened “reform treaty” that will simplify some of the EU’s operating procedures, while side-stepping efforts of deepened political integration that doomed the EU constitution in 2005. This “reform treaty” was approved by EU leaders in Lisbon last week and is scheduled to be signed in December with ratification over the course of 2008. Sarkozy has said publicly he wants France to be the first country to ratify the simplified treaty; the process of parliamentary ratification will begin in December. The French will also take over the rotating EU presidency from July-December 2008 and plan to focus on immigration, energy, the environment and European defense during their term. While Sarkozy remains firmly opposed to EU enlargement to include Turkey, he has effectively sidestepped this issue by supporting continued negotiations on the acquis communautaire that do not pre-suppose membership. He also conditioned his position on EU support for a “Committee of Wise Men” to reflect “without taboos” on the broader questions about the European future: i.e., what is the European identity, what should the EU’s borders be, how to handle common issues, and how deep can political integration go.

¶32. (C) Colombia: Sarkozy promised during his presidential campaign to work for the release of Franco-Colombian FARC hostage Ingrid Betancourt. He would sorely like to be able to achieve in a few short months what Chirac couldn’t despite years of effort. In June of this year, the French pushed Colombian President Alvaro Uribe to release 200 FARC prisoners in an effort to move forward negotiations for the release of FARC hostages. While the prisoner release did not achieve the desired results, the French are now backing Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s offer to negotiate a hostage deal between the Colombian government and FARC guerillas. Sarkozy invited Chavez to Paris in late November. The French admit Chavez is a difficult political actor but accept a “bargain with the devil” to advance prospects for the release of an iconic hostage. Sarkozy may ask us to return two FARC leaders in U.S. prison to a third country in order to obtain the release of French hostage. We should ask Sarkozy not to take any steps that would result in separate treatment for Ingrid Betancourt and put U.S. hostages in harm’s way.

¶33. (SBU) GMO Moratorium: When Sarkozy came into office not only did he create a ‘mega’ environment ministry, but he also directed it to undertake a process, the ‘Grenelle’, involving all sectors of the economy to reshape French environmental policies. Among the topics considered in the Grenelle was what to do about Genetically Modified Organisms, a subject of considerable domestic concern in France. The result is that France is currently considering a moratorium on biotech planting that would significantly undermine U.S. agricultural exports to Europe. We believe President Sarkozy may support the politically popular moratorium in order to gain capital to use in his reform efforts.

¶34. (C) Darfur (and Chad, Central African Republic): Sarkozy demonstrated an immediate renewed interest in Africa
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upon entering office, with France calling for and organizing the June 25 ministerial conference on Darfur, which served to refocus international attention on that country. The French followed up with a ministerial meeting on Darfur on the margins of the UNGA in New York in September and then hosted a broader Security Council session on Africa for heads-of-state/government. France has been instrumental in organizing a separate Security Council-blessed EU-UN peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT). Paris hopes to deploy this force as soon as practicable. In addition, the French have firmly supported the deployment of the hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur (UNAMID). We should thank Sarkozy for French leadership on Chad and the C.A.R.. Sarkozy may ask for enhanced U.S. financial contributions to MINURCAT.
Please visit Paris’ Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton


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09LONDON2198     2009-09-22 14:02     2010-11-30 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy London

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3554
INFO RUCNDSC/DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
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Tuesday, 22 September 2009, 14:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 002198
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS PARM, KNNP, PREL, CH, EG, FR, IN, IR, IZ, JA, KN, PK,
RS, SL, UK
SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER’S MEETINGS WITH FS MILIBAND AND OTHER
HMG OFFICIALS
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Under Secretary Tauscher held meetings in London on September 2-4 on the margins of the P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards nuclear Disarmament with Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Simon McDonald, Head of the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, Mariot Leslie, Director General, Defence and Intelligence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Jon Day, MOD Director General for Security Policy. The UK interlocutors expressed broad support for USG goals with regard to nonproliferation and disarmament and highlighted the need for close P3 and P5 coordination in the lead-up to the UNSC Heads of Goverment Summit and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Confererence (RevCon). They also predicted that UK arms control policy would not be affected either by next year’s elections or the upcoming Strategic Defense Review. McDonald cited the need to get tough with Iran if it did not respond to overtures by the end of September. U/S Tauscher expressed continued commitment to ratification of the Defense Trade Treaty and noted that she is working with the Senate to resolve questions concerning implementation. End Summary
Welcoming U.S. Leadership
-------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) While in London for the September 3-4 P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards nuclear Disarmament, U/S Tauscher held separate meetings September 2-4 with Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Simon McDonald, Head of the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, Mariot Leslie, Director General, Defence and Intelligence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Jon Day, MOD Director General for Security Policy. The British interlocutors underscored that the UK welcomes U.S. leadership on nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control. FS Miliband expressed appreciation for President Obama’s Prague speech, observing that the process for getting to “a world at or close to zero in terms of nuclear arms is not a straight line” but is long and complex. McDonald said that for the last forty years the nuclear states have downplayed the obligation to spread civil nuclear power and to disarm; President Obama’s leadership presents an opportunity to change that dynamic. DG Leslie observed that UK decision makers are “fired up by how the President has made the (nonproliferation) agenda his own.” Prime Minister Brown wants to “refresh and refurbish” the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), she said. DG Day said he was “delighted” that the U.S. has “resumed leadership” on nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament.
Maintaining P3 and P5 Unity
---------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) Leslie stressed that the UK position is “really very similar to your Administration on nearly everything.” The UK’s goal is for the P5 to work well together but we should “not scare the horses,” which means “not scaring off the French” and “keeping the Chinese and Russians on board.” She acknowledged that it was “hard to get everyone together” for the 9/3-4 P5 Conference, but expressed hope that it would help cement P5 unity in the lead-up to the NPT Review Confererence (RevCon). Day acknowledged that the 9/3-4 P5 Conference was not a vehicle designed to make progress by “leaps and bounds.” He stressed that “the engagement is valuable” and would help cement P5 unity.
¶4. (S/NF) We need a strong, but unanimous, signal from the UN Security Council (UNSC) at the UNSC Heads of Government Summit, Simon McDonald stressed, noting that the first draft resolution was a disappointment. The UK interlocutors agreed on the importance of P5 unity at the summit, as well as on the importance of close P3 and P5 coordination in the lead-up to the summit and to the NPT RevCon. McDonald also observed that Libya was on the UNSC and that the P5 should take positive note of the fact that Libya has made a “strategic shift” on nuclear proliferation.
France and P3 Unity
-------------------
¶5. (S/NF) DG Leslie said that the UK had done a “lot of hard
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work and expressed a commitment to disarmament...and the French are uncomfortable with this.” Leslie said that the UK “gets on well” with the French, but the French are “excessively worried about what they view as unilateral UK disarmament.” She said that P3 talks would help maintain P3 unity; “We need to reassure France,” she said. Leslie characterized closer U.S.-France relations as “extremely healthy.”
¶6. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher, Leslie, and Day agreed to regular P3 meetings, starting in October, to help cement P3 unity. French interlocutors also agreed, during separate bilateral meetings with Tauscher, on the importance of regular P3 consultations.
Missile Defense and the nuclear Posture Review
--------------------------------------------- -
¶7. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher described the Missile Defense review underway in Washington, with emphasis on countering the Iranian missile threat to Europe with proven technology. She also described the nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which would replace the 2002 NPR and would address questions such as extended deterrence and security assurances. Her UK interlocutors expressed considerable interest in both reviews, and she made clear the U.S. would consult bilaterally and with NATO as soon as the reviews progress to that point.
Political consensus on a Strategic Defense Review
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶8. (S/NF) Day acknowledged that “the next year will be pretty disruptive” in the UK as the two major parties prepare for the next general election. He stressed that both the Labour and Conservative parties are committed to a Strategic Defense Review after the election. He predicted that neither political conflict between the two major parties nor the defense review would affect arms control policy, although he advised that these factors “may distract the attention” of political leaders. He predicted that “defense will be a bigger issue than it usually is” during the British electoral period. He cited intense debate over Britain’s role in Afghanistan and the “defense budget crisis” as two prominent issues.
¶9. (S/NF) Day opined that “mobilizing” NATO allies after General McChrystal released the results of his review would be “very difficult.” “Our message” to the U.S. is “bear with us... we will continue to work closely with you,” Day said. He pledged to work closely with the U.S. on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National Posture Review (NPR) as well as on the UK’s Strategic Defense Review. In regard to the UK review, Day observed that he had worked on the last review in 1997-98, and he bemoaned the lack of institutional memory within HMG regarding the review process.
¶10. (S/NF) Day also promised that the UK had “put measures in place to protect your interests” during the UK inquiry into the causes of the Iraq war. He noted that Iraq seems no longer to be a major issue in the U.S., but he said it would become a big issue -- a “feeding frenzy” -- in the UK “when the inquiry takes off.”
Iran
----
¶11. (S/NF) Tauscher made clear that Iran needed to respond to the P5 1 offer prior to the UNGA, at which point there would be a stock-taking; absent progress, attention would turn to substantially stronger sanctions. FS Milband opined that U.S. Administration is “rightly trying to overcome a deficit of prejudice and mistrust in a relatively short time” by diplomatic outreach to Iran. He continued that the Iranian elections were a “bad outcome” -- an outcome that had given extremists the upper hand and resulted in a “culling of reformists.” Miliband said that, in his opinion, Iran’s extremist government would not make concessions in a short time. Nonetheless, the U.S. “Administration’s support for a diplomatic solution is very wise.” He praised the impact of financial sanctions spearheaded by Treasury U/S Levey. Leslie asserted that the Iranian administration is “in a state of flux” and “not focused,” so probably unable to respond to overtures.
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¶12. (S/NF) McDonald stressed that the PM supports the President’s outreach efforts to Iran, but this outreach should not be “open ended.” The UK view is that “if Iran is not responsive, we have to get serious.” UK experts have concluded that stronger sanctions should be in place by the end of the year if Iran is not significantly responsive by the end of September. McDonald observed that it would take some time to negotiate a UNSCR; in the meantime, the UK is considering national steps it could take as well as possible steps the EU could take. HMG shares NSA Jones’ view that proliferation problems posed by Iran and North Korea should be addressed together, not as separate, unrelated issues, McDonald said.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
------------------------------------
¶13. (S/NF) UK interlocutors sought an update from U/S Tauscher on the progress toward U.S. Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) -- and on the President’s leadership on CTBT ratification. Tauscher said the ratification of the CTBT had high priority. START had a certain urgency, given the December 5 expiration; we were working in parallel to prepare for ratification of CTBT, including a new National Academy study, a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and a funded program to modernize our nuclear infrastructure. UK interlocutors made clear they would welcome U.S. CTBT ratification, which would be a tangible sign to the world of U.S. commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. McDonald noted that since the 1993 Executive Order, the U.S. has acted as if the CTBT had been ratified, which he characterized as an argument that could persuade reluctant senators. UK interlocutors also sought an update from Tauscher on the progress of START negotiations and the status of the NPR.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
-----------------------------------------
¶14. (S/NF) “We need to put some steel in Director General-elect Amano,” Miliband opined. Amano has a key role and he “must be a leader and a consensus-builder who reports faithfully what experts tell him.” McDonald observed that the IAEA seems more prepared than it has in the past to address Iranian conduct. Tauscher agreed we need to make Amano a success.
Russia-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
--------------------------------------------- -
¶15. (S/NF) Leslie commended U.S.-Russian progress on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks. She said that the UK was looking for the U.S. to deal with Russia since “our relations (with Russia) are very poor.” Leslie said that despite UK-Russia bilateral problems, HMG would be able to work with Russia through the NPT process and she expressed hope that Russia “could do the right thing” to address global proliferation. She noted the Russian proposal for a conference that could help address Egyptian concerns. Day opined that after START negotiations are successfully concluded, Russia might be inclined to seek “another deal” in regard to Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), since such discussions would “keep them at the top table” in terms of negotiations.
China, Pakistan
---------------
¶16. (S/NF) Leslie flagged the “inconvenient truth” that “China is building its nuclear arsenal.” She evoked an arms race in the Pacific in light of India’s nuclear program. Nonetheless, Leslie said she was optimistic regarding China’s commitment to multilateral cooperation and she suggested that the U.S. and the UK should push China for progress “until they say ‘stop it’.” She noted that the Chinese had “pretty much” said a year ago that if the U.S. ratifies the CTBT, China would follow suit. Further, China has “dumped” Pakistan in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which is a “good sign.” Tauscher urged P5 action to get Pakistan to stop blocking progress in the CD on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
¶17. (S/NF) The UK has deep concerns about the safety and
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security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and China could play a big role in stabilizing Pakistan, Leslie said. Pakistan has accepted nuclear safety help, but under the IAEA flag (albeit British technicians). The Pakistanis worry that the U.S. “will drop in and take their nukes,” Leslie said.
¶18. (S/NF) Day expressed support for the development of a “cold war”-like relationship between India and Pakistan that would “introduce a degree of certainty” between the two countries in their dealings. He noted that recent intelligence indicates that Pakistan “is not going in a good direction.” Pakistan sees the debate about Afghanistan in the U.S. and the UK as demonstrating that the allies lack the will to maintain their commitment there. The Pakistanis also believe that their recent successes against extremists in the Swat valley validate their belief that they can deal with their own internal problems without changing their approach toward India. Day asked if the U.S. would be “obliged” to cut relations with Pakistan if the military took over again; he said that the last time the military assumed power the UK had maintained military-to-military ties. Day also asked for the U.S. perspective on Nawaz Sharif, whom he described as “potentially less venal” than other Pakistani leaders.
Nonproliferation and Public Diplomacy
-------------------------------------
¶19. (S/NF) Leslie opined that P5 states are “losing the public diplomacy arguments about nonproliferation” and civil nuclear power, with the P3 and the P5 “being portrayed as the bad guy.” Day expressed a similar sentiment, noting that there is “no real recognition” of what the UK has done in terms of nonproliferation and disarmament, “either in our own media or worldwide.” U/S Tauscher agreed that we all need to do a much better job of getting our narrative out, and noted that the State Department has brought in new people to help to do that.
¶20. (S/NF) Leslie acknowledged that there had been divisions within HMG about the strategy for addressing proliferation. In Leslie’s view, the risk of proliferation is a bigger threat than terrorism but it ranks lower than terrorism on the public’s list of perceived threats. She flagged efforts both by states and by terrorist groups to obtain nuclear weapons. She cited former FS Beckett’s speech at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference in June 2007 as setting out the UK’s commitment to a nuclear free world. In HMG’s view, President Obama’s Prague speech expressed the same commitment. Disarmament alone )- without successfully addressing proliferation )- would not make the world safer, so “we need to manage disarmament,” Leslie stated. She rejected the French assertion that that the U.S. and the UK are “starting a (public) debate that is not there” by publicly addressing issues of nuclear disarmament.
Civil nuclear Cooperation
-------------------------
¶21. (S/NF) UK interlocutors noted HMG’s commitment to civil nuclear power and that the nuclear weapons states have done a poor job in terms of Article IV of the NPT. FS Miliband commented that the nuclear weapons states have a credibility problem with the non-nuclear weapons states. Leslie said that the UK had demonstrated its commitment to “moving forward” civil nuclear issues, citing the UK-hosted and organized nuclear fuel cycle conference in March 2009 as an example. Tauscher agreed that we should support nuclear power and nuclear cooperation in a manner that does not lead to the spread of dangerous technologies, citing our agreement with the UAE as an example.
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
-----------------------
¶22. (S/NF) FS Miliband asked about the status of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), insisting “we are not trying to keep people from bearing arms in the USA.” He asked if it was “conceivable” for the U.S. to ratify the treaty. Tauscher stated she was not optimistic given the Second Amendment issues being raised by opponents, but said the Administration was planning to review the ATT and we are prepared to listen to the UK make its case on this issue. FS Miliband said that the UK launched its campaign in favor of the ATT in September 2008 with the support of some U.S. companies.
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¶23. (S/NF) Day observed that there is “sometimes a sense” that the FCO “pushes” the ATT while the MOD opposes it. He stressed that the MOD and the UK defense industry “support strongly” the ATT. He said that he had personally seen the impact of MANPADS in Sierra Leone, and stated that ground to air missile proliferation is a major problem that the ATT could address. “Given our operational deployments in Afghanistan, we’re focused on” the ATT,” he said.
NATO - Strategic Concept
------------------------
¶24. (S/NF) Day raised the NATO Strategic Concept review, predicting a major debate in the Alliance about deterrence and its strategic dimensions. A “major objective” should be “to minimize fallout” on nuclear issues. He noted that the Secretary General (SYG) would prepare the first draft. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) will need to review the final product since the first stage of work is done among a small group of nations and many others will be “suspicious.” The direction of NATO’s debate will depend on the outcome of the German elections: the Social Democratic Party (SPD) could force a debate, while the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) would not, Day said. Day volunteered that he had been “soured” by the last two Strategic Concepts. Tauscher said that the USG would be addressing some of the issues in developing the Strategic Concept as part of our nuclear Posture Review.
¶25. (S/NF) Day said SYG Rasmussen “must not take his foot off the accelerator of reform.” The SYG must be a strong leader, needs “some early wins,” and must have the kind of access in Washington that former NATO SYG Robertson had, Day said.
Defense Trade Treaty
--------------------
¶26. (S/NF) UK interlocutors sought an update from U/S Tauscher on the status in the Senate of the U.S.-UK Defense Trade Treaty. Tauscher explained that we are working with the Senate to resolve questions concerning implementation. Day emphasized that the Treaty “matters operationally... this is the sort of stuff that saves lives.” McDonald stressed that the Treaty was not just an agreement between two leaders, former President Bush and former Prime Minister Blair, “but an agreement between our two systems.” McDonald expressed appreciation for Tauscher’s affirmation that implementing legislation is not necessary for the Treaty to go into force. Tauscher replied that the purpose of the Treaty was to cut red tape, and we don,t want to put it back in the implementation. Leslie stressed that the UK did not want to “complicate” the Administration’s efforts to get the Treaty fully ratified. The UK interlocutors expressed appreciation for Tauscher’s commitment to the Treaty’s ratification and her explanation of the Administration’s steps to achieve that goal.
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶27. (S/NF) FS Miliband asked for U.S. support for UK candidate John Freeman as Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Director General.
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN


/tag/IR_0.html


09LONDON2214     2009-09-23 16:04     2010-11-30 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy London

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 LONDON 002214

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS PREL, PARM, KNNP, CH, EG, FR, IN, IR, KN, PK, RS, UK
SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER’S BILATERAL MEETINGS IN LONDON WITH
RUSSIAN, CHINESE, AND FRENCH OFFICIALS
REF: A. (A) LONDON 2198 B. (B) LONDON 2199
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: U/S for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher and Special Representative for nuclear Nonproliferation Ambassador Susan Burk held bilateral consultations in London September 3-4, on the margins of the P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards nuclear Disarmament, with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei, and French Director for Strategic Affairs Patrick Maisonnave. (Refs) All interlocutors agreed on the need for close P5 coordination in the lead-up to the UNSC Heads of Government Summit and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon). French interlocutors expressed a particular need for closer, more efficient P3 coordination. All interlocutors were supportive of the President’s proposed nuclear Security Summit. End Summary.
Russian Perspective -- NPT
--------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) U/S for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher and Special Representative for nuclear Nonproliferation Ambassador Susan Burk held bilateral meetings in London September 3-4, on the margins of the P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards nuclear Disarmament, with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei, and French Director for Strategic Affairs Patrick Maisonnave. Ambassador Burk opened the first meeting, with Russian DFM Ryabkov, by presenting an outline of U.S. objectives for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon). DFM Ryabkov stated that Russia and the U.S. are “very much in line with each other” regarding the NPT RevCon. He confirmed that Russia seeks a P5 consensus with a results-oriented NPT conclusion. “We cannot allow the NPT to fail,” he said. Ryabkov cited the “good experience of being almost there” in terms of the chair’s recommendations from the third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom). “We must focus while moving toward the NPT RevCon on realistic deliverables in all areas,” he said, which means avoiding pretexts for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to balk. Russia seeks to avoid “prescriptive outcomes.” He expressed the view that the UK draft text was a good basis for a P5 statement. Ryabkov said Russia would stress universal adherence to the NPT, universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, the Comprehensive nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and negative security assurances. He noted the importance of “progress” on CTBT ratification, preferably before the end of the conference. He stated the importance of developing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification and control mechanisms, and that negative security guarantees are key. Russia would think positively about the development of a legal instrument.
Egypt
-----
¶3. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said the Egyptian position gives Russia “serious concern.” Russia regularly engages with the Egyptians, but the Egyptians do not seem to understand the gravity of the situation. Ryabkov expressed hope that the U.S. would support ideas such as a special coordinator and comprehensive IAEA coverage of facilities in the Middle East. He noted that Middle Eastern countries need to ratify the CTBT. Russia has been in touch with Israel to see if it would consider becoming part of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which would “play well” with the Egyptians. U/S for Arms Control and International Security Tauscher said she had been working with Egypt, including with Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit, and would continue to do so in the coming weeks. She said that some Egyptians consider their approach last year to be a mistake, and that we were working to get Egypt and Israel to come together on an approach that would command consensus. Ryabkov said Russia had not detected reconsideration by Egypt, and promised to “explore”
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Tauscher’s suggestion that the U.S. and Russia meet jointly with the Egyptians to show U.S.-Russia coordination and to explain concerns to the Egyptians.
Multilateral Approaches to the Fuel Cycle
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said Russia was surprised by opposition to initiatives, “both yours and ours,” at the most recent Board of Governors (BOG) meeting. Russia will continue to push forward on its Angarsk idea. Russia will soon circulate a draft agreement and will consult with the U.S and as many other potential co-sponsors as possible to increase the chances of a positive outcome. U/S Tauscher made clear the U.S. supports the Angarsk initiative and wants to push it forward at the November Board as the first step; other steps could follow using the Angarsk precedents. Ryabkov expressed appreciation for U.S. expressions of support for Angarsk and asked the U.S. to make positive remarks at the next BOG meeting.
“Creative Ways” to Present Arguments Needed
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said it is important in the lead up to the RevCon to find “creative ways” to present our arguments, citing Egyptian skepticism. U/S Tauscher agreed that we need to find better ways to get our narrative out, and proposed that the two of them write an op-ed that could run in New York at the time of the UNGA. Ryabkov responded that such a piece could make clear that the U.S. and Russia stand together on fuel assurances. He said it was a “good idea,” and they should look for the right occasion. Ryabklov also raised the 13 steps, suggesting that some elements were “OBE” and the context was now different.
nuclear Security Summit
-----------------------
¶6. (S/NF) Senior Director for WMD Terrorism and Threat Reduction at the National Security Council Laura Holgate briefed on plans for the nuclear Security Summit in April. Ryabkov expressed appreciation and said the summit should seek a result that is both “political and technical,” which he characterized as “a huge task requiring thorough preparation.” He stressed the importance of early exchanges on summit preparations. He promised that Russia would work to develop ideas by the Sherpa meeting or shortly thereafter. However, the time frame is “extraordinarily short,” even if the summit is postponed until April. The summit should seek a “defendable niche” that will not take away from NPT, he said.
CTBT, FMCT
----------
¶7. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher said the U.S. was carefully preparing for ratification of the CTBT by the Senate, including a new study by the National Academy. Another key priority for the U.S. is the FMCT. We were encouraged by the steps in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in May, but Pakistan has blocked implementation. She said the P5 must work together to preserve the work plan in January and commence actual negotiations. Ryabkov responded that Russia would welcome early U.S. CTBT ratification. Russia had talked to the Pakistanis about the FMCT, but DFM Ryabkov indicated that they were “quite evasive.” He urged the U.S. to engage the Pakistanis. Tauscher said we would continue to do so and encourage the rest of the P5 to do so as well.
Iranian Threat, Missile Defense
-------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher proposed that Russia and the U.S. implement together the understandings reached by the two Presidents in Moscow regarding missile defense, joint threat assessment and the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). Responding to her proposal to send a team to Moscow to get Russia’s intelligence assessment on the Iranian missile threat, Ryabkov said that missile defense remains a difficult
LONDON 00002214 003 OF 007
issue for Russia; the Presidential text was good guidance, but Russia needed more time to consider the U.S. view regarding the missile threat from Iran and issues of their missile technology. Russia has “objective data” and the differences between the Russian and U.S. views are “considerable.”
¶9. (S/NF) Tauscher described the missile defense review underway in Washington. Ryabkov expressed appreciation, and suggested that they revisit the joint threat assessment and the JDEC after the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) review has been completed.
nuclear Cooperation
-------------------
¶10. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher welcomed Head of Federal Atomic Energy Agency Sergei Kiriyenko,s planned visit to Washington and the establishment of the working group on nuclear energy and nuclear cooperation. She pressed for approval and signature of the plutonium disposition agreement. DFM Ryabkov replied that the situation with respect to plutonium disposition was the same as it was during the President,s visit to Moscow. The issue of financing had precluded real progress before the POTUS visit. Russia needs to figure out what is realistic. There are no political constraints. Russia is disposing of highly toxic materials. Ryabkov expressed interest in information about what the U.S. was doing in that regard.
S-300 Air Defense Missiles
--------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov asked about the status of the Russia 123 agreement. U/S Tauscher responded that some in Congress are interested in moving forward on the 123 agreement, and that further discussions could be held in October. It is crucial that Russia not transfer the S-300 system to Iran if Congress is to allow the agreement to come into force, she added. Ryabkov said Russia had a valid contract for the sale of the S-300s, and acknowledged that Russia needed to make a decision regarding the S-300 sale to Iran, an issue that has been the subject of “utmost attention in many places.” Russia is in a position of growing difficulty for not honoring its contractual obligations and, finances aside, Russia is getting “no points in Iran.” Ryabkov said Russia understands the U.S. and Israeli arguments and wants to be transparent on the topic, and noted that the U.S. and Russian presidents have discussed it. The current situation is not sustainable; Russia cannot hold up the sale indefinitely. At some point Russia will have to make up its mind, Ryabkov said. Russia did not agree to sell surface-to-surface missiles but has a contract to sell Iran air defense systems.
Votkinsk
--------
¶12. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia and the U.S. have different views on whether continuous monitoring at Votkinsk should be continued in the Stategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on agreement. Russia considers the importance of switching off the system to be quite high. The run-up to the end date of START could create difficulties. U/S Tauscher stated that we have the right to monitor until December 5, to which Ryabkov replied, “That goes without saying.” Tauscher went on that we see merit in continuing with the Votkinsk system in the new agreement. If the final decision is not to continue the system, we are prepared to work out an arrangement that maintains our rights through December 4. Contractors can box and ship the equipment; there are ways to manage this, she said.
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
-----------------------------------
¶13. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia circulated its ideas on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty in Vienna on May 5. “We don’t want to abandon the CFE regime altogether,” he said. Russia has the sense that NATO is “becoming comfortable” with the current situation. Russia,
LONDON 00002214 004 OF 007
however, does not want to return to the old treaty. CFE adaptation plus more is required. Flank limitations are the core problem. Ryabkov said Turkey is not that concerned about flank limitations but wants to keep the system for its own reasons. There could be a chance to “move innovatively” regarding CFE, but the current situation is unsustainable.
¶14. (S/NF) Ryabkov concluded by saying Russia wants someone on the U.S. side who will deal with this issue on a regular basis with MFA Security and Arms Control Director Anatoly Antonov. Russia wants to move forward and wants to reinvigorate the Vienna process without undermining the bilateral process.
Australia Group
---------------
¶15. (S/NF) Ryabkov asked for a “fresh look” regarding the Australia group, since the U.S. and Russia are now cooperating in many ways. U/S Tauscher said she has seen no interest on the part of the other members of the Australia Group in Russian membership given the concerns with respect to Russian implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Ryabkov responded that he thought they had dealt with those questions.
MANPADS -- Venezuela
--------------------
¶16. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher asked that Russia look further into the end-use controls on Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) transferred to Venezuela to ensure they do not wind up with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). Ryabkov affirmed Russia’s commitment to ensure legitimate end-user certificates and the ability to conduct inspections; this is true for MANPADS. The information provided was fragmentary, he said. Russia concluded that the factory marks on the munitions made it difficult to determine if they were part of the equipment sold to the Venezuelan government. Ryabkov said Russia understood the tense situation between Venezuela and Colombia.
Chinese Perspective -- CTBT
---------------------------
¶17. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher opened the discussion with Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affiars He Yafei with a description of U.S. preparations to seek ratification of the CTBT in the Senate. VFM He asked “Are you there yet?” Tauscher asked if China would follow with its own ratification, and He replied that it is “likely” that China would follow if the U.S. ratified the CTBT.
U.S.-China Cooperation
----------------------
¶18. (S/NF) VFM He said China and the U.S. have many common interests and “we’re flooded with issues.” President Obama’s Prague speech “caught the attention of many.” The NPT is “important but we must improve on it” and must “start and restart” issues of disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful use. The Chinese President’s vision is to study issues in the context of Chinese and U.S. cooperation. “I have a mandate to work with you,” He said. Nonproliferation issues have been dormant for a dozen years, but the context has changed. China’s goal is a “serious reduction of the nuclear threat.” The time to act is now since “we have a mandate and a consensus at the top level.”
P5 Consultation in Advance of the NPT RevCon
--------------------------------------------
¶19. (S/NF) VFM He said the P5 may not always see eye-to-eye but should closely consult in the lead-up to the NPT RevCon. The P5 should “stand together” and unite since the P5 countries are a “target.” He added that is important to improve communications with non-nuclear states.
¶20. (S/NF) VFM He raised the issue of the Egyptian Middle East nuclear-free zone. U/S Tauscher responded that the U.S.
LONDON 00002214 005 OF 007
was working hard with both Egypt and Israel to find a common approach and avoid confrontation at the IAEA General Conference and the NPT RevCon. He said China was prepared to support that effort. He added the P5 should carefully review Iran and the DPRK but deal with them separately from the upcoming UNSC Summit and the RevCon.
FMCT, Pakistan
--------------
¶21. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher outlined the problem caused by Pakistan in blocking implementation of the CD program of work. She said the U.S. was talking to Pakistan and arguing that Pakistan could make its points in the negotiations but should not block the beginning of talks. VFM He agreed that the Pakistanis “have concerns” regarding the FMCT negotiations. He said he understood Pakistani “hesitancy,” as well as their “logic” and “illogic.” The solution is to address the underlying problem, which is that India and Pakistan view each other as enemies. nuclear weapons are crucial to Pakistan. Indeed, a Pakistani military leader said his army was no match for the Indian army. “India is the lynchpin” to assuaging Pakistan’s fears and the U.S. could influence India. China has resolved all border issues except those with India, He observed. In response to Tauscher,s expression of appreciation for China’s efforts in the CD with Pakistan, He said China would engage the Pakistanis.
UNSC Summit
-----------
¶22. (S/NF) VFM He said that the U.S. draft for the UNSC Summit was fairly good, but that China had amendments. China’s Ambassador to the UN has authority to negotiate on the draft resolution which, unfortunately, does not mention China’s disarmament efforts, though the efforts of other P5 countries are noted. China should get credit for, for example, its no first use policy. VFM He also said that China has a different view on the proposed moratorium on the production of fissile material. China supports a ban, but not a moratorium, which raises questions concerning definition, how long, verification, and the like.
nuclear Security Summit
-----------------------
¶23. (S/NF) Senior Director Holgate briefed on planning for the nuclear Security Summit in the spring. VFM He said China supports this initiative, which he described as a “huge, daunting job.” He advised the U.S. to consider establishing a “small, informal group to resolve issues” before the summit--U.S., UK, China, Russia, and a few others--to make sure the major parties are comfortable.
DPRK
----
¶24. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher mentioned Ambassador Philip Goldberg,s useful talks, which would continue. She asked where the DPRK stood. VFM He responded that the United States is the DPRK’s main preoccupation. The country views normalization of its relations with the U.S. as the only way out of its current “mess.” China believes the DPRK leadership is anxious about economic development but they believe their security concerns override their economic concerns. Nonetheless, there are signs the DPRK is reaching out. DPRK wants bilateral talks with the U.S., not Six-Party Talks. China wants the Six-Party Talks to continue. The DPRK wants “something in return” to restart the talks. VFM He asserted that China is encouraging the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. China is also trying to convince the DPRK not to go back on its promise to denuclearize. The DPRK leader appears to be in good health and control.
Civil nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan
---------------------------------------
¶25. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher asked about the status of civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. VFM He responded that all
LONDON 00002214 006 OF 007
cooperation is for civil purposes, under safeguards, and that China is not going out of that mode. It is not in China’s interest to proliferate nuclear technology. Tauscher asked about Pakistan,s financial situation. VFM He replied that Pakistan was hit hard by the financial crisis, but it is a largely agrarian society that needs little cash to survive and is in no danger of going broke. China is the only country that has given cash support to Pakistan, he said.
French Perspective -- P3 Coordination
-------------------------------------
¶26. (S/NF) In a final meeting, French Director for Strategic Affairs Patrick Maisonnave expressed a need to reinforce P3 coordination. Maisonnave noted his disappointment at the current negotiating process in New York, stating that “P3 coordination could be more efficient.” U/S Tauscher agreed the P3 needed to stick together and suggested frequent telephone calls. Maisonnave said he looked forward to frequent phone contact among the three countries.
UNSC Summit
-----------
¶27. (S/NF) Regarding the September UNSC Heads of State Summit, Maisonnave observed that it could be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve consensus on specific language regarding the DPRK and Iran, but “a strong generic message would help.” This was important to French political authorities. U/S Tauscher agreed, and asked if there were other political messages France wanted to send. DAS-equivalent for Disarmament and nuclear Non-Proliferation Martin Briens said France wanted the text of the Summit’s resolution to put the issue of nuclear nonproliferation in a broader context. He suggested a short sentence asserting that “we need to make progress on other forms of disarmament.” Briens said that France wants a paragraph in the resolution setting out concrete measures against proliferation. He also noted “some technical problems” that needed to be resolved, such as issues surrounding the return of property and equipment.
Defining Language and Minimum Objectives
----------------------------------------
¶28. (S/NF) DAS-equivalent Briens noted the “political requirement” of sending a message to Iran and the DPRK, of “not letting them off the hook.” Maisonnave said that one red line for France was that there must be nothing in the final text of the resolution that would weaken deterrence. He expressed support for a “balanced result” and called for managing expectations. Maisonnave stressed the importance of supporting access to civil nuclear energy. P3 consultations would provide an opportunity to clarify goals and to “define minimum objectives.” Briens said that when the P3 meets in early October, there would be an opportunity to set “minimum goals” and “work on our statetgy.” The October 8-9 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Conference in Washington would potentially be a good time for experts to meet, Briens said.
¶29. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher noted the importance of coordinating public diplomacy messages. Brien concurred on the importance of better public outreach.
nuclear Security Summit
-----------------------
¶30. (S/NF) Senior Director Holgate briefed on plans for the nuclear Security Summit. Maisonnave expressed support for the summit next spring and sought details about timing and goals. He described it as an “excellent initiative” and said that French officials would have their first planning meeting September 8. Briens said that the summit would give political momentum and help provide political will to reenforce nonproliferation mechanisms. Briens expressed “one small caveat” about such mechanisms, citing French displeasure with the Global Partnership and remarking that it provides a “huge benefit for Russia” by paying for its
LONDON 00002214 007 OF 007
disarmament while Russia builds submarines. “Let’s leverage what we have rather than spend money” at the summit, Briens said. Maisonnave expressed appreciation for reassurance that the President’s summit would not be a pledging conference.
FMCT: P3 Coordination and Red Lines
-----------------------------------
¶31. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher provided an update on START negotiations, Administration strategy regarding CTBT ratification, the nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) review, and Pakistan’s actions to prevent the beginning of negotiations on the FMCT at the CD. Briens agreed that Pakistan had been a problem regarding the FMCT. He added that France shares some common interests with the U.S. regarding the FMCT but said that “we need to discuss some technical details.” He stated that France would be reluctant to agree to terms regarding transparency of fissile material stockpiles. He underscored the importance of not raising expectations and stressed that there are “sensitive issues that we must coordinate carefully with the P3” and discuss in detail. He said that national experts should talk directly on sensitive technical issues, and that France has some red lines that need to be discussed.
IAEA
----
¶32. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher encouraged support for the new IAEA Director General Amano, saying we need to make him a success and make sure he has the budget to do his job. Briens agreed that the U.S. and France should talk to DG Amano regarding shared priorities, “and make sure he does the right thing.” He also agreed that the U.S. and France should consult with each other regarding the IAEA budget. The U.S. and France should also think about what can be done to improve IAEA verification safeguards.
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN


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10ABUDHABI33     2010-01-25 09:09     2010-11-30 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Abu Dhabi

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAD #0033/01 0250933
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 250933Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0187
INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0010
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0014
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0012

Monday, 25 January 2010, 09:33
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000033
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/SRAP, SCA AND NEA/ARP
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/25
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, EFIN, AF, IR, YM, AE
SUBJECT: UAE FM DISCUSSES TALIBAN FINANCIAL FLOWS AND REINTEGRATION
WITH AMB. HOLBROOKE AND TREASURY A/S COHEN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard G. Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: During a January 11 meeting in Abu Dhabi, visiting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Amb. Richard Holbrooke discussed Afghan reintegration with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ). AbZ noted the importance of establishing an effective and transparent reintegration trust fund that includes Saudi support. Amb. Holbrooke urged the UAE to do more to disrupt Taliban financial flows. AbZ discussed his recent visit to Iran, noting Iran is acting more confident even as the country moves backwards. He added that Pakistani President Zardari had asked the UAE to take in his family in the event of his death. End Summary.
AFGHANISTAN MEETINGS
--------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke began by thanking AbZ for hosting the well-timed SRAP meeting in Abu Dhabi on January 12. AbZ said he was looking forward to the Gulf participation, including that of the Jordanian Foreign Minister, particularly following the recent attack in Khost. AbZ said Judeh had told him Jordan plans to send more troops to Afghanistan; Amb. Holbrooke said Judeh had made the same point during his recent visit to Washington.
¶3. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke said the decisions on the Afghan reintegration program and the upcoming elections would be the key deliverables for the Abu Dhabi meeting and would pave the way to success in London. AbZ asked what the role of reintegration fund contributors would be, noting that the UAE did not want to be associated with a fund that Afghans would find ineffective, non-transparent or slow. AbZ said funding must go to programs with clear benchmarks that have strong financial and policy oversight. He added that it is “very crucial” Saudi Arabia donate to the fund, for symbolic reasons. Turning to the elections, AbZ suggested a compromise solution, whereby the Afghan government would ask ISAF when it would be ready to support the elections, rather than having any party dictate to President Karzai.
DISRUPTING TALIBAN FINANCE
--------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke stressed to AbZ the importance of UAE efforts to combat Taliban financial flows through the UAE. Amb. Holbrooke noted the productive meeting he and Treasury A/S Cohen had with UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Hazaa bin Zayed earlier on January 12 and the UAE’s efforts to crack down on bulk cash smuggling. A/S Cohen added that the USG is most concerned about Dubai’s central role in regional financial flows.
¶5. (S/NF) AbZ asked several questions about USG concerns and the UAE’s response, including if Taliban financial flows are regional and/or transiting Dubai, what is the suspected value of these flows, why the USG does not intercepting the funds in Afghanistan, if incoming or outgoing cash declarations would help, and if the USG believed the UAE was not effectively enforcing existing regulations. Amb. Holbrooke and A/S Cohen explained that the USG is concerned that Dubai is being used for the facilitation of the flow of Taliban funds, goods and personnel to and from Afghanistan. The USG is working with Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that the UAE should also take steps to enforce and investigate inbound cash declarations and amend laws to require outbound declarations. A/S Cohen noted that the planned DHS/ICE cash courier training in February would focus on identifing and intercepting likely couriers.
PAKISTAN - ZARDARI CONCERNS
---------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) AbZ said he had met with Pakistani President Asif Zardari in Dubai in late December and the latter was “in better shape” than AbZ expected. Stressing the sensitivity of the information, AbZ told Amb. Holbrooke that Zardari had asked AbZ to convey a request to UAE President Sheikh Khalifa (AbZ’s half-brother) that Zardari’s family be allowed to live in the UAE in the event of his death. (Note: The Bhutto family has lived in Dubai for years and in effect this would be a continuation of a commitment late UAE President Sheikh Zayed made to Ali Zulfikar Bhutto. End Note.)
IRAN - AND YEMEN
----------------
¶7. (S/NF) Turning to his late December trip to Iran, AbZ said it was his first meeting with Ahmedinejad that did not include a cleric (murshid). He interpreted this to mean that Ahmedinejad is now trusted and does not need constant supervision. Noting that Ahmedinejad had cited Western media criticism of Dubai’s financial situation as a plot against Dubai, AbZ told Amb. Holbrooke he believes Ahmedinejad is “crazy but well-educated.” AbZ said he felt Tehran is going backwards although he was surprised by the number of women “not covered up properly.” The Iranians believe that the United States is now preoccupied in Afghanistan and Iraq, which will prevent any US attack on Iran. AbZ said the U.S. message on Iran in the region is “not loud and clear.” Many are acting like Iran is already a nuclear power, and Iran sees the United States is not doing anything about it. If Middle East peace was achieved, AbZ said the Iranians would be unable to suggest they are the defenders of the Palestinian cause.
¶8. (SBU) AbZ said that FM Mottaki was polite and courteous, “for a change” during the December visit. He added that Mottaki called him on January 3 to convey that the U.S. had promised democracy and development in Afghanistan, but the result was more smuggling, narcotics and terrorist acts. Mottaki went on to discuss Yemen, telling AbZ that Saudi and US forces are attacking civilians in Yemen.
¶9. (SBU) Amb. Holbrooke’s office has cleared this cable. OLSON


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09RIYADH447     2009-03-22 10:10     2010-11-30 17:05     SECRET     Embassy Riyadh

O 221014Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0402
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T RIYADH 000447

NSC FOR JBRENNAN AND JDUNCAN; STATE FOR S/WCI

EO 12958 DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, KWBG, SA, AF, IN, PK, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER BRENNAN’S MEETING WITH
SAUDI KING ABDULLAH
REF: RIYADH 427

Classified By: Pol Counselor Lisa Carle, 1.4(b),(d)

¶1. KEY POINTS
-- (S) Saudi King Abdullah welcomed White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan, S/WCI Ambassador Williamson, and Ambassador Fraker to his private palace March 15 for a 90-minute discussion focused on U.S. Saudi-relations, counterterrorism cooperation, the Yemeni Guantanamo Bay detainees, Iran, and Iraq.
-- (S) Brennan presented the King with a letter from President Obama expressing a personal message of friendship, appreciation for our close and collaborative relationship and concern over the disposition of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo.
-- (S) The King said he had told Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki only minutes before that Iran should stop interfering in Arab affairs, and had given Iran a one-year deadline to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia.
-- (S) The King expressed a complete lack of trust in Iraqi PM al-Maliki and held out little hope for improved Saudi/Iraqi relations as long as al-Maliki remains in office.
-- (S) When asked what advice he had for President Obama, the King said he had “one request”: that it was “critically important to restore America’s credibility” in the world.
U.S. SAUDI RELATIONS

¶2. (S) PLEDGES OF FRIENDSHIP: Brennan asserted that the U.S./Saudi alliance must remain strong, and assured the King of President Obama’s wishes for a long and healthy U.S./Saudi relationship, and the President’s personal commitment that Saudi Arabia had a friend in the White House. The King replied that he appreciated the sentiments and that he had great respect for President Obama. “We (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) spilled blood together” in Kuwait and Iraq, the King continued, and Saudi Arabia valued this tremendously. Friendship can be a difficult issue that requires work, Abdullah said, but the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have done it for 70 years over three generations. “Our disagreements don,t cut to the bone,” he stated.

¶3. (S) U.S. CREDIBILITY IS CRITICAL: The Bush Administration is now in the past, the King said. Both President Bushes were his friends, but the recent President Bush didn,t take his advice on dealing with issues in the region, and they found their problems “compounded.” The King said, “we are ready to consult, provide guidance and to do whatever is necessary. We are people of the region and we know it well.” Brennan responded that President Obama wants to listen, and asked what advice the King would offer to President Obama. Abdullah said his one piece of advice was that restoring U.S. credibility in the world was critically important. Brennan responded that this was an important issue for President Obama as well. Brennan said that under President Obama we will restore our credibility. He said the U.S. is a great country and we know what we have to do.

¶4. (S) THE WORLD NEEDS OBAMA: Brennan said President Obama looked forward to seeing the King at the G-20 summit in London. “Thank God for bringing Obama to the presidency,” the King answered, which has created “great hope” in the Muslim world. “May God grant him strength and patience, Abdullah continued, “May God protect him. I’m concerned about his personal safety. America and the world need such a president.”

¶5. (C) THAT WITHOUT WHICH NO SAUDI MEETING IS COMPLETE: Abdullah said “as a friend” that “it was a mistake” to limit access of Saudi citizens to the U.S., since “this damages bilateral relations and the image of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia.” The King noted there were 60,000 Saudi students abroad, about one third of whom were in the U.S., and “others would have gone” but for the difficulties in gaining access to the U.S. The King noted that for many years very senior Saudi officials, including Prince Saud al-Faisal, had studied in the U.S. He then noted that Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Adel al Jubeir (who was interpreting for the King) had studied in the U.S. and was “half American” as a result. He also said he was aware of, and appreciated, Ambassador Fraker’s efforts to improve the visa situation “even though there were people in Washington who fought him.” Finally, he observed that anyone from Saudi Arabia who studies in the U.S. inevitably becomes a friend and advocate of the United States and that we only hurt ourselves by cutting off this flow of students.
DETAINEES

¶6. (S) GUANTANAMO WILL BE CLOSED: Brennan explained that President Obama had made a commitment to close Guantanamo to eliminate the potential propaganda benefits its existence provided to Al-Qaeda, but also because it was the right thing to do. Brennan reassured the King, however, that President Obama would remain strong on counterterrorism. Brennan presented the King with a letter from President Obama addressing the issue of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo. Brennan noted that he had met with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN) the day before to discuss at length The issue of the Yemeni detainees. Brennan further stated that he would be traveling to Sanaa the next day to meet with President Saleh, as the issue of the remaining 99 Yemeni detainees still needed to be resolved. Brennan praised MbN as an outstanding counterterrorism partner, and that the MOI was doing a wonderful, courageous job in countering the terrorist threat to the Kingdom. Returning to the subject later in the conversation, Brennan warned that the U.S. feared Yemen could become another Waziristan, and urged that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia needed to work together to keep Al-Qaeda in Yemen from growing even more dangerous. The King replied that having Somalia next door to Yemen only adds to the danger. Brennan said that the capabilities of the Ministry of the Interior security forces had grown impressively over the past 10 years. Brennan added that counterterrorism and intelligence sharing cooperation between our countries had never been better and that MbN deserved the credit. In an unusual concession, made at the conclusion of their conversation, the King said, “be assured I am fully briefed on the work you are doing with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef.”

¶7. (S) HOW TO TRACK DETAINEES: “I’ve just thought of something,” the King added, and proposed implanting detainees with an electronic chip containing information about them and allowing their movements to be tracked with Bluetooth. This was done with horses and falcons, the King said. Brennan replied, “horses don,t have good lawyers,” and that such a proposal would face legal hurdles in the U.S., but agreed that keeping track of detainees was an extremely important issue that he would review with appropriate officials when he returned to the United States.
IRAN

¶8. (S) A “HEATED EXCHANGE”: The King noted that Iranian FM Mottaki had been “sitting in that same seat (as Brennan) a few moments ago.” The King described his conversation with FM Mottaki as “a heated exchange, frankly discussing Iran’s interference in Arab affairs.” When challenged by the King on Iranian meddling in Hamas affairs, Mottaki apparently protested that “these are Muslims.” “No, Arabs” countered the King, “You as Persians have no business meddling in Arab matters.” The King said the Iranians wanted to improve relations and that he responded by giving Mottaki an ultimatum. “I will give you one year” (to improve ties), “after that, it will be the end.”

¶9. (S) “SPARE US YOUR EVIL”: The King expressed hope the U.S. would review its Iran policy and “come to the right conclusion.” Brennan responded that President Obama was personally reviewing U.S. Iran policy and wanted to hear the King’s thoughts. Abdullah asserted that Iran is trying to set up Hizballah-like organizations in African countries, observing that the Iranians don’t think they are doing anything wrong and don’t recognize their mistakes. “I said (to Mottaki) that’s your problem,” recounted the King. Abdullah said he would favor Rafsanjani in an Iranian election, were he to run. He described Iran not as “a neighbor one wants to see,” but as “a neighbor one wants to avoid.” He said the Iranians “launch missiles with the hope of putting fear in people and the world.” A solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict would be a great achievement, the King said, but Iran would find other ways to cause trouble. “Iran’s goal is to cause problems,” he continued, “There is no doubt something unstable about them.” He described Iran as “adventurous in the negative sense,” and declared “May God prevent us from falling victim to their evil.” Mottaki had tendered an invitation to visit Iran, but Abdullah said he replied “All I want is for you to spare us your evil.” Summarizing his history with Iran, Abdullah concluded: “We have had correct relations over the years, but the bottom line is that they cannot be trusted.”

¶10. (S) AN EMPTY CHANNEL: The King said “three years ago” Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei had sent his adviser Ali Akbar Velayati with a letter asking for Abdullah’s agreement to establish a formal back channel for communication between the two leaders. Abdullah said he had agreed, and the channel was established with Velayati and Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal as the points of contact. In the years since, the King noted, the channel had never been used.

¶11. (S) A DANGEROUS NEIGHBORHOOD: Brennan responded that the Saudis lived in a dangerous neighborhood with Iran across the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia sharing a long border with Yemen, and with a number of other troublesome countries nearby. Brennan noted that we have a lot of work to do in the Middle East together. The King responded that the world,s attention was focused on the region. He further stated that he believed that the U.S. could help in this sensitive region, but that we should not take matters lightly. Brennan noted that President Obama is fully aware of the dangers in the region, that the U.S. knew that it had to remain involved in constructing a solution, and that we would seek the King,s counsel in dealing with the many issues in the Middle East. The King asked if that included Iran. Brennan responded that it did. Brennan said that we had our eyes wide open to Iranian ambitions, that we were not nave to the dangers Iran posed to Saudi Arabia, and that Iran could not be allowed to succeed in its destabilizing activites. Brennan observed that the President had ordered a complete review of U.S. Iran policy and made reference to a passage in the President,s letter that we needed to test Iran,s intentions to cease its destabilizing behavior and live up to its international obligations. Brennan further observed that the U.S.-Saudi partnership had to remain strong and that together, and with others, we needed to thwart Iran,s nuclear ambitions. “That is important,” responded the King. Finally, Brennan said the President wanted the King to know he had a good friend in the White House who would be willing to assist in any way that he could. The King thanked Mr. Brennan, said he appreciated the sentiments, said that he had great respect for President Obama, and reflected that we had been great friends for many years and would remain friends as our disagreements were minor.

¶12. (U) SEE REFTEL: Ref A provided a separate readout on the Iran discussion and the King’s meeting with Mottaki.
IRAQ

¶13. (S) IN THE HANDS OF GOD AND IRAN: Brennan expressed the importance the U.S. attaches to achieving peace and stability in Iraq. The King replied that this was “in the hands of God,” though he agreed that Iraq was vitally important to both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The King also pointed out that “some say the U.S. invasion handed Iraq to Iran on a silver platter; this after we fought Saddam Hussein.”

¶14. (S) NO HOPE FOR MALIKI: The King said he had “no confidence whatsoever in (Iraqi PM) Maliki, and the Ambassador (Fraker) is well aware of my views.” The King affirmed that he had refused former President Bush’s entreaties that he meet with Maliki. The King said he had met Maliki early in Maliki’s term of office, and the Iraqi had given him a written list of commitments for reconciliation in Iraq, but had failed to follow through on any of them. For this reason, the King said, Maliki had no credibility. “I don,t trust this man,” the King stated, “He’s an Iranian agent.” The King said he had told both Bush and former Vice president Cheney “how can I meet with someone I don,t trust?” Maliki has “opened the door for Iranian influence in Iraq” since taking power, the King said, and he was “not hopeful at all” for Maliki, “or I would have met with him.”
AN ALERT AND ENGAGING HOST

¶15. (S) I MISS MY HORSES: The King appeared alert and at times animated, entertaining his guests with anecdotes about his encounters with Iranian leaders (septel), and throwing up his hands in complaint when asked if he spent time with his horses: “I see them on television when they race,” he said. “I love horses,” he exclaimed, “every couple of weeks I get to see them, and then I have a very calm and restful sleep.”

¶16. (S) DIALOGUE AND REFORM AS DUTY: In response to Brennan,s praise for the King,s interfaith dialogue initiative, his commitment to advancing rights as reflected by his recent appointment of the first female (deputy education) minister, the King said “Thanks for the sentiment but I did nothing special, only what I thought was my duty. I believe we do our duty as determined by God.”

¶17. (S) PARTICIPANTS:
Saudi Arabia -- Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud -- HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Assistant Minister of the Interior -- Ambassador to the U.S. Adel al-Jubeir (interpreter)
U.S. -- John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism -- Ambassador Ford Fraker -- Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson -- John Duncan, NSC Director for Counterterrorism -- Shaun Coughlin, Special Assistant, S/WCI -- Embassy control officer/notetaker

¶18. (U) Assistant to the President Brennan cleared this cable.
FRAKER


/tag/IR_0.html


72TEHRAN5055     1972-08-22 09:09     2010-11-30 16:04     UNCLASSIFIED     Embassy Tehran

R 220927Z AUG 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9461

UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 5055

E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006
TAGS: IR PTER
SUBJECT: CONTINUING TERRORIST VIOLENCE

REF: TEHRAN 4887

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SAID TAHERI, BOMBING AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE. SAVAK MAINTAINING ITS POLICY OF WIDESPREAD PREVENTIVE ARRESTS AND, WHILE THIS RUNS RISK OF HEIGHTENING RESENTMENT AMONG POPULACE, OFFICIALS SEEM CONFIDENT THAT GUERRILLAS ARE ON THE RUN. WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE OFFICIAL OPTIMISM AND FEEL THAT SANGUINE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THE GUERRILLA REACTION THEY USUALLY PROVOKE MAY FURTHER ERODE CREDIBILITY OF SECURITY ORGANS IN MIND OF PUBLIC.
END SUMMARY

¶1. IN WAKE OF SMOOTHLY HANDLED ASSASSINATION AUGUST 13 OF HEAD OF PRISONS BRIGADIER GENERAL SAID TAHERI (REFTEL) WHO WAS ALSO CHIEF OF AN ANTI-GUERRILLA SUBCOMMITTEE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAS INCREASED. RECENT CONFIRMED INCIDENTS HAVE INCLUDED A BOMB IN A TEHRAN DEPARTMENT STORE WHICH INJURED THE TERRORIST PLANTING IT, BOMB IN TEHRAN NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY BUILDING WHICH KILLED WATCHMAN, APPREHENSION OF A TERRORIST IN SOUTH TEHRAN WHICH RESULTED IN ONE KILLED AND FIVE WOUNDED, AND SHOOTING TO DEATH OF THREE POLICEMEN IN A SMALL BAZAAR IN SOUTH TEHRAN. NUMEROUS OTHER BOMBINGS AND SHOOTINGS RUMORED BUT NOT VERIFIED BY EMBASSY OR CONFIRMED BY GOI.

¶2. SAVAK AND OTHER SECURITY ORGANS ARE PROCEEDING WITH A WIDESPREAD AND, WE HEAR, NOT VERY WELL TARGETED ROUND-UP OF SUSPECTS, AIDED BY LISTS OF NAMES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FOUND IN DWELLING OF A RECENTLY SLAIN TERRORIST LEADER. POLICE NETS, WHICH ARE REPORTEDLY HAULING IN THE INNOCENT WITH THE GUILTY, HAVE EXTENDED AS FAR AFIELD AS ISFAHAN WHERE A NUMBER OF SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED TWO WEEKS AGO.

¶3. DESPITE INCREASING LEVEL OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, POLICE OFFICIALS REMAIN OPTIMISTIC. CHIEF OF NATIONAL POLICE LTG JAFFARQOLI SADRI ASSURED EMBOFF AUG. 17 THAT CURRENT FLURRY OF INCIDENTS CONSTITUTES DYING GASP OF GUERRILLAS WHO, HE CLAIMS, HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY TWO THIRDS IN PAST YEAR AND ARE FORCED TO ACT NOW TO SHOW THEY STILL EXIST. IN A MEDIA INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN LOCAL PRESS AUG. 19, SADRI UPPED FIGURE FOR REDUCTION OF GUERRILLA FORCES TO THREE FOURTHS, PREDICTED THAT REMAINING TERRORISTS WOULD SOON BE WIPED OUT AND REITERATED STANDARD GOVERNMENT LINE THAT GUERRILLAS ARE CONFUSED MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS OF MARXIST-LENINIST BENT BUT WITHOUT GOALS OR PROGRAM. IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF SADRI ATTACHED NO PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO MURDER OF GENERAL TAHERI, ASSERTING THAT TERRORISTS WOULD HAVE BEEN SATISIFED WITH ANY HIGH-RANKING OFFICER AND CHOSE TAWERI ONLY BECUASE OF IOSLATED LOCATION OF HIS HOUSE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR LONG WALKS ALONE. SADRI ALSO DISCOUNTED POSSIBILITY THAT ASSASSINS WERE OF HIGHER CALIBER THAN RUN-OF-THE-MILL GUERRILLAS, POINTING OUT THAT SHOTS WHICH KILLED TAHERI HAD BEEN FIRED FROM 50 CENTIMETERS AND THAT "A CHILD COULD HIT A MAN FROM THAT DISTANCE."

COMMENT: WE CONSIDER IT MORE LIKELY THAT TAHERI WAS PERSONALLY TARGETED DUE TO HIS DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. MOREOVER, SKILLFUL MANNER IN WHICH ASSASSINATION CARRIED OUT, REQUIRING CAREFUL PLANNING AND RECONNAISSANCE AS WELL AS DEFT EXECUTION, APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THOSE INVOLVED WERE MUCH BETTER TRAINED THAN AVERAGE TERRORISTS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN BLOWN UP BY THEIR OWN BOMBS.

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT NUMBER OF GUERRILLA INCIDENTS WILL BEGIN TO TAPER OFF, BUT WE DO NOT SHARE SADRI'S CONFIDENCE THAT HIS TACTICS AND THOSE OF SAVAK CAN COMPLETELY HALT TERRORIST ACTIVITY. IN FACT OVER REACTION AND TOO ZEALOUS A REPRESSION BY SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS SEEM AT LEAST AS LIKELY TO RECRUIT NEW GUERRILLAS AS TO STAMP OUT OLD ONES. IN ADDITION WISDOM SEEMS QUESTIONABLE OF SECURITY OFFICIALS MAKING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT BREAKUP OF GUERRILLA GROUPS AND PREDICTIONS OF THEIR DEMISE. WE RECALL THAT THE LAST SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT LAST JANUARY WAS FOLLOWED BY SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS ON US-PROPERTIES AND OTHER SITES IN TEHRAN. IN OUR VIEW SUCH PUBLIC DECLARATIONS RUN RISK OF INCREASING CREDIBILITY GAP AND RESENTMENT ON PART OF PUBLIC WHO LIKELY BE INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE OF INDISCRIMINATE ARRESTS THAT DO NOT SEEM TO BE STAMPING OUT TERRORISTS.

THE PROGNOSTICATION THEREFORE IS FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE TERRORISM BUT, DESPITE SUCCESSFUL MURDER OF TAHERI, WE DO NOT CONCLUDE THAT GUERRILLAS WILL NOW PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON ASSASSINATION AS A TOOL. REASON IS THAT TERRORISTS STILL LACK ENOUGH TRAINED PERSONNEL TO PULL OFF ASSASSINATIONS ON REGULAR BASIS.

FARLAND


/tag/IR_0.html


75TEHRAN2069     1975-03-04 11:11     2010-11-30 16:04     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Tehran

R 041125Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 475

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 2069

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO
Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY CREATED BY SHAH

SUMMARY: CREATION OF IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY ANNOUNCED BY SHAH
MARCH 2 IS MOVE TO SEEK BROADER SUPPORT FOR MONARCHY AND THE SHAHPEOPLE
REVOLUTION. ALL IRANIANS OF VOTING AGE ARE EXPECTED TO
EXPRESS ALLEGIANCE TO NEW PARTY OR RISK BEING VIEWED AS OPPONENTS
OF SHAH AND EVEN TRAITORS WHO SHOULD LEAVE IRAN OR GO TO PRISON.
SHAH EXPLAINED IRAN'S RETURN TO SINGLE PARTY SYSTEM AS NECESSARY
BECAUSE QTE SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES UNQTE BY SOME IRANIANS SHOWED NEED
FOR IRANIANS TO CLOSE RANKS IN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE QTE GREAT
CIVILIZATION, UNQTE AND BECAUSE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAD FAILED.
ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR SUMMER WILL APPARENTLY BE HELD, BUT IT IS
NOT CLEAR HOW THEY WILL BE ORGANIZED. NET RESULT IS TO MAKE
IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM LESS FLEXIBLE. INTERNATIONAL REACTION
WILL PROBABLY RANGE FROM INDIFFERENCE TO CHARGES OF INCREASED
TOTALITARIANISM. SHAH APPARENTLY PLANS TO CONTINUE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT
IN DAILY POLITICAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS CONTRARY TO EARLIER SUGGESTIONS
THAT HE MIGHT BE MOVING GRADUALLY TO CONFINE HIMSELF TO
BROAD POLICY GUIDANCE AND LEAVE IMPLEMENTATION TO GOVERNMENT. END
SUMMARY.

¶1. SHAH'S LENGTHY STATEMENT AT HIS MARCH 2 PRESS CONFERENCE, FROM
WITH CORRESPONDENTS FOR FOREIGN MEDIA WERE EXCLUDED, (TEXT SENT BY
AIRGRAM) ESTABLISHED IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY. NEW PARTY WILL
ABSORB RULING IRAN NOVIN PARTY, LOYAL OPPOSITION MARDOM PARTY,
AND THE ULTRA-NATIONALIST PAN IRANIST PARTY AND ITS SPLINTER
GROUP THE IRANIANS PARTY. PRIME MINISTER HOVEYDA IS TO BE SECRETARY
GENERAL FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST TWO YEARS. SHAH WILL LATER
PROPOSE CHAIRMAN OF NEW PARTY'S EXECUTIVE BOARD AND PRESIDENT FOR
ITS POLITICAL BUREAU. A PARTY CONGRESS WILL BE HELD, PERHAPS
WITHIN TWO MONTHS. GENERAL ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD THIS SUMMER
UNDER AUSPICES OF NEW PARTY.

¶2. SHAH'S STATEMENT BEGAN WITH FAMILIAR RECITATION OF IRAN'S
GROWING SELF-RELIANCE AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE CONTRASTING SHARPLY
WITH ITS RELATIVE WEAKNESS IN FIRST HALF OF CENTURY. HE NOTED THAT
OPPOSITION PARTIES WERE CREATED IN RESPONSE TO HIS OWN WISHES
AND COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD BEEN FACED WITH A DIFFICULT TASK.
SHAH OBSERVED THAT THEY HAD FAILED TO FULFILL THEIR PROPER ROLE. HE
COMMENTED THAT SOME IRANIANS HAD MADE QTE SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES
UNQTE WHICH REFLECTED A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF IRAN' GOALS. IN
ORDER TO WELD ALL IRANIANS TOGETHER IN PURSUIT OF GOALS OF THE
SHAH-PEOPLE REVOLUTION, HE HAD, THEREFORE, DECIDED TO CREATE NEW
ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD SUPPRESS PARTY DIFFERENCES. ONLY REQUIREMENTS
FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NEW ORGANIZATION WOULD BE LOYALTY TO (1)
MONARCHY, (2) IRAN'S CONSTITUTION, AND (3) SIXTH OF BAHMAN (SHAHPEOPLE)
REVOLUTION. HE SPECIFICALLY SAID NEW PARTY WOULD FOSTER
CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM, AND HE PREDICTED THAT POLITICAL WINGS
WOULD EVOLVE WITHIN NEW PARTY. HE URGED ALL IRANIANS ELIGIBLE TO
VOTE TO ENTER INTO NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE OR CLARIFY THEIR POSITION.
BY THIS HE MEANT THAT THOSE WHO COULD NOT AGREE WITH THE
THREE PRINCIPLES SHOULD LEAVE IRAN OR GO TO PRISON AS TRAITORS
UNLESS THEY OPENLY EXPRESSED THEIR DISAPPROVAL AND WERE NOT ANTINATIONAL.
IF DISAPPROVAL IS IDEOLOGICAL, PERSON WOULD REMAIN FREE
IN IRAN BUT QTE SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY EXPECTATIONS UNQTE. FULL
PARTICIPATION IN IRAN'S PROGRESS WOULD OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE MEMBERSHIP
IN THE IRAN RESURGENCE PARTY. HE SAID IT WAS HIS EXPECTATION
THAT WORKERS, FARMERS, AND TEACHERS WOULD BE THE FIRST GROUPS TO
ANNOUNCE THEIR LOYALTY TO THE NEW PARTY.

¶3. COMMENT: ABOVE ALL, SHAH'S ACTION IN RETURNING TO SINGLE PARTY
SYSTEM OF 1964-67 PERIOD SHOWS HIS EXTREME SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM
AND STRONG DESIRE TO RECEIVE OVERT EVIDENCE OF POPULAR SUPPORT.
AFTER HE EXPERIMENTED WITH TAME OPPOSITION PARTIES IN
1956-64 PERIOD WITH POOR RESULTS, SHAH THEN TURNED TO HASSAN ALI
MANSUR'S PROGRESSIVE SOCIETY TO CREATE IRAN NOVIN PARTY AS INSTRUMENT
TO IMPLEMENT HIS SIXTH OF BAHMAN REVOLUTION. MARDOM PARTY
WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REJUVENATED TO STIMULATE IRAN NOVIN TO PERFORM
MORE EFFECTIVELY. DESPITE CONSTANT STATEMENTS OF LOYALTY TO SHAH
AND HIS PLANS FOR IRAN, PARTIES HAVE APPARENTLY NOT PLEASED HIM.
AS INDICATED BY FAILURES OF FORMER MARDOM PARTY SECRETARIES
GENERAL ALI NAQI AND NASSER AMERI, EVEN ACTIVITIES OF GELDED
OPPOSITION HAD PROVED TOO CRITICAL FOR SHAH'S TASTE. NEVERTHELESS
HIS PAST STATEMENTS INDICATED CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR COCCEPT OF
MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN IRAN, AND IMPERIAL DECISION TO INSTITUTE ONEPARTY
STATE REPRESENTS 180-DEGREE SHIFT IN POLICY WHICH ALSO
APPEARS TO NEGATE EARLIER PROMISES OF FREER ELECTIONS LATER THIS
YEAR. KEY SECTION OF SPEECH IS COMMENT THAT HE HAD HEARD QTE SOME
REALLY SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES, WHICH IN NOW WAY SHOULD BE EXPECTED
FROM AN IRANIAN. THIS SCENE, OF COURSE, HAS ALWAYS RECURRED WHEN
IRAN HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE DEFENCE OF ITS RIGHTS AT A HISTORIC
JUNCTURE. THIS SITUATION IS INTOLERABLE, UNQTE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
WE DOUBT THAT MUCH CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM WILL EMERGE
FROM THE IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY.

¶4. IN OPERATIONAL TERMS LITTLE HAS CHANGED, FOR DESPITE FACADE OF
QTE ME-TOO UNQTE OPPOSITION PARTIES SHAH HAS ALWAYS CALLED THE
TUNE AND ONLY RULING IRAN NOVIN PARTY HAD ANY IMPORTANCE. PRIME
MINISTER HAS BEEN LEAD DANCER, AND HIS SELECTION AS SECGEN AT
JANUARY PARTY CONGRESS HAD TIED IRAN NOVIN PARTY EVEN CLOSER TO
SHAH. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF NEW MOVE HAS BEEN FLOOD OF STATEMENTS
OF LOYALTY TO SHAH, CONSTITUTION AND REVOLUTION, BOTH BY
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS. THERE IS CLEARLY NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR
IRANIANS WHO WANT TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT
AND SHARE ITS PROSPERITY. ALL DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT
SHAH'S PLAN FOR IRAN WILL BE SUPPRESSED UNTIL NEW PARTY
DEVELOPS AN IDEOLOGY AND ITS LEADERSHIP IS CONSTITUTED.

¶5. SHAH'S SPEECH IS VAGUE ON GOALS OF IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY AND
MANY OTHER POINTS. IT IS NOT CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, HOW CANDIDATES
WILL BE SELECTED FOR SUMMER ELECTIONS AND ON WHAT PLATFORMS THEY
WILL RUN. SPEECH SHOWS SIGNS OF HURRIED PREPARATION FOR ISSUANCE
PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR ALGIERS. WHILE MOST IRANIANS WILL
ACCEPT NEW CHANGE WITH TYPICAL CYNICISM, IMPLIED CRITICISM OF ALL
PARTIES FOR FAILING TO GET BEHIND SHAH'S PUSH FOR REVOLUTION FROM
THE TOP MAY ALIENATE SOME PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO HAVE
WORKED HARD FOR IRAN NOVIN PARTY ON ASSUMPTION THEY WERE CARRYING
OUT SHAH'S WISHES.

¶6. INTERNATIONAL REACTION WILL PROBABLY VARY FROM INDIFFERENCE TO
INCREASINGLY SHRILL CHARGES OF TOTALITARIANISM. IRAN'S IMAGE AS
COUNTRY IN WHICH ALL ELEMENTS WERE BEING TAPPED IN DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS MAY SUFFER UNLESS NEW PARTY'S MEMBERSHIP COMES FROM BROAD
SPECTRUM. IT APPEARS THAT EARLIER SUCCESSFUL IRANIAN POLICY OF
COMPROMISE AND COOPERATION HAS BEEN REPLACED BY QTE TAKE IT OR
LEAVE IT UNQTE STANCE IN DEALING WITH OPPOSITION.

¶7. IN A-19 EMBASSY NOTED THAT SHAH HOPES TO MOVE TOWARD SITUATION
IN WHICH HE GIVES POLICY GUIDANCE BUT KEEPS HIS DISTANCE FROM
DAILY ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENT. INITAL IMPRESSION OF HIS ACTION IN
CREATING NEW POLITICAL PARTY AND FORECASTING HIS PERSONAL SELECTION
OF SOME OF ITS LEADERS IS THAT HE HAS RETURNED TO MORE DIRECT
INVOLVEMENT IN THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT. BETTER JUDGMENT ON THIS
POINT CAN BE MADE WHEN FUNCTION OF NEW PARTY BECOME CLEAR.

¶8. IN SUM, GIVEN EXISTING STRICT DEGREE OF POLITICAL CONTROLS,
SHAH'S DECISION TO MELD ALL POLITICAL PARTIES INTO ONE APPEARS TO
OFFER LITTLE IN WAY OF IMPROVEMENTS TO IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
WHILE ADDING SEVERAL DISADVANTAGES BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY.


HELMS

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO
Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006


/tag/IR_0.html


09KUWAIT110     2009-02-05 16:04     2010-11-30 16:04     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Kuwait

VZCZCXRO3981
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0110/01 0361636
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051636Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2777
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000110

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2029
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR KU IR
SUBJECT: THE INTERIOR MINISTER'S REMEDY FOR TERRORISTS:
"LET THEM DIE."

REF: KUWAIT 0095

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: During a February 3 meeting in their
ongoing dialog on US-Kuwait CT cooperation, Kuwaiti Minister
of Interior Shaykh Jaber al-Khalid Al Sabah discussed with
Ambassador US and Kuwaiti efforts to locate and apprehend
terror financiers (including Mohammed Sultan Ibrahim Sultan
Al-Ali, aka Jawad/Abu Umar), applauded improved liaison
information exchange, expressed skepticism Kuwait would ever
develop a rehabilitation center for former GTMO detainees and
other extremists supporting jihad, and suggested the US
should release current GTMO detainees back into Afghanistan,
where they could be killed in combat. He sardonically
questioned why US NAVCENT forces had gone to the trouble of
rescuing foundering Iranian hashish smugglers two weeks
earlier, saying "God meant to punish them with death and you
saved them. Why?" Characterizing the previous Saturday's
provincial elections as a "huge success," Shaykh Jaber
expressed his belief that President Obama and the US had the
tools necessary to successfully confront all challenges. END
SUMMARY.

¶2. (S/NF) Ambassador called on Shaykh Jaber February 3 to
review progress on our CT liaison relationship and to seek
the Interior Minister's support for operational concepts
aimed at intercepting individuals involved in the
exploitation of traditional smuggling routes in the northern
Gulf to move would-be jihadists and their
financier/facilitators between Kuwait and Iran, Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Shaykh Jaber began the meeting by applauding
the "huge success" of the provincial elections in Iraq and
expressing his confidence in the ability of President Obama
and the "super power" US to address current challenges.

¶3. (S/NF) Ambassador noted she'd met recently with VADM
McCraven, now JSOC commander for this region, and that they'd
discussed alternative approaches to staunching the flows of
terror financing, given the constraints of Kuwait's current
legal and political systems. Offering his support for these
approaches ) and underscoring that he was as concerned about
terrorist influences from Saudi Arabia as from Iran, given
the loose border controls -- the Minister expressed his
understanding of what he characterized (fairly) as improved
information exchange between our services, while
acknowledging the ongoing deficiencies in Kuwait's legal
system that stymie effective prosecution and restraint of
these individuals once captured.

¶4. (S/NF) Ambassador noted recent press reports that
self-confessed jihadi recruiter and financier Mohammed
al-Bathali had been released on a 500 dinar bond after being
sentenced to three of a possible five years imprisonment for
"inciting jihad against a friendly state." (Reftel) At the
same time, Kuwait's Ambassador to the US, Shaykh Salem Al
Sabah, had approached S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson to
inquire after the status of Kuwait's four remaining GTMO
detainees. Ambassador clarified that President Obama's
announcement of our determination to close the detention
center at Guantanamo did not mean we no longer had security
concerns which would be factored into any release scenarios;
the Kuwaiti detainees were nasty, unrepentant individuals and
Kuwait's record had been tarnished by the example of former
GTMO detainee al-Ajmi, who'd allegedly blown himself up in
Mosul following his release to the Kuwaiti authorities.
Ambassador asked the Interior Minister the status of the
rehabilitation center Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Mohammed
Al Sabah had mentioned in his September 18th conversation
with then-Secretary Rice in Washington. Ambassador noted
that we were aware of the stories of Saudis who'd gone
through SAG rehabilitation centers only to re-emerge with Al
Qaeda in Yemen; nonetheless, the GOK had to take steps to
show its seriousness in changing and controlling the
behaviors of extremists within its society.

¶5. (S/NF) Shaykh Jaber replied with an anecdote: Following
the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and Desert Storm, General
Schwarzkopf had raised the issue of "rehabilitating" Kuwaitis
who'd been exposed to the brutality of war so that they could
re-integrate into society. Shaykh (Ret,d General) Jaber had
replied: "But you are thinking of the Vietnam model, where
young war veterans came home to empty apartments or anonymous
urban environments. That is not who we are. We are a small,
close-knit society and everyone knows each other. No one
will feel alienated: those who can heal will heal naturally
with family; those who cannot heal in that environment will
never heal." Relating this to the current topic, Shaykh

KUWAIT 00000110 002 OF 002

Jaber told the Ambassador: "You know better than I that we
cannot deal with these people (i.e. the GTMO detainees). I
can't detain them. If I take their passports, they will sue
to get them back (Note: as happened with Al-Ajmi. End
note.) I can talk to you into next week about building a
rehabilitation center, but it won't happen. We are not Saudi
Arabia; we cannot isolate these people in desert camps or
somewhere on an island. We cannot compel them to stay. If
they are rotten, they are rotten and the best thing to do is
get rid of them. You picked them up in Afghanistan; you
should drop them off in Afghanistan, in the middle of the war
zone."

¶6. (S/NF) Ambassador then raised with the Minister developing
an SOP for dealing with incidents such as the recent rescue
by US NAVCENT forces in the northern Gulf of seven Iranian
smugglers whose boat was foundering while engaged in
smuggling hashish. In the event, the Omanis had agreed to
repatriate the Iranians but we nonetheless needed to think
about dealing with similar episodes in future in expeditious
fashion. The initial response of the Kuwaiti Coast Guard had
been to refer the matter to the Minister of Interior, via the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador noted our
supposition that the Kuwaiti Coast Guard must have had
similar experiences with Iranian smugglers who needed
repatriation to Iran. Smiling broadly, the Interior Minister
deflected the question, saying "God wished to punish them for
smuggling drugs by drowning them, and then you saved them.
So they're your problem! You should have let them drown."
In any case, he added, the Kuwaitis generally sent the
Iranians back to Iran in their own boats so there had not
been a question of physically handing them over.

¶7. (S/NF) In closing, Ambassador noted that the Minister had
created the position of Special Advisor to Shaykh Jaber for
Kuwait Security Services (our GRPO liaison counterpart) and
assigned Shaykh Salman Sabah al-Salem al-Humoud Al Sabah to
that role. Ambassador asked whether the Minister believed
there was any appropriate liaison relationship between the
Embassy and Shaykh Salman, to which the Minister replied in
the negative. Finally, the Ambassador invited the Minister
to join her in attending the US Ambassador's reception
February 24 at the IDEX event in Abu Dhabi, as part of our
efforts to boost the relationship.

¶8. (C) COMMENT: The Minister was as frank and pessimistic as
ever when it came to the subject of apprehending and
detaining terror financiers and facilitators under Kuwait's
current legal and political framework. Ongoing tensions
between parliament and the PM and his cabinet make any
changes highly unlikely any time soon. The remaining GTMO
detainees remain a particularly thorny issue for the
leadership here, who privately recognize the downsides of
taking custody and readily acknowledge their inability to
manage them but who remain under strong domestic political
pressure to "bring their boys home." Telling was the fact
that press accounts of the Ambassador's February 3 meeting
with the Minister (which was one-on-one with a notetaker) and
her meeting two days earlier with the MFA U/S focused solely
on the GTMO issue, although it was discussed only marginally.
END COMMENT.

********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
JONES


/tag/IR_0.html


09STATE11937     2009-02-10 03:03     2010-11-30 16:04     SECRET//NOFORN     Secretary of State

O 100328Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
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INFO USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 011937


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL KPAL FR IR RS
NATO, UK, CN
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's February 5, 2009
expanded meeting with French Foreign Minister Bernard
Kouchner

CLASSIFIED BY EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARCIE RIES,
ACTING FOR REASONS 1.4 (D)

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Secretary Clinton and French Foreign
Minister Bernard Kouchner met on February 5 for 30
minutes in their first bilateral meeting. The warm and
open exchange followed a one-on-one working lunch and
preceded a 20-minute press conference. The two agreed
to coordinate closely on a wide range of issues
including the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia,
the Balkans, GTMO detainees and Africa, especially
Darfur. On Afghanistan, Kouchner emphasized the need
for greater "Afghanization" and international "access"
to everyday Afghan people, and asked for U.S. support to
hold a second "Neighbors" conference to follow up on the
initial December 14, 2008 event. On GTMO, the FM
indicated Europe would help on a case-by-case basis, and
asked the U.S. for assistance with a 15-year old
Canadian national, Omar Khadr. The FM asked for a
reaction to its Transatlantic paper, passed to the U.S.
during France's 2008 EU presidency. As the meeting
closed, the Secretary joked that the FM was "not even in
her league" concerning criticism when the FM mentioned a
new book critical of him that might spark press
questions. END SUMMARY.

-----------
Middle East
-----------

¶2. (C) The Secretary opened the meeting by welcoming FM
Kouchner and expressing appreciation for French
leadership on a broad agenda of cooperation, which she
said President Obama hoped to deepen. Kouchner
congratulated the Secretary and said he looked forward
to the pleasure of working together on a first name
basis. The two then summarized topics discussed in
their one-on-one meeting, beginning with the Middle
East.

¶3. (S) The Secretary said she understood that the issue
of the Middle East was of grave concern to France. She
expressed appreciation for French leadership on
interdicting weapons into Gaza and with the Copenhagen
process. She thanked President Sarkozy for his ideas
and for French work in providing assistance to the
people of Gaza. FM Kouchner said that he had met with
Palestinian Authority (PA) PM Abu Mazen three days prior
and found him completely isolated. There was a game
being played among Arabs, most of whom, Egyptians
excepted, did not care. He said "Abbas is lost. You
tried, we tried but nothing has happened. The key, he
said, was to figure out how to build up Abu Mazen in a
government of national unity. Salam Fayyad was a
fantastic PM who had ideas about how to open the Gaza
crossing, specifically a tax paid by a group of people
who would be acceptable to both sides just to get the
crossing operating." It was especially important, he
continued, to offer the Palestinian people a sign that
the crossing was open because of Abu Mazen's
involvement. He had to be seen as a leader. He said it
would take weeks and noted that Hamas does not want to
talk to Mazen. Still, it was important to help convince
the Israelis to open the crossing. Kouchner cautioned
that it would be difficult to get anything done ahead of
the Israeli election on February 10.

¶4. (S) The Secretary concurred that the situation was
difficult. She added that confidence building measures
were needed so that the Israelis would feel committed.
It was important to persuade the new Israeli government
to participate in the peace effort and be convinced that
they could work with the PA. If Abu Mazen's government
of national unity is to work, Israel needs to understand
that it should work with him and that this development
could help. She was encouraged by the actions that the
Egyptians had taken against the tunnels. She said there
was much to coordinate and supported the role of the
Quartet, but agreed that little could happen in advance
of the Israeli elections. She noted that the U.S. was
conducting a review based on Mitchell's work.

-----------
Afghanistan
-----------

¶5. (S) The Secretary said that the U.S. was working on
a comprehensive strategy and thanked the FM for France's
contributions and cooperation. Kouchner noted that
France had increased its troops to 3000 from 3300. He
said there was progress in several areas, including
civil society, but presented a mixed picture overall.
He returned several times to problems with access to the
population and suggested that this was the key. He also
promoted Afghanization, saying it was important "for the
people to take their own problems into their own hands."
He expressed pride in the French hospital in Kabul as an
example of what was possible noting that Afghan patients
were being treated by Afghan doctors, and even the
Taliban presented themselves for treatment. He said
that Kabul is not Afghanistan, but that Kabul works
because it has been "Afghanized." The rest of the
country needs the same, but it will take years. He was
also concerned about growing Iranian influence, noting
that a huge Shi'a mosque had recently been built with
Iranian funds.

¶6. (C) FM Kouchner asked for the Secretary's support
for a follow-up event to the December 14, 2008
"Afghanistan Neighbors conference" that Kouchner hosted
in Paris. The FM said the meeting had been very
interesting, despite the Iranians not showing at the
last minute, and should be repeated if the U.S. agreed.
Kouchner put the conference in the context of a broader
approach, stressing "there is no military solution in
Afghanistan."

¶7. (C) The Secretary took note of the proposal, but
made no commitment on a follow-up conference. She said
the U.S. believed that there had been some success with
building the Army, but more problems with the police.
Both commented on the strength of the new Minister of
Interior. The Secretary said that the Minister of the
Interior was an interesting person but that it might be
necessary to deal with some of the more radical people
whether we wanted to or not. On reconciliation,
Kouchner said that there were some very bad people
involved, but they were nationals of Afghanistan and it
was important to start negotiations, including the
negotiations in Saudi Arabia. Finally on the
presidency, Kouchner said "Karzai is somebody. We have
to talk to him, but there may be other candidates." He
said Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi was such a person but, while
interesting, he probably couldn't win against Karzai.
The Secretary noted that Richard Holbrooke would travel
to the region.

-----------
GUANTANAMO
-----------

¶8. (C) The Secretary expressed appreciation for French
leadership within the EU on this issue. She said she
was proud of President Obama's commitment to close the
facility, calling it "a cancer" the U.S. wanted to take
care of, but would take time. She said this was
complicated, so we were asking friends and allies to
consider taking some detainees. FM Kouchner said the EU
27 had not yet reached consensus, but that they
"accepted the idea," but would consider detainees on a
case-by-case basis; Europeans do not want to create
legal problems for themselves. They were working with
three categories of individuals. First were "the best
cases." Second, were those who had made individual
requests for resettlement in specific countries and
third without legal problems. There were many
outstanding questions, such as whether they had refugee
status, but because of the Schengen visa requirements,
it was necessary for the EU to address this together.
At the end of this discussion, the FM handed the
Secretary a paper concerning Omar Khadr, a 15-year old
Muslim of Canadian origin. The Secretary agreed to
review the case.

----
Iran
----

¶9. (S/NF) The Secretary opened the discussion by
alluding to the private conversation with FM Kouchner
and their agreement that it was important to prevent
further development of Iran's nuclear capabilities and
its missile program. Iran's recent space launch
complicated this effort noting that the Iranians had
respected none of the internationally recognized
requirements for a space launches specified in UN
Security Council resolutions. The FM said he welcomed
the U.S. willingness to consider direct talks between
the U.S. and Iran. He said that the Iranians were
waiting for the U.S. The launch had surprised the
Russians, of whom he said "they are more affected than
we being 2000 kilometers closer." He added that the
sanctions seemed to be having some effect on the
domestic population, but he ended by repeating the need
for a Quartet meeting. He said that it was important
for any approach to be done together with the Germans
and the Russians, particularly since the Russians are
closer to Iran and could be more easily targeted.
Kouchner suggested not including the Chinese because the
Chinese are "absolutely not useful" in this process.
The Secretary said it was important to follow up,
possibly with U.K. Foreign Secretary David Miliband on
the margins of the G-20 Summit in London.

---------------------
Russia/Georgia/Energy
---------------------

¶10. (C) FM Kouchner told the Secretary that France had
been surprised by the Georgian invasion. "We did stop
it, but we didn't solve it." He continued that the
South Ossetians and Abkhaz are a "sort of independent
people" but he worried that there is no humanitarian
access to the population. He said that Georgian PM
Saakashvili had been "badly inspired; he fell into the
trap." But the FM said the Geneva process should
continue, though it might take months or years. On
energy, he said the EU had been united, but then Poland,
Romania and others had been completely cut off and that
both Russia and Ukraine had been "absolutely awful." He
said "a group of Europeans were trying to secure a
pipeline from one country to the other." But he
cautioned that the U.S. position on Missile Defense was
also a factor. He complimented Medvedev as "a normal
guy, at least better than Putin," and credited him with
what he believed to be the sound decision not to put
Iskander missiles in Kalinigrad. He said things were
now more complicated with the Iranian space launch. On
the whole, things were frozen, which was "not bad" as a
place to be for the moment.

¶11. (C) Continuing on Russia, Kouchner said that the
main thing for the U.S. and Russia to begin to work
together. "Let's talk to them," he said. He said that
the Russians are "rough, rude, and brutal," but we
should still engage them. Kouchner said Russian FM
Lavrov was one of the most brutal, but was among the
cleverest FMs. In any case, they were an important
player and had to be included.

-------
Balkans
-------

¶12. (C) FM Kouchner said that Bosnia remained a
problem, but, it was important to simply "follow the
road." It was important to push the Serbian government
closer to the EU, though he conceded this was difficult
due to Dutch and Belgian objections to the failure of
the Serbs to hand over Ratko Mladic to ICTY. Presumably
referring to EULEX, he said there was success on the
ground in Kosovo as the two sides were not killing each
other and concluded that things were not in a bad place
for the moment.

------
Darfur
------

¶13. (C) FM Kouchner told the Secretary he thought the
International Criminal Court (ICC) would soon issue an
arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir. He complimented the Qataris for playing a
useful role with their work in Doha. He said they were
working with both sides, including the Islamists. He
said it had taken two years to build toward success.
EUFOR, a contingent of 17 nations deployed in Eastern
Chad and northern Central African Republic, was a
success and he expected a resolution before March 15
when EUFOR will hand over its responsibilities to the UN
(MINURCAT II). On the humanitarian front, he estimated
that half of the displaced persons in Eastern Chad,
mainly women, would begin coming home in Darfur by March
¶15.

----------------------------
Book and Transatlantic Paper
----------------------------

¶14. (SBU) As the meeting ended, the Secretary said
there was a lot to digest and do. It would require
cooperation. On a lighter note, FM Kouchner said that
waiting journalists might raise the issue of "The World
According to K," the expose published yesterday accusing
him of enriching himself as a consultant in Africa,
tarnishing his humanitarian image. The Secretary
dismissed the book, saying "One book? I have 25.
You're not even in my league!" He said that "the first
one hurts a little more than the others." The FM asked
the Secretary for US reaction to the Transatlantic paper
passed to the U.S. during the French presidency. The
Secretary said she would review the issue and respond.
Note: EUR passed the paper to S staff on 2/5/09 and is
preparing a response to the FM). End note.

¶15. (U) Participants in the Bilateral:

United States
The Secretary
SCA - A/S Richard Boucher
EUR - PDAS Marcie Ries
NEA - DAS David Hale
PA - Robert Wood
EUR/WE - Pamela Spratlen (notetaker)
NSC - Toby Bradley
Interpreter

France
Foreign Minister Kouchner
Ambassador Vimont
Eric Chevallier, MFA Spokesperson
Philippe Errera, MFA Counselor
Emmanuelle Lenain, Embassy Spokesperson
Aurelien Lechevallier, Notetaker
Interpreter



CLINTON


/tag/IR_0.html


10ANKARA302     2010-02-25 11:11     2010-11-30 16:04     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Ankara

VZCZCXRO3002
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RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 7044
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
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RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
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RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000302

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S
SINIRLIOGLU

REF: ANKARA 263

Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: During February 18 "Shared Vision and
Structured Dialogue" meetings in Ankara, Turkish MFA
Undersecretary Sinirlioglu:

-- Appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols
ratification and the Minsk Process;
-- Registered increasing GoT dissatisfaction with Iraqi PM
Malaki;
-- Expressed hope USF-I CG Odierno's engagement would elicit
substantive cooperation from the KRG against the terrorist
PKK;
-- Urged higher profile USG involvment in the Cyprus
reunification talks, and;
-- Confirmed GoT interest in further dialogue on missile
defense.

End Summary.

IRAN
----

¶2. (C) Burns strongly urged Sinirlioglu to support action to
convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course.
Sinirliolgu reaffirmed the GoT's opposition to a nuclear
Iran; however, he registered fear about the collateral impact
military action might have on Turkey and contended sanctions
would unite Iranians behind the regime and harm the
opposition. Burns acknowledged Turkey's exposure to the
economic effects of sanctions as a neighbor to Iran, but
reminded Sinirlioglu Turkish interests would suffer if Israel
were to act militarily to forestall Iran's acquisition of
nuclear weapons or if Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to seek
nuclear arsenals of their own. He said the international
community's patience with Iran had been met with the Iranian
refusal, since October, to work with the P5-plus-1, the
clandestine enrichment facility near Qom and Tehran's recent
decison to enrich its low-enriched uranium to 20%. The
IAEA's creative proposal to fabricate new fuel assemblies for
the Tehran Research Reactor had stumbled on a technically
unfeasible Iranian counter-offer for a simultaneous exchange
in Iran of Iranian fuel for fuel assemblies. Carefully
constructed sanctions, Burns argued, targeting the
increasingly pervasive economic power of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps, would convey the international
community's unity and determination. "We'll keep the door
open to engagement," he stressed. A visibly disheartened
Sinirlioglu conceded a unified message is important. He
acknowledged the countries of the region perceive Iran as a
growing threat: "Alarm bells are ringing even in Damascus."

ARMENIA
-------

¶3. (C) Sinirlioglu appealed for "simultaneity" between
Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process. He
emphasized "a strong reaction" against the protocols among
ruling party MPs had to be overcome before the government
would hazard a ratification effort. He warned Congressional
passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would "complicate"
his government's domestic political calculations regarding
ratification. He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani
President Aliyev can found, then "we can move" the protocols
forward. Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia's
announcement of an agreed framework for Minsk Group progress
would provide the GoT with the necessary political cover.
Burns inquired about the prospect for progress on a natural
gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Sinirlioglu implied

ANKARA 00000302 002 OF 005


Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey's handling
of the protocols: "He doesn't trust us."

IRAQ
----

¶4. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's increasing
dissatisfaction with PM Malaki and fear that he is tending
"to get out of control." "He is preoccupied with his
political survival;" nevertheless, Sinirlioglu continued,
the GoT is in frequent contact with him. The MFA hosted
Maliki advisors Sadiq al Rikabi and Tariq al Najmi to
meetings 10 days prior. Sinirlioglu lamented Iran's efforts
to influence the election. He noted Saudi Arabia is also
"throwing around money" among the political parties in Iraq
because it is unwilling to accept the inevitability of Shia
dominance there. "We want a free, transparent and fair
election," he said, "we need to forestall a deepening of the
sectarian divide."

¶5. (C) After the March 7 elections, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey
would initiate an effort to connect Iraqi gas fields to the
Turkish grid via a 300 kilometer pipeline, costing USD 500
million. He asserted the pipeline could begin pumping within
two years. He alleged Iranian opposition to the pipeline
because most of Iraq's gas fields are in Kurdish and Sunni
areas. Sinirlioglu advocated a second pipeline that would
give Iraqi oil an alternative to the Gulf as a route to
Europe once the country is able to meet its OPEC quota. He
asserted the piplines' construction would pull the several
Iraqi communities together into a common project. The
creation of new "common assets," he said, could be more
important for its politically unifying effect than its
economic impact.

¶6. (C) Sinirlioglu registered his appreciation for USF-I
Commanding General Odierno's recent visit. He hoped for the
early drafting of an action plan that would elicit more
cooperation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)
against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
leadership harboring in northern Iraq: "We want the KRG to
understand that working with us is important."

ISRAEL
------

¶7. (C) Burns focused on Turkey's strained relationship with
Israel. Sinirlioglu argued "the problem is not bilateral,
but general." He attributed increasing regional country
frustration with Israel to the stalled Peace Process,
especially on the Palestinian track. He blamed the lack of
progress on Israeli intransigence, which caused regional
stake-holders to question Netanyahu's goals. He contended
the "humanitarian situation in Gaza," which is not a
punishment of Hamas, but of the Gazan people, fed Turkish
popular anger against Israel. Even so, bilateral cooperation
with Israel is continuing. Turkey is acquiring Israeli
military equipment, notably Heron UAVs. Direct flights
between the two countries are routine. Two-way trade is
healthy, he said, tourism has dropped recently, but "will
recover." Sinirlioglu described Israeli Defense Minister
Ehud Barak's mid-January visit as "very good." He noted the
MFA is exploring the possibility of arranging a meeting
between the two prime ministers on the margins of an
international gathering. Returning to a GoT obsession, he
recalled the Turkey-brokered Syria-Israel proximity talks,
"which were shattered by Cast Lead," Israel's December 2008
military operation in Gaza. Burns noted Syria places high
value on Turkey's role as a mediator and repeated Senator
Mitchell's statement that Turkey-brokered proximity talks can
make an important contribution to the Peace Process.

ANKARA 00000302 003 OF 005



SYRIA
-----

¶8. (C) Sinirlioglu contended Turkey's diplomatic efforts are
beginning to pull Syria out of Iran's orbit. He said a
shared hatred for Saddam had been the original impetus for
their unlikely alliance. "Now, their interests are
diverging." Once again pitching Israel-Syria proximity
talks, Sinirlioglu contended Israel's acceptance of Turkey as
a mediator could break Syria free of Tehran's influence and
further isolate Iran.

EU, CYPRUS and GREECE
---------------------

¶9. (C) Sinirlioglu said Turkey's EU accession is being
obstructed by the politically motivated objections of several
member states, notably France, Austria and Cyprus. He
reserved special criticism for President Sarkozy. He accused
France of changing the rules mid-game. He contended French
opposition to Turkey's membership is "deepening the cultural
divide" between Christian Europe and the Muslim world: "A
wider audience is watching this."

¶10. (C) He regretted perceived Greek Cypriot complacency
regarding the island's reunification talks: EU "membership
makes them invulnerable." Greek Cypriots, he said, want the
world to forget the progress achieved by the Annan Plan in
¶2004. They pretend relations between the island's two
communities are an internal affair, even though, by treaty,
it's been an international issue for 50 years. Talat's
cross-voting proposal, Sinirlioglu continued, should have
been a breakthrough, but the Greek Cypriots failed to react.
Downer is frustrated, Sinirlioglu alleged, and so are the
Turkish Cypriots. He implied the island's Turkish community
would register its frustration by voting out Talat as TRNC
"president" in April. He renewed Turkey's appeal for higher
profile direct USG involvement in the negotiations.

¶11. (C) Sinirlioglu welcomed Greek PM Papandeou's belated
response to Erdogan's October 30 letter seeking a frank new
discussion of the two neighbors' several long-running
disputes. He conceded Papandreou's delay is understandable
in light of his likely preoccupation with Greece's acute
financial crisis. Based on Papandreou's response,
Sinirlioglu said, Turkey expects to begin new talks with
Greece soon.

AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN and INDIA
-------------------------------

¶12. (C) Burns opened the discussion on Afghanistan with
praise for Turkey's military, training and development
contributions there. Sinirlioglu said Turkey had chosen to
focus on three Afghan challenges: "the marriage of Wahhabism
and Pashtun nationalism"; the chronic antagonism between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and; the country's security forces
deficit. He said Turkey plans to address the first by
ramping up its education programs in Afghanistan; the second
by pursuing its trilateral Ankara Process, which sponsors
meetings of senior Afghan and Pakistani ministerial and
intelligence counterparts, and; the third by establishing a
police training center in Kabul that aims for a throughput of
5160 trainees per year. Keying off the last point, AMB Tacan
Ildem, who recently concluded an assignment as Turkey's NATO
PERMREP, declared the EUPOL police training effort in
Afghanistan a failure. He said the EU's criticism of
Turkey's unwillingness to work directly with EUPOL is
unjustified. He argued, since Turkey does not have a
security agreement with the EU and is excluded from the

ANKARA 00000302 004 OF 005


European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the GoT lacks a
legal basis on which to cooperate with EUPOL. "We would like
the EU to involve us not as a third country, but, in view of
our accumulated rights," as a candidate for membership. He
urged the USG not to coordinate bilateral agreements to
support EU operations but, instead, to route all cooperation
with the EU on security issues through NATO.

¶13. (C) Deputy Undersecretary for South Asian Affairs Engin
Soysal led the discussion on Pakistan. He described the
Ankara Process and the recent Turkey-sponsored Afghanistan
Neighbors Summit as Turkish efforts to assert regional
responsibility for South Asia's inter-linked problems. He
said Turkey had not invited India to the neighbors summit in
deference to Pakistani sensitivities; however, he claimed,
Pakistan understands attempting to exclude India from the
nascent South Asian regional structures would be a mistake.
He reported Indian Prime Minister Singh had requested
President Gul's assistance with Pakistan during the latter's
visit to New Delhi the previous week. Acting on that
request, Gul had phoned Pakistani President Zardari, who was
skeptical of Indian intentions. Gul is planning to visit
Pakistan later this year. Soysal said Iran is proposing a
quadrilateal summit, which would include Turkey, Afghanistan
and Pakistan, but that proposal had yet to generate
enthusiasm.

¶14. (C) Soysal, Turkey's former ambassador to Pakistan, said
the Pakistani military, though displeased with Zardari,
remains unwilling to intervene; nevertheless, senior
officers' patience may not be infinite. Zardari needs to
increase the democratic legitimacy of parliament. Soysal
offered. Nawaz Sharif has become a much more constructive
player.

¶15. (C) Soysal urged a NATO training role in Pakistan.
Picking up from Soysal, Tacan Ildem suggested NATO invite
Pakistani military officers to courses at Oberammergau.

BOSNIA
------

¶16. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's determination to
resist perceived EU efforts to exclude Turkey from the
Balkans, particularly Bosnia. He identified effecting
rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia as Turkey's immediate
diplomatic goal for the region. Towards that end,
Sinirlioglu said, we convinced Haris Siladjdzic, who had been
in Ankara the day before, to cease references to Serbian
"genocide." The United States and Turkey have "agreed to
disagree" on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia;
nevertheless, "we value your involvement in the Balkans."

BILATERAL EUROPEAN RELATIONS, NATO
----------------------------------

¶17. (C) Burns inquired about Turkey's bilateral relations
with Europe. Sinirlioglu briefly recapped Turkey's
unhappiness with Sarkozy. He described his country's
relationship with Austria as infected by the latter's ethnic
prejudice. He complained Belgium and Denmark are reluctant
to suppress terrorist PKK-affiliated organizations active in
their countries. Tacan Ildem added that, as part of the 2009
POTUS-brokered deal that had overcome Turkish objections to
the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary
General, Denmark had promised to clarify its legal
requirements prerequiste to acceding to Turkey's request for
the closure of Roj TV, a PKK mouthpiece. This still needed
to be done, Ildem said.

¶18. (C) Picking up from Ildem, Sinirlioglu recalled the

ANKARA 00000302 005 OF 005


POTUS-brokered deal had included an understanding that a
qualified Turk would be considered for Assistant Secretary
General. Instead, he said, a German of uncompelling merit
was selected. "We suspect a deal between Rasmussen and
Merkel." Ildem complained high-level positions should be
part of NATO reform: "We missed an opportunity with the
selection of the Assistant Secretary General." Sinirlioglu
added: "We let Rasmussen have Secretary General, because we
trusted you."

MISSILE DEFENSE
---------------

¶19. (C) Sinirlioglu inquired about Russia's reaction on
missile defense. Burns said the Russians are much more
relaxed towards the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we
hope to have more conversations on missile defense
bilaterally and, eventually, within the NATO-Russia Council.
Sinirlioglu recalled PM Erdogan's request in his recent
meeting with SECDEF Gates that the Iranian threat not be
highlighted to justify PAA.

¶20. (U) Participants:

Turkey

Undersecretary Feridun Sinirliolgu
Deputy Undersecretary Engin Soysal
Ambassador Reha Keskintepe, Director General for the Americas
Ambassador Tacan Ildem, Director General for International
Security Affairs
Ambassador Aydin Sezgin, Director General for Intelligence
and Security Affairs
Ebru Barat Gokdenizler, Deputy Director General for the
Americas
Serhat Aksen, Department Head, Americas

United States

Undersecretary William Burns
Ambassador James Jeffrey
Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow
Bridget Brink, NSC
Daniel O'Grady, Political Counselor
Tamir Waser, P Staff
Jeremiah Howard, Deputy Political Counselor - Notetaker

¶21. (U) Undersecretary Burns has cleared this cable.



Jeffrey

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"


/tag/IR_0.html


09LONDON2303     2009-10-06 16:04     2010-11-30 11:11     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy London

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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T LONDON 002303

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, UK, KNNP, MOPS, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY’S OCTOBER 10-11
VISIT TO LONDON

Classified By: Ambassador Louis B. Susman for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (C//NF) Summary. The Secretary’s visit to London comes on the heels of the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat political party conferences -- their last before the UK elections which must be held by June 2010. The domestic political situation remains in flux, but with the Conservatives enjoying a consistent lead in the polls. A Conservative victory is not assured, however; the Conservatives have done a better job of criticizing Labour policies than of selling Conservative solutions. The cumulative contraction of the UK economy by 5.7 percent over the last five quarters has focused electoral discussions on economic issues. The major foreign policy issues for the election are the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan, which all parties continue to back for now in spite of eroding public support and a lively debate in the media, and the UK’s role in the EU, which Labour has been using as an example of the Conservatives’ “isolationist” tendencies on economic and foreign policy. Politically, PM Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband will want the Secretary’s visit to demonstrate the strength of their relationship with the U.S. administration in order to counter domestic press speculation about a perceived decline in the “special relationship” following Megrahi’s release and President Obama’s reported “snubbing” of PM Brown’s requests for one-on-one meetings at the G-20 and UNGA. Some of the key issues of import to the UK Government are Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Northern Ireland, and non-proliferation. End summary.

The UK on Key Issues
--------------------

¶2. (S//NF) The Secretary’s meetings with PM Gordon Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband likely will focus on the following key issues:

-- Afghanistan - As the second largest force contributor in Afghanistan, the UK has lost 219 soldiers since operations began in 2001. The up-tick in British casualties in July and August 2009 has contributed to renewed public debate on the UK’s engagement there. Public support for the war effort is tepid. Rather than questioning the reasons for the UK’s presence in Afghanistan, many critics instead have asserted that Brown has provided insufficient troops and equipment (including helicopters) to get the job done. In his September 25 discussion with the President, Brown said Afghan forces must shoulder a greater portion of the burden and take more responsibility for their own affairs and asserted the UK would not be “cutting out” of Afghanistan, though it lacks the capacity to commit additional troops. Brown and Miliband made similar statements to General McChrystal on October 1 and Admiral Mullen and Admiral Stavridis October 2, and the PM’s Foreign Policy Advisor Simon McDonald has asked the USG to show “understanding of the political pressures that the PM is under.” However, UK military officials claim that 1,000 - 2,000 additional troops are available for deployment. Brown, Miliband, and British military leaders would like other NATO allies to assume a greater share of combat operations, stressing that the U.S., UK and a few other allies have borne the brunt of the fighting. The PM very much wants to see strong U.S. leadership and is anxious to see the Administration’s policy review completed soon.

-- Iran - The UK has privately shared with us that it is ready to proceed with designations of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and Bank Mellat under their Counter Terrorism Act powers, an action that requires parliamentary approval. In the wake of the October 1 P5 1 meeting in Geneva, however, UK officials are likely to want to consult with the U.S. on the best timing for announcing the designation. UK officials may also raise the issue of Nosratollah Tajik, former Iranian ambassador to Jordan, currently under arrest in the UK and awaiting extradition to the U.S. on charges of procuring restricted military items (night-vision goggles) for the Iranian government. Tajik has exhausted all judicial appeals in the UK and all that stands in the way of the extradition is approval by the Home Secretary. Before approving the extradition, the UK wants to be sure the timing is right and will not interfere with our joint efforts through the P5 1 to engage with Iran.

-- Pakistan - Because of immigration and economic ties, Pakistan has an important domestic dimension for the UK and will feature in public debates in the run-up to the UK’s 2010 elections. Following the Friends of Pakistan meeting on September 25, the UK announced it will provide an extra GBP 50 million (USD 80 million) to improve infrastructure and security in Pakistan’s border areas. However, UK officials later confirmed that these are not new funds and will instead
come from the current GBP 655 million (USD 1 billion) already designated for Pakistan aid. British leaders view a secure Pakistan as key to regional stability. They recognize Pakistan’s now more effective response to the Taliban and other extremists, but say more is needed.

-- Northern Ireland - Prime Minister Brown and Northern Ireland Secretary Shaun Woodward will probably ask the Secretary to urge Northern Ireland First Minister Peter Robinson and Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness to accept the “Westminster Package,” regarding the devolution of justice and policing powers, which was recently presented by Prime Minister Brown. HMG would like to reach an agreement with the parties this week, before the Secretary’s arrival. HMG argues that the proposal is a good deal for Northern Ireland. If the agreement is not completed by the weekend, there is potential that some of the parties could seek to draw in the Secretary. The best approach is to urge all parties to work together patiently to reach agreement. An agreement would be a strong, positive signal to potential investors.

-- nuclear Non-proliferation - Both PM Brown and FS Miliband welcome U.S. leadership on the global nuclear non-proliferation agenda, including the April 2010 nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The UK firmly agrees with us on the importance of close P5 and P3 cooperation in the lead up to next year’s nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference. At UNGA, Brown emphasized that the onus is on non-nuclear states to prove they are not developing nuclear weapons. He also pledged the UK’s support for sponsoring a uranium bank and offering civil nuclear power to non-nuclear states that fulfill their responsibilities. He also announced that, subject to the sustained ability to maintain continuous deterrence, the UK will consider reducing its fleet of Trident nuclear-armed submarines from four to three. The move also is regarded as a cost-cutting measure for a government facing significant fiscal challenges in the coming years.

-- Defense Trade Treaty - The PM and FS Miliband may ask about the status of the Defense Trade Treaty and when the Senate will ratify it. U/S Tauscher told UK officials on September 30 that her goal is to have the Senate act on the treaty by year’s end. U/S Tauscher and A/S Shapiro are working to counter the SFRC staff’s belief that implementing legislation is necessary to enforce the treaty and to address their concerns about Congressional consultations and notifications.

-- Arms Trade Treaty - Miliband frequently raises with senior U.S. interlocutors the possibility of negotiating an ATT. We continue to have doubts about the possibility of negotiating an effective treaty, but are willing to move forward on the condition that it will proceed on the consensus basis traditional for multilateral arms control and nonproliferation negotiations.

-- Gary McKinnon Extradition Case - The PM will likely raise with the Secretary (as he has with the Ambassador) the extradition case of Gary McKinnon. McKinnon is a 43-year old computer hacker with Asperger’s Syndrome who is wanted for prosecution in the U.S.; he is accused of hacking into U.S. government systems in 2001 and 2002. McKinnon has gained enormous popular sympathy in his appeal against extradition; the UK’s final decision is pending. The case has also caused public criticism of the U.S.-UK extradition treaty. In August, PM Brown, in a one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador, proposed a deal: that McKinnon plead guilty, make a statement of contrition, but serve any sentence of incarceration in the UK. Brown cited deep public concern that McKinnon, with his medical condition, would commit suicide or suffer injury in imprisoned in a U.S. facility. The Ambassador has raised this proposal with AG Holder and would be happy to brief the Secretary in more detail.

Domestic Politics in Flux in Run-up to Elections
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶3. (C//NF) The annual political party conferences currently underway have thrust the UK into electoral campaigning mode, with the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat parties all positioning themselves for the general elections, which must occur before June 2010. The recent conferences have given each party in turn an up-tick in the polls, though with the Tories consistently enjoying a significant overall lead. PM Brown is unchallenged as leader of the Labour Party, but remains embattled by the UK media. Many in his party question if Labour can win the next elections with him at the helm despite his strong showing at the Labour conference. Honing its campaign message, the Labour Party plans to make
the elections about class divisions, highlighting Labour’s strong public services record and its economic vision for Britain. At present, the major foreign policy issues shaping the electoral debate are the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan, which all parties continue to back for now in spite of eroding public support and a lively debate in the media, and the UK’s role in the European Union, which Labour has been using as an example of Conservative economic and foreign policy “isolationist” tendencies.

¶4. (C//NF) Conservative leader David Cameron’s headline message to the media as the Tory conference began October 5 was about the UK’s “twin crises” of debt and unemployment and the Tory’s to-be-unveiled “big, bold, and radical” scheme to “get Britain working.” The Tories’ platform during the June European and local elections was based on keeping in focus bedrock issues such as the economy, job creation, and health and education reform; casting Labour as profligate and irresponsible; and portraying the Conservatives as the party of thrift, responsible spending and transparency. Ireland’s “yes” vote on the Lisbon Treaty has highlighted internal Conservative party divisions on the EU as the conference gets underway. PM Brown and FS Miliband may ask the Secretary to emphasize U.S. support for a “strong Europe” as a way to highlight Conservative schisms.

¶5. (C//NF) In response to the summer 2009 parliamentary expenses scandal, which has alienated some voters from the political class and the mainstream parties, Cameron has been credited with reacting more decisively than Brown - a performance that some political commentators have said demonstrated impressive leadership, especially compared to Brown (who throughout his prime ministership has had to fight accusations of indecisiveness). Keeping the public focused on the economy, Cameron has said the Conservatives would be judged by their response to the UK’s debt crisis and has called for an “age of austerity.” While spending cuts are expected to be a large part of the future Conservative program, neither Cameron nor Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer Osborne has offered details on where government spending should be cut, beyond just saying there will be a ten percent cross-the-board cut with only education and the National Health Services remaining untouched. Many in the UK public remain skeptical of the Tories’ unspecified plans for major cuts.

¶6. (C//NF) The UK’s relationship with the U.S. has also become a campaign issue. During the fever pitch of UK media reporting on the release of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, the Conservatives blamed Labour for damaging the “special relationship.” The UK media has refused to let the issue die, continuing its mischievous reporting of recent alleged USG snubs of senior UK officials, particularly during UNGA.

Overview of UK Economy
----------------------

¶7. (U) The UK officially entered recession in the third quarter of 2008 and has suffered a cumulative contraction of 5.7 percent over the last five quarters. In July, the IMF forecast a further contraction of 4.2 percent in 2009 and growth of 0.2 percent in 2010. HM Treasury expects a contraction of 3.5 percent in 2009 and growth of 1.25 percent in 2010. Unemployment stands at 7.8 percent, its highest since 1995, and is expected to climb to more than 10 percent in early 2010. Unemployment is particularly acute among 18-to-24 year olds at 17 percent. The economic downturn is taking a heavy toll on trade. According to U.S Commerce Department and U.S. International Trade Commission monthly trade statistics, U.S. goods exports to the UK declined by 21.7 percent from January to June 2009, compared to the same period in 2008, and UK exports to the U.S. declined by 25.6 percent. Concerns about employment figures remain high, with unemployment rates near eight percent and expected to peak just in advance of the parliamentary elections.

¶8. (U) Public debt stands at GBP 800 billion (56.8 percent of GDP), its highest level since records began in 1974, and up from 56.6 percent last month. However, UK debt as a percentage of GDP is still lower than in the other G7 countries. How to manage and finance the UK’s debt burden is a key issue dividing the two parties, and is expected to emerge as one of the top economic issues during the political campaign.
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN


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08BEIJING1141     2008-03-26 09:09     2010-11-29 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Beijing

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Wednesday, 26 March 2008, 09:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001141
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/26/2033
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PARM, KNNP, MNUC, KN, CH, IR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL JANUZZI DISCUSSES NONPROLIFERATION, IRAN,
AND DPRK WITH MFA ARMS CONTROL DIRECTOR GENERAL
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Current bilateral cooperation on arms control, nonproliferation and export control is “remarkable,” MFA Department of Arms Control Director General Cheng Jingye told Staffdel Januzzi March 24. Nevertheless, there is a “perception” that the United States counts on China’s support on nonproliferation issues but does not fully trust China as an equal partner. On Iran, China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via Security Council resolutions and focusing on the diplomatic front. China’s cooperation with Iran on energy is unrelated to the Iran nuclear issue and Cheng “can’t imagine” the consequences if Sinopec is sanctioned. On North Korea, Cheng urged the United States to find a creative resolution to the declaration issue. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Frank Januzzi and Puneet Talwar, staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met MFA Department of Arms Control Director General Cheng Jingye March 24 to discuss Chinese views on arms control, non-proliferation, Iran and North Korea.
“Remarkable” Cooperation
------------------------
¶3. (C) Arms control, export controls and nonproliferation all contribute to China’s security, said Cheng. A decade ago, cooperation between China and the United States focused on certain cases, but today’s level of cooperation on nonproliferation and arms control issues is “remarkable,” Cheng said. For example, China is actively involved in diplomatic negotiation efforts on North Korea and Iran. And in many areas of nonproliferation, said Cheng, the two countries see “eye-to-eye.” He referred to multilateral agreements such as the nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement and said that even if China is not a member of these various organizations, China has in place its own export control regime. For example, there is interagency coordination on sensitive exports as well as alleged proliferation cases raised by the United States. Cheng noted that while the pace of implementing arms control agreements has slowed in the past decade, China is prepared to move the disarmament conference forward within the United Nations framework.
Equal Partners
--------------
¶4. (C) Cheng contended that there is a “perception” that the United States counts on China’s support and cooperation on nonproliferation issues but does not fully trust or treat China as an equal partner. For example, in the 1990s, China was invited to join the MTCR and the Australia Group but declined to join. Currently, however, China is “not welcome,” despite expressing a willingness to join, Cheng said. China and the United States need to cooperate on a “mutual, equal basis.” Cheng also raised the issue of sanctions against China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). CGWIC has been subject to sanctions for ten years without “solid evidence,” said Cheng. Over the past 3-4 years, CGWIC has restructured the company, changed its business model and prohibited contacts with countries of concern to the United States. Cheng expressed hope that the company would make progress during its March 20 meetings in Washington.
Iran
----
¶5. (C) Cheng said China and the United States share the same goal for Iran: no further proliferation of nuclear weapons. China makes this point very clearly to the international community and to Iran in the context of its private bilateral contacts. PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told Iranian leaders during his November visit to Iran that China is opposed to proliferation in the Middle East. China supports the UNSCRs on Iran and the P5-plus-1 process, emphasized Cheng. After the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and IAEA reports on Iran last year, there is a need for more diplomatic efforts, Cheng said. China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via UNSCRs and focusing on the diplomatic front.
¶6. (C) One of the dilemmas of the Iran nuclear issue is that despite three UNSCRs, Iran’s capability to enrich uranium
BEIJING 00001141 002 OF 002
continues to expand, Cheng underscored. China and other countries need to be “creative” in devising a proposal “attractive” to Iran. The international community must find a way to ensure its concerns about Iran’s nuclear development are addressed and promote the peaceful development of nuclear energy, maintained Cheng. Cheng reasoned that if incentives do not work, then it will make applying pressure easier in the future because it shows that diplomacy was not effective. The P5-plus-1 meeting in Shanghai in April will allow the ministers to discuss strategy on next steps. Cheng noted that a recent proposal from the United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA) includes some interesting ideas and that his office is in the process of studying its proposal. Cheng said that Germany has put forward a proposal to “refresh” previous offers. China believes that the P5-plus-1 will need to offer new incentives to Iran.
¶7. (C) Iran might be more willing to offer a reciprocal positive gesture on the nuclear issue if it does not feel threatened by regime change, Cheng said. Regarding Iran’s claim that it did not have a nuclear program prior to 2003, China is not in a position to comment without presentation of evidence and materials, Cheng said. China continues to urge Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and encourages the IAEA to play a greater role. Cheng also discussed possible incentives for Iran after international confidence is restored, including reinstatement as a non-nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) member, education cooperation, normalization of economic relations, etc.
China-Iran Energy Cooperation
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Regarding China-Iran energy cooperation, Cheng believes that there is a “misunderstanding” on the part of the United States. China has made clear its need for energy resources and has previously stated that its cooperation with Iran on energy has nothing to do with the Iran nuclear issue. China hopes that the U.S. Congress understands this point, said Cheng. Specifically, the threat of sanctions against Sinopec is a very serious issue, Cheng emphasized. Sinopec is very important to China and Cheng “can’t imagine” the consequences if the company is sanctioned. Januzzi noted Cheng’s concerns and said that he would pass this message to Washington.
North Korea
-----------
¶9. (C) Januzzi recounted his meetings with DPRK counterparts during his five-day trip to North Korea and said that he encouraged them to provide a declaration. Cheng said that China does not have specific information on North Korea’s alleged purchase of centrifuge technology and that China had received this information from the United States. He urged the United States to focus on the future and not to dwell on the past. The United States is not interested in delving into North Korea’s past, Januzzi countered. The United States needs to have clarity on certain issues, however, in order to move forward. According to Cheng, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei urged the DPRK to take advantage of this unique opportunity. The resolution of the declaration issue will require some imagination and creativity, Cheng said. North Korea does not fully trust the United States and remains concerned about admitting to an activity it claims never existed, Cheng claimed.
¶10. (U) Staffdel Januzzi did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. PICCUTA


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09ASTANA982     2009-06-08 10:10     2010-11-29 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Astana

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000982
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/A, EUR/CARC, EAP/CM, EAP/K, EEB/ESC
EO 12958 DECL: 06/08/2029
TAGS PREL, ECON, EPET, AF, GG, RS, IR, KN, ZK, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: CHINESE AMBASSADOR COMMENTS ON KEY FOREIGN
POLICY ISSUES
REF: ASTANA 0678
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On June 5, Chinese Ambassador Cheng Guoping hosted the Ambassador for dinner at the restaurant on the 23rd floor of a striking new hotel built in Astana and owned by the Chinese National Petroleum Company. During a fascinating, wide-ranging, three-hour tour d’horizon, the Chinese Ambassador discussed his government’s policy -- and occasionally made personal comments -- on human rights, smart power, President Obama, Afghanistan’s reconstruction, Russia’s policy in Central Asia, Georgian President Saakashvili, Iran’s upcoming presidential elections, North Korea’s nuclear tests, Central Asia’s energy resources, the Manas air base, and the proposed international nuclear fuel bank. The Chinese Ambassador clearly enjoyed the free and easy, open-ended conversation and invited the Ambassador to meet again, at the restaurant, in the near future. Guoping was joined by an unidentified policy advisor and an interpreter, to whom he addressed his remarks in soft whispers throughout the evening. END SUMMARY.
CHINA’S MFA “SCARED” BY PELOSI’S VISIT
¶2. (SBU) Guoping was relaxed, wearing short sleeves and no jacket, and clearly eager to engage and entertain his American guests. He began the evening by referring to the recent visit to Beijing of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Without openly acknowledging or discussing the twentieth anniversary of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square protests, Guoping said the government was prepared, and also fearful, for the Speaker to raise human rights and democracy issues during her visit. “She had the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) scared to death on the eve of her visit,” Guoping said, half-jokingly.
PRAISE FOR SMART POWER
¶3. (SBU) Without prompting, Guoping praised President Obama’s leadership style and approach to foreign affairs. He singled out the President’s “effective management” of the financial crisis, for example, calling his decisions to stimulate the U.S. economy “bold and courageous.” He called the President’s June 4 speech in Cairo - which Guoping was able to download in Mandarin from the Department’s website - “a milestone for the use of smart power.” Guoping said the President’s willingness to employ both military and cultural assets would prove to be a “very effective” approach to foreign affairs. He observed that statesmen require both in order to achieve their policy objectives and said the Administration’s use of “smart power is a very good idea.”
IRANIAN ELECTIONS
¶4. (SBU) Guoping perceptively connected the Cairo speech to upcoming elections in Iran. “This speech is very timely,” he said. “I predict that it will influence Iran’s presidential elections, and will be particularly beneficial for reformers in Iran.” He said that President Obama has already played a positive role in rebuilding U.S. relations with Iran and again stressed the importance of the upcoming elections. “The reformists have a chance,” he said. Guoping suggested that it would be impossible for Iran to ignore President Obama’s overtures for long. “They cannot remain in the background of these global changes in foreign policy. If they do, they will become even more isolated than they already are. And ultimately, if Iran doesn’t respond, President Obama will have to change his policy. Iran might be the last country standing for extremism in the Muslim world,” he said.
FOCUS ON THE TALIBAN
¶5. (SBU) About Afghanistan, Guoping said the Taliban is the real enemy of the United States and the “basis for terrorism in South Asia.” He argued that the United States must first “eradicate the Taliban in order to defeat terror in Iraq” and said the Administration’s emphasis on Afghanistan was a shrewd policy. “You have enlisted the help of all governments in the region to assist
ASTANA 00000982 002 OF 004
with the rebuilding of Afghanistan, saying that to do so is to play a part in the war against terrorism. No one is able to say openly that they do not want to combat terrorism, so you have made it very difficult to refuse to help.”
NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
¶6. (C) In particular, Guoping said that the Northern Distribution Network to transport non-lethal supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan has enabled many countries to participate in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. He said that the Chinese government is aware of the U.S. government’s request to transit non-lethal supplies via China and said “we are actively researching this suggestion. In essence, it would mean that the People’s Republic of China would be supporting a NATO military operation, which would be an interesting development.” Guoping confided that China’s MFA and its Ministry of Defense have different opinions on the subject, although he said he expected a decision soon. “My own personal opinion,” he said, “is that we will do the right thing and cooperate with NATO and the U.S. government in Afghanistan.” Guoping said this would be an appropriate issue to raise in the context of the President’s visit to Beijing in July.
RUSSIA’S POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA
¶7. (C) Guoping said that Russia is experiencing “severe difficulty” now because of the global financial crisis. He suggested that the government of Russia is eager to improve relations with the United States now because Moscow is concerned that the economic downturn will begin to affect the political stability of the country, “even the stability of the Kremlin.” Guoping said that Russia does not want or need any foreign policy problems right now; “they need to focus on their domestic, economic affairs.” Guoping also said that Russia would like more support from the United States for its insistence on a privileged sphere of influence in Central Asia, in exchange for greater cooperation in Afghanistan. “Russia is convinced that they must dominate Central Asia and the Caucasus. They believe they have vital, strategic, historical interests in the region,” Guoping said. When pressed by the Ambassador to express his own opinion, Guoping said, “I personally do not agree that Russia should be granted a special sphere of influence in the region, but that is their view.”
ON GEORGIA
¶8. (C) On Georgia, Guoping said he expects Russia to use military force to overthrow Georgian President Saakashvili. He did not elaborate or offer any specifics, but merely observed that Russia has already established military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and is likely to remain there for the foreseeable future. Guoping worked in Georgia for four years and understands well the history and culture of its people. He observed that South Ossetia has strong cultural ties to Russia, but said it is likely that the Ossetians will ultimately press for greater independence from Russian influence.
¶9. (C) In unusually blunt language, Guoping said Saakashvili is “not a mature statesman. He overreacted to Russian provocations and gave Russia the opportunity to take Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” Guoping suggested that Secretary Rice’s July 2008 visit to Georgia before the war in August 2008, might have indirectly encouraged Saakashvili to take military action. He said his understanding was that Saakashvili briefed Secretary Rice on his plans to mobilize Georgian armed forces and when she did not directly object, Saakashvili mistook that as a sign of U.S. support. Guoping said, “Clearly, Russia baited and cheated Georgia. But Saakashvili was impressed with his earlier success in Batumi (Adjara) and he thought he could involve the United States in the war.” Guoping said he expects former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze to become Georgia’s next president. “She is much more mature than Saakashvili. He won’t stay long,” he said.
NORTH KOREA’S nuclear TESTS, DOMESTIC POLITICS
¶10. (C) Guoping seemed genuinely concerned by North Korea’s recent
ASTANA 00000982 003 OF 004
nuclear missile tests. “We need to solve this problem. It is very troublesome,” he said, calling Korea’s nuclear activity a “threat to the whole world’s security.” China opposes North Korea’s nuclear testing and is working to achieve peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, according to Guoping. When asked about the reunification of Korea, Guoping said China hopes for peaceful reunification in the long-term, but he expects the two countries to remain separate in the short-term. Guoping said the domestic political situation in North Korea is “very complex” and suggested that Kim Jong-il’s reported decision to anoint his youngest son as his successor was driven more by Kim’s deteriorating health than any carefully planned strategy. “They had no time to plan for this,” he said. Guoping said the “military really governs” North Korea and controls domestic politics and foreign policy. He suggested that Kim Jong-il’s announcement was designed to send a message to the military and the great powers that he is really in charge and in control. Guoping said China’s objectives in North Korea were to ensure they honor their commitments on nonproliferation, maintain stability, and “don’t drive [Kim Jong-il] mad.”
CENTRAL ASIAN ENERGY
¶11. (SBU) Turning to a discussion of energy resources and energy security in Central Asia, Guoping said that Russia owns and controls most of Central Asia’s pipelines, “but it cannot prevent the ultimate diversification of export routes.” He said that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are close to Russia, but they nevertheless understand that they must seek and develop alternatives. He predicted that they will soon “break the Russian monopoly” on the export of hydrocarbons from the region and said the oil and gas pipelines to China now under construction will be “very important” in that regard. Guoping said that Kazakhstan’s oil pipeline from Atasu to Alashankou would be completed in July and will initially carry 200,000 barrels per day (bbl/d), but will soon be expanded to 400,000 bbl/d. He said China would encourage Western oil companies to ship their production eastward. He was aware of plans to ship Kazakhstani oil across the Caspian Sea by tanker and said China had no objections to the project, which they considered “strictly commercial.” When asked about China’s recent $10 billion loan to Kazakhstan, Guoping confirmed that $5 billion was earmarked for investments in the energy sector, including the purchase of 50% of MangistauMunaiGas, while the remaining $5 billion would be delivered to the Development Bank of Kazakhstan as a “soft loan that the government would be free to use as it likes.”
POTENTIAL PARTNERSHIP WITH U.S. OIL COMPANIES
¶12. (SBU) Guoping said China sees “great potential for an energy partnership with U.S. companies in Central Asia,” including the development of onshore resources in Turkmenistan. He said that the Chinese MFA is very interested in pursuing these opportunities and suggested that this would be worth including in the China-U.S. Strategic Economic Dialogue. “This is very reasonable,” he said, adding, “Our government would actively support such a proposal.” The Ambassador noted that Chevron is already working with Chinese companies in western China.
ON NAZARBAYEV
¶13. (SBU) Commenting on President Nazarbayev, Guoping called him a “wise and mature statesman,” who has presided over a period of remarkable stability and economic growth. He praised President Nazarbayev’s foreign policy skills and added that China’s MFA has “great respect” for President Nazarbayev and holds him in high regard.
MANAS AIR BASE
¶14. (C) Referring to the Manas air base, Guoping said that the government of Kyrgyzstan has tried to show similar sophistication in balancing the interests of the great powers in the neighborhood, but has been much less successful. He said that according to his information, the United States is prepared to pay an additional $50 million a year to the government of Kyrgyzstan “to make them think
ASTANA 00000982 004 OF 004
about” keeping the base open. He said he has seen a subtle shift in U.S. policy in the region, adding, “You’ve also made important progress in Uzbekistan. We ourselves have noticed a change in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy over the last year, especially toward Russia.”
nuclear FUEL BANK
¶15. (C) Guoping did not appear to be well briefed on the subject of the IAEA-administered international nuclear fuel bank proposed by the nuclear Threat Initiative. He was aware of Russia’s earlier proposal to host a fuel bank, but he seemed surprised when told that Kazakhstan has announced its intention to host an IAEA-administered fuel bank on its territory. Indeed, he went so far as to question the accuracy of the Ambassador’s information that Iranian President Ahmadinejad supported Kazakhstan’s proposal during his state visit to Astana in April. “We are still conducting research on this idea,” Guoping said, subtly indicating his unwillingness - or inability - to discuss the subject further.
¶16. (C) COMMENT: In the past six months, the Ambassador and Guoping have established a relaxed, open, and even frank relationship. Guoping prefers to meet the Ambassador in the U.S. Embassy or in a public place, having explained previously that he believes his own Embassy’s temporary quarters are thoroughly bugged -- by whom, he doesn’t say. CNPC built the high-rise, pagoda-roofed Beijing hotel as a gift to Astana. The marble lobby is impressive, if a bit too totalitarian-austere. The hotel was supposed to have opened in January, and we are not convinced that it is now fully open for business. We were the only guests in the restaurant, although an untouched full buffet was laid out. The revolving restaurant provides a spectacular panorama of Astana, and the empty steppe beyond, but it seems to revolve at varying speeds and sometimes can be a bit too fast on a full stomach and after a few glasses of wine. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND


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09ANKARA1654     2009-11-17 17:05     2010-11-29 21:09     SECRET     Embassy Ankara
Appears in these articles:
nytimes.com

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DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: KNNP PREL TU IR
SUBJECT: TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN

REF: ANKARA 1626

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d)

¶1. (S) Iran dominated A/S Gordon's 40-minute meeting November
12 with Foreign Minister Davutoglu. The FM had just gotten
off the phone with El-Baradei and had discussed in detail the
IAEA proposal to send Iran's low enriched uranium to Turkey.
El-Baradei had said he would "call Washington" that same
morning. This had followed two long "harsh" sessions with
the Iranians in Istanbul on Sunday evening. The Iranians
have said they are willing to meet with Solana, but have told
the Turks that they have serious problems with Cooper and the
British. They have "more trust" in the U.S. The Iranians
would also prefer to get fuel from the U.S. rather than the
Russians.

¶2. (S) Davutoglu said the Iranians: a) are ready to send a
delegation to Vienna to work out the specifics on this
proposal; b) have given their "full trust" to Turkey; c)
continue to face serious domestic problems inside Iran. He
said the Turks actually see Ahmadinejad as "more flexible"
than others who are inside the Iranian Government.
Ahmadinejad is facing "huge pressure" after statements from
some P5 members to the effect that a nuclear deal would
succeed in weakening Iran,s nuclear capability -- which is
interpreted by some circles in Iran as a virtual defeat.

¶3. (S) Given this context, the Turks had asked Ahmadinejad if
the core of the issue is psychological rather than substance.
Ahmadinejad had said "yes," that the Iranians agree to the
proposal but need to manage the public perception.
Accordingly, the Iranians are proposing that the first 400
kilos be transferred to Kish Island -- thereby keeping it on
Iranian soil -- and would receive right away an equivalent
amount (30-50 kilos) of enriched fuel. The second stage
would focus on the management of Iranian public opinion,
after which Tehran would proceed with the Turkey option for
the remaining 800 kilos, probably in two tranches. Davutoglu
said Baradei agreed to consider this.

¶4. (S) Davutoglu noted that he had spoken to NSA General
Jones Wednesday, who had said that we should perhaps suggest
to the Iranians that they transfer 600 kilos to Kish Island
and 600 kilos to Turkey simultaneously. A/S Gordon said he
could not give an official response to the proposal as this
is the first time we heard it, but that he anticipates much
skepticism about providing fuel to Iran before all the LEU
has been taken out. It would be better to get all 1200 kilos
out right away.

¶5. (C) Davutoglu noted that these are two different
proposals. The first is Iran's request for fuel for its
nuclear reactor. Even if this takes place, he said, we still
need to work on limiting Iran's nuclear enrichment
capability. If we succeed with this proposal, he said, it
will create "confidence" and a "new momentum" and would allow
room for negotiation.

¶6. (C) Noting that Davutoglu had only addressed the negative
consequences of sanctions or the use of military force,
Gordon pressed Davutoglu on Ankara's assessment of the
consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. Davutoglu gave a
spirited reply, that "of course" Turkey was aware of this
risk. This is precisely why Turkey is working so hard with
the Iranians. President Gul himself had spent two hours
Sunday with Ahmadinejad in Istanbul.

¶7. (C) Gordon noted that while we acknowledge that Turkey can
be helpful as a mediator, some of the Prime Minister's recent
public comments raise questions about how Turkey sees this
issue. Davutoglu said he is aware of these concerns, but
contended that the Guardian newspaper had not accurately
presented its recent interview with the Prime Minister. The
PM's comments had been taken out of context. Erdogan had
been asked if he views Iran as a friend. If he had said
"no," it would not have been possible to convince Tehran to
cooperate on this latest proposal. Only Turkey can speak
bluntly and critically to the Iranians, Davutoglu contended,
but only because Ankara is showing public messages of
friendship.

¶8. (C) Gordon pushed back that Ankara should give a stern
public message about the consequences if UN resolutions are
ignored. Davutoglu countered that Erdogan had given just
such a statement in Tehran when he visited. He emphasized
that Turkey's foreign policy is giving a "sense of justice"
and a "sense of vision" to the region. Turkey has provided a
"third option" in addition to Iran and the Saudis (who he
contended are viewed as "puppets" of the US). The result, he
said, is that we "limit Iranian influence in the region." We

ANKARA 00001654 002 OF 002


need a "pro-Western approach AND a sense of justice."

¶9. (C) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable.

JEFFREY

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"


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09BEIJING3313     2009-12-11 10:10     2010-11-29 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Beijing

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EO 12958 DECL: 12/11/2034
TAGS PREL, PARM, MNUC, PGOV, KN, IR, CH
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS MEETING WITH CCID DIRECTOR
WANG JIARUI ON IRAN, NORTH KOREA

Classified By: Political Minster Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) Under Secretary Burns met with Director of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee International Liaison Department (CCID) Wang Jiarui December 9 to discuss U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea and Iran. Wang said that the “ideal outcome” of Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth’s current visit to Pyongyang would be a meeting with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il. The very fact of the visit, Wang emphasized, was important because it sent a signal to the DPRK that the United States was serious about negotiating a settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue. The DPRK would be unwilling in the short run to publicly announce denuclearization or an immediate return to the Six-Party talks, but would not want to lose the opportunity presented by Ambassador Bosworth’s visit. The important thing was to keep things moving in the right direction and prevent the situation spinning out of control.

¶2. (C) Wang praised U.S. policy on Iran, calling it a “practical” approach. He said China was in agreement with the United States “in principle” that Iran should not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and that the consequences of such an event would have a negative impact on Chinese interests. He also said that China would cooperate in persuading Iran to live up to the commitments it made at the October meeting in Geneva with the P5-plus-1 to resume discussions on the nuclear issue and allow third countries to reprocess its nuclear fuel. However, Wang insisted, continued diplomacy, rather than military action or stronger sanctions, was the best option at present. U/S Burns stressed the importance of China’s cooperation and would not close the door on diplomacy but that U.S. patience was wearing thin and Iran had to soon show it was complying with international agreements or face real consequences. End Summary.

China Pleased With Bosworth Visit to DPRK
-----------------------------------------

¶3. (C) Asked his views on the North Korea nuclear situation, CCID Director Wang stated that China was very pleased that Ambassador Bosworth was in Pyongyang, noting that the visit would be “cost effective” because the North Koreans had made clear there could be no resuming the Six-Party Talks without first convening a bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue. Ambassador Bosworth’s visit effectively “kicked the ball” back to the North Koreans. When asked what the likely outcome of the talks would be, Wang said the ideal outcome would be a meeting with Kim Jong-il, which would send a very positive signal, but it was impossible to predict North Korean behavior through “normal” means of reading public indicators. Wang said that Ambassador Bosworth would likely meet with First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, who was “a hardliner” with “strong views” and whose opinions were valued by the DPRK’s top leaders. However, Kang had to follow orders from above, Wang noted, and would not want to lose such an opportunity to improve relations with the United States. The negotiations with Ambassador Bosworth would be a bargaining process, with each side trying to discern the other’s bottom line.

¶4. (C) The North needed a breakthrough in its relations with the United States, Wang asserted, both because of its domestic situation and the current international environment, but it would not be easy for North Korea to make a specific promise regarding a return to the Six-Party Talks or to announce denuclearization. Ambassador Bosworth’s trip itself was important because it demonstrated that the United States was serious about preventing a nuclear Korean peninsula and was committed to a peaceful resolution of the issue. Wang said China was aware that the United States worried that it would be deceived by the North but in China’s view there was no need to worry because the current process of promoting dialogue and negotiations was quite transparent and the international community would know what the outcome would be.
¶5. (C) Wang reiterated China’s long-standing position that the key objective at this stage was to prevent the situation on the Korean peninsula from spinning out of control and to establish a positive direction through dialogue and negotiation. He said that Ambassador Bosworth should make clear to North Korea that it was not in U.S. interests to prolong the current state of hostility, that the United States had no intention of promoting regime change in the North, and that international sanctions and relations with the DPRK’s neighbors could be changed and they could help

BEIJING 00003313 002 OF 003
with North Korea’s economic development. This was contingent upon a change in North Korean behavior and an eventual North Korean pledge to the world that it would not embark on the road to nuclear weapons. U/S Burns responded that the United States understood the complexity of the situation and emphasized the great importance of joint U.S.-China and Five-Party efforts to bring North Korea back as soon as possible to the Six-Party Talks and its denuclearization commitments.

Unified U.S.-China Effort Needed on Iran
----------------------------------------

¶6. (C) U/S Burns emphasized that the nuclear weapons challenge in Iran required a similarly unified U.S.-China and international effort. The United States was profoundly concerned about Middle East stability, which was crucial to both U.S. and Chinese security and economic interests. If Iran continued developing a nuclear capability, Israel would “no doubt” act, and concern among the Arab states might trigger a regional arms race. President Obama had repeatedly reached out to Iran’s leaders, but had yet to receive a positive response. Moreover, Iran had not followed through on the understandings reached in Geneva in October, including Iran’s commitment to meet with the P5-plus-1 countries for talks focused on the nuclear issue and its initial acceptance of the IAEA’s TRR proposal. The United States would continue to take a diplomatic, creative and flexible approach working with our Russian, Chinese and European partners, but time was running short. By the end of the year, President Obama would have to evaluate Iran’s actions thus far. If Iran did not live up to its agreements, the United States would work with its international partners to make clear to Iran the consequences of its unwillingness to engage seriously.
Wang Pledges Chinese Support...

-------------------------------

¶7. (C) Wang had high praise for U.S. efforts in the Middle East in general and the approach to Iran in particular, stating that China viewed U.S. measures in Iran as very practical and as based on realities on the ground. China had economic interests in Iran, but, in principle, China had no differences with the United States on the nuclear weapons issue. China agreed that Iranian nuclear weapons would bring great instability to the Middle East, including possible warfare, even on a global scale, with consequences far greater than China’s economic interests. China agreed with the IAEA proposal and that Iran should live up to the commitments it made in Geneva, but unfortunately, Iran had not responded positively to this proposal despite many efforts by the United States, China, and the international community. China had consistently told Iran that China strongly opposed Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. This message, he claimed, has been conveyed in party-to-party and government-to-government meetings and in “all channels.” However, Iran maintained it had no nuclear weapons and was simply pursuing the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

...But Urges Continued Diplomacy
--------------------------------

¶8. (C) Wang pressed U/S Burns for details on when the limits of U.S. patience might be exhausted and counseled further efforts to find a diplomatic solution. Burns replied that U.S. patience was nearly exhausted. Wang acknowledged that there was a potential for an Israeli military strike were the situation not handled properly, which was of grave concern to China, but insisted that harsh actions were not yet warranted. Recent U.S. experience with a military option, he said, should teach some lessons, and the outcome of tougher sanctions was also unpredictable. The United States needed to understand that Iran was not Iraq, and the best way forward was to continue to pursue peaceful dialogue and negotiations and to carefully examine previous diplomatic efforts to see what changes needed to be made.

North Korea and Iran Similarities
---------------------------------

¶9. (C) Wang also claimed similarities between the North Korea and Iran nuclear issues. The solution in both cases was to persist over the long haul, continuing intensive efforts with the objective of ensuring that the situation did not spin out of control. Wang noted that in his several recent visits to Iran anti-American sentiment was strong, everywhere, and palpable, which, he said, was not conducive to resolving the issue.

¶10. (C) Wang asked U/S Burns for his views on who made final decisions in Iran, President Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader
BEIJING 00003313 003 OF 003
Khamenei. He said it would be very helpful to China if the decision-making process in Iran could be sorted out. Wang appeared to agree with the Under Secretary that Khamenei was the final arbiter of Iranian policy and concluded by stating that there might be a way for direct communication with the Supreme Leader. He said direct engagement would avoid the distortions of message that occurred when communicating through an intermediary. Wang noted that there was not one country in the international arena that supported Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and emphasized that there was a need for a unified international view on Iran.

¶11. (C) U/S Burns responded that the United States had made very clear its willingness for direct diplomacy, but that it took both sides to make direct communication work. He emphasized that this was a core national security issue for the United States, which could not abide greater Middle East instability, and said the United States would continue its diplomatic efforts in a creative and flexible manner. However, he stated, at some point there had to be results and U.S. patience was fast running out.

U.S.-China Cooperation
----------------------

¶12. (C) Wang said China would continue to make its own efforts on the issue but China was willing to do more to cooperate with the United States to facilitate a resolution to the Iran nuclear problem. He welcomed further U.S. suggestions on measures to achieve a breakthrough and asked what the United States would like China to do or whether there were areas in which China could make a contribution. U/S Burns emphasized that the United States would like to cooperate with China and needed to work closely with China to find a way to persuade Iran to make the right choices. The current focus was on persuading Iran to live up to the commitments it made at the Geneva meetings on the TRR proposal and by meeting again soon on the nuclear issue. The two P5-plus-1 tracks -- diplomacy and sanctions -- were not mutually exclusive. The United States had tried many approaches to Iran in the past 11 weeks, and none had borne fruit. The United States would not close the door on diplomacy, but as in the case of putting pressure on North Korea through UN Resolution 1874, we had to work together to apply pressure to get Iran back to the diplomatic track. Iran had to understand that it faced a clear choice. Iran could choose to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which the United States supported and would work to implement if Iran demonstrated the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. But Iran had to understand there were costs to not following this path. Wang agreed that both sides should try very hard to resolve the problem.
HUNTSMAN


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07PARIS159     2007-01-16 15:03     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PRIMARY TAG)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017
TAGS: KDEM LE PGOV PREL FR IR
SUBJECT: FRANCE SEEKS EU COVER ON IRAN CIVIL SOCIETY

REF: STATE 2659

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche on January 16 to MFA
Iran Desk Officer Arnaud Pescheux, who indicated that France
had not budgeted any funds for democracy promotion in Iran.
"If we were to do something, it would undoubtedly be via
Brussels," Pescheux said. He noted that France "anticipated
supporting" a proposal by Javier Solana for the EU to expand
its own Farsi broadcasting capabilities, although he said
that details of that proposal have yet to be worked out.
While the MFA does not currently partner with any French NGOs
operating in Iran, in the past a few NGOs (e.g., Reporters
Without Borders) had brought members of Iranian civil society
to France to participate in programs.

French Envoy to Tehran
----------------------

¶2. (C) Citing a press report in the January 16 edition of Le
Monde, Poloff asked whether it was true that France planned
to send a presidential envoy to Tehran in the near future.
Choosing his words with care, Pescheux said that the Le Monde
report was "not false" but stressed that a final decision had
not yet been taken. Pescheux said that the envoy would not
engage on the nuclear file but would instead discuss regional
issues and, in particular, would seek to "find a solution on
Lebanon."

¶3. (C) Poloff said he was shocked that France, which had
steadfastly rejected entreaties to negotiate Lebanon's future
with the Syrian regime, apparently found the prospect of
conducting similar negotiations with Tehran less
objectionable. Had the Iranians given the French some
indication that they would be more forthcoming than Damascus?
No, Pescheux admitted, the Iranians had not tipped their
hand; they had merely indicated that they were willing to
talk.

Supreme Leader Still on Top
---------------------------

¶4. (C) Turning to the results of Iran's recent elections,
Pescheux indicated that the French were pleasantly surprised
by the outcome (immediately prior to the election, their
reporting from Tehran suggested that President Ahmadinejad's
supporters were poised to make significant gains in the
Assembly of Experts). The Quai's interpretation of the
election results is that the axis between Supreme Leader
Khamenei and former President Rafsanjani (i.e., the
traditional conservatives) has been strengthened, with
Khamenei remaining the supreme arbiter of Iran's political
balance of power. In an aside, Pescheux claimed that
notwithstanding the French diplomatic presence in Tehran, the
MFA has virtually no insight into the inner workings of the
Pasdaran.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON


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07PARIS170     2007-01-17 14:02     2010-11-29 12:12     SECRET     Embassy Paris

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: FR IR LE PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S ENVOY TO IRAN -- WHAT'S PROMPTING THIS
AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT


CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, REASONS



PAGE 02 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T
1.4 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (S) LE MONDE'S JAN. 17 EDITION RAN A FRONT-PAGE STORY ON
CHIRAC,S INTEREST IN PURSUING A DIALOGUE WITH IRAN ON
LEBANON, THUS CONFIRMING WHAT MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR GERARD
ARAUD TOLD THE AMBASSADOR DURING THEIR JAN. 15 MEETING. WE
FACE THE PROSPECT OF UNTOWARD POLICY INITIATIVES BY CHIRAC
DURING THE WANING MONTHS OF HIS PRESIDENCY. (THE FIRST ROUND
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WILL BE HELD APRIL 22; IT IS
WIDELY ASSUMED THAT CHIRAC WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO RUN
FOR A THIRD TERM.) WE MAY HAVE ENTERED A PERIOD IN WHICH THE
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT WILL IMPACT DIRECTLY ON FOREIGN
POLICY DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO LEBANON AND
IRAN.

¶2. (S) FIRST OF ALL THE FACTS, AS WE KNOW THEM AND AS
CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR STAPLETON BY ARAUD. CHIRAC FAVORED
ENLISTING IRAN IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK THE STALEMATE IN
LEBANON. TO THIS END, THE PRESIDENCY PROPOSED SENDING
FOREIGN MINISTER DOUSTE-BLAZY TO TEHRAN TO SOUND OUT THE



PAGE 03 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T
IRANIANS ON THEIR PLAYING A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN LEBANON --
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE nuclear ISSUE. THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY, UNCONVINCED THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY IRANIAN
INTEREST, AND CONCERNED ABOUT APPROACHING IRAN AS A
DEMANDEUR, OPPOSED THE INITIATIVE. SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT
BOTH VOICED STRENUOUS OBJECTIONS. U/S BURNS RAISED USG
CONCERNS DIRECTLY WITH ARAUD. THE ELYSEE THEREFORE BACKED
OFF "FOR NOW" ACCORDING TO THE MFA SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY.
WHILE ARAUD DID NOT MENTION THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT TO
TEHRAN BY A LOWER-RANKING ENVOY, LE MONDE HINTED THAT MIDDLE
EAST TROUBLE-SHOOTER JEAN-CLAUDE COUSSERAN, WHO VISITED THE
IRANIAN CAPITAL IN JULY, DURING THE ISRAEL/HIZBALLAH WAR,
COULD BE DISPATCHED AGAIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

¶3. (S) REPORTING IN OTHER CHANNELS INDICATES THIS IS INDEED
POSSIBLE. THE DECISION NOT TO SEND DOUSTE-BLAZY COULD WELL
BE DEFINITIVE. EVEN IF A LOWER-LEVEL EMISSARY IS SENT TO
TEHRAN, THE MAKINGS OF A DEAL ON LEBANON ARE NOT OBVIOUS.
HOWEVER, THIS EPISODE HAS HIGHLIGHTED A NUMBER OF CONTEXTUAL
FACTORS AND HYPOTHESES THAT GIVE RISE TO A FEW CONCERNS.



PAGE 04 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T

¶4. (S) THE FIRST IS THAT THE DISTORTING EFFECT OF CHIRAC,S
"OBSESSION WITH LEBANON" (ARAUD,S WORDS) MIGHT ONLY BE
FURTHER ACCENTUATED AS HIS PRESIDENCY DRAWS TO A CLOSE.
CHIRAC,S FOCUS COULD BE NARROWING IN ON ONE SINGLE
OBJECTIVE: TO ENSURE THAT THE SYRIAN REGIME, WHICH HE REGARDS
AS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF RAFIK HARIRI, DOES
NOT GAIN A NEW FOOTHOLD IN LEBANON. THIS COULD TRANSLATE
INTO A WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH IRAN TO FIND SOME SORT OF
ACCOMMODATION WHICH STRENGTHENS HIZBOLLAH IN LEBANON, BUT
PREVENTS THE STRATEGIC RETURN OF SYRIA. NO MFA OR ELYSEE
INTERLOCUTOR HAS POINTED US TO SUCH A CONCLUSION, BUT WE ARE
LEFT WITH FEW OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR CHIRAC'S APPARENT
DETERMINATION TO REACH OUT AT THIS TIME TO HIZBOLLAH,S MAIN
REGIONAL SPONSOR.

¶5. (S) MOREOVER, THIS ANALYSIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER
INDICATIONS OF LATE THAT FRANCE IS FIXATED ON LOWERING
TENSIONS IN LEBANON. THESE INCLUDE, INTER ALIA: THE
RELUCTANCE (THUS FAR) TO OPERATE FRENCH UAVS OVER SOUTHERN



PAGE 05 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T
LEBANON; THE MFA'S DECISION IN LATE DECEMBER TO "TAKE A
BREAK" FROM PUSHING FOR THE RAPID ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON; AND THE FACT THAT MFA
DESK OFFICERS ARE CAREFULLY SCRUBBING PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S
PROPOSED INTERVENTION AT THE JANUARY 25 LEBANON CONFERENCE TO
ENSURE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE DOES NOT ANTAGONIZE THE
LEBANESE OPPOSITION. IN ADDITION, CHIRACS NEW-FOUND CAUTION
ON LEBANON AND HIS PROPOSED OVERTURE TO IRAN MAY BOTH REFLECT
THE FRENCH PRESIDENT'S FEAR OF INCURRING FRENCH CASUALTIES IN
LEBANON IN THE FINAL MONTHS OF HIS PRESIDENCY.

¶6. (S) ANOTHER CONCERN RELATES TO CHIRAC,S FOREIGN POLICY
LEGACY, WHICH HINGES SIGNIFICANTLY ON TWO ACHIEVEMENTS, HIS
LEADERSHIP IN OPPOSING THE U.S. OVER IRAQ, AND IN RESTORING
LEBANON,S INDEPENDENCE. THE LE MONDE REPORT WHICH BROKE THE
NEWS OF THE ABORTED DOUSTE-BLAZY MISSION CLOSES WITH
SPECULATION THAT CHIRAC IS INCREASINGLY ALARMED BY U.S.
INTENTIONS VIS A VIS IRAN. CHIRAC COULD BE TEMPTED BY POLICY
INITIATIVES THAT SERVE TO BOLSTER HIS LEGACY ON BOTH COUNTS:
PROTECTING LEBANON,S INDEPENDENCE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME



PAGE 06 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T
STANDING STRONG AGAINST ANY PERCEIVED DANGEROUS DRIFT IN U.S.
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, A REPRISE IN GENTLER FORM OF THE GLORY
DAYS OF 2003.

¶7. (S) FINALLY, CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HERE HAS IT THAT THE
ONLY CONCEIVABLE SCENARIO WHEREBY CHIRAC COULD BECOME A


VIABLE CANDIDATE TO SUCCEED WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN



PAGE 02 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS. MIGHT CHIRAC BE POSITIONING HIMSELF TO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN IRAN-CENTERED CRISIS THAT WOULD OFFER
HIS ONLY TICKET BACK TO THE ELYSEE?

¶8. (S) CHIRAC MAY CHOOSE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH HIS ENVOY IDEA
BEFORE WE CAN GET FULL CLARIFICATION. IF HE DOES, IT SEEMS
OBVIOUS (TO US AND TO MANY WITHIN THE FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
ESTABLISHMENT) THAT THE IRANIANS WILL SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY
TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN AGENDA IN LEBANON WHILE TRYING TO DRIVE
A WEDGE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S nuclear PROGRAM. WE WILL
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR INTERACTIONS WITH SENIOR FRENCH LEADERS
OVER THE COMING DAYS TO MAKE CLEAR OUR CONCERNS, AS WE ASSUME
WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL DO AS WELL. HAVING NOTED THE
COALITION RAID ON THE IRANIAN OFFICE IN IRBIL, THE DEPLOYMENT
OF A NEW CARRIER BATTLE GROUP TO THE PERSIAN GULF, AND RECENT
STATEMENTS ON IRAN BY SECDEF GATES AND OTHERS, THE FRENCH ARE
AWARE OF THE GROWING PRESSURE ON TEHRAN. MAINTAINING OUR
FULL AND FRANK EXCHANGES WITH THE FRENCH ON IRAN WILL BE
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THE COMING DAYS.



PAGE 03 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T


PLEASE VISIT PARIS' CLASSIFIED WEBSITE AT:
HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.C FM

STAPLETON


/tag/IR_0.html


07PARIS2440     2007-06-07 17:05     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0000
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002440

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/7/2017
TAGS: PREL FR IR IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL SHARES VIEWS ON IRAN/IRAQ


CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: FRANCK GELLET, FRENCH DAS-EQUIVALENT FOR THE
PAGE 02 RUEHFRA2440 C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002440
PERSIAN GULF, SHARED HIS VIEWS ON IRAN AND IRAQ ON JUNE 7.
GELLET ASSESSED THAT THE IRANIANS ARE OVERCONFIDENT AND
VULNERABLE TO A BAN ON INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL. HIS
ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ WAS NOTABLY BLEAK. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) OVER LUNCH JUNE 7, THE MFAS DAS-EQUIVALENT FOR THE
PERSIAN GULF, FRANCK GELLET, SHARED HIS VIEWS ON IRAN AND
IRAQ. HAVING RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A 15-DAY TRIP TO IRAN,
GELLET SAID THAT HIS MOST SERIOUS AND USEFUL INTERLOCUTOR WAS
FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER VELAYATI, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS BEING
"LESS ROMANTIC" THAN THE REGIME'S OTHER FOREIGN POLICY
HEAVYWEIGHTS. GELLET SAID THAT VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE IRANIAN
OFFICIALS HE MET OVERESTIMATED THE REGIME'S STRENGTH, BOTH ON
THE REGIONAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE. "THE IRANIANS ARE
CONVINCED THAT NO ONE -- INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES -- CAN
TOUCH THEM ECONOMICALLY OR MILITARILY. THEY SIMPLY CAN'T
IMAGINE THAT THE U.S. HAS THE CAPACITY AND THE POLITICAL WILL
TO LAUNCH A MILITARY STRIKE AGAINST THEM AT A TIME WHEN THE
U.S. MILITARY APPEARS TO BE BOGGED DOWN IN IRAQ," SAID
GELLET.



PAGE 03 RUEHFRA2440 C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002440

¶3. (C) GELLET SAID HIS OWN VIEW (WHICH, HE CAUTIONED, IS NOT
SHARED BY EVERYONE AT THE MFA), IS THAT IF THE EUROPEANS
REALLY WANT TO AVOID A MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND IRAN THEN THEY NEED TO SHOW THE IRANIANS THEY ARE
SERIOUS ABOUT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. "THE IRANIANS WILL NEVER
BLINK UNTIL THEY FEEL THAT THE REGIME'S SURVIVAL IS AT
STAKE," SAID GELLET. HE SUGGESTED THAT -- IN ADDITION TO A
FURTHER SANCTIONS ON THE BANKING SECTOR, A FULL ARMS EMBARGO,
AND A CUT IN EXPORT CREDITS -- THE IRANIANS MIGHT BE
VULNERABLE TO AN EMBARGO OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. IN
ADDITION, HE SUGGESTED THAT WE NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DRAMATIC
ISOLATING EFFECT THAT A BAN ON INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL TO
AND FROM IRAN WOULD HAVE. GELLET NOTED THAT THESE WERE JUST
HIS PERSONAL VIEWS, AND SAID THAT HE HAS NOT YET RECEIVED ANY
GUIDANCE FROM THE NEW PRESIDENCY ON IRAN SANCTIONS. HE
OBSERVED THAT PRESIDENT SARKOZY TOOK A HARD LINE AGAINST THE
IRANIAN nuclear PROGRAM DURING HIS ELECTION CAMPAIGN, BUT
SAID IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHAT THAT WOULD TRANSLATE INTO IN
POLICY TERMS.



PAGE 04 RUEHFRA2440 C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002440

¶4. (C) GELLET, WHO SERVED FOR NEARLY THREE YEARS AT THE
FRENCH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD BEFORE ASSUMING HIS CURRENT
POSITION, HAD A PARTICULARLY GRIM VIEW OF IRAQ. "WE DON'T
HAVE THE SLIGHTEST HOPE IT CAN BE SALVAGED -- IT'S LOST," HE
SAID. HE PREDICTED THAT IRAQ WILL DESCEND INTO FULL-SCALE
CIVIL WAR WHETHER OR NOT MNF-I REMAINS. ON THE OTHER HAND,
HE PREDICTED THAT IF THE COALITION WERE TO WITHDRAW THERE
WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE AND HORRIFIC SPIKE IN THE LEVEL OF
VIOLENCE. "YOUR DEPARTURE WOULD BE SEEN EVERYWHERE AS A SIGN
THAT IT'S TIME FOR THE GLOVES TO COME OFF," HE SAID. HE
FURTHER PREDICTED THAT, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COALITION'S
DEPARTURE (WHENEVER THAT OCCURS), THE ENSUING CONFLICT WOULD
LAST MANY YEARS UNTIL IRAQ'S SUNNIS AND SHIITES (AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE PATRONS) WERE EXHAUSTED. AS FOR THE KURDS, GELLET
SAID THEY SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATED THE RISK THAT THEY WOULD
BE ANNIHILATED DURING THE COURSE OF A CIVIL WAR THAT WOULD
LIKELY PULL IN MOST OF IRAQ'S NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING TURKEY.

¶5. (C) NOTWITHSTANDING HIS BLEAK ANALYSIS, GELLET ENCOURAGED



PAGE 05 RUEHFRA2440 C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002440
THE U.S. TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION.
HE NOTED THAT ONE COMPLAINT HE OFTEN HEARD FROM HIS SUNNI
CONTACTS WAS THAT THEY RECEIVED CONFLICTING MESSAGES FROM THE
VARIOUS USG AGENCIES ON THE GROUND IN IRAQ, AND WERE NEVER
SURE WHICH OF THEM HAD THE ULTIMATE DECISION-MAKING
AUTHORITY. GELLET FINISHED BY WARNING THAT OUR TRIBAL ALLIES
IN ANBAR PROVINCE WOULD TURN ON US WHENEVER IT SUITED THEIR
INTERESTS TO DO SO.


PLEASE VISIT PARIS' CLASSIFIED WEBSITE AT:
HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.C FM


STAPLETON


/tag/IR_0.html


07PARIS3668     2007-09-05 12:12     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003668

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA READOUT ON AUGUST 23 TEHRAN VISIT BY
ELYSEE ADVISER RICHIER AND MFA DAS GELLET

REF: PARIS 3645 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosen
blatt for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: The GOF took a hard line during an August
23 trip to Tehran by French presidency strategic affairs
adviser Richier and French MFA DAS-equivalent Gellet that
Iranian leader Khamanei's foreign policy adviser Velayati
hoped would open a new channel to Paris. Gellet explained
August 31 that Velayati was apparently operating from a
flawed premise that Nicolas Sarkozy would free France from
its "dependence" on the USG. Velayati further believed
France could be broken away from the P-5 over further
sanctions against Iran. Gellet said Richier previewed for
Velayati the line Sarkozy would use in a subsequent speech to
French ambassadors that the world faced a "catastrophic"
choice between Iran with a bomb or bombing Iran. Although
Velayati's hopes were shattered, Iran is still interested in
the channel; Gellet said that Richier has the lead in
deciding what the GOF will do next. Gellet expressed a
strong French desire to remain informed on U.S. plans
regarding Iran particularly should we decide to take military
action against Iran. End summary

¶2. (C) French MFA DAS-equivalent for Iran, Iraq, and the
Gulf Franck Gellet on August 31 provided a readout on his
August 23 visit to Tehran accompanying the French
presidency's strategic affairs adviser Francois Richier. The
visit followed an invitation from Ali Akbar Velayati, former
Iranian foreign minister and current foreign affairs adviser
to Supreme Leader Khamanei. Gellet confirmed information
that the French Embassy in Washington communicated to the
Department that Velayati wanted to establish a new direct
channel to Paris. Gellet elaborated that Velayati's
(apparently convoluted) thinking had been expressed in an
article he had written that took the view that the election
of Nicolas Sarkozy gave France a chance to break free of its
"dependence" on the U.S. in terms of its foreign policy.
Velayati, according to Gellet, believed that Chirac had been
entirely beholden to the U.S. during his presidency.
Sarkozy's election, therefore, offered Iran a chance to
appeal to France in a way that would allow France to follow
its independent line a la de Gaulle and thus pry France loose
from the coalition that now sought to impose tougher
sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program.

¶3. (C) Despite this clearly flawed analysis of France's
position and political dynamics, the GOF decided this opening
was important enough to explore. Gellet recounted how he and
Richier met Velayati, heard him out, and proceeded to burst
his bubble. Richier, according to Gellet, told Velayati that
Sarkozy was firm on the nuclear issue and previewed for him
the line that Sarkozy would use in his August 29 speech to
French ambassadors that under current circumstances the world
faced the stark alternative that Iran would obtain "the bomb"
or be bombed. Velayati was not happy to hear this but did
not close the door to further discussion. Gellet surmised
that Velayati believes the French are still susceptible to
Iranian blandishments and wants to keep some sort of
alternative line open to the Elysee.

¶4. (C) Gellet stressed that Velayati's initiative was not
taken without reference to others in the Iranian government.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International
Affairs Abbas Araghchi sat in on the Velayati meeting just as
Velayati attended a meeting Gellet and Richier had with
Araghchi. Gellet did not indicate what other subjects came
up, but Velayati's pitch was the main one. When asked
whether France felt the visit had been worthwhile and what
sort of follow-up there might be, Gellet was vague. He said
that Richier, in his Elyse capacity, would decide what to
do, including whether to keep this dialogue going. Gellet
surmised that Richier would be willing to discuss this
further with USG officials, like PM A/S Rood, in future
meetings to discuss next steps in the nuclear fuel dispute.

¶5. (C) Gellet found the visit a bit surreal but quite
indicative of the bizarre way Iran functions. He noted the
diffusion of power among different entities and the
uncertainty that pervades Iranian decision making. Velayati
clearly sought to minimize or counterbalance President
Ahmadinejad's hard line but without actually taking a softer
line himself. Iran's core position, therefore, did not seem
to be shifting or subject to any flexibility. When asked how
France understood Sarkozy's either/or statement on Iran had
played in that country, Gellet replied that Iranian
authorities seem to have largely kept it out of the national
media. The implication that France sees Iran facing a
serious risk of military retaliation over its stance was thus
largely unreported. Gellet argued that this suits Velayati's
calculations because the impression remains that Iran can

PARIS 00003668 002 OF 002


somehow turn to France to blunt American pressure to impose
more sanctions and escalate the situation.

¶6. (C) On the issue of escalation, Gellet asked that the
USG keep France informed of its thinking as regards possible
military action against Iran. He claimed that the Elysee
worries about being blindsided if or when the time comes for
a strike. The timing and magnitude of such action, i.e., a
surgical strike or a more generalized campaign, could have
enormous stakes in terms of French interests. Gellet noted,
in this vein, French concerns about Iranian retaliation
against the Gulf States and their capacity to respond. He
surmised that a U.S./France dialogue, if it were to develop,
might occur at a much higher level than his. His hope, which
was personal as much as he said it reflected official
thinking, was that we would keep the French in the loop as we
moved into the next phase of high-tension diplomacy focused
on further UNSC sanctions.

¶7. (C) Comment: It appears that this latest Iranian
initiative to open a new channel to Paris is unlikely to
change the dynamics of Tehran's ongoing confrontation with
the world. The French seem keen to reassure us that they are
not wavering. President Sarkozy's tough words to the French
Ambassadors conference following the meetings in Tehran made
that point loud and clear. On whether to engage more
intensively with the French about the various contingencies
related to Iran, we believe we should continue to test
Sarkozy's apparent desire to deal with us differently than
his predecessors did. As an indication of different French
thinking, the newspaper "Le Monde" reported active discussion
in the Elysee of sanctions targeting Iran outside the UNSC
that France could impose alone or potentially with others in
the EU. The article made clear that, as "fissures" seem to
be appearing among the P-5 over Iran, France seems to be
toughening its position. We will follow up with Richier for
his take on this visit.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON


/tag/IR_0.html


07PARIS3733     2007-09-07 18:06     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 003733

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IR
SUBJECT: FRENCH ELYSEE NEA ADVISER RECOUNTS TOUGH LINE
TAKEN WITH IRANIANS

REF: PARIS 3668

Classified By: Classified by Polmincouns Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons
1.4.(b), (d)

¶1. (C) Following up on reftel, Polmincouns and poloff asked
French presidential adviser for NEA issues Boris Boillon
September 6 about the visit to Tehran by French Presidency
official Richier and MFA DAS Gellet. Polmincouns noted the
stark phrasing in President Sarkozy's speech to French
ambassadors (indicating the world faced the choice between
Iran with a bomb or bombing Iran) and wondered what it meant
in the context of the visit. Boillon was glad we raised the
subject and stated that Sarkozy had wanted to warn Iran in a
dramatic and public way that it must cooperate with the
international community with respect to its nuclear program
or face potential catastrophe in the form of military action.
This did not mean, as some media were misinterpreting the
statement, that France would be ready to participate in such
action. Far from it, Boillon continued; France vigorously
opposed a resort to force and preferred to resolve the
ongoing dispute diplomatically.

¶2. (C) Boillon echoed much of what MFA DAS Gellet had
related in reftel when he observed that the Iranians do not
seem to understand the gravity of the situation or France's
position. They suffer, he complained, from a closed mindset
that he later termed "autistic." Boillon recounted in the
same terms as Gellet the origin of the Iranian initiative
from Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign affairs adviser to supreme
leader Khamenei, to establish a special dialogue between
Tehran and Paris. Even before Richier and Gellet traveled,
the GOF told the Iranians to "forget it" if their intention
was to split France away from the P-5 plus one. Richier and
Gellet repeated this message in Tehran and indicated that
France might be willing to speak of other subjects (NFI).
Boillon believed the level was perfect in that the French
sent senior working level officials well below the "political
level," whereas Velayati clearly was at the political level.
This disparity gave the French considerable leeway in terms
of the frankness with which they could speak.

¶3. (C) Boillon repeated that it was clear the Iranians did
not understand or accept the blunt message they heard. In
his characteristic candor, Richier told Velayati and other
Iranian officials that, absent full compliance, sanctions
against Iran will only ratchet up. As he previewed the tough
line that Sarkozy would express in his speech, Richier added
that France wants to avoid military action against Iran but
might eventually have to accept it as the only recourse left
to the international community to prevent a nuclear-armed
Iran.

¶4. (C) Boillon stated that the GOF had not decided whether
to continue the dialogue that Richier and Gellet had started.
Diplomatic contacts, nevertheless, continue apace, and he
pointed to a then current visit to Paris by Iranian Deputy
Foreign Minister for European and American Affairs Jalili.
(Note: As reported by a staffer of KM Kouchner September 7,
Jalili had inexplicably not been briefed on Richier's and
Gellet's message to Velayati. End note) Boillon contended
that France had no problem pursuing a diplomatic dialogue per
se and kept its embassy in Tehran for just such a reason. As
Richier told the Iranians, however, there was no need for a
special channel if the Iranian aim was to pry France away
from the P-5 plus one. Richier was very direct that France
had no intention to deviate from the line it was on with its
partners. Boillon expanded his assessment of the Iranians as
"autistic like the Syrians. As with the Syrians, one must be
direct and not always 'diplomatic.'"

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA


/tag/IR_0.html


07PARIS3956     2007-09-21 09:09     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003956

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM FR IR
SUBJECT: KOUCHNER EXPECTED TO MEET IRANIAN COUNTERPART AT
UNGA BUT NOT SARKOZY

REF: A. (A) PARIS POINTS 20 SEPTEMBER 2007

¶B. (B) PARIS 3668

Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Andrew Young for rea
sons 1.4. (b), (d).

¶1. (C) During a September 19 call on French MFA
DAS-equivalent for the Levant Ludovic Pouille, we asked
whether he had heard anything that might indicate FM Kouchner
or any other French officials planned to meet with Iranian
President Ahmadi Nejad in New York. Pouille shook his head
no on Ahmadi Nejad, but he stated that Kouchner is scheduled
to meet with his Iranian counterpart on the margins of the
UNGA.

¶2. (C) Although Pouille does not cover Iran, he stated that
posts throughout the NEA region had reported queries from
host governments about France,s policy in light of FM
Kouchner,s recent remarks about the possibility the
confrontation over Iran,s nuclear program could lead to war.
This had necessitated the drafting of &talking points8 to
be sent out worldwide to refocus attention on what Kouchner
said about the need to pursue diplomacy to the maximum extent
possible. Pouille (strictly protect) opined that Kouchner
had not for the first time allowed his tongue to get ahead of
his brain in terms of his public utterances. He has
struggled since to get the emphasis back on diplomatic
efforts to resolve the nuclear issue and to minimize the
importance of his reference to the possibility of war.

¶3. (C) We spoke September 20 to French MFA Iran desk
officer Arnaud Pescheux, who confirmed his understanding that
Kouchner was currently the most senior French official
expected to meet with the Iranians in New York, and then only
the foreign minister. He related that the Iranian mission in
New York had passed a formal written request to the French
mission for an Ahmadi Nejad/Sarkozy meeting. The GOF had
ignored the request in the same manner it ignored Ahmadi
Nejad,s congratulatory message to Sarkozy after his election
as president. Nonetheless, and as Kouchner has publicly
stated, Pescheux underscored that France continues to have a
normal relationship with Iran across the board, covering a
host of bilateral and regional issues (notably Lebanon).
This includes frequent visits to Paris by Iranian officials.
Tension over the nuclear issue has not changed this, even
though it has obviously complicated the bilateral dialogue
somewhat. In this respect, Pescheux stated that the French
embassy in Tehran has received numerous complaints about
recent public French statements despite the fact that few of
them have been replayed fully via the Iranian media to the
public at large. (Comment: This echoes what MFA
DAS-equivalent for Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Franck Gellet and
others have told us per ref b. End comment)

¶4. (C) With respect to the new channel Velayati has tried
to open via Gellet and Presidency strategic affairs adviser
Francois Richier (also ref b), Pescheux said that it was not
closed off, just inactive until such time as France might
decide to make use of it. He repeated that the GOF is fully
aware that Tehran is trying to divide the P-5 1 by opening
such a channel. As for the idea, bruited by Pouille, that
French special envoy for Lebanon Jean-Claude Cousseran might
travel to Tehran with a larger mandate than the situation in
Lebanon, Pescheux said that was under discussion. Nothing
had been decided, either in terms of dispatching Cousseran on
such a mission or possible timing, although it was unlikely
to happen prior to the end of the ministerial portion of the
current UNGA. Pescheux reiterated the often expressed view
at the Quai that, unlike Syria, Iran is not presently
inclined to stir things up in Lebanon. He explained that for
Iran, the consequences of a renewed civil war that could
inter alia pit Sunnis against Shi,a would set Iranian
efforts to expand its regional influence back.

¶5. (C) Comment: As ref a demonstrates, Kouchner is not
only trying to recast his earlier remarks in a way that
downplays references to the possibility of war with Iran but
to underscore his readiness to engage with Iran including via
a trip to Tehran. We are not aware of any plans for Kouchner
to travel there, however, and he was very careful when he
responded to a reporter,s question on this that he kept it
limited to whether in principle he was prepared to go.
Despite the rhetoric and the furor surrounding Kouchner,s
remarks, the French have not closed any doors to continued
engagement. We think it unlikely, given the charged
atmosphere and the French determination to keep Ahmadi Nejad
at arms length, that President Sarkozy will meet formally
with him on the margins of UNGA, although we would not rule
out the possibility of an impromptu pull-aside should the two
find themselves at a group event organized by the UN.
Sarkozy was unwavering in a national television interview

PARIS 00003956 002 OF 002


September 21 that Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear
weapons.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


Pekala


/tag/IR_0.html


07PARIS4685     2007-12-11 15:03     2010-11-29 12:12     SECRET     Embassy Paris

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR CRAIG STAPLETON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV PINR KPAL EU FR LG SY IS IR
SUBJECT: YOUR DECEMBER 16-18 VISIT TO FRANCE

PARIS 00004685 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (
d)

SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) That the first international follow-on to Annapolis
is taking place in Paris reflects the new confidence and
greater cooperation that characterize our relationship with
France seven months into the Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy.
France's support for our efforts to achieve peace in the
Middle East contrasts sharply with its previous preferred
role as a side-line critic. It is just one example of the
broader re-positioning of France vis-a-vis the U.S. which we
have been quick to recognize and take advantage of.
Sarkozy's desire to maximize France's influence by working
with the U.S. to address common challenges is the
international component of a larger ambition for his
five-year Presidency: to renew France though deep reform at
home and resumption of its leadership in Europe. With an
exceptionally long political honeymoon behind him, Sarkozy is
now pressing ahead with his domestic reform agenda. He has
met with predictable opposition (most dramatically in the
form of transport strikes), and some questioning among
political allies of his strategy of undertaking sequential,
calibrated reform rather than a Thatcherite big bang at the
outset of his term. Despite the difficulty of the challenge,
including an unsettled international economic context, and
little budgetary room for maneuver, Sarkozy remains
determined to see his program through. Given his dominant
political position, that remains a realistic prospect. An
activist on the international scene, with an opportunistic
eye for grabbing attention and credit, Sarkozy will remain a
challenging partner despite his desire to improve the
bilateral relationship. He has concentrated responsibility
for foreign affairs in the Presidency to an unprecedented
degree, while Foreign Minister Kouchner has focused on
selected policy issues. This message also addresses the
specifics of France's Middle East policies. While under
Sarkozy the French are more supportive, our collaboration
(and intra-GOF coordination) on Lebanon has of late not been
as close as it should be, as Sarkozy's team in the Elysee has
focused single-mindedly on electing a President while
squeezing the democratically-elected majority and weakening
its ability to deal with post-election challenges. End
Summary

THE RELATIONSHIP
----------------

¶2. (C) Madame Secretary, The seven months since Nicolas
Sarkozy became President of France -- and the six months
since your last visit -- has been a remarkable period in
three respects. First, our relationship with France has
undergone a significant qualitative change. Sarkozy has set
in place a new paradigm for French foreign policy, one more
favorable to our interests. Scrapping Chirac's worldview,
which equated French leadership with containing U.S.
hegemony, Sarkozy has articulated the need for France to work
closely with the U.S. -- in order to address common
challenges, but also as the surest way to increase France's
global influence. France's increased involvement in and
commitment to Afghanistan, the beginning of a French interest
in Iraq, and France's consideration of a full return to NATO,
are the most symbolically powerful examples of France's
policy reorientation. Second, we have ratcheted up our
cooperation with France across our foreign policy agenda,
particularly on Middle East issues, but also on Kosovo,
Burma, Sudan/Darfur and elsewhere. In Lebanon, Sarkozy's
more activist foreign policy has already put the new
cooperative relationship to the test. Third, over the past
seven months, Sarkozy has begun to implement the ambitious
platform of domestic reform he had promised as a candidate.

SARKOZY
-------

¶3. (C) Before addressing the Middle East issues that will
be the focus of your visit here, a word on the domestic
context. Sarkozy enjoyed an exceptionally long political
honeymoon, one which extended well into the Fall. His
election -- representing the victory of a new-generation
leader, one with unmatched communication skills and a
detailed and ambitious program for renewing France -- led to
a season of national elan and optimism. The return to normal

PARIS 00004685 002.2 OF 004


in the political life of the country over the past two months
was predictable, as Sarkozy's efforts to implement difficult
domestic changes have run into opposition from those -- such
as rail workers -- who stand to lose, and many others who
fear change of any kind. Sarkozy has disappointed some in
his own camp for not immediately embarking on radical,
deep-rooted, pervasive reform, taking advantage of his
electoral mandate. Instead, Sarkozy has decided to carefully
pick his battles, gaining momentum from each piecemeal
victory. All in all, Sarkozy remains in a politically
powerful position, operating as the hands-on leader of a
largely unchecked executive branch, unencumbered for now by a
political opposition worthy of the name. He is determined to
make his mark during his five year term (which he insists may
be his single term of office), but has demonstrated greater
caution than might have been expected, mindful of the
international economic and financial environment, and severe
budgetary constraints at home.

KOUCHNER
--------

¶4. (C) Sarkozy's foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, was
the prize catch in Sarkozy's opportunistic effort to appoint
figures of the center and center-left to his government,
thereby increasing its legitimacy and political heft (and
depleting that of the opposition) as he waged the domestic
reform battle. While rumors circulate of a cabinet
re-shuffle early in the new year or following municipal
elections in March, Kouchner's position appears secure for
now. (Defense Minister Morin and Interior Minister
Alliot-Marie are among those thought most imperiled.) He
enjoys a personal chemistry with the President based on
Sarkozy's long-time admiration of Kouchner's personal and
political courage and humanitarian accomplishments. Kouchner
remains very popular -- consistently scoring at or near the
top of the polls measuring the popularity of France's
political leaders. But even his star quality (that he alone
in the government can claim) has not kept him from being
eclipsed by his hyper-active and media-savvy president.
Surely more of a concern to Kouchner, Sarkozy has
concentrated foreign policy decision-making and
implementation to an unprecedented degree in the Elysee, with
Secretary-General Claude Gueant and Diplomatic Advisor

SIPDIS
Jean-David Levitte accruing as much if not more influence
than Kouchner. Kouchner has largely focused on the issues
with which he has the greatest experience and level of
comfort -- Lebanon, Kosovo, and Darfur among them. While he
has of late curbed his penchant for off-the-cuff,
undiplomatic public comments, the thin-skinned Kouchner has
shown irritation over the involvement of Elysee officials in
the delicate negotiations over Lebanon's presidential
elections, and he may be uncomfortable with Sarkozy's
increasing willingness to downgrade human rights
considerations in his dealings foreign leaders, as
demonstrated by the way he has kept his distance from the
ongoing five-day visit to Paris of Mu'ammar Qadhafi.

Middle East
-----------

¶5. (S) Under Sarkozy, France's Middle East policies have
become more supportive of and congruent with U.S. interests,
but we are concerned that in the past few weeks our
collaboration (and intra-GOF coordination) on Lebanon has not
been what it should be, as Sarkozy's Presidency team has
focused single-mindedly on electing a President in such a way
that squeezes the democratically-elected majority and weakens
its ability to deal with post-election challenges.

--Arab/Israeli peace: The French remain major supporters of
our efforts focused on supporting the Israeli/Palestinian
negotiations. Their eagerness to make Annapolis a success
and to host the Paris conference on assistance to the
Palestinians underscored this. Sarkozy and Kouchner both
want France to be a key player in what they hope will be a
strong and successful push in 2008 to the creation of a
Palestinian state. In many ways, France aspires to be a
favored additional partner to the Quartet. Syrian
participation at Annapolis has also sparked hopeful
commentary in the French media that a larger dynamic -- in
which France can participate -- is underway that inter alia
would foster an unraveling of the Syrian/Iranian relationship
and halt Iranian inroads through support of Hizballah in
Lebanon. Sarkozy and Kouchner will listen attentively to any

PARIS 00004685 003.2 OF 004


vision you may outline of how you expect the negotiations to
unfold and whether there is a reasonable expectation of them
broadening to include Syria.

--Lebanon: Even as the French have become a positive force
behind our efforts on behalf of Arab-Israeli peace, the close
collaboration with the GOF under former President Chirac,
with his single-minded focus on supporting Saad Hariri and
isolating Syria, has suffered. This is partly due to the
extremely fluid situation in Lebanon. But it also results
from the tug of war between Kouchner and the Elysee over who
is in charge of the issue, one that developed after it became
clear the deadline for electing a new president would pass
without a new candidate chosen. There is abundant evidence
that the Syrians, possibly with help from the Amir of Qatar
(a friend of Sarkozy and President Bashar al-Asad), lured the
Elysee into leading a process with far different objectives
than the one Kouchner began last summer. Whereas Kouchner
was focused on helping the Lebanese get out of their
political deadlock, Levitte and the Elysee have sought a
resolution of the presidential crisis that would satisfy
larger geopolitical aims involving Syria. It is also clear
to us that the Elysee, given Sarkozy,s obsession with
achieving results, is focused on electing a president so that
it can be considered another French diplomatic triumph. The
unfortunate net result continues to be the impression that
French pressure for a deal falls exclusively on the March 14
majority and not where it belongs -- on the March 8
opposition that is acting in close coordination with Syria
intent on wringing key concessions from the democratically
elected majority. Even if the presidential crisis is
resolved by December 17, we would recommend that you discuss
with Kouchner and Sarkozy how we can more effectively work
together as we address the multitude of difficult challenges
facing Lebanon, of which the Presidential election is only
the first.

--Iran: The public release of the recent NIE on Iranian
nuclear capabilities was a shock to all but the highest
levels of the GOF, which was briefed on its conclusions.
Although the French have publicly backed our view that Iran
continues to pose a serious threat and further international
sanctions are warranted (a line echoed in most of the French
press), the GOF anticipates a major "communication problem"
with its EU partners, the Iranians, China, and Russia. There
is further the delicate diplomacy France is undertaking with
different elements in the Iranian regime in order to maintain
a viable channel that bypasses President Ahmadinejad (who
appeared to complain about this in a recent letter to
Sarkozy). In geostrategic terms, the French see Iran as the
primary threat to the Middle East and worry about inroads it
has made in Lebanon and Iraq. As noted above, there is also
some thinking, at least among analysts outside the GOF, that
Annapolis and the NIE betoken a significant shift of U.S.
strategy in the Bush Administration's last year that involves
new U.S. thinking about Iran. Sarkozy and Kouchner would
welcome anything you could share with respect to how we
regard Iran in a post-Annapolis Middle East.

--Iraq: French follow-up to Kouchner's visit to Baghdad last
August and Iraqi President Talabani's subsequent visit to
Paris has been slow. Concern about the security situation,
despite what the French acknowledge to be marginal
improvements in some areas of Iraq, lack of coordination at
the working level among French ministries, and the failure so
far to achieve a breakthrough on national reconciliation have
slowed or prevented follow-on French engagement. Kouchner,
however, did ask SecDef Gates for a list of specific areas in
which we thought France could be helpful. We should use that
opening to engage the French in a more active dialogue
between representatives of our respective interagencies. We
recommend that you use the opportunity to inquire about
Kouchner's current thinking about French assistance to Iraq
and let him know we would like to send an interagency team to
Paris early in the New Year to begin these discussions. We
would further recommend that you ask Kouchner about his
efforts to rally EU support for and to promote meaningful
engagement with the Iraqi government. You might also praise
his personal commitment to Iraq's success, as demonstrated in
part by his participation in the recent Istanbul summit. We
understand Kouchner may next visit Iraq in February when
France is expected to open an embassy office in Irbil.




PARIS 00004685 004.2 OF 004



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON


/tag/IR_0.html


08PARIS114     2008-01-23 14:02     2010-11-29 12:12     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Paris

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000114

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO FR RU IR GG UP AG
SUBJECT: SARKOZY, KOUCHNER ADVISERS ON NATO, RUSSIA, IRAN,
AND SARKOZY

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 b and d.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 16, Joseph Wood, Deputy
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security
Affairs, met with Philippe Errera, strategic affairs adviser
to FM Kouchner, and Francois Richier, strategic affairs
adviser to President Sarkozy. Errera and Richier provided
their views on NATO, ESDP, Russia, the Iran NIE, and
President Sarkozy's own guiding principles. Both advisers
emphasized that French reintegration into NATO needs thorough
consideration and is unlikely to take place before 2009.
They shared their concerns about recent signals from Russia
and described the "disastrous" consequences of the Iran NIE
on international efforts. Finally, they shared their
perspectives on the principles that underlie President
Sarkozy's dynamic administration, including France's desire
to be influential on the world scene while maintaining close
relations with its allies. END SUMMARY.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NATO Reintegration -- Not Before 2009
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶2. (C) Both Richier and Errera noted that President Sarkozy
has publicly accepted the principle of French reintegration
into NATO. Furthermore, according to Richier, he is the
first elected president in France to go on the record as
supportive of NATO. The U.S. should not underestimate the
attitude shifts that have made reintegration politically
feasible today. At the same time, both interlocutors
stressed that the GOF will not "rush" into a final decision
on reintegration into the military command structure.
Richier observed that the 2009 NATO summit would be a
reasonable timeframe for the announcement of a final
decision, noting the need for a thorough evaluation of the
implications of the decision. He added that France's defense
white paper will include a vision for French and collective
security, but that the exercise will conclude no sooner than
the end of April 2008.

¶3. (C) Errera said the GOF prefers the term "normalization"
to "reintegration," in part to underscore for domestic
political reasons that the NATO of today is not the NATO of
previous eras. Errera said that President Sarkozy wants to
work for a "new" NATO, and that France needs to be on the
inside to work for reform. He stressed that use of the
correct terminology should help frame the public dialogue
that is certain to ensue in France, despite the lack of
public outcry responding to Sarkozy's initial expressions of
interest. Richier noted that there is much ignorance in
France today about what NATO does; for example, many think
ISAF is under UN auspices. Errera pointed out that the
defense white paper commission, which is conducting a broad
review of defense and security policy, includes people who
are skeptical of NATO.

¶4. (C) Errera characterized this moment as "awkward," given
that formal discussions about the form of French
reintegration have not yet started. He noted that political
commitment and practical considerations had to be developed
simultaneously and incrementally, adding that the Joint
Chiefs must have a sense for where in NATO French officers
would be posted, for example, before a decision is made.
Most importantly, he said that France (including Sarkozy's
diplomatic adviser Jean-David Levitte) wants to avoid the
same mistakes that were made in the 1990s when reintegration
was last on the table. To avoid repeating those mistakes,
Errera said smaller, practical questions should not be
permitted to become pressure points that could block a
political decision. Richier said that it would be a mistake
to set firm goals today on what had to be achieved before a
political decision could be made, and that the overall
direction is more important than the specifics. He
acknowledged that there is suspicion in Europe regarding
France's motivations, and suspicion in France regarding NATO,
that will need to be overcome. He pointed to President
Sarkozy's scheduled February 1 meeting with NATO SYG Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer as one important step to alleviate some
concerns.

¶5. (C) Errera said that generally, newer members of NATO
will view French reintegration positively, reducing their
current suspicion of France for its non-normalized NATO
membership. On the other hand, newer members of NATO use
NATO jobs to reward their top leadership, and French

PARIS 00000114 002 OF 004


reintegration would put a tight squeeze on command structures
and high-level posts. High-level positions are also an issue
with Germany and the U.K.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NATO and ESDP: Inseparably Linked
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶6. (C) Errera stated that during France's upcoming EU
Presidency, President Sarkozy will push hard to strengthen
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), while working
for a revitalized NATO. Richier called this a transatlantic
effort to strengthen European security, while noting that
billing it as an "alternative" to NATO would be both
politically and financially absurd. Errera observed that
substantive progress on ESDP will be very difficult, partly
due to British concerns. Richier expressed hope that
European defense budgets could increase, noting that the gap
vis--vis the U.S. is growing, but added that if budgets
cannot be increased in the short term, efficiency must be
increased.

- - - - - - - - -
NATO Enlargement
- - - - - - - - -

¶7. (C) Adriatic 3: Errera said that France is comfortable
in principle with each of the Adriatic 3 candidates. In
particular, France has "no problems" with Croatian
membership. However, Errera said Albania seems to be taking
acceptance for granted, and needs to make more of an effort
to "clean up" corruption issues. Regarding Macedonia, Errera
said the GOM underestimates the seriousness of the name issue
for Greece and that the U.S. should not make the same
mistake. France will not pressure Greece on this issue.
Furthermore, if Athens were to give in on the name issue, the
Greek government could fall, thus bringing in a new
government which would be responsible for -- and presumably
hostile to -- the NATO enlargement ratification progress.

¶8. (C) Georgia and Ukraine: Errera said that the GOF does
not want a public dispute with the U.S. on these issues
before Bucharest, adding that European allies are hedging
because Washington is not sending clear signals. Errera
expects that new Ukrainian PM Tymoshenko will come out soon
publicly in favor of MAP for Ukraine, a step for which France
will "not have a great appetite." Errera said MAP is not
just one more step in closer relations, but a serious
decision in light of Article 5 commitments. Regarding
Georgia, he said Saakashvili "pulled off the election
somehow" but still not under ideal circumstances, and that
NATO may not be ready for Article 5 guarantees to Georgia
either. That said, the GOF has systematically made clear to
Russia that there is no Russian redline or veto regarding
Ukraine and Georgia. In response, Wood noted that France's
hesitation regarding Article 5 commitments implies a de facto
"sphere of influence," because Russia is the only possible
menace to Ukraine or Georgia.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Russia: Negative Trends
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶9. (C) Richier characterized the current Russian regime as
revisionist, saying that Putin made much-needed improvements
to Russian infrastructure but has gone too far in seeking to
restore Russia's grandeur at the expense of international
cooperation and development. Among the Russian population,
many are culturally and economically oriented towards the
West, but remain politically tied to Putin. According to
Errera, Russian judgment on important issues is worsening.
In the past, Russia has been difficult to work with, but has
ultimately made the right decisions -- until recently. As an
example, in President Sarkozy's private meeting in Moscow
with President Putin, Putin was very hardline on Iran
(notwithstanding Russia's exports of fuel for Bushehr), but
that in the subsequent press conference, Putin distanced
himself on this issue, to Sarkozy's surprise and chagrin.
Errera said that in the past, Russia did not mind hurting
Iran as long as Russia was not hurt as well; now Russia seems
not to want to hurt the Iranians.

- - - - - - - - -
Energy Dependence
- - - - - - - - -


PARIS 00000114 003 OF 004


¶10. (C) Both interlocutors noted that France's use of
nuclear energy makes it less dependent than some other
European countries on Russian oil and gas. That said,
Richier expressed concern that Russia is "grabbing" gas
infrastructure and supply at a time of military buildup and
strong rhetoric. He said that it will be difficult for
Europe to agree on a common energy policy, as there is
currently no consensus, nor any great ideas, on how to solve
the problem. Richier described Russian policies as motivated
to obtain short-term profit for individuals, rather than to
build long-term, worldwide power. Errera observed that
dependence on Russia for energy is better than dependence on
Iran, which is the only other real option. He said that
Sarkozy had made overtures to Algeria on gas before and
during his visit to Algiers, but that France was "stiffed."
Nor is there any sense that there will be progress with
Algeria on gas in the near term. Errera said that while
France seeks a commercial relationship, Algeria views energy
cooperation as complicated by history and tinged with a sense
of nationalism.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-
NIE: "The Best Christmas Gift Ahmadinejad Could Have
Imagined"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-

¶11. (C) Both interlocutors called the NIE a "disaster" that
has "substantially jeopardized" progress on Iran in the short
term and will have lasting consequences, including
eliminating France's ability to build consensus in Europe.
French views are unchanged, but many others have been
affected, and the NIE destroyed not just the momentum of the
international community but also what little leverage France
and the international community had on less radical Iranian
elements. Errera noted that the timing of the release of the
NIE was especially bad, with EU Political Directors having
been poised for a new UNSC resolution just before the NIE
release. He said at the IISS Manama Dialogue in December,
speculation was rampant about why the current U.S.
administration did not better manage the report's fallout by
postponing its release or changing the characterization of
Iran's enrichment activities as exclusively civil.

¶12. (C) Both interlocutors said quick passage of a new UNSC
resolution, although likely to be a weak, is key. Richier
said that Iran has no incentive to negotiate and that the
international community's most effective mechanism has been
creating a financially difficult operating environment for
Iran. If the perception declines in the financial community
that investment in Iran is dangerous, this will change.
Errera noted the EU might be able to go farther than the
Security Council will, perhaps with Gulf countries and/or the
G7, to pressure Iran on continued uranium enrichment by
raising the price for doing so.

¶13. (C) Errera also said that an intelligence team from the
French DGSE traveled to the U.S. recently to meet with their
U.S. counterparts regarding the NIE, and was disappointed
that the information shared was "even less" than has been
reported in the press. This reception did not help the
perception shared by some in the GOF that France has not been
treated as a full partner by the U.S., despite working
side-by-side and fielding criticism following the NIE
release.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Sarkozy's Governing Philosophy
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶14. (C) Errera said that two clear priorities underlie
Sarkozy's administration. The first is realigning French
presence with French objectives, and reestablishing French
influence where it had been diminished (for example, within
the EU, by giving momentum to the simplified EU treaty).
Errera said France will maintain its influence in Africa but
seeks to rebalance its overseas investments, for example by
creating a military base in the UAE. Errera said that France
cannot say Iran is a key threat without investing more in the
Gulf and that the Iranians will "get the message." He noted
that the new base in the UAE will be the first French
military installation not in a former colony. Secondly,
Errera said that Sarkozy believes in the concept of "the
West," making him the first non-Gaullist French president not
to consider France an exclusively independent actor. This

PARIS 00000114 004 OF 004


identification provides Sarkozy a clear course for steering
French policy even on difficult questions like dealing with
Libyan President Qadhafi.

¶15. (C) Richier suggested that Sarkozy's core conviction is
that France must be pulled into the 21st century. He said
Sarkozy likes to use the metaphor of a person who exercises
for the first time in a while -- many muscles may be sore
afterwards, but the exercise has done them good. Richier
said he sees new energy in French diplomacy, focused on
bringing diversity and reconciliation to the global stage.
Sarkozy wishes to encourage countries to accept the diversity
(ethnic, religious, etc.) within their own societies, as
tolerance for others is key to democracy. Sarkozy also
recognizes a need for reconciliation and believes the effort
to correct the course of a "bad guy" is worthwhile (COMMENT:
In public Sarkozy has defended his outreach to Qadhafi and
Hugo Chavez along these lines.) According to Richier,
Sarkozy believes the short-term costs of talking to rogue
actors by using carrots and helping them move forward are
less than the long-term costs of inaction. However, he also
recognizes the importance of not creating gaps between the
U.S. and Europe in reaching out to "bad guys," marking a
departure from previous French governments. Finally, Richier
noted that "relations with Islam" and climate change were two
immediate priorities of President Sarkozy's that would
nevertheless remain on the French agenda.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA


/tag/IR_0.html


10PARIS71     2010-01-22 17:05     2010-11-29 12:12     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Paris

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S E C R E T PARIS 000071

NOFORN
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C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
H PASS TO HOUSE STAFFER KESSLER'S OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR AF PK FR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER ENGAGES THE FRENCH ON IRAN,
SANCTIONS AND AFGHANISTAN

REF: 09 PARIS 1671

Classified By: Pol M/C Allegrone for Reasons 1.4 b and d.

¶1. (C) Staffdel Kessler, representing the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, visited Paris January 12-14 to engage French
officials, non-government entities and the private sector
regarding Iran, sanctions, non-proliferation and Afghanistan.
With a main focus of discussing potential U.S. sanctions
legislation related to Iranian efforts to develop weapons of
mass destruction, the staffdel heard from a wide spectrum of
French players. Most of the opinions supported USG efforts
as France has been a strong ally, especially regarding Iran
and Afghanistan. While the usefulness of sanctions continues
to be debated, French officials said their government was
moving forward with haste, and bringing the European Union
(EU) with it, to prepare enhanced sanctions against Iran.
Even the French political opposition appears on board with
this plan. While challenges abound in Afghanistan, the
Government of France (GOF) remains firmly committed to NATO's
mission there. Total company senior representatives
explained to the staffdel members that its activities in Iran
are completely legal, small in scope and that it has not been
able to complete its buy out program there due to
foot-dragging by the Tehran regime. Highlights of Staffdel
Kessler's meetings in Paris are as follows. End summary.

IRAN: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW
------------------------------------

¶2. (S/NF) In a January 13 meeting with members of Staffdel
Kessler, Francois Richier, Strategic Affairs Advisor to
President Sarkozy, addressed the issue of imposing enhanced
sanctions against Iran. Richier explained that the GOF was
developing a package of measures that largely targeted the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps because of its economic
holdings and its role as a weapons proliferator. This
package would include:

--Finance - The GOF is willing to include the Iranian Central
Bank in targeted sanctions, most likely through some of its
subsidiary bodies. Paris is also trying to target an Iranian
Sovereign Wealth Fund which it recently learned has a branch
in Germany. France would also seek to impose sanctions that
would cut Iran's ability to conduct "correspondent banking."

--Transport - These sanctions would ban Iranian ships from
ports and harbors in Europe. The French envision the
possibility of enhanced sanctions that would trace Iranian
ships that have been re-flagged to obscure their origin. In
addition, Iranian air cargo planes would be banned from EU
airports.

--Insurance and re-insurance - Given the limited number of
actors in the re-insurance industry, France believes
prohibiting re-insurance coverage in Iran would be an
effective sanction.

--Oil and Gas - Paris proposes a ban on technical cooperation
and investment in Iran, a well as prohibiting exports of
refinery equipment and spare parts for oil and gas
industries.

¶3. (S/NF) Richier said he expects the EU will agree to
"complement" any eventual UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) and France hopes for a short timeline to secure a new
UNSCR in early February before securing approval at the
Council of EU Foreign Ministers later that month. Richier
said that we will have to decide whether to accept grudging
Russian concessions in order to get a UNSCR that may be weak
and limited, or whether to "waste time" trying to lobby for a
UNSCR that will be, at best, only marginally better. Richier
noted that it would be helpful if the U.S. Congress did not
act on sanctions legislation at least until the UNSCR debate
is concluded and he said it might be best to have U.S.
sanctions legislation reference the new UN resolution.
Regarding potential Chinese opposition, he hoped for
agreement on a new UNSCR (as the prior ones were unanimous),
but would accept a simple abstention. Richier expects Russia
will support the measure because the Russians were "shocked"
by the discovery of the uranium enrichment site in Qom.
Nevertheless, the Russians still need time to adjust their
thinking to this reality.

¶4. (S/NF) European countries face three main difficulties in
deciding on sanctions against Iran, according to Richier, and
he outlined them as follows:

--Most European countries want a UN framework, including a
new UNSCR. Richier pointed out that a signal from the Obama
administration that we are also prepared to move forward

would be very helpful.

--Determining the nature of sanctions: Some EU countries want
to put the UN decision into EU law, but the French want to go
beyond that and target different sanctions that we are
unlikely to get from the next UNSCR.

--Some countries simply hesitate to support sanctions for a
variety of reasons, whether protecting their own economic
interests, or on ideological grounds. This is manageable,
but complicated by individual circumstances, according to
Richier.

¶5. (S/NF) The GOF remains concerned about enforcing
sanctions with Brazil and Turkey, said Richier, because both
have considerable ties to Iran. He said that Turkey has made
clear it does not want to suffer economically, as it has in
the past. Richier noted France's concern over Turkey's
"regional policy" towards Iran, whereas it views Brazil's
engagement as being more nave and possibly based on
misinterpretation of the Obama decision to try engagement
first (without Brazil knowing what limits on that engagement
should be).

¶6. (S/NF) Richier was skeptical that sanctions aimed at
exporters of refined oil to Iran would be effective, although
the GOF has pushed for this, because such a policy would
require a verification mechanism requiring an investment of
military ships along Iran's long coastline and other
resources. Richier believes such a policy would send a
signal to exporters worldwide, but it would be too hard to
implement, and would likely only dissuade the honest
exporters. When asked about French oil company Total and
pending U.S. congressional legislation, Richier replied Total
has not made new investments in Iran, although it is involved
in a buy-back arrangement and said sales of Total's refined
products in Iran are declining.

IRAN: MFA SHARES ELYSEE'S VIEWS
-------------------------------

¶7. (S/NF) On January 14, Martin Briens, the Foreign
Ministry's DAS-equivalent for Non-Proliferation, largely
confirmed what Richier had said, but he provided additional
information. Briens also highlighted French ambitions to get
a new UNSCR approved and implemented at the February 25
Foreign Ministers meeting. However he said "tough and fast"
in the UNSC was unlikely, so we would probably have to settle
for fast. A total arms embargo, which Russia had previously
opposed but China had not, would be a major victory, assuming
Russia actually supported it.

¶8. (S/NF) Briens asserted that the June election in Iran and
its aftermath had "changed the equation" within the EU with
respect to Iran. He allowed that pending U.S. measures will
"also enter into the equation." Several countries besides
France, including Spain, have come to the conclusion that it
is time to move from sanctions that specifically target
proliferation activities to ones that have a broader impact.
Given the delays in implementing the last UNSCR on Iran,
France and close partners had received EU approval to prepare
modalities of implementation "in parallel" to negotiations in
the UN. The GOF has come to the view that the EU should take
"autonomous" measures that are not merely a magnified
application of UNSCRs, but it is still unclear how far EU
partners would go in this direction. France has noted the
UKs adoption of a process to designate individual foreign
entities for sanctions and it is now considering doing the
same. The GOF also believes that national governments can do
more through Financial Action Task Force decisions made by
the G8.

¶9. (S/NF) In addition to the potential package of sanctions
outlined by Richier (para 2), Briens said the GOF wants the
EU to:

--Impose a "prior authorization" approach on all Iran Central
Bank transactions which would allow truly sovereign
operations by the Central Bank to be approved, but it would
allow greater scrutiny and control, and would slowdown the
processing of transactions.

--Cast a wide net in banning/targeting IRGC persons and
entities.

--Ban trade in equipment for internal repression and identify
people involved.

Briens shared Richier's doubts on the efficacy of trying to
block refined petroleum products ("the bad guys will just get
rich") but the technology and parts for the oil and gas

sectors, especially for refining should also be denied to
Iran. Finally, on the issue of gaining China's
participation, he suggested emphasizing regional stability
and recruiting countries in the region to put pressure on
China as well.

AFGHANISTAN: KARZAI NEEDS TO
FOLLOW UP ON INAUGURATION SPEECH
--------------------------------

¶10. (C) On January 14 Jasmine Zerinini, head of the GOF's
interagency Afghanistan-Pakistan cell, acknowledged that
public opposition in France to the troop presence in
Afghanistan has grown steadily over the past several years,
but that this has not resulted in calls for withdrawal or
even a significant change in strategy. Regarding
coordination between the International Security Assistance
Forces, Zerinini said that there had been a great deal of
improvement, but that the approach was still too fragmented.
She said that France has recognized for the past year that
the forces stationed in the north of the country were unable
to handle the growing insurgency there. General McChrystal
understands this, she added, but this has not translated into
action.

¶11. (C) On civilian assistance, Zerinini said U.S. and French
plans to deploy more civilians are unlikely to bear fruit,
because ultimately only the Afghans themselves can bring
effective development. However, she opined, the Karzai
administration has not shown that it is capable of doing
this. Although Karzai's inauguration speech in November was
a good first step, he has done nothing since then.
Therefore, she said, the London conference is coming far too
early - the goal of London was to renew our partnership with
Karzai, but this is difficult without a real roadmap for
progress from the Afghans.

PAKISTAN: REINFORCING POLITICAL RELATIONS
-----------------------------------------

¶12. (C) Zerinini said France is working to reinforce its
political relations with Pakistan, and was expecting
President Sarkozy to visit Pakistan "early in the second
quarter" of 2010. The GOF does not want to return to a
relationship based on military equipment sales, as in the
1980s, and is instead focusing on counter terrorism in
addition to economic and trade links. France is also trying
to support an EU-Pakistan dialogue, but she said Pakistan
makes it difficult by rejecting conditionality and attempting
to focus exclusively on economic issues. Zerinini said the
Pakistani government is eager for trade concessions, but does
not want any political dialogue unless it is focused on
Kashmir.

¶13. (C) On the role of the Pakistani military, Zerinini said
General Kayani has "learned the lesson of Musharraf" and was
staying behind the scenes. However, he is manipulating the
government and parliament, including to prevent change on
Pakistan's policy towards Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) along the Afghan border, and also to stir up
controversy regarding the Kerry-Lugar bill that ties
continued U.S. aid to increased civilian control of the
military. Zerinini also argued that the west had missed its
opportunity to push the Pakistani military to crush the
Afghan Taliban taking refuge in Pakistan. Citing Jalaladin
Haqqani as an example, Zerinini said in 2004 he had standing
as a leader in the jihadi community, but did not have the
organization to represent a significant military threat.
However, since then, large amounts of funding, predominately
from Gulf donors, have allowed Haqqani to create a network
that would be difficult for the Pakistani military to defeat,
even if it had the will to do so.

¶14. (C) Zerinini said that bilateral measures alone to
strengthen civilian government were unlikely to be effective,
and that more coordination was needed among donors,
especially the United States. She said the Group of Friends
of Democratic Pakistan, while imperfect, was designed to
transform Pakistan's political elite and give them more
leverage over the military. However, Zerinini said it is not
being utilized. She said the U.S. was making significant
efforts to help develop Pakistan's energy sector, but she
added "I have not seen any of this in the energy working
group of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan."

THE FRENCH LEFTIST OPPOSITION
-----------------------------

¶15. (C) Staffdel members met opposition figures from the
French Parliament and Senate including Deputy Pierre
Moscovici (former Minister of European Affairs), Senator

Jean-Pierre Chevenement (former Minister of Defense), Senator
Monique Cerisier ben Guiga (author of "Going nuclear in the
Middle East"), and Deputy Jean-Michel Boucheron to learn
their views on Iran and the Middle East Peace Process. With
respect to Iran, the group generally thought President
Sarkozy's tone had been too harsh and they supported giving
dialogue more time to bear fruit. Moscovici was the most
alarmed at the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons
capability and he emphasized that he would not rule out any
means in dealing with it. Boucheron and Cerisier ben Guiga
accepted the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran with equanimity
because they felt Iran was only seeking to enhance its power
rather than seeking to use nuclear weapons for hostile
purposes, while Boucheron was more concerned that the West's
focus on this issue was preventing movement on a host of
other issues where Iran might be helpful, including Iraq,
Afghanistan, Lebanon and Gaza. Chevenement said he was
prepared to support sanctions on Iran, but he argued that
achieving progress towards peace between the Israelis and
Palestinians would be the most effective way of improving
relations with the Iranian regime.

¶16. (C) The group generally agreed that the USG was not
moving fast enough on the Middle East peace process.
Moscovici thought President Obama could both be a friend to
Israel, as well as being firm when necessary. The opposition
members said the USG was not putting enough pressure on
Israel and that the temporary settlement freeze announced by
the Nentanyahu government is inadequate. The group's
expectations for what the Obama Administration could
accomplish in the Middle East were high, and the perceived
absence of concrete results could lead to disappointment on
the French left.

FRENCH ENERGY MAJOR TOTAL IN IRAN
---------------------------------

¶17. (C) Total's Vice President for International Relations
Hubert des Longchamps told staffdel members that the
company's current activities in Iran are legal. Much in line
with recent statements (see reftel), Longchamps said Total's
focus is on recouping funds, in the form of cash payments,
from previous investments in the development of Iran's oil
and gas blocks. He added that Total has no operational
responsibility in the South Pars field, and talks to finalize
buy-back arrangements to reimburse Total a "few hundred
thousand dollars" should have ended in 2008. In addition,
Total provides limited technical services to the Iranians to
safeguard its remaining property interest. Longchamps said
to walk away from these interests would only reward the
Tehran regime. He added that Total from "time to time" sells
excess gasoline supplies to Iran when demand drops in Europe.
Longchamps did not quantify the value of this trade, but he
said if such deals carried a high political risk, Total was
willing to forego the business. He reiterated that there is
no existing regulation prohibiting such sales, and if Total
withdrew entirely from the refined petroleum product markets,
the Indians, Koreans, and Chinese would remain active
players.

18 (C) Like other energy companies, Total plans to return to
Iran in the future when the political situation improves,
Longchamps explained. Therefore, Total offers financial
support to local communities to develop social and medical
projects. These programs help maintain a dialogue with the
Iranian society and is a channel of communication that Total
wants to keep open. He pointed out that Total has not
violated any U.N., EU or French laws. Longchamps cautioned
the U.S. against imposing sanctions in Iran because they
would hurt typical Iranians without impacting the political
leadership. When the Total Vice President asked the staffdel
if pending U.S. legislation could penalize energy companies
for selling refined petroleum to Iran, staffdel members
responded the legislation could possibly impact Total's
recent shale-gas investments in the U.S.

THINK TANK: EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS
--------------------------------------

¶19. (C) French officials are divided over the effectiveness
of sanctions as a response to Iran's continued pursuit of
nuclear enrichment, according to Bruno Tertrais, senior
researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research (a think
tank focusing on international security and defense issues
whose main client is the GOF). Tertrais told staffdel
members that he believes sanctions can be efficient, but he
noted the importance of defining the end goal. He stated the
purpose of sanctions on Iran is not to stop the nuclear
program immediately but to exert pressure on the regime and
to elicit a gradual change. He listed the successful use of
sanctions in the past on four different countries -- South

Africa, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea -- the fact that
sanctions on Iran have put a strain on its imports, and the
accelerated debate within Iranian leadership as factors that
back the argument that sanctions can be effective. He
caveated his statements throughout the meeting by saying
sanctions would be ineffective if nothing was done to address
the black market and business circuits to Dubai. Regarding
the GOF's stance on sanctions, Tertrais noted that the Office
of the Presidency (Elysee) was more supportive of further
sanctions and mindful of strategic issues than the MFA, which
tended to take a regional approach and be more dovish.
Tetrais stated that the history of the late 1980s showed that
the more pressure foreign governments placed on the Tehran
regime, the more the Iranians backed down.

¶20. (C) Embassy comment: Staffdel Kessler's engagement with a
broad audience on these issues helped advance our mutual
understanding of the challenges and strategies to advance our
common interests in Iran and Afghanistan, and on the
effectiveness of sanctions.

¶21. (U) Staffdel Kessler did not clear this cable.
RIVKIN


/tag/IR_0.html


10PARIS174     2010-02-12 16:04     2010-11-29 12:12     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Paris

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E.O 12958: DECL: 02/08/20
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR FR IR AF NATO
SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FOREIGN
MINISTER KOUCHNER, FEBRUARY 8, 2010

Classified By: Alexander Vershbow, ASD/ISA. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: At the request of the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (SecDef) met with French FM
Bernard Kouchner in Paris on February 8, 2010. Discussions included
how to persuade the Chinese and others to support sanctions against
Iran, and the importance of targeting the Iranian government rather
than the people. On Afghanistan, Kouchner confirmed that France would
maintain its position that it could not add additional combat troops
for the time being but was open to the possibility of sending
additional trainers. Both Kouchner and SecDef lauded recent progress
in Pakistan. Discussing NATO, Kouchner argued for a stronger European
pillar, which SecDef supported with the caution that pursuit of an
independent European security role risked reducing the already limited
capabilities available to the Alliance. SecDef also raised the need
for reform and for examination of future NATO missions, which he would
define narrowly rather than broadly. END SUMMARY

----
Iran
----

¶2. (S/NF) Kouchner said that the U.S. and France were working well
together in New York on an Iran sanctions resolution - all the problems
now are with the Chinese. Kouchner had met Chinese FM Yang twice the
previous week, but said that right now it was difficult to predict
whether the Chinese would veto or abstain. He noted that the Chinese
were furious over the U.S.-Taiwan arms deal, which would make it
difficult to get a resolution passed in February.

¶3. (S/NF) SecDef observed that Russia usually followed China's lead on
North Korea, whereas China usually followed Russia on Iran. Therefore
we should try to get the Russians to persuade the Chinese to support
the Iran sanctions resolution. MFA political director Jacques Audibert
remarked that the Russians had been helpful during the last P5-plus-one
teleconference, but he worried that the Russians would water down the
content of the resolution. Kouchner said that President Medvedev seemed
strongly on board, and there was daylight between his position and that
of Foreign Minister Lavrov. SecDef said he suspected that China
ultimately would not want to be isolated and would abstain.

¶4. (S/NF) SecDef urged Kouchner not to exaggerate the Chinese concern
over Taiwan - they would need a little more time and, in the end, an
abstention might be a good enough result for us. He added that we
should urge the Saudis to weigh in with Beijing since China has more at
stake in its relations with Saudi Arabia than Iran. He commented that
the Saudis always want to "fight the Iranians to the last American,"
but that now it is time for them to get into the game.

¶5. (S/NF) Raising his concerns about bringing non-permanent UNSC
members on board, SecDef reported that in Ankara he had impressed upon
PM Erdogan the dangers of proliferation to other Middle East countries
or an Israeli strike if the Iranian nuclear program couldn't be
stopped. Kouchner expressed his doubts about Turkey's desire for a
constructive role in region, describing Erdogan's comments to
Ahmadinejad defending the Iranian nuclear program as dangerous.

¶6. (S/NF) Kouchner then asked SecDef for his perspectives on the
popular protests in Iran. In the French view, the internal
developments were very important - the most significant change in
decades. He urged careful thought about how to avoid discouraging the
protesters with sanctions, bearing in mind that the protesters did not
support Tehran's ambitions for nuclear weapons. He further emphasized
his belief that human rights issues should receive attention as well.

¶7. (S/NF) SecDef said that Kouchner's argument underscored the need to
focus sanctions on the IRGC and companies it owns, in order to minimize
the hardship for the Iranian people. He remarked that Iranians across
the political spectrum support a peaceful nuclear program, but it was
not clear whether they favored acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, our political strategy should reaffirm Iran's right to have
a civilian nuclear program as long as it is safeguarded and in
compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

¶8. (S/NF) Further explaining the U.S. position, SecDef said that while
our understanding of the Iranian leadership was opaque, we do know that
they do not like to be isolated. The USG would soon be designating
several IRGC companies under the Iran Sanctions Act. His own view was
that it was important to get the UNSCR passed quickly, even if it were
not as harsh as we might wish. Once a resolution is passed, he
explained, it will offer a legal platform on which the EU and
individual states can impose harsher sanctions.

PARIS 00000174 002 OF 003



¶9. (S/NF) Kouchner agreed, but added that another problem was to get
the nine votes needed in the UNSC. He said that Lebanon was one of
France's prime targets in this respect, but he doubted that France
would be able to bring the resolution to a vote during its presidency,
as February is a very short month. Gabon, which takes the chair in
March, is a "good asset for France," he commented. Audibert
interjected that the Russians had supported deleting some sections of
the draft UNSCR, but had approved including sanctions on the IRGC.
Kouchner said that France had to proceed carefully since a French woman
had been taken hostage in Tehran. He disparaged FM Mottaki's
duplicitous performance in Munich.

-----------
Afghanistan
-----------

¶10. (S/NF) On Afghanistan, Kouchner confirmed that France would
maintain its position that it could not add additional combat troops
for the time being. Pledging that France would stay "until the very
end," he said that the French would send 80 French trainers to Kabul on
their own, but were also looking into joint training opportunities with
Germany - possibly an OMLT.

¶11. (S/NF) Kouchner solicited SecDef's reaction to Karzai's idea of
local non-combat zones. Gates said that he was not familiar with this
proposal but was skeptical about declaring zones where the government
could not use force since we could not enforce similar restraint on the
Taliban.

¶12. (S/NF) The U.S., SecDef said, supports reintegration and has money
in its military budget to support short-term efforts at integration
similar to the Sons of Iraq initiative in Anbar province. Kouchner
commented that a key was to provide higher salaries to the ANA and ANP.
SecDef agreed, noting that salary increases in late 2009 had led to an
increase in recruits. Kouchner said that this made sense as we were
fighting misery as well as terrorism.

--------
Pakistan
--------

¶13. (S/NF) Turning to Pakistan, SecDef described the dramatic changes
that had taken place over the past year. It was astonishing that
President Zadari had remained in power and that the Pakistanis had
conducted such effective COIN operations. He noted that coordination
between ISAF and Pakistan's armed forces was improving - and this was
creating a more difficult situation for the Taliban along the border.
The Pakistan operation in South Waziristan had flushed out Taliban and
Al Qaeda elements; they were more vulnerable on the move. Moreover,
Pakistan's aggressive campaign against the insurgency had won broad
political support among all political parties. Operations in the West
and North-West had begun to accrue respect for Pakistan Army that
Musharraf had squandered. It is important for all of us to talk to the
Pakistanis and provide economic assistance. SecDef commented that one
can never be an optimist about Pakistan, but that the changes had been
striking. Kouchner agreed with SecDef's analysis that the changes in
both the political and military spheres were "nothing short of a
miracle."

-----
NATO
-----

¶14. (C) Kouchner then raised NATO, declaring that France was ready to
play its role in defining the Alliance's future strategy. He said that
General Abrial (Supreme Allied Commander - Transformation) has offered
input, but emphasized that it was critical to come up with real
strategy that we could explain in debates in Parliament. Kouchner
stressed that we needed to clarify NATO's roles and missions, as well
as its role in combating the threats of terrorism, poverty and
oppression. SecDef agreed that the Strategic Concept should deal with
21st century security threats Q with an emphasis on the word
"security." He said the Strategic Concept should also incorporate
lessons learned from Afghanistan - particularly the need for
comprehensive civil-military strategies and better partnership between
NATO and the EU and UN.

¶15. (C) SecDef said that NATO reform should proceed hand-in-hand with
an examination of Alliance threats and missions, either as a parallel
process or as a part of the Strategic Concept itself. In this regard,
the Alliance cannot afford so many headquarters and needs to take steps

PARIS 00000174 003 OF 003


to reduce overhead.

¶16. (C) SecDef also stated that the Alliance should be clear as to
what NATO's limits are -- for example, it does not have role in the
Pacific. We should adhere to the basic principle that NATO is about
the security of its member states. We all face terrorist risks, and
there are many other new threats, but SecDef would be inclined to
define future missions narrowly rather than broadly.

¶17. (S/NF) Kouchner highlighted piracy as an emerging issue on which
the EU and NATO were working together, although the real problem was
inside Somalia. As an aside, he mentioned that France was willing to
support the training of additional troops for the TFG.

¶18. (C) Kouchner argued that strengthening the European pillar in NATO
was necessary: the EU cannot exist without defense, the U.S. needs
strong European Allies, and a strong European pillar was not in
contradiction with NATO. SecDef replied that during his time as
SecDef, he has felt the need for a better way for EU and NATO to work
together. While NATO is primarily a security alliance, it can't do its
job without a civilian component. The EU is primarily a
political-economic organization, but he was willing to acknowledge that
it had some security role -- such as counterpiracy or peacekeeping in
Chad. SecDef said that while each organization might have its primary
role and mission, they could both perform both functions.

¶19. (C) Interpreting SecDef's latter comment as prohibiting an EU
security role, Kouchner dissented and said that since 500 million
people live in the European Union, the EU needed to be able to
adequately protect them. Gates observed that France was just one of 5
or 6 nations that spent more than 2 percent of GDP on defense, and that
if the EU decided it needed an independent security role, it could
reduce number of forces available to NATO and cripple the Alliance.
Even now, NATO had insufficient resources. Kouchner said that we needed
to share burdens among all nations, and that it was hard to make people
spend more on defense in the midst of an economic crisis.

¶20. (U) This cable has been cleared by SecDef. Drafted by OSD staff.


RIVKIN


/tag/IR_0.html


Reference ID     Created     Released     Classification     Origin
10STATE13750     2010-02-17 03:03     2010-11-29 12:12     SECRET//NOFORN     Secretary of State

VZCZCXRO5206
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHC #3750/01 0480313
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 170309Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8385
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1309
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6409
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6148
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0360
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7288
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 013750

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/20
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO RS FR IR TU
SUBJECT: READOUT OF JANUARY 20 U.S.-FRANCE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
IN WASHINGTON

Classified By: Under Secretary Bill Burns for reasons 1.4(b,
d).

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. On January 20, 2010, Under Secretary Bill
Burns and Defense Under Secretary for Policy Michele Flournoy
hosted the third U.S.-France Strategic Dialogue with
counterparts Jacques Audibert and Michel Miraillet.
Discussions focused on Afghanistan, Pakistan, NATO Reform,
Missile Defense, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the Middle East
Peace Process. The French indicated an announcement of
further civilian contributions to Afghanistan would be made at
the London Conference, but hedged on a decision regarding
additional combat troops. On NATO's new Strategic Concept,
the French highlighted the potential for a split in the
Alliance between old and new members, and agreed that a
document that linked to NATO reform measures was needed. The
French requested more information on the U.S. proposal to make
Missile Defense a mission for NATO. Both U/S Burns and USD(P)
Flournoy underscored that the potential sale of a French
Mistral-class Helicopter carrier to Russia would be unhelpful
in terms of regional stability. Next steps on Iran were
discussed with the French agreeing that the European Union
(EU) was more unified than ever on the need for increased
pressure and welcoming U.S. efforts to engage the EU as a
whole on this issue. End Summary.



------------------------
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
------------------------

¶2. (S/NF) U/S Burns praised the French contributions and
previewed U.S. goals for the London Conference on Afghanistan,
which included agreement on growing the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), reintegration, and choosing a new UN
Senior Representative for Afghanistan. USD(P) reviewed the
POTUS decision and highlighted that July 11, 2011 was an
inflection point -- the beginning of a process. She noted
that POTUS was careful to not create an artificial timeline
for transition to Afghan responsibility and that the U.S.
message to the region is that "we are not leaving." Deputy
SRAP Jones described the new U.S. regional stability strategy
and our efforts to align Karzai with the international
community's civilian priorities.

¶3. (S/NF) Audibert remarked on France's "special" commitment
to Afghanistan based on France leading the invocation of
NATO's Article 5 after 9/11. Nine years later, the French
cite Allied unity as the mission's principal success. France
believes the President's announcement of 30,000 more troops
substantively changed the operation. While the London
conference is a chance to impress upon Afghan President Hamid
Karzai that he must implement the commitments in his
inauguration speech, the French are concerned it might be too
early to put too much political pressure on Karzai. Audibert
suggested a second international conference on Afghanistan in
the spring would be helpful and was pleased to hear about
plans for an April conference in Kabul. Audibert also stated
that France will make an announcement about its "civilian
surge" at the London conference, but that commitments on
further troop deployments were not ready. Miraillet lamented
French public opposition to the war in Afghanistan, but
believed that the government was making progress in convincing
the French people of the necessity for the operation. He also
explained that the military staff had developed several plans
for additional contributions, which were now with President
Sarkozy for action.

----------------------
NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT
----------------------

¶4. (C/NF) Audibert noted that the Strategic Concept (SC) was
"not a redrafting of the Washington Treaty," and should not
open troublesome issues such as new missions and redefining
Article 5. He further emphasized that France wanted to stay
as close to the 1999 Strategic Concept as possible on language

STATE 00013750 002 OF 004


relating to NATO nuclear issues. Audibert highlighted the
risk of a split between old and newer members of the Alliance
on these questions and advocated for a short, simple document.
The French want to use the Strategic Concept to drive reform
at NATO. He noted that France had submitted several proposals
on reform and that France was keen for U.S. support.
Miraillet added that with the dire state of NATO financing, it
was important to stress financial reform even before the
drafting of the Strategic Concept. Miraillet also warned that
SecGen Rasmussen might put a tight grip on drafting the
concept and cautioned that Turkey would play a stronger role
in drafting than in 1999.

¶5. (C/NF) USD(P) asserted that the U.S. has played a leading
role in the Senior Officials Group (SOG) because of our strong
commitment to NATO reform. On the SC, she said it was
important that the key Allies make their input to the SecGen
before pen was put to paper. Further, USD(P) clarified that
the U.S. did not believe Alliance transformation could happen
without financial reform and that it was a priority for the
U.S. State Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian
Affairs Phil Gordon agreed; any misperception that the U.S.
did not want to link the Strategic Concept to reform must be
corrected. OSD Assistant Secretary for International Security
Affairs Alexander Vershbow added that the new concept must put
a public face on the Alliance and address issues for the
future, such as Article 4 and crisis management capacity. He
agreed that reform of financing was critical as the current
budget crisis evidenced. ASD Vershbow stressed that we must
work with the UK to solve the financial crisis at NATO and
suggested that the idea of "zero real growth" be put aside.
Audibert was pleased to hear that the U.S. was on the same
page as France regarding reform and that this was a priority
goal for the French side during the Strategic Dialogue.

---------------
Missile Defense
---------------

¶6. (S/NF) USD(P) briefed the French on the current state of
play regarding worldwide U.S. missile defense plans. She
noted that the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) would
soon be submitted to Congress and noted the Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA) would be a U.S. contribution to a NATO Missile
Defense project. This plan would protect both U.S. forces and
interests in Europe and our NATO Allies. USD(P) requested
French support for securing NATO approval for the Active
Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to
become the Command and Control (C2) backbone of a wider
European Missile Defense program. USD(P) stressed that NATO
approval for the C2 relationship between ALTBMD and the PAA
was important as Turkey was unlikely to approve participation
unless it was part of a larger NATO enterprise.

¶7. (S/NF) Miraillet conveyed that France was pleased with
the Obama administration's swift action on Missile Defense and
welcomed the U.S. development of the PAA. France shared the
U.S. perception of the threat and had ideas on ways it could
participate in the U.S.-proposed system. However, Miraillet
emphasized that France needed more information before the
government could endorse a NATO-PAA linkage through ALTBMD,
and argued that the Lisbon Summit may be too early for a NATO
decision. He said that France wanted information on phases
three and four of the PAA and whether the SM-3 Block 2B could
be perceived as a threat by the Russians. Audibert added that
France needed much more detail on the potential costs to NATO
Allies before endorsing ALTBMD as the C2 for the European
Missile Defense system. He also asked how the C2
relationships in the system would work in a NATO context.
Audibert concluded by underscoring that French hesitation on
accepting a NATO role for European-wide Missile Defense is not
reluctance, but a reflection of the need for greater clarity
on what was being proposed.

¶8. (S/NF) In response, USD(P) Flournoy said we would soon
share additional details on C2 arrangements, noting that
authorities would need to be delegated given the short
decision time for a response. She and ASD Vershbow pressed
the importance of a political decision at Lisbon to adopt
territorial Missile Defense as a NATO mission, both to secure
Turkish agreement to host the forward-based radar and to
demonstrate that NATO was addressing real Article 5 threats.


STATE 00013750 003 OF 004


------
Turkey
------

¶9. (S/NF) Miraillet and Audibert were remarkably downbeat on
Turkey and lamented poor French bilateral relations with
Turkish leadership, though they believed ties were slowly
improving. Miraillet believed the military leaders were no
longer what they once were as the recent Ergenekon scandal had
weakened the influence of the Generals in Turkish politics.
Miraillet asserted that FM Ahmet Davutoglu had kept with his
theory of "strategic depth," which he had described in his
previously published books, through Turkey's continued
engagement with neighbors like Syria and Iran and in Turkey's
proactive approach to the Caucasus and recognition of the
Iraqi Kurds. Miraillet, in noting that the Turkish military
had of late established a better relationship with the
Pakistani military, stated that Turkey was a nuclear threshold
country and that France did not know if there were similar
civilian nuclear cooperation linkages with Pakistan. In
highlighting Turkey's unwillingness to engage in combat in
Afghanistan, its improved relationships with Syria and Hamas,
its willingness to negotiate with Iran outside the P5-plus-1
process, and its position on selecting a new NATO Secretary
General at the April 2009 Strasbourg Summit, Miraillet summed
up that Turkey was becoming more of a global actor, but not
always a positive actor in the international system.

¶10. (S/NF) USD(P) asked whether the EU was closer to
identifying a way that it could signal to Turkey that the door
was open to a closer relationship, such as observer status in
the European Defense Agency. Audibert noted that President
Sarkozy had been particularly upset with the Turkish position
on Rasmussen at Strasbourg and that Sarkozy's objection to
Turkish membership in the EU was one of five pillars on his
political campaign that the public still remembered. Further,
when France tried to move forward with closer NATO-EU ties
during its 2008 EU presidency, Turkey rejected every plan that
was put on the table. For these reasons, it would be
difficult for France to see any opening on EU membership for
Turkey in the near future. All French interlocutors agreed
that a "more arrogant" Turkey could present a problem during
NATO Strategic Concept discussions this year. In response,
Flournoy, Vershbow and Gordon reiterated that by closing the
door on the Turks, the EU was creating a vicious circle that
fueled Turkish obstructionism at NATO.

------
Russia
------

¶11. (S/NF) Audibert began by stating that France was taking
pragmatic approach to Russia, but that President Sarkozy had a
"problem of confidence" and did not fully trust Russia.
Audibert said Russia's two treaty proposals on new European
Security Architecture were unacceptable and mere provocations,
but that the French position was to use the proposals to
engage the Russians on new approaches to crisis management,
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, and on the
adoption of the Open Skies/verification measures. However, he
noted, these issues will continually be bogged down over the
situation in Georgia, which Audibert saw as intractable as
Russia will never "derecognize" the sovereignty of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia while also never recognizing Georgian
sovereignty over its territory, including the two enclaves.

¶12. (S/NF) Audibert, noting he was raising his "if-raised"
point, brought up the issue of France's potential sale of a
helicopter carrier Mistral-class ship to Russia. He asserted
that the French had merely agreed to negotiate with Russia on
the potential sale, but then argued that sale would be only
for the ship without armament systems. Audibert also said
that while France understood U.S. concerns over the potential
for Russia to use the ship for projection of power, it was
important to note that any decision on the issue would, in the
end, be political in nature. Miraillet stated that this sale
would be a gesture of good will to Russia as France assessed
the Russian Navy was in dire condition. In any case,
concluded Miraillet, if France did not make the sale, the
Netherlands and Spain would likely sell similar technology.

¶13. (S/NF) On Mistral, USD(P) observed the optics and policy
behind the sale were perplexing as it would "fly in the face"

STATE 00013750 004 OF 004


of President Sarkozy's personal engagement on resolving the
Georgia crisis in 2008. She asserted that this sale would
send a confusing political signal to Russia as well as to
other Europeans. U/S Burns concurred with USD(P), noting the
sale would feed Georgia's fears and could lead to an arms
race, increasing the chance of miscalculation by one or both
sides. USD(P) concluded that while we understood that France
wanted to actively engage Russia, the U.S. would prefer that
France find a different confidence-building measure than a
Mistral sale.

----
Iran
----

¶14. (S/NF) U/S Burns stated that the international community
had reached a point where it had to begin looking for further
consequences for Iran as the credibility of our efforts was at
stake. U/S Burns noted that other actors were watching
Western actions on Iran. He cautioned that moving China
toward greater sanctions would not be easy, but that we need
to continue engaging them.

¶15. (S/NF) Audibert noted that France was using every means
possible to bring the EU together on Iran. He noted a
recently EU Council decision to task Foreign Ministers with
developing new ideas on the way forward with Iran. Briens
stated that since the Iranian regime cracked down following
the June 2009 elections, the EU was more solid as a block on
sanctions. In particular, Spain and Sweden, who were
reluctant to support sanctions in the past, were more
supportive because of recent gross human rights violations.

-------------------------
Middle East Peace Process
-------------------------

¶16. (S/NF) Audibert hailed U.S. efforts to reestablish peace
talks between Israel and the Palestinians. He asked pointedly
where the U.S. saw the process in the next six months, and how
to further involve Europe, especially regarding a possible
settlement. Notably, the French did not advocate for a Middle
East summit in Paris.

¶17. (U) Participants:

United States:

Department of State
William Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Phil Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs
Paul Jones, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan
Maureen Cormack, Director for Western Europe
Tamir Waser, Special Assistant to U/S Burns
Andrew Lorenz, Senior France Desk Officer

Department of Defense
Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Jim Townsend, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
European and NATO Policy
Andrew Winternitz, Deputy Director for European Policy

France:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jacques Audibert, Under Secretary for Political and Strategic
Affairs
Martin Briens, Deputy Assistant Secretary for nuclear
Nonproliferation
Nicolas Roche, Political Counselor, Embassy of France

Ministry of Defense
Michel Miraillet, Director for Strategic Affairs
Gen Gratien Maire, French Defense Attache to the U.S.
Gen Emmanuel de Romemont, Deputy Director for Disarmament and
Proliferation
Col Cyrille Claver, Deputy Director for European and NATO
Affairs
Col Frederic Pesme, Director for North America

18.This cable was cleared by U/S Burns and USD(P) Flournoy.
CLINTON


/tag/IR_0.html


72TEHRAN1164     1972-02-25 09:09     2010-11-28 18:06     UNCLASSIFIED     Embassy Tehran

R 250930Z FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7561
INFO SECDEF
EUCOM
CSAF

UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 1164

E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006
TAGS: MASS MARR IR
SUBJECT: ACCELERATION OF F-4ES FOR IRAN

REF: TEHRAN 1091: TEHRAN 263: MOSCOW 1603

COUNTRY TEAM. MESSAGE


BEGIN SUMMARY

GENERAL AZIMI, MINISTER OF WAR, ON INSTRUCTION OF SHAH ASKS THAT WE TAKE ANOTHER HARD LOOK AT F-4E PRODUCTION LINE IN ORDER ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF ONE SQUADRON OF F-4ES TO IRAN IN 1972. REQUEST REFLECTS SHAH'S INCREASING CONCERN OVER SOVIET AMBITIONS IN AREA AND ESPECIALLY THREAT SHAH SEES TO IRAN OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY UNDER CONSIDERATION BY IRAQ AND USSR. SHAH RECOGNIZES PROBLEMS THIS POSES FOR US BUT IS TURNING TO USG WITH THIS REQUEST TO GIVE IRAN HIGHER PRIORITY ON FA-4E PRODUCTION SCHEDULE BECAUSE HE REGARDS US AS MOST DEPENDABLE FRIEND. END SUMMARY

ACTION REQUESTED: COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDS US REVIEW F-4E PRODUCTION LINE AND RESPOND FAVORABLY TO SHAH'S REQUEST FOR 16 F-4ES IN 1972 FROM WHATEVER SOURCE MAY BE AVAILABLE.

¶1. ON FEB 24 CHARGE WAS CONVOKED BY MINSTER OF WAR, GEN. REZANUZIMI, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM SHAH. AZIMI SAID SHAH MOST DEEPLY CONCERNED AT TRENDS IN SECURITY SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST AND EXPECIALLY ON HIS WESTERN BORDERS. US OFFICALS ALREADY AWARE OF SHAH'S CONCERN THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER GOI OFFICIALS (SEE REFTELS), BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ SOVIET RELATIONS INCLUDING AGREEMENT TO DELIVER MORE MIGS AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT PLUS INDICATION THAT RECENT IRAQI-SOVIET TALKS IN MOSCOW INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY AS WELL AS INCREASED MILITARY COOPERATION INJECT NEW SENSE OF URGENCY IN SHAH'S TIMETABLE FOR MODERNINZING AND STRENTHENING HIS ARMED FORCES. MOST SPECIFICALLY, SITUATION REQUIRED IRAN ACCELERATE ITS MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND HOST PARTICULARLY DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT.

¶2. AZIMI RECALLED THAT GOI HAD REQUESTED DELIVERY OF 16 OF F-4E AIRCRAFT NOW ON ORDER BY IRAN (FIRST OF WHICH WAS NOT SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY UNTIL AUGUST 1973) BE ADVANCED TO CY 1972. HOWEVER, GOI HAD RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED BY USG AND MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS THAT PRODUCTION LINE FOR IRAN COULD NOT RPT NOT BE ADVANCED TO MEET 1972 DELIVERY DATES DESIRED. SHAH WAS MOST DISTURBED, AS ADDITION OF F-4ES IN 1972 WAS VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY AT THIS TIME. SHAH HAD DIRECTED THAT USG BE ASKED, IF PRODUCTION FOR IRAN COULD NOT IN FACT BE ADVANCED, TO MAKE REQUESTED F-4ES AVAILABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES. SHAH'S DESIRE IS FOR DELIIVERY OF F-4FS IN LOTS OF FOUR DURING JUNE TO DECEMBER TIME-FRAME.

¶3. CHARGE REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US-IRAN MILITARY COOPERATION, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT AND CREDIT, AND STRESSED THAT RECORD INDICATED WE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED SHAH'S CONCERNS AND DESIRES AND HAD BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY RESPONSIVE TO SHAH'S WISHES. CURRENTLY, AZIMI'S DEPUTY GEN. TOUFANS, WAS IN US DISCUSSING VERY QUESTION OF ACCLERATED EQUIPMENT ACQUISIION INCLUDING F-4E. ACCELERATION OF F-4E DELIVERY RAISED DIFFICULT TECHNICAL AND COST PROBLEMS AS WELL AS QUESTIONS OF OTHER COMMITMENTS AND PRIORITIES. UNDOUBTEDLY THESE ISSUES WERE BEING DISCUSSED IN FULL WITH GEN. TOUFANIAN TO ENSURE THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY INFORMED OF POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS AND REASONS FOR ANY LIMITATIONS ON MEETING GOI REQUEST THAT MIGHT EXIST. GEN. TOUFANIAN PROBABLY WOULD HAVE FULLER PICTURE OF SITUATION THAN WE NOW HAD IN IRAN.

¶4. AZIMI RESPONDED THAT GOI WAS BEING KEPT INFORMED OF TOUFANIAN DISCUSSIONS, BUT DECISON ON F-4E COULD NOT BE DELAYED. AZIMI MADE CLEAR SHAH FELT AQUISITION OF 16 F-4E AIRCRAFT IN 1972 WAS MOST IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE MILITARY PROBLEM OUTSTANDING. HE STRESSED SHAH BELIEVED THAT NUMBER REQUIRED WAS SMALL IN RELATION TO US INVENTORY, AND THAT UNSETTLED SITUATION CONFRONTING IRAN WARRANTED ACCELERATED DELIVERY TO IRAN AS AGAINST OTHER POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS (AS TO EUROPE OR EVEN USAF) IN SAME TIME FRAME.

¶5. CHARGE NOTED WE WOULD TRANSMIT SHAHS REQUEST TO, WASHINGTON AND THAT USG IN SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH MARKED OUR RELATIONS WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BE RESPONSIVE. CHARGE SAID THIS SAME FRIENDSHIP REQUIRED HIM TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT ALTHOUGH WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MEET SHAH'S NEEDS AS SHAH SAW THEM, OUR MILITARY ADVISERS, AS GOI KNEW, WERE CONCERNED THAT ACCELERATION OF AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION WOULD STRAIN SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL MANPOWER OF IIAF AND COULD LEAD TO DECREASE RATHER THAN INCREASE IN IIAF EFFECTIVENESS. AZIMI REPLIED THAT NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED HAD BEEN, CLOSELY STUDIED BY IlAF WITH MAAG ASSISTANCE, AND IIAF WAS SATISFIED THAT SIXTEEN AIRCRAFT REQUESTED COULD BE EFFECTIVELY INTEGRATED INTO PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE. AZIMI CLOSED MEETING BY ASKING THAT USG ANSWER SHAH'S REQUEST AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

¶6. COMMENT. SHAH IS DEEPLY CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS OVER PAST YEARS STRENGTHENING SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN MIDEAST AND INDIAN OCEAN AND APPEARING TO INDICATE SUBSTANTIALLY ENLARGED SOVIET COMMITMENT, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY, TO IRAQ. HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT INCREASED PRESENT DANGER REQIRES IRAN'S FIRST LINE AIR DEFENSE TO BE BEEFED-UP NOW RATHER THAN IN PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED SCHEDULE STARTING IN EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE NUMBER, FREQUENCY AND TONE OF DEMARCHES ON SUBJECT WE HAVE RECEIVED IS VIRTUALLY UNPARALLELLED, AND CAN LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT HIM CONSIDERS ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE.

¶7. WHETHER WE FULLY AGREE WITH SHAH'S CONCERN, WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT REQUEST --LIKE USG DECISION IN 1970 ON SALE TO IRAN OF SEVENTH AND EIGHTH SQUADRONS OF F-4E --HAS BECOME ANOTHER GUT ISSUE IN SHAH'S MIND. SHAH IS AGAIN TURNING TO USG BECAUSE IN PERIODS OF ANXIETY SHAH FEELS HE CAN LOOK TO US FOR COOPERATION AND HE HOPES THAT US AS RELIABLE FRIEND WILL FIND CHANCE BE RESPONSIVE ON MATTER HE CONSIDERS IMPORTANT AND VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY. THUS USG CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST MUST RECOGNIZE THAT DECISION INVOLVES UNUSUAL DEGREE OF POLITICAL IMPORTANCE RELATED TO FABRIC OF USG-GOI RELATIONS. DECISION SHOULD ALSO NOT OVERLOOK OR UNDERESTIMATE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN FOR VITAL US NATIONAL INTERESTS.

¶8. ACTION REQUESTED. COUNRY TEAM URGES THAT USG GIVE PROMPT AND SYMPATHETIC ATTENTION TO SHAH'S REQUEST FOR 1972 DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT, FROM WHATEVER SOURCES MAY BE AVAILABLE TO BE TAPPED (INCLUDING DELIVERIES TO USAF). WE RECOGNIZE THAT REQUEST MAY RAISE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, BUT URGE THAT EVERY AVENUE BE EXPLORED TO REACH POSITIVE RESPONSE. IT IS ALSO MOST IMPORTANT THAT COUNTRY TEAM BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS TO ENABLE US CONTINUE TO MEET AND TEMPER SENSE OF URGENCY ON SUBJECT WHICH PREVAILS WITHIN GOI. IF DELAYS OR BARRIERS TO FULLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE MATERIALIZE, WE TRUST THAT EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE (E.G. PARTIAL DELIVERY IN 1972) AND THAT PERSUASIVE RATIONALE CAN BE DEVELOPED TO FULLY EXPLAIN TO SHAH REASONS FOR ANY SHORTCOMING. IN ORDER TO DIMINISH AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE NEGATIVE IMPACT.

HECK


/tag/IR_0.html


79TEHRAN8980     1979-08-13 04:04     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Tehran

R 130458Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3182

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 08980

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/12/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR IR
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS

¶1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

¶2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE
EMBASSY HAS BEEN INVOLVED HERE, RANGING FROM COMPOUND
SECURITY TO VISA OPERATIONS TO GTE TO THE SHERRY CASE,
HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL SPECIAL FEATURES OF CONDUCTING
BUSINESS IN THE PERSIAN ENVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES
THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARE A PARTIAL
REFLECTION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION,
BUT WE BELIEVE THE UNDERLYING CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
QUALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE NATURE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES
ARE AND WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT. THEREFORE,
WE SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS BE USED TO BRIEF
BOTH USG PERSONNEL AND PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES
WHO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH AND IN THIS
COUNTRY. END INTRODUCTION.

¶3. PERHAPS THE SINGLE DOMINANT ASPECT OF THE PERSIAN
PSYCHE IS AN OVERRIDING EGOISM. ITS ANTECEDENTS LIE
IN THE LONG IRANIAN HISTORY OF INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY
WHICH PUT A PREMIUM ON SELF-PRESERVATION. THE PRACTICAL
EFFECT OF IT IS AN ALMOST TOTAL PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION
WITH SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR UNDERSTANDING POINTS
OF VIEW OTHER THAN ONE'S OWN. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IT
IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO AN IRANIAN THAT U.S. IMMIGRATION
LAW MAY PROHIBIT ISSUING HIM A TOURIST VISA WHEN HE HAS
DETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO LIVE IN CALIFORNIA.
SIMILARLY, THE IRANIAN CENTRAL BANK SEES NO INCONSISTENCY
IN CLAIMING FORCE MAJEURE TO AVOID PENALTIES FOR LATE
PAYMENT OF INTEREST DUE ON OUTSTANDING LOANS WHILE THE
GOVERNMENT OF WHICH IT IS A PART IS DENYING THE VAILIDITY
OF THE VERY GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE CLAIM IS MADE WHEN
CONFRONTED BY SIMILAR CLAIMS FROM FOREIGN FIRMS FORCED
TO CEASE OPERATIONS DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

¶4. THE REVERSE OF THIS PARTICULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL COIN,
AND HAVING THE SAME HISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOISM,
IS A PERVASIVE UNEASE ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WORLD IN
WHICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT
NOTHING IS PERMANENT AND IT IS COMMONLY PERCEIVED THAT
HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT EACH
INDIVIDUAL MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES
TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE MALEVOLENT FORCES THAT
WOULD OTHERWISE BE HIS UNDOING. HE IS OBVIOUSLY
JUSTIFIED IN USING ALMOST ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT
SUCH OPPORTUNITIES. THIS APPROACH UNDERLIES THE SOCALLED
"BAZAAR MENTALITY" SO COMMON AMONG PERSIANS, A
MIND-SET THAT OFTEN IGNORES LONGER TERM INTERESTS IN
FAVOR OF IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE ADVANTAGES AND COUNTENANCES
PRACTICES THAT ARE REGARDED AS UNETHICAL BY OTHER
NORMS. AN EXAMPLE IS THE SEEMINGLY SHORTSIGHTED AND
HARASSING TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE PGOI IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS
WITH GTE.

¶5. COUPLED WITH THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS IS A
GENERAL INCOMPREHENSION OF CASUALITY. ISLAM, WITH ITS
EMPHASIS ON THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD, APPEARS TO ACCOUNT
AT LEAST IN MAJOR PART FOR THIS PHENOMENON. SOMEWHAT
SURPRISINGLY, EVEN THOSE IRANIANS EDUCATED IN THE
WESTERN STYLE AND PERHAPS WITH LONG EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE
IRAN ITSELF FREQUENTLY HAVE DIFFICULTY GRASPING THE
INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF EVENTS. WITNESS A YAZDI RESISTING
THE IDEA THAT IRANIAN BEHAVIOR HAS CONSEQUENCES ON THE
PERCEPTION OF IRAN IN THE U.S. OR THAT THIS PERCEPTION
IS SOMEHOW RELATED TO AMERICAN POLICIES REGARDING
IRAN. THIS SAME QUALITY ALSO HELPS EXPLAIN PERSIAN
AVERSION TO ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONE'S OWN
ACTIONS. THE DEUS EX MACHINA IS ALWAYS AT WORK.

¶6. THE PERSIAN PROCLIVITY FOR ASSUMING THAT TO SAY
SOMETHING IS TO DO IT FURTHER COMPLICATES MATTERS.
AGAIN, YAZDI CAN EXPRESS SURPRISE WHEN INFORMED THAT THE
IRREGULAR SECURITY FORCES ASSIGNED TO THE EMBASSY REMAIN
IN PLACE. "BUT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TOLD ME THEY
WOULD GO BY MONDAY," HE SAYS. AN MFA OFFICIAL REPORTS
THAT THE SHERRY CASE IS "90 PERCENT SOLVED," BUT WHEN
A CONSULAR OFFICER INVESTIGATES HE DISCOVERS THAT NOTHING
HAS CHANGED. THERE IS NO RECOGNITION THAT INSTRUCTIONS
MUST BE FOLLOWED UP, THAT COMMITMENTS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED
BY ACTION AND RESULTS.

¶6. FINALLY, THERE ARE THE PERSIAN CONCEPTS OF INFLUENCE
AND OBLIGATION. EVERYONE PAYS OBEISANCE TO THE FORMER
AND THE LATTER IS USUALLY HONORED IN THE BREACH.
PERSIANS ARE CONSUMED WITH DEVELOPING PARTI BAZI--THE
INFLUENCE THAT WILL HELP GET THINGS DONE--WHILE FAVORS
ARE ONLY GRUDGINGLY BESTOWED AND THEN JUST TO THE
EXTENT THAT A TANGIBLE QUID PRO QUO IS IMMEDIATELY
PRECEPTIBLE. FORGET ABOUT ASSISTANCE PROFERRED LAST
YEAR OR EVEN LAST WEEK; WHAT CAN BE OFFERED TODAY?

¶7. THERE ARE SEVERAL LESSONS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD NEGOTIATE
WITH PERSIANS IN ALL THIS:

- --FIRST, ONE SHOULD NEVER ASSUME THAT HIS SIDE OF
THE ISSUE WILL BE RECOGNIZED, LET ALONE THAT IT WILL
BE CONCEDED TO HAVE MERITS. PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH
SELF PRECLUDES THIS. A NEGOTIATOR MUST FORCE RECOGNITION
OF HIS POSITION UPON HIS PERSIAN OPPOSITE NUMBER.

- --SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN IRANIAN READILY
TO PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGES OF A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP
BASED ON TRUST. HE WILL ASSUME THAT HIS OPPOSITE
NUMBER IS ESSENTIALLY AN ADVERSARY. IN DEALING WITH
HIM HE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS TO HIMSELF
THAT ARE IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE. HE WILL BE PREPARED
TO GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, INCLUDING
RUNNING THE RISK OF SO ALIENATING WHOEVER HE IS DEALING
WITH THAT FUTURE BUSINESS WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE, AT
LEAST TO THE LATTER.

- --THIRD, INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECTS
OF AN ISSUE MUST BE PAINSTAKINGLY, FORECEFULLY AND
REPEATEDLY DEVELOPED. LINKAGES WILL BE NEITHER READILY
COMPREHENDED NOR ACCEPTED BY PERSIAN NEGOTIATORS.

- --FOURTH, ONE SHOULD INSIST ON PERFORMANCE AS THE
SINE QUA NON AT ESH STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. STATEMENTS
OF INTENTION COUNT FOR ALMOST NOTHING.

- --FIFTH, CULTIVATION OF GOODWILL FOR GOODWILL'S SAKE
IS A WASTE OF EFFORT. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE AT ALL
TIMES SHOULD BE IMPRESSING UPON THE PERSIAN ACROSS THE
TABLE THE MUTUALITY OF THE PROPOSED UNDERTAKINGS, HE
MUST BE MADE TO KNOW THAT A QUID PRO QUO IS INVOLVED
ON BOTH SIDES.

- --FINALLY, ONE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE THREAT
OF BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT AND NOT
BE COWED BY THE POSSIBLITY. GIVEN THE PERSIAN
NEGOTIATOR'S CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS, HE
IS GOING TO RESIST THE VERY CONCEPT OF A RATIONAL
(FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW) NEGOTIATING PROCESS.


LAINGEN

CONFIDENTIAL


/tag/IR_0.html


05TELAVIV1593     2005-03-17 14:02     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001593

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KNNP EU IR IS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE
IRANIAN nuclear PROGRAM

REF: STATE 26053

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Israel sees Iran as the primary threat to
its security and sees the enrichment cycle as the "point of
no return" for Tehran's nuclear weapons program. The GOI
believes that diplomatic pressure with teeth, such as
sanctions, can affect Iranian behavior, and is lobbying the
EU-3 and IAEA on details of a permanent suspension agreement.
The Israelis support a unified international front but are
concerned that the USG may move toward the EU position.
Despite the GOI's focus on the diplomatic track, public and
private speculation about possible Israeli air strikes
continues. In weighing the military options, the GOI is
aware of significant differences from its successful strike
against Iraq's nuclear program in 1981, including an
uncertain and dispersed target set, the presence of coalition
forces in Iraq and the Gulf, Iranian capabilities to
retaliate through Hizballah and terrorism, and the changed
strategic environment. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------------------------- ----------
The Iranian Threat, "Point of No Return," and Timelines
--------------------------------------------- ----------

¶2. (S) PM Sharon calls Iran "the main threat to Israel" and
has recently expressed concern that some states are "getting
used to" the idea of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. Other
senior Israeli officials echo this, cautioning that Tehran's
nuclear weapons program poses what Mossad Chief Meir Dagan
calls an "existential threat" that alters the strategic
balance in the region.

¶3. (C) In a meeting with congressional visitors in December,
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described operation of the
enrichment cycle as the "point of no return" for the Iranian
program, a view shared by many senior GOI officials. Mossad
Chief Dagan went a step further, saying that the Iranian
program will be unstoppable once it no longer requires
outside assistance to complete the enrichment process. At
the technical level, the director for external affairs at the
Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) told poloff that the
critical step would be Iran's operation of a centrifuge
enrichment cascade.

¶4. (S) GOI officials have given different timelines for when
they believe Iran will have full enrichment capability. In
February, PM Sharon told the Secretary that he believes there
is still time remaining to pressure Iran, but that the window
of opportunity is closing quickly. DefMin Mofaz cautioned
that Iran is "less than one year away," while the head of
research in military intelligence estimated that Iran would
reach this point by early 2007. Technical experts at the
IAEC predicted that Iran would have enrichment capability
within six months of the end of the suspension agreement. A
few GOI officials admitted informally that these estimates
need to be taken with caution. The head of the MFA's
strategic affairs division recalled that GOI assessments from
1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998
at the latest.

--------------------------------------------
Focus on Diplomacy and Concern with the EU-3
--------------------------------------------

¶5. (S) In the near term, Israel is focused on maintaining
diplomatic pressure on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and
EU-3. Sharon defines diplomatic pressure to include UNSC
sanctions, e.g. on Iran's airlines and trade, as noted below.
President Katsav has said that Tehran is "very conscious of
international opinion." Other MFA and NSC officials point to
the current suspension and to Iranian reaction to the Mykonos
case as proof that diplomatic pressure can affect
decision-making in Tehran.

¶6. (S) The Israelis often express disappointment with EU-3
efforts, but see no real alternative at this time. PM Sharon
told reporters on March 10 that Iran uses the negotiations to
"play for time." In private, Sharon, his Cabinet, and
military leaders have all complained that the Europeans are
"too soft." Similarly, President Katsav has cautioned that
Iran will "cheat" on any commitments it makes. MFA staff
told poloff that they do not believe that the EU-3 effort
will be successful in obtaining a permanent suspension or
that the Europeans will support effective sanctions against
Iran.

¶7. (C) GOI technical experts said they have been lobbying the
Europeans and IAEA on several issues. First, the GOI would
like a clearer and more detailed listing of all activities
covered by the suspension, along with timelines for each
step. Second, they want more robust verification measures
and greater focus on Iran's denial of access to IAEA
inspectors. Third, the Israelis insist that any final
agreement must be endorsed by the UNSC to ensure that
noncompliance will be dealt with at an appropriate level.
Fourth, Israel is pushing the EU-3 to define benchmarks that
would signal a failure of the process, and to identify the
concrete consequences of such failure.

¶8. (C) According to the IAEC, the GOI has urged the Europeans
to examine bilateral or EU sanctions with small, but
noticeable, economic impacts. After telling the press on
March 10 that "it would probably not be advisable to impose
an oil embargo on Iran," PM Sharon advocated trade and flight
restrictions. Lower-level GOI officials said these steps
could include restrictions on Iranians studying in Europe,
limitations on travel by Iranian scientific personnel, and
suspension of landing privileges for Iranian airlines within
the EU. The goal, according to the deputy NSA for foreign
affairs, is unified pressure from the EU, Russia, and U.S.
for a "complete, full, verifiable cessation of the fuel cycle
program." In the short term, this means a full suspension of
all enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water-reactor
construction, and related R&D activities.

--------------------------------------------- --
Israeli Preference for USG and UNSC Involvement
--------------------------------------------- --

¶9. (C) In light of their uneasiness with EU-3 efforts, the
Israelis are hoping for robust U.S. involvement and action by
the UNSC. PM Sharon has urged the EU-3 to continue its
efforts, but also stressed the importance of preparing to
take Iran to the UNSC. In a meeting with a CoDel on December
12, DefMin Mofaz pushed for the U.S. to take the lead with
the Europeans and pursue all diplomatic solutions, including
sanctions. President Katsav asked the Secretary not to "wait
for the Europeans."

¶10. (C) This desire for U.S. activity is amplified by the
extremely limited options open to Israel on the diplomatic
front. The IAEC's director for non-proliferation admitted
that the GOI sees "little we can do" to increase pressure on
Iran as long as Tehran abides by the suspension agreement.
The MFA's office director for the Gulf states said that
Israel would maintain its low-profile diplomatic activities,
such as supplying IAEA members with intelligence material
related to the Iranian program. She said the MFA believes
that any overt Israeli pressure would backfire, leading to a
surge of Arab support for Iran and focusing attention on
Israel's own nuclear activities.

¶11. (C) Following the recent announcements on Iran by the
President and the Secretary, several Israeli officials asked
if the USG is shifting its policy on Iran. The deputy NSA
for foreign affairs acknowledged that the U.S. move is
probably necessary to build international consensus for
taking Iran to the UNSC. At the same time, he expressed
concern that the USG would be influenced by what he called
the EU's habit of granting concessions to Iran prior to full
compliance. Mid-level staffers at the NSC and IAEC were also
disquieted by U.S. press reports claiming that the USG is
re-examining its position on Hizballah.

------------------------------------------
The Military Option: Bushehr is not Osirak
------------------------------------------

¶12. (S) Despite frustrations with diplomatic efforts, Israeli
officials are understandably reluctant to discuss possible
military options. In public, PM Sharon has stressed the
importance of the "political and economic" track. During a
recent discussion with a visiting USG official, IDF Deputy
Chief of Staff (and CoS-designate) Major General Dani Haloutz
similarly said "we don't want to go there." In February,
President Katsav told the Secretary that "the military option
is not necessary -- bring the issue to the Security Council."

¶13. (S) Public speculation about possible military strikes
usually focuses on the differences from the Israeli Air
Force's attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. In private,
GOI officials have acknowledged that several factors would
make any attack against Iran a much more difficult mission.
A senior military intelligence official told the Embassy that
the GOI does not know where all of the targets are located
and said that any attack would only delay, not end, the
Iranian program. The MFA's office director for the Gulf
states noted that potential target sites are well dispersed
throughout the country, with several located in built-up
civilian areas. The IAEC stressed the importance of Russian
assistance in restraining Iran's nuclear ambitions and said
that any attack on Bushehr would likely result in Russian
casualties and endanger Moscow's cooperation.

¶14. (C) MFA contacts said that the distance to the targets
and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the Gulf raise
additional complications. An Israeli assault would
necessitate prior coordination with coalition forces in Iraq,
they maintained, leaving the USG open to retaliation
throughout the Islamic world, especially in Iraq. MFA and
NSC officials acknowledged that any attack would also elicit
a strong response from Arab states and the Palestinians,
effectively freezing the peace process.

¶15. (C) The Israelis realize that Iran would use any military
strike as an excuse to cease cooperation with the EU-3 and
the IAEA. In addition, the GOI is acutely aware of Iran's
ability to retaliate, both militarily and through attacks by
its regional surrogates. PM Sharon has claimed that
Hizballah has 11,000 rockets (and possibly UAVs) capable of
reaching Israel from launching sites in Lebanon. The MFA's
office director for the Gulf states said that she believed
that Iran would retaliate by inciting terrorist groups in
Israel and the Occupied Territories.

¶16. (C) Current USG, EU-3, and IAEA focus on Iran also
creates a situation that differs from 1981, when the Israelis
felt that the international community was ignoring the Iraqi
threat. Israelis hope that the others will solve the Iranian
problem for them, or as Vice PM Shimon Peres has said, "I do
not think that the matter of Iran needs to be turned into an
Israeli problem -- it is a matter of concern for the whole
world."

--------------------------------------------- --
Comment: Diplomatic Solution Preferred, but ...
--------------------------------------------- --

¶17. (S) COMMENT: The Israelis are focusing on diplomatic
channels in the IAEA and EU-3, and appear to have very real
concerns about the feasibility of military strikes against
the Iranian nuclear program. Nevertheless, the GOI has shown
time and again that it will act militarily if it believes
that its security is threatened, and the IDF is most
certainly keeping contingency plans up to date. The Israeli
press reported that in February PM Sharon's Security Cabinet
had given "initial authorization" for an attack on Iran. The
press reports cited an unnamed "Israeli security source," who
claimed that the USG would "authorize" an Israeli attack.
Post notes that it may not be possible to detect preparations
for any military strike. Air defense operations would pose
nearly perfect cover for civil defense and Air Force
activities preceding any attack. Due to both the extreme
sensitivity of the issue and the GOI's near inability to
prevent leaks, any attack order would be closely held,
probably even from many members of PM Sharon's Cabinet.

¶18. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The GOI knows that we share its
interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, we should expect continued Israeli lobbying at
the highest levels urging the USG to ensure that the EU-3
effort is on track and backed by a solid international front.
We will also hear Israeli concerns that the U.S. position
may move toward the EU stance. At the same time, we should
recognize that Israeli intelligence briefings will
understandably focus on worst-case scenarios and may not
match current USG assessments.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
KURTZER


/tag/IR_0.html


05ABUDHABI2178     2005-05-16 09:09     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Abu Dhabi

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002178

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS PHUM ELAB IR IZ XF SA PK FR TC
SUBJECT: MBZ ON IRAQ, IRAN, PAKISTAN

REF: ABU DHABI 1008

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison.
For reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d).

¶1. (U) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed,s weekly
Sunday "VIP Majlis" provided an excellent opportunity for a
visiting National Defense University delegation to observe
first-hand the UAEG,s informal consultative process. MbZ,
brothers MinState Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan and Interior
Minister Sheikh Saif, and Labor Minister al Ka'abi were
joined by several dozen prominent Abu Dhabi officials and
businessmen for the weekly gathering at Bateen Palace.

NDU
---

¶2. (U) NDU President Lt. Gen. Dunn and National War College
Deputy Commandant Ambassador Wahba briefed MbZ on several new
NDU initiatives, including opportunities for UAE students in
the Information Resources Management College program, which
emphasizes threats, vulnerabilities, and risks in a
net-centric environment. Ambassador Sison praised the UAE's
selection of NDU candidates, noting that several were serving
in key positions today: GHQ Armed Forces Deputy Chief of
Staff MG Mohammed Hilal al-Kaabi, GHQ Director of General
Procurement Obaid Al Ketbi, Deputy Commander UAE Air Force
Brigadier Ali, and MbZ's aide Yousef al Otaiba had all
benefited from NDU programs.

Iraq
------

¶3. (C) Ambassador Sison noted that day's visit to Iraq by
Secretary Rice, highlighting the Secretary's encouragement

SIPDIS
for continued momentum in the political process and her
meetings with PM al-Jaafari and KDP leader Barzani. MbZ
voiced disdain for al-Jaafari, citing (again) his concerns
over the Prime Minister's ties to Iran. These concerns were
aimed at Jaafari's Dawaa Party colleagues, as well. While
agreeing that it was important for Iraq's Sunni Arabs to be
more involved in the political process and in drafting the
constitution, MbZ complained that "there wasn't one
worthwhile Sunni" on the scene. He criticized new Sunni
Defense Minister Dulaimi as being "in it for himself." Nor
did MbZ have anything good to say about former Iraqi Finance
Minister Mahdi's nomination as one of two Vice Presidents,
complaining that Mahdi "did not work for the people of Iraq."
Nonetheless, MbZ said he agreed with the USG's efforts to
encourage the various Iraqi factions to work together. The
UAE would continue to help train Iraqi police forces at the
UAE's police academy in Al Ain and provide reconstruction
assistance. It was important for the region as a whole that
the U.S. and its allies "got it right" in Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
and Egypt, he underscored. (Note: MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba
had a few days earlier shared with Ambassador concerns passed
by former PM Allawi that Dulaimi was "devious," "bad news,"
"very close" to Iranian intelligence, and had been introduced
to the Iranians by Chalabi. Yousef had also noted the
UAEG,s impression Mahdi had not always been a "team player"
in the government of former PM Allawi. End note.)

Iran
----

¶4. (S) Turning to Iran, MbZ voiced certainty that the EU-3
efforts with Iran would break down and that Iran would resume
its nuclear activities ) if it had not already done so.
Repeating concerns first voiced to us in February (reftel),
MbZ appeared convinced that it was only a matter of time
before Israel or the U.S. would strike Iranian nuclear
facility targets. U.S. installations in the Gulf could be
targeted by Iran in the aftermath of such an action, he
warned. MbZ agreed with the USG,s tough line with Tehran
and the Europeans. A nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize
the Gulf region and possibly allow terrorist access to WMD.
MbZ asked Lt. Gen. Dunn whether it would be possible for
&anyone8 to "take out" all locations of concern in Iran via
air power; Lt. Gen. Dunn voiced doubt that this would be
possible given the dispersed locations. "Then it will take
ground forces!" MbZ exclaimed. Ambassador noted that the
UAE's Director of Military Intelligence, BG Essa al Mazrouei,
would pay counterpart visits this week to CENTCOM, J-2, DIA,
and CIA for discussions on Iran and Iraq-related matters.
MbZ said he looked forward to sharing "contingency planning"
scenarios in future conversations.

Pakistan
--------

¶5. (C) Ambassador asked about MbZ's visit the week before to
Lahore to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf. MbZ
chuckled and asked why the USG "always" convinced the
Pakistanis to delay news of the capture of senior Al Qaeda
operatives such as Abu Faraj al Libbi. MbZ went on to
congratulate Washington for its decision to allow U.S. firms
to bid for contracts to provide F-16s and other defense
technology to Pakistan. It was important to support
Musharraf as he battled the terrorists, he emphasized. While
the Indians had and would continue to balk at the decision,
the region needed Musharraf to stay strong. There was no
alternative leader in sight, MbZ opined. Besides, he
continued, the F-16 decision would not tip the military
balance between India and Pakistan. Even if it had, India's
strength as a stable democracy would ensure that it would not
ever be in as "risky" a situation as its neighbor. MbZ then
slapped his knee and said "you,ll never guess what Musharraf
asked me...he asked me whether the UAE had received approval
for the Predator!" (Note: the USG's inability to meet the
UAE's request for an armed Predator remains a sore point for
MbZ, although he has not directly raised the issue with us
for some time.)

Gyrocopter, GAWC
----------------

¶6. (SBU) MbZ also referred to his interest in exploring
selling the UAE's "gyrocopter" (a helicopter-supported UAV
co-developed with Austrian company Schiebel) to the U.S. Air
Force, an idea he first floated during Gen. Moseley,s visit
for the May 3 F-16 ceremony. MbZ noted that his aide would
pass detailed gyrocopter specifications to the Embassy this
week. (Note: We will be exploring this initiative with
CENTAF and CENTCOM in relation to force protection aerial
surveillance system needs at Al Dhafra airbase for the 380 th
Air Expeditionary Wing. End note.)

¶7. (C) Lt. Gen. Dunn complimented MbZ on the Gulf Air
Warfare Center (GAWC), which he and the NDU group had toured
that morning. MbZ expressed satisfaction over the
relationship between the UAE and U.S. Air Forces, but
expressed disappointment that more GCC countries had not
joined recent GAWC classes. Ambassador noted the recent
robust participation by Saudi Arabia in the GAWC's fourth
class, which had included six Saudi F-15s and two young
pilots who were also members of the Saudi royal family. MbZ
asked whether the two high-ranking Saudis had actually
completed all requirements for graduation or had been "passed
through." Ambassador confirmed that they had completed all
course requirements. MbZ commented that "the real reason"
the Saudis had turned out for the GAWC class had been "to see
what the UAE was up to" with the F-16 Block 60 and other
procurement successes. Although Egypt and Jordan wished to
join in the next GAWC class, MbZ added, they also wanted the
UAE Air Force to pay fuel costs. MbZ said he had asked both
countries "to go talk to ADNOC," the state-owned Abu Dhabi
National Oil Company.

France
------

¶8. (U) MbZ noted that he would travel to Paris June 18-20 to
meet with President Chirac, recalling that he had canceled
his trip to France at the last minute in mid-January.

Camel Jockeys
-------------

¶9. (SBU) On the margins of the MbZ conversation, Ambassador
thanked Interior Minister Sheikh Saif for his assistance the
week before in allowing G/TIP visitor Feleke Assefa access to
camel jockey rehabilitation and social support centers.
Ambassador noted that a Tier 3 ranking remained a possibility
despite the UAEG,s vigorous efforts since mid-March with
UNICEF, IOM, and others. A trafficking in persons
reassessment would take place in August, she noted, and it
was important for the UAE to continue the good work it was
doing in solving the problem. MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba
promised to forward a copy of the UAE-UNICEF TIP implementing
agreement and budget. (Note: he has done so; we have
forwarded the document electronically to G/TIP and NEA/ARPI.
End note.)

Labor and the FTA
-----------------

¶10. (SBU) Labor Minister al Ka'abi noted he had received
reports that the U.S. and UAE sides had moved closer on the
text of the labor chapter of the FTA during the last day of
negotiations. He reiterated the UAEG,s concern that it
receive some recognition of its unique demographic situation,
as only 15 percent of the population held Emirati
citizenship.
SISON


/tag/IR_0.html


06ABUDHABI1725     2006-04-29 13:01     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Abu Dhabi

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001725

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR S/CT - AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016
TAGS: PTER PINS ASEC EPET MCAP IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR
CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO THE UAE

REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243
¶B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565
¶C. ABU DHABI 409
¶D. ABU DHABI 779
¶E. ABU DHABI 1228
¶F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL)
¶G. ABU DHABI 176
¶H. ABU DHABI 605
¶I. USDEL 00007
¶J. ABU DHABI 1123
¶K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL)
¶L. ABU DHABI 1520
¶M. ABU DHABI 1716
¶N. ABU DHABI 1422
¶O. ABU DHABI 1724

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming
you to the UAE on May 7. U.S. and UAE officials have had a
number of productive meetings on the topic of
counterterrorism, the most recent of which came on April 22,
when Fran Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, met over lunch with Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) and his brother,
Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ). Your visit
builds on our ongoing dialogue and efforts to push the UAE on
several areas of interest to the USG: counterterrorism,
counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq, and ideological
extremism (each is covered in the scenesetter). We have
requested separate meetings with Foreign Minister Sheikh
Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ), whom you met in New York last
September, and State Security Director Sheikh Hazza bin
Zayed, whom Deputy Coordinator Urbancic met last October. In
your meetings, you should commend the UAE for its assistance
and cooperation, including its strong condemnation of the
April 24 bomb attack in Dahab. The UAE remains a committed
partner in the global war on terror, but it continues to take
an ad hoc approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the
problem for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a
transnational basis. In January, the U.S. and the UAE held
the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating
Committee (JTFCC). Treasury U/S Levey is currently in the
UAE to hold a second meeting that will focus on cash couriers
and charities.

¶2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most
serious threats to national security, UAE officials are
reluctant to take actions that could provoke their neighbor
and compromise their extensive trading relationship. At the
same time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of
the UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As tensions escalate
between Iran and the international community, the UAE is
growing increasingly nervous. The UAE leadership, which has
told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization, plans
to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
to the Palestinian people. The UAE has taken an active role
in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political
process and continues to condemn the sectarian violence that
is preventing stabilization of the country. In the face of
growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE leadership
is politically determined not to allow Islamist extremists to
gain a foothold on UAE soil. End Summary.

Counterterrorism Efforts
------------------------

¶3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the
UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for
reducing its vulnerability (ref A). The UAE considers
homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than
prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have
focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees,
and procuring equipment. In your meetings, we recommend that
you inquire about the government's plan, announced by
President Khalifa in December 2005, to place all the security
agencies under a newly established National Security Council.
MbZ, asked by Townsend if the UAE was worried about its oil
infrastructure, responded emphatically, "absolutely." He
told Townsend that there are three international companies
currently conducting risk assessments of the UAE oil
infrastructure and maritime security for the UAEG. Townsend
offered U.S. assistance in helping the UAE to reduce its
vulnerability (ref O).

¶4. (S) The UAEG reacts quickly when presented with evidence
of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not approach
the problem from a transnational posture. The UAE's
immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport
them. UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far
the problem goes or whether there is an international network
involved. Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation
is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on
specific cases), Emiratis do not consistently share lead
information found in the possession of individuals in their
custody with each other or with the U.S. Government. These
tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services'
ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and
planned attacks. The UAE's insistence on deportation as a
solution does not protect the country long-term or truly
address the nature and scope of the problem. Townsend
discussed this matter with MbZ and urged the UAE to instead
to fully investigate terror suspects and share the results of
those inquiries with the USG.
Counterterrorism Finance
------------------------

¶5. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the
financial sector against money laundering and terrorist
financing (ref B). Although the UAE now has a strong legal
framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement.
It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and
prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering,
cash courier, and charity laws and regulations. To date,
investigation and prosecution have been weak. In an effort
to increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing,
the
first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance
Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on
January 24, 2005 (ref C). The UAE team had representatives
from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of
Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. However, no one
participated from Dubai. In order for the JTFCC to be an
effective committee, Dubai's Police, State Security, Customs,
and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must
participate. The April 30 meeting will focus on cash
couriers and charity regulations.

Iran
----

¶6. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating
tensions between Iran and the international community. AbZ
publicly expressed his country's concern, and the entire
region's "vulnerability," at a press conference in Kuwait
April 25, while urging a peaceful resolution (ref M).
Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai
is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result
the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and
encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected
Iranian proliferation activities. Although the UAEG is
worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy
decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its
neighbor. The USG has approached the UAEG four times since
January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected
of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs. None of
those instances has resulted in a successful interdiction.
In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to
take action (refs F and G). The Director of Dubai's State
Security Organization explained during the 11 February
U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the
decision not to inspect the containers had been a political
decision based on the UAE's concern that Iran might retaliate
(ref H). In the two later instances (ref K), ships that had
been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar
Abbas. AbZ told U/S Joseph during his April 8 visit to Abu
Dhabi that the USG should approach the UAE on interdiction
requests "only as a last resort" (ref N). Two weeks later,
he assured Townsend that the UAEG does not want Iran to take
advantage of the UAE's open trading environment. He said the
UAE was in the final stages of ratifying its export control
law and that it would be announced "soon." In an encouraging
development, the UAE on April 15 privately endorsed the
Proliferation Security Initiative's Statement of Interdiction
Principles (ref L).

¶7. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, Abu
Dhabi's ruling family has expressed clear support for U.S.
initiatives against Iran. The U.S. and UAE have a "common
desire to succeed," AbZ told U/S Joseph, noting that the
combination of Iran and terrorism is something that cannot be
tolerated. "The threat from al-Qa'ida would be minor if Iran
has nukes," AbZ said (ref N). MbZ told Townsend April 22
that the Iranians think that the U.S. will not do anything
about their recent declaration that they have successfully
enriched uranium. He added that he thought the Iranians were
wrong. MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23
about the need to counter Iran's growing influence in the
region and its nuclear ambitions, although they specified
that any sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership,
not the Iranian people (ref I). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28
that he did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before
proceeding with any U.S. plans against Iran (ref E). He told
A/S Welch that the UAE would prepare a paper responding to
USG concerns about Iran and mechanisms for addressing the
challenge posed by Iran. In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM
Commander General Abizaid, MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat
with a greater sense of urgency. He was strongly in favor of
taking action against Iran and its president sooner rather
than later. "I believe this guy is going to take us to war.
... It's a matter of time," MbZ warned, adding that action
against Iran and President Ahmedinejad should be taken this
year or next year.

¶8. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the
Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting
the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this
should not be considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that
Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international
terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their
financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship
between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was
also of concern, as was Iran's attempts to expand its
influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. MbZ also
expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah
was supporting Hamas. During your meetings, you should
explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the
United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to
isolate Iran--regardless of potential economic backlash. You
should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely
with the USG on interdiction requests. These meetings will
be a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with AbZ
April 8, when Joseph outlined the USG's policy priorities for
Iran. (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for U.S.
initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should come
to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve
something without involving the UAE, please do so." End
Note.)

Palestinian Territories/Hamas
-----------------------------

¶9. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a
terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas
unless they denounce violence (refs D and E). However, after
Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on
March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs
Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha'ali, Meshaal publicly claimed
that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial
assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J).
MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to
come, but that "officially, we don't recognize Khaled
Meshaal." MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime
Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the
Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is
"going to the right people." In his meeting with Townsend,
MbZ said that the UAE "felt the Muslim Brotherhood rally
behind Hamas" after its electoral victory in the Palestinian
territories, and that the Hamas victory should be a lesson to
the West. UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of optimism when he told
Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas, "with some pressure,"

SIPDIS
would understand the need to respect the will of the
international community.

¶10. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant
financial assistance to the Palestinian people. Typically,
the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through
charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the
UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the
Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March
2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries. In the wake of the Hamas
electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor
their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
(including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex
that was announced last year).

¶11. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD
Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a
negative side to the Hamas election win. On the negative
side, he cited Hamas' position with regard to Israel, and
their violent agenda. On the positive side, Hazza noted the
fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the
international community. He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat
posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hazza also asked A/S Welch
how the USG would react to those countries that did support
the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of
U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations.
A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing
that no money should go to the government unless Hamas
renounced violence and accepted Israel. A/S Welch also told
Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other
Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas
government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show
accountability. MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from
"official and private contributions" from Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar. MbZ said it was "easy to take $1 million
in a suitcase" to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers.

Iraq
----

¶12. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues
to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and
other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The UAE has also
been a helpful supporter of Iraq's burgeoning political
process. It has worked with Iraqi political and religious
figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has
consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions
about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq. The UAE has
publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence
in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the
al-Askariya Shrine. MbZ told Townsend that he had "no
confidence" in the new Iraqi Prime Minister-designate, Jawad
al-Maliki, and he reiterated his concern about Iran's
meddling in Iraq's internal affairs. He has pledged the
UAE's support to the fight against al-Qaida.

Ideological Extremism
---------------------

¶13. (S) The Abu Dhabi ruling family continue to be outspoken
on the issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to
the region. MbZ told Townsend that if there were an election
in Dubai tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over.
He said the challenge is to find a way to remove the
extremists in a way that they never come back. One way he
and his brothers have been trying to accomplish this is by
reforming the education system, which they say was penetrated
by the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1960s. (Note: The UAE
has announced that half of the members of the Federal
National Council would be elected while half would continue
to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates.
Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other
Gulf states in terms of democratization. End Note.) UAE
officials publicly and strongly condemn extremism and
terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has been the focus of
government-approved Friday sermons in the mosques.
SISON


/tag/IR_0.html


07DUBAI59     2007-01-28 08:08     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Consulate Dubai

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FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
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INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 2084
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RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 8134

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBAI 000059

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS MARR AE IR IS LE
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JANUARY 23 MEETING WITH UAE VICE
PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER AND DUBAI RULER MOHAMMED BIN RASHID AL
MAKTOUM

REF: DUBAI 00018

DUBAI 00000059 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Paul R Sutphin, Consul General, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)



1.(C) Summary: In a January 23 meeting in Dubai with U/S Burns,
UAE Vice President, Prime Minister and Dubai Ruler Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum (MbR) expressed concern about the
potential negative impact on Dubai of possible future UN
sanctions against Iran; he urged the quiet US-UAE cooperation on
financial and export control restrictions against Iran, offering
to set up a "joint committee" to this end. He agreed that Iran
should not have nuclear weapons, but warned of the dire regional
consequences of military action. U/S Burns said the US would
protect its interests in the region and support Gulf governments
in resisting efforts by Iran to dominate the region. He
emphasized the importance of continued support for the Siniora
government in Lebanon, and the high priority the US put on a
renewed effort to move the Israelis and Palestinians toward
peace. U/S Burns raised the case of Amcit Vafa Valapour, which
has been under criminal investigation in Dubai for nearly 16
months without charges before a court(although under the local
system police charges have been filed); MbR asked his aides to
ensure the case moved forward as rapidly and transparently as
possible End Summary.

2.(C) On January 23, U/S for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns
met with MbR for one hour in MbR's downtown office. Burns was
accompanied by NEA PDAS Jim Jeffrey, the Ambassador, the Consul
General, P Staff assistant Herro Mustafa and ConGen notetaker.
MbR was accompanied by his sons Sheikh Hamdan (who chairs the
Dubai Executive Council, the Emirate's governing body) and
Sheikh Mayed; Minister for Cabinet Affairs (and Dubai Holdings
head) Mohammed Gergawi; federal Minister for Education Dr. Hanif
al Qasimi; Dubai General Security Service head Brigadier
Mohammed al Qemzi; Dubai World head Sultan bin Sulayem; and
Emirates Airlines chairman and Dubai Civil Aviation head Sheikh
Ahmed bin Sayed al Maktoum. U/S Burns expressed admiration for
the Dubai's rapid development, hailing it as an open and
productive model that was now being emulated throughout the
region.

3.(C) Lebanon: U/S Burns conveyed the gratitude of the Lebanese
government for financial and other assistance from the UAE. MbR
said the UAE understands that the Siniora government needs
regional support. U/S Burns urged continued assistance, noting
the US will soon offer the Siniora government $1 billion for
security and reconstruction efforts.

4.(C) Iran sanctions: U/S Burns highlighted the significance of
the June 2006 international offer to negotiate with Iran to
resolve the nuclear issue--the first official US offer to
negotiate with Tehran in 27 years. Tehran had rejected this
broadly-supported, reasonable proposal, which offered economic
incentives such as sanctions relief and the sale of civilian
airliners in addition to negotiations. U/S Burns said that the
UNSCR 1737's limited sanctions were a first step to pressure
Iran to compromise, but that absent Iranian movement another,
more restrictive, sanctions resolution is likely in February.
The US was also taking bilateral action through Treasury
designations against Iranian banks that were funding terrorism.

5.(C) MbR expressed willingness to cooperate in financial
restrictions against Iran, but urged that the cooperation be
conducted quietly; he offered to set up a "joint committee" to
do so (he did not offer details); he later repeated this offer
with regard to military transfers (see para 8). He voiced
concern regarding the potential negative impact of economic
sanctions on Dubai, and against the "good Iranians" -- including
Dubai's estimated 350,000 Iranians residents. U/S Burns and
Ambassador Sison expressed readiness to engage with Dubai on
financial cooperation against Iran. (Note: the number of
resident Iranians was supplied by Al Qemzi, and is higher that
the 200-300 thousand usual cited by the Dubai officials.)

6.(C) Iran and Gulf Security: U/S Burns stated that the US will
protect its interests and support its allies, like the UAE, in
the face of Iranian attempts to dominate the Gulf. This is why
we have stationed a second carrier battle group there, and have
detained Iranian agents in Iraq who were providing arms and bomb
components used to kill US troops. MbR stated that the UAE does
not want Iran to have nuclear weapons, and urged continued
international pressure on Iran, but expressed deep concern about
the destabilizing consequences to the UAE and to region of a
military strike. He urged that the US find a way to stop or
disarm Iran without using military force. U/S Burns reiterated

DUBAI 00000059 002.2 OF 002


that the US wants a diplomatic solution, and is working with the
UN and its allies toward this end; strong UAE support was
important to this effort.

7.(C) MbR expressed hope for change inside Iran, which U/S Burns
echoed. Burns noted the US wants to support the influence of
moderate Iranians and encourage Iran to engage in negotiations.
Minister Gergawi mentioned rumors that Supreme leader Khamenei
is suffering from prostate cancer. Gergawi opined that the
merchant class in Iran has been pressuring Ahmadinejad over his
failing economic policy. He asserted that the growing sectarian
conflict in Iraq, as well as the hanging of Saddam Hussein
(which, he implied, was inspired by Iranian pressure), have now
undermined the possibility of a regional alliance between
extremist Sunnis and Shia. Regional Sunnis now blame Iran for
instability in Lebanon and Iraq. (Note: Gergawi's family is of
Iranian origin, and he acts as one of MbR's principal advisors
on Iran.)

8.(C) Security cooperation: U/S Burns called the Gulf
Cooperation Council a good forum for quiet security cooperation,
and reiterated that the US seeks a close, productive dialogue
with the UAE on Gulf security. The US opposes arms sales to
Iran and will urge its partners in the European Union, Russia
and the Middle East to cooperate on this front. MbR reiterated
his offer to set up a committee to cooperate on these issues.

9.(C) Israel/Palestinians: U/S Burns stressed that the US
believes progress between Israel and the Palestinians toward
peace is central to regional stability, and supports the
creation of a Palestinian state. This would be "the best
thing," MbR replied; a peace deal would make radical groups like
HAMAS "everyone's enemy". Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
should be supported, particularly since HAMAS is funded by Iran.
MbR noted UAE assistance was again flowing to the Palestinians,
although it had been suspended for a time because of corruption
concerns. U/S Burns said the US is careful to ensure its
assistance is going to the Palestinian people, rather than the
HAMAS government, and is confident in the assistance mechanisms
now in place.

10.(C) Valapour case: U/S Burns raised the case of Amcit Vafa
Valapour, who has been under criminal investigation in Dubai for
nearly 16 months. U/S Burns said the US sought return of
Valapour's passport, which has been held by the Dubai police.
He underscored that, while he was taking no substantive position
on the merits of the case, the US believes the case should move
forward with due process as quickly as possible. MbR was
unfamiliar with the case, and turned to Gergawi for background.
Gergawi outlined the Dubai government view of the case, saying
the bottom line is that Valapour and his non-USC partners had
profited from insider information in a deal on the Dubai Metro
project with a corrupt Dubai official. "We don't tolerate
corruption," Gergawi concluded. The Consul General noted that
he had recently met with the Dubai Attorney General (reftel) on
the case. The AG had agreed to meet with Valapour's US and
Emirati representatives to help to resolve the issue. MbR asked
his aides to ensure the case moved forward as quickly and
transparently as possible, and promised Valapour would receive
fair treatment.

11.(C) Afghanistan: U/S Burns expressed appreciation for UAE
assistance in Afghanistan, and urged support for the Karzai
government. MbR asserted the UAE and US are partners against
drugs, money laundering, and terrorism and in Afghanistan. He
said the best weapon against the Taliban was economic
investment. U/S Burns outlined ongoing reconstruction efforts,
and noted the difficulty of creating economically viable
substitutes for drug crops. MbR said Karzai is reluctant to
tackle the drug issue because he fears decreased support in the
provinces.

12.(C) Comment: MbR offered little new, other than his somewhat
vague offer to create a bilateral committee to address financial
and arms/technology flows to Iran. He is clearly concerned
regarding the prospect of more comprehensive UN economic
sanctions, given that Iran is Dubai's largest trading partner,
an assertion often cited by Dubai officials (although good
Dubai/Iran trade numbers are hard to come by). We will follow
up to try to get a better read on the scope of MbR's offer.
SUTPHIN


/tag/IR_0.html


07ABUDHABI145     2007-01-31 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Abu Dhabi

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000145

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM IZ IR AF AE
SUBJECT: GENERAL ABIZAID TALKS IRAN, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN WITH
ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE

Classified By: Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

¶1. (S) Summary. On the evening of January 21, Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed
Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) Al Nahyan hosted
CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid for dinner. They
discussed regional security issues, but Iraq was clearly the
focus of MbZ's interest. MbZ expressed lack of confidence in
being able to work with the Maliki government. MbZ believes
that the Saudis will not support any Sunni group in Iraq with
Al-Qaeda ties, but that the Saudis are firm in their resolve
to counter Iran. MbZ reiterated UAE interest in acquiring
Predator B. Referring to the recent events in Somalia, MbZ
commented: "The Somalia job was fantastic." Also present
were UAE Chief of Staff, Lt. General Hamad Mohammed Thani
Al-Rumaithy; Director of Intelligence, Staff Brigadier
General Engineer Essa Saif Mohammed Al-Mazrouei; Commander of
the Special Operations, Major General Juma Ahmed Al-Bawardi
Al-Falasi; and Commander of the UAE Air Forces and Air
Defense, Staff Air Vice-Marshal (Major General) Mohammed
Sowaidan Al-Gimzy. End Summary.

Iraq
----
¶2. (C) Clearly the focus for MbZ, discussion began with his
pronouncement: "Let's talk about Iraq." Gen. Abizaid noted
that extremists on both ends of the Sunni/Shia spectrum are
largely irretrievable, but we still have an opportunity to
stabilize Iraq by reinforcing the moderate middle ground.
MbZ said that he had little confidence in being able to work
with this (Maliki's) government, saying of Maliki: "I think
we are operating on different frequencies -- no, different
radio systems altogether."

¶3. (S) MbZ asked General Abizaid what the U.S. hoped to
achieve with the extra troops set to deploy to Iraq in 2007,
and reiterated his concern about the level of ongoing
violence against the Sunni. Abizaid responded that the
violence in Iraq is highly localized, principally in the
Baghdad area, and that most of the rest of Iraq is quiet. The
extra troops are intended to bring calm to Baghdad and give
the government sufficient space and time to contain violence
even further. It will also send a message that the U.S. is
not abandoning Iraq. MbZ stated that Ahmad Chalabi and
others had made a "big deal" out of the Baathist threat, but
said that the Baathists were not and are not the problem --
even though specific individuals linked to the Ba,ath Party
were/are the problem. MbZ offered that de-Baathification was
and is "an unnecessary distraction," stating that "pursuing a
problem that doesn't really exist only leads to more
problems." He said he had seen Iyad Allawi a month ago --
noting that Allawi was looking to the UAE for support and
assurances. MbZ said that there is no assurance that the UAE
can give him, adding: "It's not his time." MbZ added that he
believes that the Saudis will not assist Sunni groups in Iraq
that are aligned with Al-Qaeda.

Iran
----
¶4. (S) MbZ acknowledged that Tehran knows that the U.S. is
serious in its stance against Iranian proliferation. This
can be clearly seen in "how Iran is changing its tactics."
Abizaid pressed that countries in the region should make
stronger statements. Weak statements only encourage the
Iranians: "We need our friends to say that they stand with
the Americans." MbZ avoided committing the UAE to anything
like a public statement and shifted the discussion to other
countries in the region saying: "The Saudis need no
encouragement -- they are Wahhabis after all -- and will
resolutely stand up to any Shi'a anywhere and counter them
strongly." Agreeing that it is only a matter of time before
the Iranians develop or acquire advanced weapons
technologies, including MTCR-controlled UAV technology, MbZ
asserted: "That's why we need it first . . . give me
Predator B." MbZ added: "Iran has to know that there is a
price to pay for every decision they make. They are
expanding day by day -- they have to be dealt with before
they do something tragic." But that said, he continued: "We
(UAE) are not ready yet" to confront Iran.

Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------------
¶5. (S) Abizaid thanked MbZ for the actions of the UAE forces
currently deployed in Afghanistan. MbZ reciprocated: "No --

ABU DHABI 00000145 002 OF 002


thank you. This has been a good chance for us, and we
appreciate the opportunity." MbZ questioned the role the
Iranians were playing in Afghanistan. He further observed
that Musharraf is not doing enough to engage the tribes in
the south, and needs to expand its efforts there.

Lebanon/Hizballah/Somalia
--------------------------
¶6. (S) Noting Lebanese PM Siniora's January 16 visit to the
UAE, MbZ characterized Siniora as &a good man. We are
supporting him." MbZ said that Hizballah has made a "big
mistake" in estimating its support in Lebanon, and has
"played it wrong -- they do not have the support of the
majority of the Lebanese people." MbZ discussed with Abizaid
the military technology that Hizballah used in 2006,
specifically noting the amount of anti-tank weapons that
Hizballah possessed. Abizaid acknowledged that Hizballah has
access to weapons technology that most Arab states don't
have. MbZ interrupted the conversation to state explicitly
that he wants the U.S. to understand that the UAE was not
involved in the transfer of those weapons or technologies in
any way. Referring to the recent events in Somalia, MbZ
commented: "The Somalia job was fantastic."

¶7. (U) POLAD Ambassador Richard Roth has approved this
message.
SISON


/tag/IR_0.html


07ABUDHABI187     2007-02-07 06:06     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Abu Dhabi

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INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000187

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN CONCERNS WITH
GENERAL MOSELEY

REF: A. ABU DHABI 97
¶B. ABU DHABI 145

Classified By: Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

¶1. (S) Summary. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed
(MbZ) Al Nahyan hosted Chief of Staff USAF General T. Michael
Moseley on February 1, 2007. MbZ warned Moseley of the
growing threat from Iran, stating that they (Iran) "can't be
allowed to have a nuclear program." MbZ further emphasized
that Iran's nuclear program must be stopped "by all means
available." As expected, MbZ inquired about Predator B.
Moseley informed MbZ that the question of Predator B would
require further discussion within the interagency and with
our MTCR partners, while Ambassador noted that the USG looked
forward to discussion of UAE defense requirements and our
shared security objectives in the context of the Gulf
Security Dialogue. MbZ expressed a desire to have a missile
defense system in place by Summer 2009, and was looking to
add ship-based launch platforms as a part of that system. He
also noted that the UAE had identified a location on the
northern border at an elevation of 6,000 feet that may be
suitable for installation of an early warning radar system.
End Summary.

Iran
----
¶2. (S) Stating that "we are living in a dangerous
neighborhood," MbZ stressed the importance of curtailing
Iran's nuclear program to the overall stability of the Gulf,
the Middle East as a region, and to the world's energy
markets. Pointing out that a nuclear weapon with even a
short-range delivery system puts all the critical
infrastructure in the Gulf at risk -- as well as the oil
shipping lanes -- MbZ asserted: "If Iran can increase oil
production to more than 15 million barrels of oil per day,
let them have nuclear power, but until they can replace (the
Gulf's) oil production they can't be allowed to have a
nuclear program."

¶3. (S) MbZ told Moseley that the US should not focus too much
on Ahmadinejad as the problem, but should focus instead on
"the greater Iranian threat." Calling Ahmadinejad "merely
the driver" of a bus (nuclear program) that has been running
for a long time in Iran, MbZ described Iran's nuclear program
as one that is no longer driven by personalities -- but which
has become part of the Iranian identity. Noting that even if
Ahmadinejad or other leaders were to change, the nuclear
program would still continue, MbZ stated: "Even a siege at
this point will not change anything." In answer to
Moseley's question what should be done, MbZ responded: "Delay
their program -- by all means available." He added: "I am
saying this knowing that I am putting my country at risk and
placing myself in a dangerous spot."

¶4. (S) Speaking about his fears of Iran's growing hegemonic
aspirations, MbZ warned the US not to underestimate the
Iranians characterizing them as "extremely smart." "It
amazes me," MbZ continued, "that the Muslim Brotherhood,
which controls Hamas, has at its core an opposition to all
things Shi'a, and yet they (Hamas) cooperate with Iran. That
shows you how smart they are." MbZ then pointed to what he
called successful Iranian actions in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,
and Palestine to illustrate how Iran has managed to
manipulate Muslim extremism in order to advance Shi'a and
Iranian goals.

UAV/Predator B
--------------
¶5. (S) MbZ again asked about the status of the UAE request to
acquire Predator B. GeneralMoseley informed MbZ that the
question of Predatr B acquisition would require further
discussionwithin the interagency and with our MTCR partners.
MbZ nodded in understanding: "We are patient." He then
added: "I hope the Iranians give us time; they are aggressive
and are moving fast." MbZ also mentioned that there were
several other countries offering UAVs to the UAE. Ambassador
added that the U.S. and the other 33 MTCR members would be
meeting in March to review the MTCR control list. Growing
demand worldwide for unmanned aerial vehicles had led to the
need for a general discussion of how the MTCR controls UAVs
and cruise missiles, and the USG looked forward to further
discussion of UAE defense requirements and our shared
security objectives in the context of the ongoing Gulf
Security Dialogue (GSD).

Strategic Interests
-------------------

ABU DHABI 00000187 002 OF 002


¶6. (S) Moseley's meeting with MbZ immediately followed a
Raytheon/Lockheed Martin briefing of MbZ on the ongoing
development of THAAD/PAC-3 and shared early warning systems.
Speaking of a time frame for the first time, MbZ said he
wants a complete missile defense system by summer 2009. MbZ
expressed particular interest in the possibility of mounting
PAC-3 on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). Learning that PAC-3
cannot yet be mounted on a seagoing platform, MbZ was pleased
to note that SLAMRAAM has already tested successfully on a
wide variety of platforms and could be ship-based. Sheikh
(Major) Ahmed bin Tahnoon A-Nahyan, advisor to MbZ on
critical infrastructure protection, took particular note of
this fact and asked about upgrading/extending their existing
Hawk/AMRAAM assets. When briefers noted the 32km limit of
unelevated radar, MbZ stated that he has a location
identified on the UAE's northern border at an elevation of
6000 feet that he would like contractors to come back and
look at as a possible location for an early warning radar
system. Also present was International Affairs Advisor to
the Crown Prince's Court Yousef Al-Otaiba, who is a UAE
representative to the GSD.

¶7. (S) Comment: Although MbZ is increasingly talking tough on
Iran, i.e., stop Iran "by all means possible" and "deal with
Iran sooner rather than later" (ref A), his comments should
also be taken in the context of strong UAE interest in
acquiring advanced military technology and, specifically,
MbZ's repeated requests for Predator B (ref B). The UAEG is
clearly nervous about any US actions that could upset their
much larger and militarily superior neighbor. The UAE's
significant trade relationship with Iran--approximately $4
billion--is another complicating factor in the relationship.
On more than one occasion, the UAE leadership has expressed
trepidation over the prospect of being caught in the middle
between the US and Iran. End Comment.

¶8. (U) POLAD, Chief of Staff USAF, Ambassador Marcelle M.
Wahba has approved this message.
SISON


/tag/IR_1.html




07TELAVIV1114     2007-04-18 06:06     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Tel Aviv

VZCZCXRO8870
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DE RUEHTV #1114/01 1080655
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180655Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0564
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001114

SIPDIS

CODEL
SIPDIS

H PLEASE PASS TO REPRESENTATIVE ACKERMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP EFIN IR KPAL IS
SUBJECT: CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WITH OPPOSITION LEADER
BINYAMIN NETANYAHU: ECONOMIC SQUEEZE ON IRAN AND HAMAS;
SCENARIOS FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT; RIGHT OF RETURN AS ACID
TEST OF ARAB INTENTIONS

REF: TEL AVIV 1086

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Representative Gary Ackerman (D, New York),
Chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee of
the House International Relations Committee, accompanied by
the Ambassador, met with Opposition Leader Binyamin Netanyahu
at the Knesset April 11. The discussion covered Netanyahu's
ideas on how to pressure Iran in order to block its nuclear
program and topple President Ahmadinejad; Netanyahu's views
on dealing with the Palestinians; his critique of Prime
Minister Olmert's handling of the Second Lebanon War; and
Netanyahu's analysis of Israel's domestic political
situation. On Iran, Netanyahu advocated intensified financial
pressures, including a U.S.-led divestment effort focused
largely on European companies that invest in Iran, as the
best way to topple Ahmadinejad. On the Palestinians,
Netanyahu did not object to supporting President Abbas but
said Israel and the U.S. should first focus more on
"strangling" Hamas. Netanyahu asserted that Israel's
mishandling of the Lebanon war had strengthened Israel's
enemies. He predicted that Olmert would not be able to stay
in power much longer, then described several different
mechanisms for forming a new government. Netanyahu expressed
confidence that the Israeli public recognized that he had
been right, that unilateral withdrawals were a mistake, and
that the priority now must be stopping Iran. Netanyahu noted
that he thought dropping the "right of return" was the acid
test of Arab intentions and insisted that he would never
allow a single Palestinian refugee to return to Israel. End
Summary.

¶2. (U) House Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee
Chairman Gary Ackerman, accompanied by the Ambassador, Pol
Couns, Subcommittee Staff Director David Adams, and Staff
member Howard Diamond called on Opposition and Likud Party
Leader Binyamin Netanyahu at the Knesset April 11. Netanyahu
was joined by foreign policy adviser Dore Gold and MFA North
American Department Congressional liaison Eyal Sela.

Toppling Ahmadinejad
--------------------

¶3. (C) Representative Ackerman told Netanyahu that in his
meeting the day before with Egyptian President Mubarak, he
had asked Mubarak if military action were necessary to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, should the
strike be carried out by the U.S. or Israel? Mubarak had
responded that if it came to that, the U.S. should do it and
Israel should stay out. Netanyahu said he took Mubarak's
point, but commented that he thought the Iranian regime, or
at least President Ahmadinejad, could be toppled by economic
pressure, including a divestment campaign. Noting that
economic sanctions lose their effect over time, but can be
powerful in the short term. The goal should be to encourage
Ahmadinejad's political rivals to remove him from power.
Afterward, if the pressure could be maintained it might be
possible to bring down the entire Iranian regime, but that
would also entail identifying alternative leaders. The idea
was to use economic pressure to create a public sense of
regime failure. Netanyahu said he had consulted with noted
historian Bernard Lewis, who believed that Iran would be less
dangerous once Ahmadinejad was removed.

¶4. (C) Netanyahu said there were three bills in Congress
designed to divest U.S. pension funds from investing in about
300, mostly European, companies currently doing business in
Iran. Divestment would immediately bring down the credit
ratings of these companies, thus forcing them to respond.
Netanyahu urged Congress to support the divestment
legislation, adding that he also planned to use a visit to
the U.S. to raise the issue with Wall Street fund managers.
His approach was to tie in Darfur to expand the scope of
anti-genocide divestment and link it to U.S. policy goals.
Netanyahu said he was unsure that financial pressures would
be enough to stop Iran's nuclear program, but he was
confident they would succeed in bringing down Ahmadinejad.
He commended Dore Gold's efforts to put Ahmadinejad on a
genocide watch list as part of a broader effort to
delegitimize the Iranian President. Asked about the quality
of U.S. and Israeli intelligence on Iran, Netanyahu said his
nightmare was that we had missed part of the Iranian program.
He added that if the current intelligence was correct, it
would take Iran a few more years to develop a nuclear weapon.
He agreed with Ambassador Jones' assessment that

TEL AVIV 00001114 002 OF 003


Ahmadinejad's announcement of a breakthrough in Iran's
centrifuge program was probably exaggerated. It would be
critical, Netanyahu stressed, to target companies investing
in Iran's energy sector.

Bring Down Hamas
----------------

¶5. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked Netanyahu for his views on
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Netanyahu said Abbas
was a "nice man who means well," but he added that Israel and
the U.S. should focus on "bringing down Hamas" through an
"economic squeeze." Netanyahu asserted that eight months
ago, the Hamas government had been on the brink of collapse,
but had become stronger because Israel became weaker as a
result of the Lebanon war. Without elaborating, Netanyahu
said it would be easier to weaken Hamas than to strengthen
Abbas.

¶6. (C) Netanyahu commented that Shimon Peres had admitted to
him that the Oslo process had been based on a mistaken
economic premise, and as a result European and U.S.
assistance to the Palestinians had gone to create a bloated
bureaucracy, with PA employees looking to the international
community to meet their payroll. Netanyahu predicted that
Palestinians would vote for Abbas if they believe that he can
deliver the money. He suggested putting in place an
"economic squeeze with an address," so that Hamas would
receive the popular blame. Asked if Fatah knew how to
conduct an election campaign, Netanyahu said the Palestinian
patronage system should be forced to collapse, which would
have an immediate impact since the entire Palestinian economy
was based on graft and patronage. Instead, he asserted, the
opposite was happening. Hamas was also handling the prisoner
release issue well since they had created the impression that
Hamas was in control of the process and "sticking it to the
Israelis."

¶7. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked if Abbas would survive
politically. Netanyahu said he was unsure, since politics
were stressful, especially Palestinian politics. The policy,
he added, should be to starve the NUG. If any money is
given, it should go directly to Abbas. Netanyahu said it was
not clear the GOI has a policy, there was a general climate
of weakness.

Lebanon War Failures
--------------------

¶8. (C) Turning to the Second Lebanon War, Netanyahu said the
problem was not the war's goals but rather the disconnect
between goals and methods. If the IDF had used a flanking
move by a superior ground force, it could have won easily.
Instead, Israel "dripped troops into their gunsights," an
approach he termed "stupid." The top leadership had lacked a
sense of military maneuver. In addition, they had been
afraid to take military casualties, but instead got many
civilian casualties. If Olmert had mobilized the reserves in
ten days, seized ground, destroyed Hizballah in southern
Lebanon, and then withdrawn, he would be a hero today.
Instead, Netanyahu predicted, Olmert will not last
politically. Olmert's current public support levels of three
percent were unsustainable.

A New Government?
-----------------

¶9. (C) Netanyahu said the pressure on Olmert was
accumulating as a result of corruption investigations as well
as the impending release of the Winograd Commission's interim
report. Olmert could be pushed out as a result of a
rebellion within the Kadima Party. Kadima members are
realizing they cannot allow Olmert to stay in power, but
Kadima itself might collapse since it was a "fake party."
Netanyahu described several options, including Kadima
replacing Olmert, a new coalition formed in the Knesset, or
Netanyahu's preferred option, new elections. New elections,
he stated, are supported by sixty-five percent of the public.
Netanyahu insisted he was in no rush since he was "enjoying
the time with his family" and rebuilding the Likud Party.
Likud was reaching thousands of new supporters, including
many highly educated professionals and high tech
entrepreneurs, through the internet.

¶10. (C) Netanyahu asserted there was a growing sense in the
public that he had been right in the last election.

TEL AVIV 00001114 003 OF 003


Unilateral "retreats" (i.e. such as the withdrawals from Gaza
and southern Lebanon) were the wrong way to go. Israel had
allowed an Iranian enclave to establish itself in Gaza.
Syria was arming itself for the first time in 20 years,
Hizballah had rearmed since the war, and Gaza was being
turned into a bunker. Egypt was not doing on a twelve mile
front along the Gaza border what Jordan was doing on a
150-mile front. The way out was to stop Iran, thereby
dealing with the octopus, not just its tentacles.

Right of Return the Acid Test
-----------------------------

¶11. (C) Netanyahu stated that a return to the 1967 borders
and dividing Jerusalem was not a solution since further
withdrawals would only whet the appetite of radical Islam.
Ackerman asked if the Palestinians would accept peace based
on the 1967 lines. Netanyahu said he would not agree to such
a withdrawal since the 1967 lines were indefensible, but he
added that the "right of return" was the real acid test of
Arab intentions. Instead of Israel making more step-by-step
concessions, Israel should insist that further concessions be
linked to reciprocal steps toward peace. The Palestinians
must drop the right of return and accept Israel's right to
exist. The Arab initiative did not meet this standard since
it keeps the right of return open. Israel will only have a
peace partner when the Palestinians drop the right of return.
Asked whether Israel could accept case by case exceptions,
Netanyahu insisted not one refugee could ever return. Israel,
after all, was not asking for the right of Jews to return to
Baghdad or Cairo.

¶12. (C) Netanyahu said UNSCR 242 was not a bad formula since
it did not specify precisely from which territories Israel
would withdraw. After the withdrawals from Gaza and Lebanon,
there was deep disillusionment among Israelis about the
principle of land for peace. Even the noted Israeli leftist
writer AB Yehoshua had said in a recent interview that he
despaired about peace because the Arabs wanted all of Israel.
From 1948 to 1967, the conflict had not been about occupied
territories, but that point had been obscured by "effective
propaganda." The root of the conflict was an Arab desire to
destroy Israel, which had now become part of the larger
ambitions of radical Islam.

¶13. (C) The 1967 borders were not the solution since Israel
was the only force blocking radical Islam's agenda of
overrunning Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu proposed that
Israel offer to work with the Saudis against Iran. If Iran
was not stopped, there would be no agreement with the
Palestinians, and the peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt
would come under tremendous pressure. There could be no
deterrence against "crazies" such as Ahmadinejad. Netanyahu
advised Congress to expedite the legislative effort for
divestment. If that did not work, we could reconsider other
options. Congressman Ackerman said that if Netanyahu came to
Washington, he would hold a hearing on divestment.

¶14. (U) CODEL Ackerman did not have the opportunity to clear
this message.



********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES


/tag/IR_1.html


07DUBAI355     2007-06-03 11:11     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Consulate Dubai

VZCZCXRO3701
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DE RUEHDE #0355/01 1541114
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 031114Z JUN 07
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5452
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHZM/GCC C COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 2461
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 8545

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBAI 000355

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/3/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KNNP IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: DUBAI RULER DISCUSSES IRAN AND IRAQ WITH SENATOR LIEBERMAN

DUBAI 00000355 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Paul R Sutphin, Consul General, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)




1.(S) SUMMARY. Senator Joseph Lieberman met with Sheikh
Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MbR), Vice President and Prime
Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, on 29 May. MbR voiced
support for US policy in Iraq, but expressed strong reservations
about the al Maliki government and its links to Iran. He called
for new elections to produce leaders who would work for Iraq's
interests. He voiced suspicion of Iran's goals in the region,
and their claims that their nuclear program was for energy
purposes alone. He recommended, however, that the US seek to
contain Iran through negotiations and diplomacy. Using force, he
said, would only help the current leadership stay in power. MbR
also talked about his ambitions for Dubai as a regional model,
noting "we want to be number one." END SUMMARY

2.(SBU) Senator Lieberman, along with the Ambassador, Consul
General, codel staff members and ConGen staff met MbR at the
Zabeel Palace in Dubai on 29 May. Joining MbR were Mohammad
al-Gergawi, his principal aide and UAE Minister for Cabinet
Affairs; Major General Dhahi Khalfan al-Tamim, Commander of the
Dubai Police; Brigadier Mohammad al-Qemzi, Director of the Dubai
General Department of State Security; Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed
al-Maktoum, head of Dubai Civil aviation and Emirates Airlines;
and a number of MbR's sons, including Sheikh Rashid bin
Mohammad, Sheikh Mohammad's eldest son; and Sheikh Hamdan bin
Mohammad, Chairman of the Dubai Executive Council and Sheikh
Mohammad's heir apparent.

Iraq: Any plan B?
------------------

3.(C) MbR restated the UAE's support for the US in the region,
noting "the UAE is the only country that is 100 percent with the
US." MbR said UAE support for the US effort remained firm, but
asked what is "plan B" should the current US approach not
stabilize Iraq. Senator Lieberman quoted the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as saying "plan B is to make plan A work."

Alternative Approaches: New Elections in Iraq?
--------------------------------------------- -

4.(S) Asked by the Senator for his advice on steps to move the
situation in Iraq forward, MbR commented that he has little
confidence in Iraqi PM al Maliki, and believes his loyalties lie
elsewhere, i.e. Iran. MbR suggested the way ahead would be
improved by new elections, which he believes would now yield a
better leader who is loyal to Iraq. Senator Lieberman noted he
thought that al Maliki and his allies would oppose new elections.

The Problem of Al-Sadr
----------------------

5.(S) MbR said that at the moment Muqtada al-Sadr is the single
most powerful person in Iraq; the US should act against him,
i.e. arrest and imprison him. Asked if new elections might not
yield a al-Sadr victory, MbR made clear he thought Sunnis would
now turn out in large numbers and that al-Sadr would not be able
to win - were the election fair. (Comment: Reflecting
commonly-held thinking by UAE seniors, he clearly implied that
al-Maliki had been elected through rigging in the last Iraqi
vote. End comment.)

Progress in Anbar Province: Look to the Tribes
--------------------------------------------- -

6.(C) Commenting on the improved security situation in western
Iraq, MbR voiced strong support for closer cooperation with the
tribal sheikhs. As has been proven, if the tribal leaders can
be co-opted to work with the US, they have the ability to defeat
or suppress Al-Qaeda. He stressed the importance of working
with the tribes without regard to their being Sunni or Shia.

Sheikh Mohammad on Iran
-----------------------

7.(C) Senator Lieberman asked MbR for his views on Iran and US
policies vis-`-vis Iran. MbR stated Iran is a large country
with great ambitions, a historic sense of its importance, and a
desire to dominate the region culturally and politically. Iran
has a long-term strategy for the region, and would like to
recreate the Persian Empire and spread Shi'a Islam throughout
area. Rehearsing themes often heard by US senior visitors, MbR
said Iran "can make trouble throughout the region" if it is

DUBAI 00000355 002.2 OF 003


provoked. While he suggested that Iran is the cause of the
deteriorating situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, he also noted
that Iran could make the situation in Afghanistan, for example,
"explode" should chose to do so.

Iran Promises a Peaceful nuclear Program
----------------------------------------

8.(C) MbR told the Senator that the UAE does not want Iran to
acquire nuclear weapons. He said that during the recent visit of
Iranian President Ahmadinejad to the UAE that the Iranians had
promised their nuclear program is only to help meet domestic
energy needs -- quipping "how much can we believe what the
Iranians say is another question." MbR seemed perplexed about
the work of the IAEA inspectors and believed that they could
provide an objective view of the program. Senator Lieberman
reminded MbR that Iran has blocked the inspectors and they have
only been able to conclude that Iran will have the capacity to
produce enriched uranium on a sufficient scale to either
generate power or create a nuclear weapon within the next three
to eight years.

Negotiations - the Best Course of Action
----------------------------------------

9.(C) MbR and the Senator briefly discussed the recent meeting
in Baghdad between the US and Iran. MbR saw this as a very
positive move, recommending negotiations as the best way forward
with Iran. He said that threatening Iran encourages the Iranian
leaders to be defiant. Iranians are proud and the current
extremist leadership would not only endure, but benefit from an
attack by the US. Such attacks would ensure the continuing power
of the current government (note: presumable by rallying all
Iranians behind it in the face of a foreign enemy).

10.(C) Senator Lieberman commented would maintain the stick even
while it considered the carrot, and that the two carrier battle
groups now in the Gulf were sending a message to Iran. MbR
responded that everyone in the region knows the US is powerful
and can fight two wars simultaneously. He said that part of the
problem "is the way you (the US) talk." After making a demand,
"you (the US) should take two steps back before your next
action." Everyone in the region needs to avoid the dangerous
cycle of action and reaction. The Israeli-Palestinian problem
has worsened because actions are followed immediately by
reactions without thought.

11.(S) Brigadier Mohammad al-Qemzi, who heads State Security in
Dubai added that the Iranians are traditionally great game
players. He said that the US should play the game of
negotiation and diplomacy (to contain Iran) rather than engaging
in hostilities. Al-Qemzi recommended working for the longer
term, and believes that there will be a cultural and leadership
change in Iran -- over time, Iran would change for the better.

UAE Support for Counter Proliferation
-------------------------------------

12.(S) MbR reiterated the UAE's continued support of the US'
counter proliferation efforts in the region. Brigadier al-Qemzi
added that the previous day and in the previous week the UAE had
stopped Iranian vessels at US request suspected of carrying
goods proscribed by the UN sanctions regime. The UAE, he said,
would continue to work with us to stringently enforce UN
sanctions.

Dubai, the Region, and Transformation via Education
--------------------------------------------- ------

13.(C) Noting Dubai appeared to be a model of tolerance and
opportunity for the region, Senator Lieberman asked MbR to talk
about his goals for the emirate. MbR said bluntly "we want to be
number one." But, he said that Dubai has only taken the first
step on a journey of 1000 miles. He said that if Dubai plays it
right, the whole region can develop like Dubai.

14.(SBU) MbR indicated that Dubai has succeeded because it is a
place where all people can enjoy health, wealth, security, and
the opportunity to succeed. Commenting on his recent
announcement at the World Economic Forum in Jordan of a new $10
billion Mohammed Bin Rashid Foundation for education and job
creation (septel), he said "God gave us wealth and we must give
it back to the people in the region." MbR sees Dubai as the
leading city of a wide region and he commented "I am serving 1.5
billion [people] in the region." MbR underscored that education
is the key to regional modernization and moderation. In Dubai,
he noted, "we are trying to teach people how to fish and not
just giving a fish to our neighbor."

DUBAI 00000355 003.2 OF 003



15 (SBU) He also called for more US universities in Dubai, and
asked for Senator Lieberman's help in resurrecting the
possibility of the University of Connecticut building a sizeable
campus here (note: this deal was put on hold by UCONN leadership
after Connecticut state legislators and others objected to the
UAE regulation which prevents the entry of Israeli passport
holders).

16.(U) Senator Lieberman has cleared this cable.
SUTPHIN


/tag/IR_1.html


07TELAVIV2280     2007-07-26 13:01     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2487
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
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WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL KNNP KWBG EFIN IR IS
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA REGION WITH
MOSSAD DIRECTOR DAGAN

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (B/D).

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (AFHSC),
met Mossad Director Meir Dagan on July 12 for a general
discussion of regional security threats. On the Iranian
nuclear program, Dagan proved surprisingly optimistic about
the effects of United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
resolutions and their impact on Iranian elites. On most
other fronts, however, Dagan expressed deep skepticism
regarding any near-term solutions. Dagan believes that the
Syrians were emboldened by the Second Lebanon War, and argued
for a concerted international effort to enforce UNSC
resolutions in Lebanon as a means of removing Syria from
Iranian influence. In Dagan's personal opinion, present
attempts to prop up the government of Prime Minister Salam
Fayyad will fail, and "an entirely new approach" with the
Palestinians is required. Dagan and Townsend surveyed
political developments in North Africa, Turkey, and the Gulf,
and shared concerns about Pakistan's ability to withstand the
challenge of Islamic radicals. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------------------
Financial Sanctions Offer Hope on Iran
--------------------------------------

¶2. (S) Mossad Director Meir Dagan began his two-hour meeting
with Townsend by expressing satisfaction with sanctions
against Iran. Dagan said UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747
caught the Iranians off-guard, and were having an impact on
the Iranian elite and financial community. The resolutions
had been particularly successful through their indirect
consequences, explained Dagan, by stigmatizing Iranian
businesses and discouraging risk-averse Europeans from being
connected with Iran. Dagan praised ongoing GOI-USG
cooperation on this front, and added that domestic economic
problems were creating additional pressure on the regime.

¶3. (S) With regard to their nuclear program, Dagan said the
Iranians are attempting to convey a "false presentation" that
they have mastered the uranium enrichment process. The
reality is that they are not there yet, said Dagan, and they
are paying a heavy political price (sanctions) for something
they have yet to achieve. Dagan noted growing antipathy in
Russia towards Iran and its nuclear program, and said the
Iranians were shocked by Russian statements accusing them of
supporting terrorism against the United States. In Dagan's
view, there is no ideological conflict within the Iranian
leadership (all wish to see the destruction of Israel), but
there is a growing divide on tactics with some supporting a
retaliatory position against the West and others favoring new
policies of moderation. Recognizing the growing strength of
the moderate camp, Dagan said that the militant followers of
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are now trying to target
supporters of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as spies.

--------------------------------------------- -
Gulf States Await Action (From Others) on Iran
--------------------------------------------- -

¶4. (S) According to Dagan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf
States all fear Iran, but want someone else "to do the job
for them." Townsend and Dagan discussed the current state of
affairs in the Saudi royal court, where the Mossad Chief
accused Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal of playing a "very
negative role." He also pointed to the recent visit of the
Saudi King Abdullah to Jordan as a historical first and
turning point for relations between the two countries.
Townsend agreed, and said that the Saudi king has a sense of
urgency on the political front. Dagan characterized Qatar as
"a real problem," and accused Sheikh Hamid of "annoying
everyone." In his view, Qatar is trying to play all sides --
Syria, Iran, Hamas -- in an effort to achieve security and
some degree of independence. "I think you should remove your
bases from there...seriously," said Dagan. "They have
confidence only because of the U.S. presence." Dagan
predicted, with some humor, that al-Jazeera would be the next
cause of war in the Middle East as some Arab leaders
(specifically Saudi Arabia) are willing to take drastic steps
to shut down the channel, and hold Sheikh Hamid personally
responsible for its provocations.

----------------------------
Syria Taking Dangerous Risks
----------------------------


TEL AVIV 00002280 002 OF 003


¶5. (S) Dagan echoed other reports that Syria expects an
Israeli attack this summer, and has raised its level of
readiness. Despite the fact that Israel has no intention of
attacking, said Dagan, the Syrians are likely to retaliate
over even the smallest incident, which could lead to quick
escalation. Dagan believes that Syria's strategic alliance
with Iran and Hizballah has not changed, and that Assad views
these policies as both "successful and just." There is a
tendency to assume that Syria can be separated from Iran,
said Dagan, and that this offers the key to weakening
Hizballah. Dagan argued that the opposite is true: by
enforcing UN resolutions on Lebanon and increasing efforts to
disarm Hizballah, the international community can remove the
glue that binds Iran and Syria. Enforcing the resolutions
would put additional pressure on Assad, who fears being tried
for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri
above all else. The advantage of such an approach, continued
Dagan, is that the legal ground is already in place for
action by the UNSC. This credible threat could sufficiently
frighten Syria away from Iran and towards more natural allies
in the Arab League.

---------------------------------------------
Deep Pessimism on Relations With Palestinians
---------------------------------------------

¶6. (S) Departing from official GOI policy, Dagan expressed
his personal opinion that after more than a decade of trying
to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians,
"nothing will be achieved." Only Israeli military operations
against Hamas in the West Bank prevent them from expanding
control beyond Gaza, lamented Dagan, without which Fatah
would fall within one month and Abbas would join his
"mysteriously wealthy" son in Qatar. Offering what he
believed to be a conservative estimate, Dagan said that USD 6
billion had been invested in the Palestinian Authority since
¶1994. "What did it accomplish, other than adding a few more
people to the Fortune 500?" asked Dagan. Although he
expressed his personal faith in Salam Fayyad, Dagan said that
the Palestinian Prime Minister had no power base. Fatah as a
party would have to completely reorganize itself in order to
regain credibility, argued Dagan, but instead they have
turned once again to the "old guard." The Mossad Chief
suggested that a completely new approach was required, but
did not provide Townsend any additional details.

--------------------------------------
Pakistan...and Other Regional Concerns
--------------------------------------

¶7. (S) Townsend and Dagan then embarked on an informal tour
of the region, comparing notes on countries critical to
combating terrorism. Dagan characterized a Pakistan ruled by
radical Islamists with a nuclear arsenal at their disposal as
his biggest nightmare. Al-Qaeda and other "Global Jihad"
groups could not be relied upon to behave rationally once in
possession of nuclear weapons, said Dagan, as they do not
care about the well being of states or their image in the
media. "We have to keep (President Pervez) Musharaf in
power," said Dagan. In North Africa, Dagan contended that
Qaddafi needs to be pushed more in order to put Libya on the
right track. Qaddafi faces little domestic pressure, said
Dagan, but has traditionally responded to outside threats and
runs foreign policy based on his emotions. The only reason
Qaddafi moderated his position to begin with, said Dagan, was
that he feared that he was "in the crosshairs" for regime
change. Dagan viewed the situation in Algeria as more
serious, with the south of the country becoming increasingly
dangerous and the leadership uncertain as it faces radical
Islamic forces. Morocco is coping better with these issues
"in spite of the king," said Dagan, who appears to take
little interest in governing. In Turkey, Dagan said that
Islamists there are not of the same cloth as others in the
region, but he does fear that they are slowly breaking down
the secular character of the state and could become more
radical over time. Dagan argued that if the Turkish military
received more direct support from the United States, it would
be better able to prevent the rise of Islamists.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************

TEL AVIV 00002280 003 OF 003


CRETZ


/tag/IR_1.html


07TELAVIV2652     2007-08-31 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

VZCZCXRO5629
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #2652/01 2431245
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 311245Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3082
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0817
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1007
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0441
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0434
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 002652

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR MASS KNNP UNSC PK IR IZ ZP
JO, EG, RS, CH, LE, SY, IS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSAD
CHIEF MEIR DAGAN

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (S) In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief Meir
Dagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support of
Israel as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOU
that provides Israel with USD 30 billion in security
assistance from 2008-2018. Dagan provided his assessment of
the Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey, stressing
Israel's (a) concern for President Musharraf's well-being,
(b) view that Iran can be forced to change its behavior, and
(c) sense that Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are
unstable with unclear futures ahead of them. Dagan probed
for more detail about XXXXXXXXXXXX U.S. military assistance
to the Gulf states, and -- while signaling agreement with the
U.S. approach to the Gulf states vis-a-vis Iran -- cautioned that
they may not be able to absorb significant military assistance.
Dagan reviewed Israel's five-pillar strategy concerning
Iran's nuclear program, stressed that Iran is economicall
vulnerable, and pressed for more activity with Iran's
minority groups aimed at regime change. Dagan urged
caution in providing assistance to the Siniora government in
Lebanon, noting Syrian and Iranian efforts to topple the GOL.

¶2. (S) Under Secretary Burns cited the MOU as tangible
evidence of the USG's commitment to Israel, and stressed that
the U.S. would support all of its friends -- Arabs included
-- in the Middle East, and will remain engaged in the region
for the long term. He described U.S. efforts to support the
Musharraf and Karzai governments as they face opposition from
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and explained that the Gulf
Security Dialogue is meant to bolster Gulf states facing
threats from Iran. The Under Secretary reviewed U.S. efforts
to isolate Iran and increase pressure on it, stressing that
the U.S. is currently focused on the diplomatic track. He
shared USG thinking about the Siniora government in Lebanon,
and urged that the U.S. and Israel continue to consult on
Lebanon. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------------------------
THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MOU AND ISRAEL'S QME
--------------------------------------------

¶3. (S) Dagan observed that the signing of the MOU on
security assistance could not have come at a better time, and
stressed that Israel appreciated America's support. The
Under Secretary agreed about the timing, noting that the
U.S., Israel and like-minded countries were facing multiple
threats around the world, and that the Middle East is a very
dangerous region. He said that the MOU serves as a concrete
reminder that the U.S. stands by its long-term security
commitments to its friends, and is ready to help them with
their needs. The Under Secretary noted that the Middle East
is now at the heart of American interests. Because Egypt
also plays a vital role in the region, the U.S. would also
renew its security assistance commitment to that country.
U.S. relations with the Gulf states were longstanding, and
America would stay true to those friendships, as well. The
Under Secretary stressed that the USG is committed to
Israel's QME. He noted that the majority of systems and
equipment that the U.S. would sell to Egypt and other Arab
partners would replace items that had been sold to those
countries in the past.

-------------------------------------------
DAGAN REVIEWS MIDDLE EAST, PAKISTAN, TURKEY
-------------------------------------------

¶4. (S) Assessing the region, Dagan said Israel sees itself in
the middle of a rapidly changing environment, in which the
fate of one Middle Eastern country is connected to another.
Dagan then said he was concerned about how long Pakistani
President Musharraf would survive: "He is facing a serious
problem with the militants. Pakistan's nuclear capability
could end up in the hands of an Islamic regime." Turning to
Iran, Dagan observed that it is in a transition period.
There is debate among the leadership between Rafsanjani and
Ahmadinejad and their respective supporters. Instability in
Iran is driven by inflation and tension among ethnic
minorities. This, Dagan said, presents unique opportunities,
and Israelis and Americans might see a change in Iran in

TEL AVIV 00002652 002 OF 005


their lifetimes. As for Iraq, it may end up a weak, federal
state comprised of three cantons or entities, one each
belonging to the Kurds, Sunnis and Shias.

¶5. (S) Dagan said that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are
concerned about the growing importance of Iran and its
influence on them. They are taking precautions, trying to
increase their own military defensive capabilities.
Referring to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan warned
that these countries would not be able to cope with the
amount of weapons systems they intend to acquire: "They do
not use the weapons effectively."

¶6. (S) Dagan said that Jordan has successfully faced down
threats from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and that Egypt
is struggling with the question of who will replace President
Mubarak. He said he sees no hope for the Palestinians, and
that Israel looks at Syria and Lebanon, and sees only
instability. Further afield, it looks at Turkey and sees
Islamists gaining momentum there. The question, he asked, is
how long Turkey's military -- viewing itself as the defender
of Turkey's secular identity -- will remain quiet.

¶7. (S) If Israel's neighborhood were not unstable enough,
Dagan observed, it did not help that Russia is playing a
"very negative role" in the region. He observed that all of
these challenges have to be addressed globally -- they could
not be dealt with individually. Returning to Jordan as an
example, he noted that the more than one million Iraqi
refugees in Jordan were changing Jordanian society, and
forcing it into a new relationship with Saudi Arabia. This
is evidenced by Saudi King Abdullah's recent visit to Jordan,
which implies greater understanding between the Jordanians
and the Saudis.

----------------------------------------
DISCUSSION OF THE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE
----------------------------------------

¶8. (S) Turning to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan
said that enhancing the capabilities of the Gulf states "is
the right direction to go," especially as they are afraid of
Iran. Such a U.S. commitment will be a stabilizing factor in
the region. Dagan clarified that he would not oppose U.S.
security assistance to America's Arab partners. He expressed
concern, nevertheless, about the current policies of those
partners -- especially with regards to Syria and Iran. Dagan
added that if those countries must choose between buying
defensive systems from the U.S. or France, then he would
prefer they buy systems from the U.S., as this would bring
them closer to the U.S.

¶9. (S) Dagan observed that the challenge facing the U.S. now
is how to unite the Gulf states under a shared policy, and
pointed to Qatar as the weakest link in the chain, trying to
play all sides. Under Secretary Burns replied that the U.S.
is trying to get Qatar and its neighbors to look at issues
from a regional perspective, and to focus on threats in a
unified way. Acting PM Assistant Secretary Mull expressed
understanding for Israel's frustration with how the region
looked, but stressed nevertheless that if America did not
engage the Gulf states through the GSD, the situation would
become much worse. It is critical to get the Gulf states
focused on the Iran threat, and to adopt a regional approach
to countering it. Encouraging and supporting their
counterproliferation efforts would be crucial. Dagan said he
agreed with this approach, stressing that the threat of
radical Islam is real.

--------------------------------------------- ----
IRAN: DAGAN REVIEWS ISRAEL'S FIVE PILLAR STRATEGY
--------------------------------------------- ----

¶10. (S) Dagan led discussion on Iran by pointing out that the
U.S. and Israel have different timetables concerning when
Iran is likely to acquire a nuclear capability. He clarified
that the Israel Atomic Energy Commission's (IAEC) timetable
is purely technical in nature, while the Mossad's considers
other factors, including the regime's determination to
succeed. While Dagan acknowledged that there is still time
to "resolve" the Iran nuclear crisis, he stressed that Iran
is making a great effort to achieve a nuclear capability:
"The threat is obvious, even if we have a different
timetable. If we want to postpone their acquisition of a

TEL AVIV 00002652 003 OF 005


nuclear capability, then we have to invest time and effort
ourselves."

¶11. (S) Dagan described how the Israeli strategy consists of
five pillars:

A) Political Approach: Dagan praised efforts to bring Iran
before the UNSC, and signaled his agreement with the pursuit
of a third sanctions resolution. He acknowledged that
pressure on Iran is building up, but said this approach alone
will not resolve the crisis. He stressed that the timetable
for political action is different than the nuclear project's
timetable.

B) Covert Measures: Dagan and the Under Secretary agreed not
to discuss this approach in the larger group setting.

C) Counterproliferation: Dagan underscored the need to
prevent know-how and technology from making their way to
Iran, and said that more can be done in this area.

D) Sanctions: Dagan said that the biggest successes had so
far been in this area. Three Iranian banks are on the verge
of collapse. The financial sanctions are having a nationwide
impact. Iran's regime can no longer just deal with the
bankers themselves.

E) Force Regime Change: Dagan said that more should be done
to foment regime change in Iran, possibly with the support of
student democracy movements, and ethnic groups (e.g., Azeris,
Kurds, Baluchs) opposed to the ruling regime.

¶12. (S) Dagan clarified that the U.S., Israel and like-minded
countries must push on all five pillars at the same time.
Some are bearing fruit now; others would bear fruit in due
time, especially if more attention were placed on them.
Dagan urged more attention on regime change, asserting that
more could be done to develop the identities of ethnic
minorities in Iran. He said he was sure that Israel and the
U.S. could "change the ruling regime in Iran, and its
attitude towards backing terror regimes." He added, "We
could also get them to delay their nuclear project. Iran
could become a normal state."

¶13. (S) Dagan stressed that Iran has weak spots that can be
exploited. According to his information, unemployment
exceeds 30 percent nationwide, with some towns and villages
experiencing 50 percent unemployment, especially among 17-30
year olds. Inflation averages more than 40 percent, and
people are criticizing the government for investing in and
sponsoring Hamas, saying that they government should invest
in Iran itself. "The economy is hurting," he said, "and this
is provoking a real crisis among Iran's leaders." He added
that Iran's minorities are "raising their heads, and are
tempted to resort to violence."

¶14. (S) Dagan suggested that more could be done to get the
Europeans to take a tougher stand against Iran. Under
Secretary Burns agreed, and suggested that Israel could help

SIPDIS
by reaching out to the Europeans. Dagan said that Israel is
already doing this, and would continue to do so. Dagan
reiterated the need to strike at Iran's heart by engaging
with its people directly. Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts
are important, but more radio transmissions in Farsi are
needed. Coordination with the Gulf states is helpful, but
the U.S. should also coordinate with Azerbaijan and countries
to the north of Iran, to put pressure on Iran. Russia, he
said, would be annoyed, but it would be fitting, as Russia
appears bent on showing the U.S. that it cannot act globally
without considering Russia.

¶15. (S) Under Secretary Burns stressed that the USG is
focused on Iran not only because of its nuclear program, but
also because it supports terrorism and Shiite militias in
Iraq. The U.S. approach is currently focused on the
diplomatic track and increasing pressure on Iran through
sanctions. Work in the UNSC helps to define the Iranian
nuclear threat as one that affects international security,
and not just that of Israel. While UNSC members Russia,
China and Qatar will water down efforts to increase pressure
on Iran, it is still worthwhile to push for a third sanctions
resolution. In the meantime, the U.S. will encourage the
Europeans, Japan and South Korea to implement unilateral
sanctions against Iran outside the UNSC framework. The U.S.

TEL AVIV 00002652 004 OF 005


will continue to encourage banks and financial institutions
to slow down their operations in Iran and financially isolate
it. Regarding military pressure, the Under Secretary noted
that the U.S. has deployed 1-2 carrier battle groups in the
Gulf over the last six months, and that President Bush has
stated that he will interrupt Iran's activity in Iraq. As
for outreach to the Iranian people, the VOA is now
broadcasting programs in Farsi, and the USG is trying to get
more Iranian students to visit the U.S. to promote
people-to-people relations.

-----------------------------------------
PAKISTAN: ISRAEL WORRIED ABOUT MUSHARRAF
-----------------------------------------

¶16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf is
losing control, and that some of his coalition partners could
threaten him in the future. The key question, Dagan said, is
whether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role in
addition to his role as president. If not, he will have
problems. Dagan observed that there has been an increase in
the number of attempts on Musharraf's life, and wondered
whether he will survive the next few years. Under Secretary
Burns replied that South Asia has assumed vital importance in
American foreign policy since September 11. The U.S. is
committed to denying Afghanistan as a safe-haven for Taliban
and Al-Qaeda activity. The USG will continue to support
Pakistani President Musharraf, and is seeking to boost his
military defensive capabilities. At the same time, the U.S.
is encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to work with each
other militarily. Turning to India, Under Secretary Burns
noted that U.S.-Indian economic cooperation is growing, and
that the USG is working effectively to reduce tensions
between India and Pakistan.

-----------------------------
LEBANON: DAGAN URGES CAUTION
-----------------------------

¶17. (S) Dagan urged caution with respect to Lebanon, noting
that the results of efforts there to bolster the Siniora
government would impact Syria and Iraq. The U.S. and Israel,
he said, are on the edge of achieving something in Lebanon,
and so cannot afford to drop their guard. What is necessary
is finding the right way to support PM Siniora. "He is a
courageous man," Dagan said. Syria, Iran and Hizballah are
working hard against him. Dagan noted that much of what is
animating the leadership of Lebanon to take on Syria is
personal: "Hariri, Jumblat and others had their parents
executed by the Syrians." This anti-Syrian sentiment has
forged an alliance based on personal and national interests.
Siniora has worked well with the situation, but Dagan
suggested that the odds are against him. Under Secretary
Burns replied that the U.S. is trying to give PM Siniora as
much support as possible, and that we would continue to
consult closely with Israel on Lebanon. He noted that he
would return to Israel in October.

--------------------
MEETING PARTICIPANTS
--------------------

18, (SBU) Accompanying Under Secretary Burns in the meeting
were:
-- Ambassador Richard H. Jones
-- Acting PM Assistant Secretary Stephen Mull
-- Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs Mary Beth Long
-- NEA/IPA Deputy Director Nicole Shampaine
-- Embassy Tel Aviv Counselor for Political Research
-- Embassy Tel Aviv Political-Military Officer (notetaker)

¶19. (SBU) Accompanying Mossad Chief Meir Dagan in the meeting
were:
-- Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Salai Meridor
-- Advisor to Foreign Minister Livni Omer Caspi
-- Two unidentified Mossad officials

¶20. (U) Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns cleared on this
cable.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

TEL AVIV 00002652 005 OF 005



You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES


/tag/IR_1.html


08MUSCAT174     2008-03-01 05:05     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Muscat

VZCZCXRO2105
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DE RUEHMS #0174/01 0610549
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 010549Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9318
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000174

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ENRG KWMN IR IZ MU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON'S MEETING WITH SULTAN
QABOOS

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) Sultan Qaboos discussed both domestic and regional
issues during his February 19 meeting with Admiral William J.
Fallon, CENTCOM Commander. On the domestic front, the Sultan
described his desire to empower the government to be more
responsive to citizen concerns. Seeking to strengthen the
role of Omani women, the Sultan plans to convene a conference
in 2009 designed to increase the participation and leadership
of women in all aspects of Omani society. Sultan Qaboos also
shared plans for continued infrastructure development in Oman
and described efforts underway to obtain more natural gas.
On Iraq, the Sultan advised against a premature withdrawal of
U.S. forces and stated that more regional assistance would be
forthcoming if Iraqis would "come together" to take charge
of, and invest in, their own country. Sultan Qaboos shared
U.S. concerns about Iranian meddling in Iraq and elsewhere,
but contended that Tehran knew confrontation with the U.S.
was not in its interest. Iran's "charm offensive" in the GCC
had succeeded in lessening suspicions of some officials about
the true intentions of Iranian policies. End Summary.

¶2. (C) CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon, accompanied by the
Ambassador, met February 19 with Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id for
approximately 2 hours at one of the Sultan's castles -- Husn
al Shumugh -- in the interior of Oman. (Note: The Sultan
was outside of Muscat on his annual 4-6 week "meet the people
tour" during which he visits selected sites outside the
capital. End Note.) The Sultan appeared in good health and
was cheerful, although he commented that his role as ruler of
Oman was demanding and did not allow him time to do all the
things he wanted to do, such as reading more books. "My
office is wherever I am," he stated, noting that he
constantly had to attend to paperwork and urgent requests
from his staff, among other tasks. The Sultan added that
despite his busy schedule, he always made time to "watch the
news," though he did not elaborate on his preferred media
outlet.

-------------------
CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQ
-------------------

¶3. (C) The Sultan expressed concern over a premature
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Recognizing recent
improvements in the security situation, he counseled that
American troops should only leave "when the time is right."
He stressed that Iraqis had to "take charge" of the fate of
their country, but questioned whether the different factions
would be able to "come together" to accomplish this. He
pointedly asked the Admiral, "Do you really think Prime
Minister Maliki and his government are capable of pulling the
country together?" The Sultan did not directly respond to
Admiral Fallon's comment on the need for assistance and
investment for Iraq from elsewhere in the region. Instead,
he stated that if the Iraqi people helped themselves and
invested in their own country, others would follow suit.

¶4. (C) The Sultan appeared to follow events in Iraq closely.
He commented, for example, that the Kurds had apparently
"come out well" in recent central government talks on budget
issues, and asked about the status of electricity production
in Iraq. The Sultan seemed to take a particular interest in
Admiral Fallon's discussion of Iraqi Shia leader Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim, including the status of Hakim's health and his
possible successors.

--------------------------
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
--------------------------

¶5. (C) In addition to emphasizing the need for outside
investment in Iraq, Admiral Fallon highlighted the importance
of assistance from regional states for infrastructure
development in Afghanistan and other Central Asian nations.
Again the Sultan sidestepped the issue and shifted the
conversation to the critical role of roads and highways in
economic development. He then mentioned infrastructure
projects for Oman currently under consideration, including
construction of a new dam and a freight rail line from the
northern port of Sohar to the planned port in Duqm. The
Sultan hoped that the southern port of Salalah could be
linked by rail to Muscat and, eventually, to other GCC
states.

MUSCAT 00000174 002 OF 003



--------------
IRANIAN ISSUES
--------------

¶6. (C) The Sultan commented that the Iranians are "not
fools," and claimed that Tehran realized there are "certain
lines it cannot cross" (i.e., direct confrontation with the
U.S.). Regarding GCC relations with the Iranian government,
he stated, "Iran is a big country with muscles and we must
deal with it." He continued that Iran's "charm offensive" in
the region had achieved a degree of success as some GCC
authorities (he did not mention names) were now less
suspicious of Iranian intentions. The Sultan added,
laughing, that "I must say that as long as (the U.S.) is on
the horizon, we have nothing to fear."

¶7. (C) Responding to Admiral Fallon's frustration with
Iranian interference in Iraq, the Sultan remarked that
Iranian meddling abroad was "almost a game" to the regime in
Tehran, and said that Iran's leaders would have to stop this
practice if Iran wanted to "join the world as a noble
country." The Sultan hoped that Iraqi leaders would clearly
tell and convince Iranian President Ahmadinejad during his
upcoming visit to Iraq to cease Iran's unhelpful interference
in their internal affairs. On the possibility that Iran is
waiting out the President's final term before re-assessing
its strategy, the Sultan said that Tehran should realize that
it has to deal with the U.S. as a country, and not just the
current administration.

------------------
THE SEARCH FOR GAS
------------------

¶8. (C) After noting Iranian dependence on imports of refined
fuel, the Sultan described Oman's efforts to obtain more
natural gas to fuel growing domestic power needs and
large-scale industrial projects. Oman had committed too much
of its limited gas production to long-term liquefied natural
gas (LNG) export contracts. As a result, the government was
trying to boost production by taking smaller and less
productive gas fields away from Petroleum Development Oman
(PDO) -- 60% owned by the government and 34% owned by Royal
Dutch Shell -- and awarding them to outside companies such as
British Gas and BP. The Sultan claimed these firms were in a
better position to increase productivity in these fields, and
pointed to the progress of U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum
Company in raising oil production in former PDO concession
areas, such as Mukhaizna.

¶9. (C) Looking offshore, the Sultan said he hoped that new
gas fields would be found in the Gulf of Oman to help ease
the country's natural gas shortage. India's Reliance
Industries was currently exploring a deepwater oil and gas
block in this body of water, but had made no significant
discoveries yet. Qatar would begin supplying gas to Oman by
2013, the Sultan noted, but not in quantities sufficient to
meet outstanding needs. He added that Oman was still
supplying limited gas from Musandam to Ras al-Khaimah in the
UAE due to an agreement he made with its emir -- and which
the Sultan felt he could not break -- well before Oman was
squeezed for this resource.

---------------------------
THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION
---------------------------

¶10. (C) Sultan Qaboos shared that he placed a great deal of
importance on education, and noted that a study of history
provided the context needed to better understand present
trends and events. Regarding claims that some rulers in the
region wanted to keep their people uneducated in order to
more easily control them, the Sultan explained that this
strategy could easily backfire as it also left the populace
more susceptible to influence by extremists, such as the
Muslim Brotherhood. Former Egyptian president and
pan-Arabist leader Gamal Abdal Nasser, the Sultan said, had
"set the region back" by being "anti-everything" and engaging
in vitriolic rhetoric designed to keep the masses ignorant.

-----------------------------------
EMPOWERING THE GOVERNMENT AND WOMEN
-----------------------------------

¶11. (C) On domestic politics, the Sultan announced that he
would hold the first-ever combined meeting of his Cabinet of
Ministers and the Majlis al-Shura (the directly elected lower

MUSCAT 00000174 003 OF 003


house of Oman's bicameral advisory body) on February 26. By
meeting together, the Sultan hoped that the Cabinet and the
Majlis would learn how to cooperate better and jointly focus
on important issues. He commented that both bodies also
needed to "demonstrate more leadership" and avoid past
foot-dragging on promises made to the populace. "People need
to see the results of decisions," the Sultan stated.

¶12. (C) Letting Admiral Fallon and the Ambassador in on a
"secret," the Sultan confided that he planned to call for a
conference of all "notable women" in Oman in 2009 in a bid to
encourage Omani women to expand their participation and
leadership in different aspects of Omani society. Minister
of Social Development, Dr. Sharifa bint Khalfan al-Yahyaiya
(one of Oman's three female cabinet ministers) will chair the
meeting on the Sultan's behalf. Lamenting that no women won
seats in the October 2007 election for the Majlis al-Shura,
Sultan Qaboos observed that Omani women were stuck in
tradition and needed to be empowered to "take more charge"
and to be "less shy." "Some customs (regarding women)," he
added, "shouldn't be kept." Nevertheless, gradual change is
occurring in Oman, the Sultan asserted. His philosophy was
to "let it happen," rather than hold it up to public debate,
as the latter course of action often led to factional
fighting, internal strife, and other ills.

---------------------------------------------
A RECURRENT THEME: MORE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT
---------------------------------------------

¶13. (C) In concluding the meeting, Sultan Qaboos returned to
his goal of improving the responsiveness of the Omani
government to citizen concerns. He stated that he would be
pressing "harder" on his ministers to engage in more and
better public relations efforts before the Omani police and
to effectively enforce their decisions so that the people
could see the benefits of announced actions. Giving one
particular example, the Sultan said that rather than simply
announce a new development project, the government should
explain the downstream employment opportunities the project
would generate for Omani citizens. Effective cooperation
between ministries and the Majlis Oman was also needed to
strengthen the civil institutional framework in Oman, the
Sultan added.

-------
COMMENT
-------

¶14. (S/NF) In discussing his desire for operational change
in the senior government ranks, the Sultan twice implied (but
did not directly state) that such change was needed to
prepare the country for his eventual departure from power.
The Sultan's comments indicated that he may feel the
government is too dependent on his authority and should be
empowered to run more effectively without constant direction
from the palace. End Comment.

¶15. (U) This message has been reviewed by Admiral Fallon.
GRAPPO


/tag/IR_1.html


08RIYADH649     2008-04-20 08:08     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Riyadh

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000649

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND S/I
SATTERFIELD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2018
TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN IZ PGOV PREL MOPS SA IR
SUBJECT: SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES ON SAUDI
POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (S) Summary: US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and
General David Petraeus met with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd
al-Aziz, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, General
Presidency of Intelligence Chief Prince Muqrin bin Abd
al-Aziz, and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz during
their April 14-15 visit to Riyadh. The Saudi King and senior
Princes reviewed Saudi policy toward Iraq in detail, all
making essentially the same points. They said that the
Kingdom will not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an
embassy until the King and senior Saudi officials are
satisfied that the security situation has improved and the
Iraqi government has implemented policies that benefit all
Iraqis, reinforce Iraq's Arab identity, and resist Iranian
influence. The Saudis evinced somewhat greater flexibility
regarding the issues of economic and humanitarian assistance
for Iraq and debt forgiveness. In a conversation with the
Charge' on April 17, Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel
al-Jubeir indicated that the King had been very impressed by
the visit of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and
al-Jubeir hinted that the Saudi government might announce
changes to its Iraq policy before the President's visit to
Riyadh in mid-May. End Summary.

Positive Signs in Iraq

¶2. (S) In all their meetings with the Saudi royals, both
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus conveyed the progress
in Iraq and confirmed the negative role Iran is playing in
Iraq. They characterized the recent ISF-led operations in
Basra and Baghdad as having a striking effect against the
Shia militias, most importantly turning Iraqi public opinion
away from the militias. While Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki's decision to take action against the militias was
described as hasty and not well-planned, Ambassador Crocker
and General Petraeus emphasized that any tactical shortfalls
were overshadowed by the greater positive effect of unifying
Iraq and demonstrating the GOI's, and most specifically
al-Maliki's, determined resolve to take on the Shia militias,
especially Jaysh al-Madhi. Concurrently, these operations
unequivocally demonstrated Iran's subversive activities in
Iraq and its broader regional ambitions. Throughout all
their discussions, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus
stressed the importance and urgent need for the Saudis to
join us in supporting Iraq.

The Saudi Embassy Issue

¶3. (S) King Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, and Prince
Muqrin all stated that the Saudi government would not send an
ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy there in the near
future, citing both security and political grounds in support
of this position. The Foreign Minister stated that he had
considered dispatching an ambassador and had sent Saudi
diplomats to Baghdad to identify a site for the Saudi
embassy. However, he said. "the King simply forbade us to go
any farther." King Abdullah confirmed this account in a
separate meeting with Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus. The King asserted that the security situation in
Baghdad was too dangerous for him to risk sending a Saudi
ambassador there. "He would immediately become a target for
the terrorists and the militias," he said.

¶4. (S) The King also rejected the suggestion that by sending
a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad he could give essential
political support to the Iraqi government as it struggles to
resist Iranian influence and subversion. He expressed
lingering doubt on the Iraqi government's willingness to
resist Iran. He also repeated his frequently voiced doubts
about Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki himself by alluding to
his "Iranian connections." The Saudi monarch stated that he
does not trust al-Maliki because the Iraqi Prime Minister had
"lied" to him in the past by promising to take certain
actions and then failing to do so. The King did not say
precisely what these allegedly broken promises might have
been. He repeated his oft heard view that al-Maliki rules
Iraq on behalf of his Shiite sect instead of all Iraqis.

¶5. (S) However, in a potentially significant move, the King
did not reject the idea of dispatching a Saudi ambassador to
Baghdad completely. Instead, he said that he would consider

RIYADH 00000649 002 OF 003


doing so after the Iraqi provincial elections are held in the
autumn. The conduct of these elections would indicate
whether or not the Iraqi government is truly interested in
ruling on behalf of all Iraqis or merely in support of the
Shia, King Abdullah asserted.

Grudging Acknowledgment of Change in Iraq

¶6. (S) The Foreign Minister signaled another potential
softening in Saudi policy by saying that the Kingdom's
problem was not with al-Maliki as a person but rather with
the conduct of the Iraqi government. The King himself
admitted that the Iraqi government's performance has improved
in recent months and grudgingly accepted the point that
al-Maliki and his security forces have indeed been fighting
extremists, specifically Shia extremists in both Basra and
Baghdad and Sunni extremists and Al Qaeda in Mosul. However,
the King and the senior Princes argued that more time would
be required to judge whether the recent change in Iraqi
behavior was lasting and sincere. The King suggested that
much of the Iraqi government's improved performance is
attributable to US prodding rather than change in Iraqi
attitudes.

¶7. (S) The Foreign Minister also suggested that the USG
should prod Ayatollah Sistani to speak out in favor of a
unified Iraq and national reconciliation among different
Iraqi sects and groups. "You have paid a heavy price in
blood and treasure, and Sistani and his people have benefited
directly. You have every right to ask this of him," Prince
Saud al-Faisal said.

Possible Saudi Economic Assistance

¶8. (S) The King, Prince Muqrin, and the Foreign Minister all
suggested that the Saudi government might be willing to
consider the provision of economic and humanitarian
assistance to Iraq. Prince Muqrin asked Ambassador Crocker
and General Petraeus to send him a list of the kinds of
assistance that the US government would like to see the
Kingdom provide Iraq. Al-Jubeir later told the Charge' that
this assistance would be separate from the USD 1 billion in
aid that the Saudi government had promised at the Madrid
Conference but still not delivered due to security worries.
He said that the Madrid commitment consisted of $500 million
in trade credits and $500 million in project assistance with
strict conditionally, along the lines of what the World Bank
would require. Al-Jubeir added that the assistance the Saudi
government might provide via Prince Muqrin would initially be
in the range of $75-$300 million.

Possible Debt Relief

¶9. (S) The King noted that Saudi debt relief for Iraq "will
come at some point," although he did not say when. Al-Jubeir
told the Charge' that debt relief is a real possibility. He
also noted that the Saudi government might make changes to
its Iraq policy, perhaps including both assistance and debt
relief, prior to the President's visit to Riyadh.

The Need to Resist Iran

¶10. (S) The King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and
Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needs to cooperate
with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence
and subversion in Iraq. The King was particularly adamant on
this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well.
Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US
to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons
program. "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," he
recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to
roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority
for the King and his government.

¶11. (S) The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, called
instead for much more severe US and international sanctions
on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on
bank lending. Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing
that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval.
The Foreign Minister also stated that the use of military
pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.


RIYADH 00000649 003 OF 003


¶12. (S) Comment: Saudi attitudes toward Iraq, from the King
on down, remain marked by skepticism and suspicion. That
said, the Saudis have noticed recent events in Iraq and are
eager to work with the US to resist and reverse Iranian
encroachment in Iraq. The King was impressed by Ambassador
Crocker's and General Petraeus' visit, as were the Foreign
Minister, GPI Chief, and Interior Minister. Cautious as ever,
the Saudis may nevertheless be willing to consider new
measures in the areas of assistance and debt relief, although
further discussions will be required to make these ideas a
reality. End Comment.
¶13. (U) This cable was reviewed and cleared by Ambassador
Crocker and General Petraeus.
GFOELLER
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/04/08RIYADH649.html


/tag/IR_1.html


08RIYADH1134     2008-07-22 05:05     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Riyadh

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SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO ISN/RA RMANGIELLO AND RNEPHEW, AND
NEA/ARP BMCGRATH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2018
TAGS: MNUC PGOV PREL SA TRGY KNNP IR
SUBJECT: SAUDIS ON IRAN REF UPCOMING NAM FM MEETING

REF: A. SECSTATE 74879
¶B. RIYADH 43
Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires Michael Gfoeller for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) On July 21, Pol Counselor delivered demarche on the
upcoming Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers meeting
scheduled for Tehran from July 27-30 (Reftel A) to Saudi MFA
Deputy Director for Western Affairs Department Mojahid Ali
Alwahbi.

¶2. (S) Alwahbi informed us that Saudi Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs (MFA Deputy Secretary equivalent) Dr. Nizar
bin Obaid Madani would lead the Saudi delegation. He assured
us Saudi Arabia did not want the NAM meeting to become an
Iranian propaganda event, adding he had seen the proposed
agenda and did not expect it to develop in such a manner.
Alwahbi agreed Iran's continued nuclear enrichment was a
grave SAG concern with regional security implications (Reftel
B).

¶3. (S) Alwahbi strongly advised against taking military
action to neutralize Iran's program. Rather, establishing a
US-Iranian dialogue was the best course of action, asserting
that the USG opening an Interest Section or re-opening our
Embassy in Tehran would be positive step. Alwahbi was
heartened by the USG's initiative for Under Secretary Burns
to meet with the Iranians last week in Geneva. He added
that, in his view, Iran's position was "shifting" and wanted
to avoid escalation of tensions. He noted his belief that
the Russians had recently been effectively pressuring Iran to
be less provocative. Alwahbi concluded that he expected Iran
to keep tensions relatively low at least until after the US
presidential election.

¶4. (S) COMMENT. These comments are typical of Saudi MFA
bureaucrats who take a pacific stance towards Iran, but
diverge significantly from the more bellicose advice we have
gotten from senior Saudi royals. END COMMENT.
GFOELLER


/tag/IR_1.html


08CAIRO1637     2008-07-31 10:10     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Cairo

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001637

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PASCUAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL PHUM AU EG IR IS SU
SUBJECT: CODEL KERRY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey, for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: On July 2, Senator Kerry and the Ambassador
discussed regional developments with President Hosni Mubarak,
including Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, and Israel-Palestine.
Mubarak said that Egypt was working to find a solution in
Sudan, but preferred to do so "quietly." Mubarak warned
against a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. While he
called Iranians "liars" and said they sponsor terrorism, he
opined that no Arab state would join the U.S. in a formal
defense alliance against Iran for fear of retaliation.
Mubarak expressed frustration with the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process, and was particularly disparaging about the
lack of Palestinian unity. End summary.

-------------------
AU "Soft" on Mugabe
-------------------

¶2. (C) In a 60-minute meeting with President Mubarak in Sharm
El-Sheikh, Senator Kerry began by asking for Mubarak's views
on the discussions at the African Union Summit, which had
concluded in Sharm El-Sheikh the previous day. Mubarak said
he had been at the Summit until late in the evening and was
tired. He reported that some member states had condemned
Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, while others told him to
form a national unity government and find a role for the
opposition parties. Mubarak said he couldn't prevent Mugabe
from attending the conference in Egypt because Zimbabwe is a
member of the African Union. He said the British were behind
this "big fuss" and that the pressure from other African
leaders was "sufficiently soft that Mugabe can do what he
wants."

-------------------------------
Sudan: Quiet Diplomacy Is Best
-------------------------------

¶3. (C) In response to Senator Kerry's query about the
situation in Sudan, Mubarak said the issue was not discussed
publicly at the AU summit. He also said "this issue could
have been worked out" if it were not debated so publicly
because "two tribes always work things out." Mubarak noted
Egypt's attempts to "try and help the (Sudanese) people"
through the Egyptian hospital in Sudan and the efforts of
EGIS Director Omar Suleiman to advise on North-South
negotiations.

------------------------------
Iraq: Don't Pull Out Too Soon
------------------------------

¶4. (C) Turning to Iraq, Senator Kerry asked Mubarak if he had
changed his opinion of Prime Minister Al Maliki after Iraq's
successful stabilization efforts in Basra and Sadr City.
Mubarak said he "I am not critical. He came to Cairo. I gave
him my phone number but he hasn't called us." He noted that
Egypt offered to host and train Iraqi forces, but that the
offer had not been acted upon by the Iraqis. He said the
U.S. "cannot withdraw until you strengthen the armed forces
and police. Until then you have to stay."

-------------------
Beware The Iranians
-------------------

¶5. (C) Mubarak's top concern for the stability of Iraq and
the region is Iran. He believes that "as a result of the
invasion of Iraq, Iran is spreading everywhere." He urged the
U.S. to be wary of what Iran says. "They are big, fat liars
and justify their lies because they believe it is for a
higher purpose." He said he believes this opinion is shared
by other leaders in the region. Nonetheless, he opined that
no Arab state will join the U.S. in a defense relationship
vis-a-vis Iran out of fear of "sabotage and Iranian
terrorism." He said Iran's sponsorship of terrorism is
"well-known but I cannot say it publicly. It would create a
dangerous situation." Mubarak said that sanctions are the
best hope for containing Iran, but Arab states won't dare to
endorse them.

-----------------------------------
Not Optimistic on The Peace Process
-----------------------------------

¶6. (C) On the Middle East Peace Process, Mubarak said he sees
no progress between Syria and Israel and doesn't expect any
progress between Israel and the PA leadership. He said that
"Palestinians are quarrelling" and Hamas and other factions
will reject any agreement made by Abu Mazen. Senator Kerry

CAIRO 00001637 002 OF 002


suggested the parties appeared to be close in some areas. In
response, Mubarak reiterated he doesn't believe the many
Palestinian factions will reach agreement and, thus, they
only serve to undermine Abu Mazen's efforts.

¶7. (C) This cable was not cleared by CODEL Kerry.
SCOBEY


/tag/IR_1.html


08STATE128877     2008-12-08 17:05     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Secretary of State

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S E C R E T STATE 128877

SIPDIS
SECRET//REL SAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018
TAGS: EFIN IR KNNP PARM PINR PREL
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO SAUDI REQUEST FOR RECOMMENDATIONS ON
HOW TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON IRAN

REF: A. RIYADH 1667
¶B. STATE 115523

Classified By: ISN PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, REASONS 1.4(b) AND (d)

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 4.

-------
SUMMARY
-------

¶2. (S//REL SAU) During the week of 13 October and in
response to ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia
McNerney's encouragement to help increase pressure on Iran to
change course, Saudi MFA Undersecretary for Multilateral
Affairs, Prince Turki Bin Mohamed Bin Saud Al-Kabeer
requested U.S. recommendations on specific actions Saudi
Arabia could take (REF A). Washington would like to provide
the following non-paper to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA),
which contains suggestions on how to further enhance Saudi
Arabia,s non-proliferation efforts with regard to Iran.

¶3. On October 16, 2008, the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) issued its fourth warning of the serious threat posed
by Iran's lack of a sufficient anti-money laundering and
counterterrorist financing regime (REF B). During the same
plenary meeting, FATF also separately issued guidance on the
steps that countries should take to implement UNSCR 1803's
call for vigilance over the activities of financial
institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in
Iran, in order to avoid such activities contributing to
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or to the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. These two
actions by the FATF, combined with the already widely held
view that Iranian financial institutions play a key role in
Iran's proliferation efforts, merit immediate action by
countries to mitigate these illicit finance risks.


----------
OBJECTIVES
----------

¶4. (S//REL SAU) Washington requests Embassy Riyadh approach
Prince Turki, or other appropriate senior KSA officials, to
discuss this issue and provide U.S. recommendations. Post
should pursue the following objectives:

-- Present the non-paper at paragraph 5 to KSA officials.

-- Urge host government to issue a public statement that
advances the October 2008 FATF statement on Iran, and
encourage all regional partners to do the same.

-- Encourage host government to carefully monitor any
financial and commercial activity with Iran within KSA to
ensure that Iran does not pursue illicit transactions via the
KSA.

-- Encourage host government to use its influence in the GCC
to invigorate further actions by regional partners to enhance
vigilance over financial and commercial activity with Iran,
as is called for by the Financial Action Task Force and
UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803.


--------
NONPAPER
--------

¶5. (S//REL SAU) BEGIN NON-PAPER FOR SAUDI ARABIA

During Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia McNerney's visit
to Saudi Arabia on 15 October 2008, she raised the issue of
Iran's nuclear program and the need to increase pressure on
the Iranian regime to address international concerns
surrounding its nuclear activities. Undersecretary for
Multilateral Affairs Prince Turki Bin Mohamed Bin Saud
Al-Kabeer requested suggestions on steps the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia could take in this regard.

We believe your government should consider taking action on
the following key priorities:

-- National Financial Measures

-- Export Control Implementation

-- Express Resolve on the Iranian Threat, and

-- Full Implementation of UNSCRs, particularly 1803.

Your vigilance thus far demonstrates your government,s
recognition that real action must be taken to protect the
region,s security by preventing Iranian proliferation. We
believe that if your government implemented the actions
suggested in this paper, it would not only allow you to
exercise influential leadership with regional neighbors, it
would significantly increase the pressure on Iran to
cooperate with the international community and address its
concerns.

We would like to present to you the following recommendations
and the United States is prepared to work with the KSA to
assist with the incorporation of these measures into Saudi
Arabia's nonproliferation system.

National Financial Measures:

-- We urge the Saudi Government to issue a public statement
that advances the October 2008 Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) statement on Iran. The Saudi statement should
recommend heightened vigilance and the implementation of
preventive measures, per FATF,s October statements, by all
countries with respect to the financial transactions with
Iran given the significant vulnerability that Iran poses to
the international financial system. A statement like this
from your government would send a clear message to your GCC
partners that the risk arising from Iranian banking
transactions is real and that action must be taken to protect
the region,s banking system and prevent Iranian
proliferation.

-- On October 16, the FATF issued its fourth warning of the
serious threat posed by Iran's lack of a sufficient
anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regime.
In contrast with prior FATF actions on Iran, this statement
marked a significant escalation in concern about the
terrorism finance threat emanating from Iran and ratcheted up
the call for preventive measures that should be implemented
by FATF members and other jurisdictions to protect their
financial sectors from this risk.

-- During the October plenary meeting, FATF also separately
issued guidance on the steps that countries should take to
implement United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1803's call for vigilance over the activities of financial
institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in
Iran, in order to avoid such activities contributing to
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or to the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

-- Iran uses deceptive tactics and front companies to
disguise its proliferation activities. The U.S. recommends
that Saudi Arabia highlight this fact with its domestic
businesses and GCC partners.

-- We also recommend that you reduce Saudi Arabian Industries
Corporation (SABIC) activities in Iran,s petrochemicals
market. The U.S. also proposes that Saudi Arabia suspend
Iran-GCC free trade area talks until Iran accepts the P5 1
incentives package.

-- U.S. Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 is an authority that
allows the U.S. to block the assets of WMD proliferators and
their supporters and thereby deny them access to the U.S.
financial and commercial systems. The U.S. recommends that
Saudi Arabia explore the creation of a similar legal
authority.

Export Control Implementation:

-- Saudi Arabia should begin work on drafting a comprehensive
export control law and adopt a comprehensive control list
that meets international standards, including the standards
set by the four multilateral export control regimes
(Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, nuclear
Suppliers Group, and Wassenaar Group).

-- A comprehensive export control system will give Saudi
Arabia the ability to ensure that its trade is secure and
will encourage high technology investment.

-- The United States is prepared to support Saudi Arabia in
this regard, including through our Export Control and Related
Border Security (EXBS) Program.

Express Resolve on the Iranian Threat:

-- Saudi Arabia should exercise leadership with neighbors in
the region and publicly by expressing concerns about Iran,s
continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and
destabilizing activities in the region.

-- We would appreciate public expressions of support for the
P5 1 dual track process including encouragement for Iran to
accept the incentives package.

-- Saudi Arabia should exercise its influence with China, in
particular, to persuade China to reduce its growing
energy/economic cooperation and weapons purchases. Such
efforts by China run contrary to the spirit of the UNSCRs and
the P5 1 dual track strategy. A high level Saudi delegation
could communicate to China Saudi concerns about the threat
posed by Iran,s actions.

Full Implementation of UNSCRs:

-- Full implementation of UNSCRs 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007),
and 1803 (2008), through vigilance and action against Iran,s
efforts to circumvent sanctions are key components to
maintaining pressure on Iran.

-- A useful step would be for KSA to vigorously implement
UNSCR provisions such as freezing financial assets and
imposing travel restrictions on designated entities and
individuals, prohibit dual-use exports, call for inspections
of IRISL and Iran Air Cargo shipment, and exercise vigilance
over any activities of financial institutions in KSA with
Iranian domiciled banks.

-- As a reference, the U.S. 60-day report on implementation
of UNSCR 1803 can be found at:
www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/memberstatesrep orts.shtml


END NONPAPER FOR SAUDI ARABIA

------------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
------------------

¶6. (U) Post should report results within seven business days
of receipt of this cable. Please address replies for ISN,
IO, T, TREASURY, and NEA/IR. Please include SIPDIS in all
replies.


----------------
POINT OF CONTACT
----------------

¶7. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up
information is Nicole Menkhoff, ISN/RA, 202-736-4277,
MenkhoffN@state.sgov.gov and Kevin McGeehan, ISN/CPI,
202-647-5408, McGeehanKJ@state.sgov.gov.
RICE


/tag/IR_1.html


08TELAVIV2760     2008-12-10 08:08     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

VZCZCXRO1721
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9530
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 4716
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0552
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0461
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 6800
RUEHDIA/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0096
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0970
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002760

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR LEVEY, S.
ATHENS FOR PURCELL, A.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018
TAGS: KTFN EFIN ECON KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: U/S LEVEY REASSURES GOI THAT NO MOMENTUM WILL BE
LOST IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERROR FINANCE

Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

1.(S) In a visit to Israel on 16-17 November, Treasury Under
Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Stuart A.
Levey, reassured GOI officials that no momentum would be lost
in USG efforts to combat terrorist financing or to pressure
Iran during the transition to a new US administration in
January. In meetings with Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni,
Mossad Director Meir Dagan, National Security Council
Chairman Dani Arditi, and others, U/S Levey emphasized recent
U.S. designations against the Union of Good, the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and the recent
revocation of Iran's "U-Turn" license. In response to GOI
officials' pressure to have the U.S. designate the Central
Bank of Iran (CBI), Levey underscored the importance of
international, multilateral concurrence for such an effort to
be a success.

2.(S) Israeli officials were keen to outline an "escalation"
in CBI programs that they believed pose a danger to the
international financial system. Several key Israeli officials
identified Reza Raei, Vice Governor of the CBI, as a key
figure in masterminding new ways to help the Iranian
commercial and banking sectors circumvent sanctions. Levey
promised to continue pushing the Gulf states on adopting
stronger regulation until the last day of his appointment.

3.(S) Mossad Chief Meir Dagan informed Levey that sanctions
were beginning to have a negative effect on Iran's regime.
NSC Chairman Arditi also told him that the PA was performing
well in its renewed fight against terror finance in the West
Bank. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------------------------- -----
GOI CONCERNED ABOUT COUNTER TERROR FINANCE POLICY CONTINUITY
--------------------------------------------- -----

4.(S) National Security Council (NCS) Chairman, Dani Arditi,
in a November 16 meeting with U/S Stuart Levey, asked whether
Levey thought his efforts would continue into the next U.S.
administration. Even though he said he planned to resign as
required in January, Levey told Arditi that he believed the
Obama team would be committed to continuing the ambitious
program against terrorism finance that he has shepherded over
the last several years. Saying counter- terrorism finance was
not a partisan issue in the U.S., Levey subsequently
confirmed these sentiments to Foreign Minister (FM) Tzipi
Livni and Mossad Director Meir Dagan in separate meetings
that occurred on the following day, November 17.

----------------------
IRAN/NON-PROLIFERATION
----------------------

5.(S) On November 16, Levey outlined for Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon
Bar, and Senior Deputy Director General Yossi Gal positive
developments in the Iran effort. He told them that Treasury
had been very successful in curtailing business with Iran by
most "major players". Levey said that expanding the
non-proliferation strategy into insurance, and putting
pressure on Iran's oil refining capacity and Liquid Natural
Gas (LNG) industry were next steps being pursued. He also
reported that the recent IRISL designation has been unusually
effective.

CBI's Reza Raei Masterminds New Methods
---------------------------------------

6.(S) During their November 16 meeting, Arditi told Levey
that the Israeli intelligence community has continued to see
an escalation in CBI efforts to help designated Iranian
commercial banks circumvent international and U.S. sanctions.
The NSC Chairman presented several recent examples of CBI
behavior that he characterized as unusual for a central bank.
Arditi identified Reza Raei, Vice Governor of the CBI for
Foreign Exchange Affairs, as the mastermind of these new

TEL AVIV 00002760 002 OF 004


efforts.

7.(S) Meir Dagan subsequently told Levey that the CBI had
engineered a way for the UN-designated Iranian bank Sepah to
conduct foreign business transactions through use of the
Iranian Postal Bank. Bank Melli, a USG-designated bank, had
also purchased shares in investment funds as a way to escape
the effects of the sanctions, according to Dagan. Using these
methods, Melli and Sepah have been able to fabricate a method
of providing correspondent-like banking services to
designated Iranian banks that find it increasingly difficult
to deal in foreign currency. Arditi named the "Persia Equity
Fund" as one such financial instrument being used by Melli.
Levey commented that any such investment fund or financial
instrument could be listed as a derivative designation of
Melli if enough evidence could be shown linking the two
organizations. Levey told Meir Dagan that he was in favor of
pursuing a designation of Raei if GOI allegations were
accurate.

No International Support for Designation of the CBI
--------------------------------------------- ------

8.(S) Arditi and subsequently, Dagan, asked Levey whether the
USG was considering a designation of the CBI. Although
Treasury had looked into the possibility, said Levey, a
designation of the CBI would be ineffective without a
multilateral effort. International support for such an effort
simply did not yet exist, Levey explained. He told Dagan that
we need to build support by sharing info about the CBI's
illicit conduct, similar to the support we built for cutting
off the U-turn license. Levey said that it would be better to
focus on limiting other central and commercial banks'
business with the CBI. Noting that the banking industry
relies heavily on reputation, Levey told Arditi that the
right strategy is to continue exposing the illicit activities
of Iranian banks and banking officials.

European Banks' Business with Iran
----------------------------------

9.(S) MFA interlocutors revisited the progress of European
banks in non-proliferation efforts. In a November 16 meeting
with Yossi Gal, Senior Deputy Director General, and Alon Bar,
Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs, Gal raised
concerns that Italy and Germany were falling short in their
commitment to enforce sanctions within their banking sectors.
Gal told Levey that the MFA was planning a visit to Italy in
December, but was unsure whether its attempt to persuade the
politicians would filter down to action within the
bureaucracy. Gal expressed the same concern about the banking
sector in Germany, saying that resistance from the
bureaucracy and the private sector often undermined attempts
by political figures to improve German regulation. Bar and
Gal encouraged Levey to join the GOI in pressing the
governments and banking sectors of Germany and Italy to do
more.

Cautious Optimism on Gulf States
--------------------------------

10.(S) On the status of UAE efforts to stem Iranian finance,
Levey told Gal and Bar that he was optimistic about the
country's efforts. Among other examples, he mentioned that
the UAE had decreased the number of visas it was issuing to
Iranian nationals and that Emirati ministers were receptive
to his requests for increased banking regulation.

11.(S) FM Livni told Levey that Israel continues to encourage
the Gulf states to more publicly outline their actions
against Iranian finance within their banking sectors despite
the countries' reasons for keeping such actions secretive.
She asked Levey to join in this effort. Levey affirmed that
the USG was encouraging sanctions in all sectors and posited
that the Iranians were beginning to feel the pressure. Livni
asked if the declining price of oil was becoming leverage in
the efforts to thwart Iranian financial efforts. Levey said
that it was and that the Iranian private sector was becoming
more vocal in its criticisms of the government.

12.(S) Levey outlined for his GOI interlocutors recent

TEL AVIV 00002760 003 OF 004


efforts by Treasury to broaden its sanctioning of Iran to the
shipping, insurance, and reinsurance industries. He cited the
designation of IRISL as a positive first step and mentioned
that Treasury had found willing partners in Europe and the UK
to further efforts in this area.

Effect of Sanctions on Iran
---------------------------

13.(S) Dagan told Levey that the economic problems Iran is
experiencing as a result of sanctions are encouraging debate
within the regime. He said that in order to preserve the
revolution, some key figures have begun to consider the need
for change. The pressure is on, Dagan said, but he could not
estimate when Iran would hit the brink. He noted that the
lower cost of oil at the moment would likely prompt Iran to
increase its production, thereby encouraging more business
through the CBI. With oil prices low everywhere, however,
Dagan and Levey agreed that Iran was a less attractive place
for investment. Levey told Dagan that the present low oil
prices provide a critical opportunity to convince other
members of the international community to apply more
pressure.

14.(S) Livni asked Levey if there was a risk of Iran
regaining a foothold in certain markets as a result of the
world financial crisis. Levey said that the market turmoil
has worked to the USG's advantage: the crisis has made
financial institutions even more risk-averse, thereby
lessening Iran's attractiveness even further. Additionally,
while Iran's banks are isolated, its economy is not.

U.S. Engagement with Iran
-------------------------

15.(S) FM Livni asked Levey during their November 17 meeting
why the USG was considering a rapprochement with Iran through
a U.S. Interests section in Tehran. She questioned whether
the tactic would have a net positive outcome when measured
against the negative perceptions such a move would be bound
to create. Levey told Livni that this was a question better
posed to the State Department, but that her concern was the
central issue being debated by policy makers in Washington.
In Levey's previous meeting with MFA officials Bar and Gal,
he said that engagement with Iran would not work without
leverage, indicating that sanctions would need to be in place
no matter what the USG decides to do.

--------------------------------------------- -------------
STEMMING PALESTINIAN TERROR FINANCE: GOI PLEASED WITH PA'S
PROGRESS
--------------------------------------------- -------------

16.(S) Levey told Arditi that Treasury's recent designation
of the "Union of Good" was proof of the USG's commitment to
continue to work against Hamas and Palestinian terrorists.
Levey said, however, that while the USG supported efforts at
thwarting terrorism in the territories, the USG wished to
keep humanitarian goods flowing to the needy within the
population.

17.(S) Arditi told Levey that Palestinian Authority (PA)
efforts at stemming terrorism within the territories were
going quite well. He said the PA's positive efforts
"surprised" his staff and that he "never thought" the PA
would do so well. Levey said that Treasury coordinated with
Prime Minister Fayyad on the Union of Good designation and
was pleased to hear that PA efforts were held in high regard
by the GOI.

18.(S) When Levey inquired about efforts to prevent
correspondent banking relations in Gaza from being severed,
Arditi said that the Postal Bank "was on the agenda". Arditi
lamented that the services provided by the Postal Bank would
not be as good because of its small size and limited
capacity. He expressed his hope that the central bank
governor would be able to delay the commercial banks'
decision to end their relationship with the Palestinians
until a permanent solution was ensured.

19.(S) This cable has been cleared by Under Secretary Stuart

TEL AVIV 00002760 004 OF 004


Levey.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_1.html


09CAIRO231     2009-02-09 16:04     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Cairo

VZCZCXRO6435
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1586
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 000231

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL EG IS QA IR SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED EGYPTIAN FM ABOUL GHEIT
MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY

Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

¶1. (S/NF) Madame Secretary, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit has
been looking forward to meeting you since your nomination was
first announced. The Egyptian leadership, including
President Mubarak, are encouraged by the Administration's
immediate attention to the Middle East and your and the
President's early outreach to them. Overall, the Egyptians
believe they did not receive fair treatment from the previous
Administration and hope to see improvements. Aboul Gheit
likely will explain Egypt's "soft power"--its ability to
influence regional events without benefit of deep pockets.
He likely will focus more on the strategic challenges of the
region--the peace process and Iran--but may also address some
pending bilateral matters. He may ask for your support for
Egypt to be part of an expanded G8 or G20 and press the
candidacy of Egyptian Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for
Director General of UNESCO. He may not raise human rights
(specifically Ayman Nour), political reform, or
democratization; but you should. Aboul Gheit will want to
discuss Gaza, including smuggling and counter-tunneling;
Iran; and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. On Iraq and
counter-terrorism, we and the Egyptians see largely
eye-to-eye; intelligence cooperation is close and effective;
and our military-to-military relationship is durable but
stuck in a force-on-force mindset.

¶2. (S/NF) Summary continued: Aboul Gheit is smart, urbane,
with a tendency to lecture and to avoid discussing Egyptian
failings with all-purpose recourse to Egyptian sovereign
pride. However, because this is his first meeting with you
and it is in Washington, he may be more inclined to listen.
You should thank him for Egypt's continuing regional
leadership, in particular regarding their efforts to bring
about a ceasefire in Gaza, and press him for Egypt to
continue to use their influence and good offices to achieve a
permanent solution to intra-Palestinian infighting and
conflict. You should also stress the need for Egypt to more
effectively insure that Hamas cannot rearm via smuggling
across -- or tunneling under -- the border with Gaza. Aboul
Gheit will press for your attendance at the March 2 Gaza
Donors Conference in Cairo, and may complain about unhelpful
Qatari and Syrian behavior. He will also want to explore US
intentions towards Iran; President Mubarak told Senator
Mitchell during his recent visit here that he did not oppose
our talking with the Iranians, as long as "you don't believe
a word they say." End summary.

------------------------
Respect and Appreciation
------------------------

¶3. (S/NF) In terms of regional affairs, Special Middle East
Envoy Senator George Mitchell struck the right chord during
his recent visit to Cairo when he told President Mubarak that
he was here to "listen and hear your advice." The Egyptians
have long felt that, at best, we take them for granted; and
at worst, we deliberately ignore their advice while trying to
force our point of view on them. You may wish to thank Aboul
Gheit for the vital role Egypt played in bringing about a
ceasefire in Gaza, and its efforts at making it last. You
should ask him what the current state of play is between
Hamas and Fatah and have him describe Egypt's vision of the
future for the Palestinians, both among their factions, and
vis a vis Israel. Note: Although the Egyptians will react
well to overtures of respect and appreciation, Egypt is very
often a stubborn and recalcitrant ally. In addition, Egypt's
self-perception as the "indispensable Arab state" is
contingent on Egyptian effectiveness on regional issues,
including Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.

-----------------------------------------
Egypt and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict
-----------------------------------------

¶4. (S/NF) Although Aboul Gheit was never enthusiastic about
the Annapolis Peace process, resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the primary strategic
political goal for the Egyptians. They are proud of their
role as intermediary, well aware that they are perhaps the
only player that can talk with us, the Israelis, and all
Palestinian factions. Mubarak hates Hamas, and considers
them the same as Egypt's own Muslim Brotherhood, which he
sees as his own most dangerous political threat. Since the

CAIRO 00000231 002 OF 004


June 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza, the Egyptians, under the
leadership of intelligence chief Omar Soliman (the de facto
national security advisor with direct responsibility for the
Israeli-Palestinian account) have shifted their focus to
intra-Palestinian reconciliation and establishment of the
Hamas-Israel ceasefire. Soliman brokered a half-year-long
truce last year, which Hamas broke in December, leading to
the Israeli invasion of Gaza. He has recently re-started
those efforts, with the goal of getting Hamas to agree to a
year-long ceasefire, which should give the Egyptians space to
bring about their political goal of Palestinian
reconciliation under a technocratic, non-partisan government
headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.

----------------
Gaza and Tunnels
----------------

¶5. (S/NF) Smuggling through the Sinai Peninsula and into Gaza
is an old and complicated problem for Egypt. Egypt views a
well-armed and powerful Hamas as a national security threat,
a point driven home in dramatic fashion by the January 2008
border breach when Hamas bulldozed the old border fence and
more than half a million Palestinians poured into Egypt,
unchecked and hungry. Since the closure of the Egypt-Gaza
border following the June 2007 Gaza takeover by Hamas, most
smuggling of consumer goods and weapons has gone underground.
The narrow corridor between Egypt and Gaza is as
honey-combed with subterranean passageways as a gigantic ant
colony.

¶6. (S/NF) Although it is not directly in Aboul Gheit's
bailiwick, belonging more to the security and intelligence
forces, nonetheless the issue of tunnels and rearming Hamas
is the subject of intense scrutiny (by Israel and the
Congress), and sensitivity (by the Egyptians). Long
criticized by Israel for "not doing enough" to halt arms
smuggling via tunnels, the Egyptians have stopped complaining
and started acting. Egypt has increased efforts to counter
arms smuggling by accelerating its $23 million FMF-funded
tunnel detection program along the Egypt-Gaza border and
requesting U.S. support to purchase four backscatter X-Ray
machines to scan vehicles entering the Sinai for weapons and
explosives (note Aboul Ghait may not be of this
EGIS-originated request). Egypt also continues to cooperate
with Israel, especially via intelligence sharing, to prevent
militants from Hamas and other extremist organizations from
crossing the Gaza border, and on thwarting militant activity
in Egypt. Egyptian efforts are all justified under President
Mubarak's pledge that Egypt with "protect its borders."

¶7. (S/NF) Egypt will not take any action that could be
perceived as collaboration in Israel's siege of Gaza, and
they have been hyper-sensitive to any suggestion that
foreigners are assisting them or overseeing their efforts to
counter smuggling. Aboul Gheit publicly distanced Egypt from
our January MOU with Israel to combat arms smuggling into
Gaza, although he knew about it in advance and consulted with
Secretary Rice and me about its contents. The Egyptians do
not want to be stuck holding the Gaza bag, and must be able
to point the finger of blame at Israel for the plight of the
Palestinians. At the same time, Egypt has withstood scathing
and widespread criticism in the Arab world for refusing to
open the Rafah border crossing to supply Gaza. Even during
the height of the December fighting, the Egyptians only sent
medicine and medical supplies through the Rafah border; all
other humanitarian goods went through the Israeli crossing at
Kerem Shalom. They likewise insist that Rafah will only
reopen to handle Gazan travellers when the Gazan side is
under PA control with EU observers according to the 2005 AMA.


¶8. (S/NF) Ultimately, Egypt believes that the only realistic
and viable solution to erode Hamas' power and stop arms
smuggling is the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza
and the opening of Gaza's border to legitimate trade. While
in the short term we can best assist the Egyptians with
technical know-how and training, long term counter smuggling
success will depend on reducing the financial incentives to
smuggling by providing the Sinai Bedouin with legitimate
economic opportunities and by regularly opening the Gaza
borders to trade, thereby reducing economic incentives to
smuggle.

----------------------------------
The March 2 Gaza Donors Conference
----------------------------------

¶9. (S/NF) President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell that he

CAIRO 00000231 003 OF 004


wanted to personally invite you to the March 2 Gaza Donors
Conference in Cairo. Aboul Gheit will press hard for you to
accept this invitation. He is keen to keep up the momentum
on Gaza reconstruction and for Egypt to be seen as taking the
lead in helping the Palestinians. It is very important to
him that this conference be at the ministerial level, and he
will be disappointed if you are unable to accept.

-------------
Iraq and Iran
-------------

¶10. (S/NF) President Mubarak enjoys recounting for visiting
members of Congress how he warned former President Bush
against invading Iraq, ending with, "I told you so!" and a
wag of his finger. In addition, there are Egyptian
misgivings about Nuri Al-Maliki and Shia majority rule in
Iraq. Egypt therefore will need additional prodding to
continue to take steps to help rehabilitate Iraq into the
greater Arab world. You should ask Aboul Gheit when he plans
to fully open the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad and exchange
accredited ambassadors with Iraq (the first Egyptian
ambassador to post-Saddam Iraq was assassinated). As for
Iran, Mubarak has a visceral hatred for the Islamic Republic,
referring repeatedly to Iranians as "liars," and denouncing
them for seeking to destabilize Egypt and the region. He
sees the Syrians and Qataris as sycophants to Tehran and
liars themselves. There is no doubt that Egypt sees Iran and
its greatest long-term threat, both as it develops a nuclear
capability and as it seeks to export its "Shia revolution."
Nonetheless, Mubarak told Mitchell pointedly that he did not
oppose the U.S. speaking to the Iranians, as long as we did
not "believe a single word they say." Aboul Gheit will be
keen to hear your description of U.S. intentions towards
Iran. In his conversation with Senator Mitchell, Aboul Gheit
carefully noting he was speaking personally, expressed more
interest into bringing the Syrians into negotiations again;
President Mubarak was not enthusiastic about dealing with the
Syrians at this time.

------------------------
U.S. Assistance to Egypt
------------------------

¶11. (S/NF) The greatest Egyptian outrage a year ago --
Congressional conditioning of $100 million of U.S. assistance
to Egypt -- may now be moot, according to our latest
understanding of the state of play with the FY2009
appropriations language. Beyond the issue of conditioning,
the Egyptians resent the U.S. unilateral decision to cut ESF
in half, from $415 million in FY-08 to $200 million in FY-09,
a level which the Egyptians find embarrassing, not because
they need the money (they say), but because it shows our
diminished view of the value of our relationship. In my
view, it is important to the U.S. to continue an ESF program
aimed at health, education, and poverty eradication to
demonstrate concern for the Egyptian people as opposed to a
strictly military assistance program. Egypt has also been
unhappy with the use of these funds to support democracy in
Egypt. It would be useful if you could urge that Egypt
accept the FY 2009 levels so that we can proceed to program
funds to benefit Egypt, while promising to engage in a
serious review of the conflicts that exist and a desire to
resolve them as soon as possible.

¶12. (S/NF) Concerning military assistance, the Egyptian
political and military leadership feel that they have been
"short changed" by our holding to an FMF level of $1.3
billion, (the same level for 30 years despite inflation), and
which they contrast with increases to our military assistance
to Israel. Finally, Egypt seeks a higher profile in
international financial circles (Finance Minister Youssef
Boutros Ghali was recently named Chairman of the IMF's
policy-setting committee, the IMFC, the first from a
developing country), and Aboul Gheit is likely to ask for
your support to include Egypt in expanded G8 and G20 fora.


---------------------------------
Ayman Nour and Saad Eddin Ibrahim
---------------------------------

¶13. (S/NF) Egypt's political leadership considers our public
chastisement of their treatment of jailed former opposition
Al Ghad party leader Ayman Nour as interfering with internal
affairs and infringement on national sovereignty. Mubarak
takes this issue personally, and it makes him seethe when we
raise it, particularly in public. Aboul Gheit's view is that
we have made Ayman Nour a freedom martyr, and a damaging (and

CAIRO 00000231 004 OF 004


distorting) prism through which we view our relationship with
Egypt. Much the same can be said about Saad Eddin Ibrahim,
the outspoken political science professor and democracy
activist who is in self-imposed exile in the U.S. because of
spurious law suits brought against him for allegedly defaming
Egypt. In a negative development in late January, Egypt,s
Attorney General-equivalent took action to advance the only
criminal case pending against Ibrahim. You should press
Aboul Gheit hard on Nour and Ibrahim, and also urge the GOE
to stop arresting other less prominent political activists.
Nour's health is bad and he has served more than half his
sentence; he deserves a humanitarian pardon. You may wish to
lay down a marker for a future discussion on democratization
and human rights concerns. You might note that although you
and the President want to improve the relationship, Egypt
could take some steps to remove these very volatile issues
from the agenda.

------------
Farouq Hosny
------------

¶13. (S/NF) Egypt has mounted a full-scale international
campaign to support the candidacy of Culture Minister Farouq
Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. The Arab League and
the African Union have already publicly stated their
commitment to Hosny, and the Egyptians believe they also have
the support of several Europeans, notably the French. Aboul
Gheit will also seek US support -- or, at least, not to
actively oppose -- the candidacy of Farouq Hosny as the next
Director General of UNESCO. The U.S. informed him last year
that we could not support the candidacy and urged Egypt to
put forward another name. Abould Gheit will argue Hosny's
merits for facing down the Islamic extremists who want to
narrow the space in Egypt for artistic expression. U.S.
objections have been to statements Hosny has made that
"Israel had no culture. . .it stole cultural ideas from
others and claimed them as its own" and other objectionable
remarks. If we plan to derail the Hosny candidacy, we must
provide a credible alternate, preferably an Arab and/or
Muslim.
SCOBEY


/tag/IR_1.html


09ASHGABAT218     2009-02-13 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Ashgabat

P 131259Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2320
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
IRAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL DUBAI
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T ASHGABAT 000218


NOFORN

STATE FOR NEA/IR AND SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL PTER TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN/IRAN: WEAPONS FOUND HIDDEN IN IRANIAN
EMBASSY SHIPMENT

Classified By: Charge Richard Miles, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) A Turkmen customs official told an Embassy LES on
February 13 that an Iranian Embassy diplomatic container with
AK-47's, sniper rifles and ammunition hidden in it had been
discovered one week earlier at the Serdar Uli (Gaudan)
customs point in Ashgabat, where vehicles and containers
arriving from or bound for Iran are inspected. The weapons
were reportedly hidden underneath two Turkmen carpets that
the Iranian Embassy was shipping to Iran.

¶2. (S/NF) The LES went to the Ashgabat Customs Point (a
different location) to inquire about an Embassy pouch
shipment arriving by truck, and an issue arose about opening
the Embassy's container for inspection. The customs
official, who is a close friend of LES, then brought up the
Iranian container incident. He said that a local shipping
employee of the Iranian Embassy had been present when another
official, acting on a "hunch that something was not right,"
opened the Iranian Embassy container. The customs official
told LES that the official who discovered the cache was
honored for his actions and received a promotion.

¶3. (S/NF) COMMENT: Turkmenistan imposes stringent controls
on the importation of any type of firearm, and Chiefs of
Missions' security detail are all unarmed. Even assuming
that the weapons in question were intended for the Iranian
Embassy's internal security, this would not explain the
presence of offensive weapons such as sniper rifles, in the
cache. The Embassy has no official confirmation about the
incident, which was, we note, relayed second-hand to our LES.
END COMMENT.


MILES


/tag/IR_1.html


09STATE14577     2009-02-18 00:12     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Secretary of State

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INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 014577

SIPDIS
SECRET/NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL RS BA KU AE EG JO IS IR
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: RUSSIA S-300 MISSILE TO IRAN

REF: MOSCOW 357

Classified By: NEA Acting A/S Jeffrey Feltman: Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (SBU) This is an action request for Posts in Abu Dhabi,
Amman, Cairo, Kuwait City, Manama, and Riyadh. Please see
para 7.

Summary and Background
------------------------------------------

¶2. (C) Posts are requested to raise with appropriate
government officials our concerns about Russian plans to
transfer the S-300 long-range air-defense system to Iran.
Washington would like these governments to immediately and
directly raise this issue with their Russian counterparts
arguing that such a transfer could significantly enhance
Iran's air defense capability; increase regional instability;
and reward Iran at a time when Iran is undermining security
with its nuclear pursuits and support for terrorism.

¶3. (S//NF) Over the past few years, the Russian Government
has told the USG that, while it has a contract to supply the
S-300 air-defense system to Iran, the transfer would not be
completed until Iran complied with its international nuclear
obligations. USG suspicions were piqued during a February 12
meeting when Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov brushed off U/S
Burns concerns over such a transfer, but did not reiterate
Russia,s year-long position that the S-300 transfer depends
on Iranian behavior. The Iranian Defense Minister is
currently in Moscow for talks with Russia on the delivery of
the S-300. Initial press reports quote Rosoboronexport
officials as saying there has been no progress in the talks
to expedite delivery of the system. Russian news media also
speculates that Russia will not deliver the S-300 to Iran for
fear of upsetting discussions with the new US administration.
Despite the denials in the press, we are concerned by the
technical preparations for delivery of the S-300, which are
complete or nearing completion. It appears that there is a
need for action now to prevent a senior-level political
decision to allow the delivery to go foward.

¶4. (C) Though Russia states that the S-300 is "defensive" in
nature, the mobile system could be used to support offensive
operations. S-300s located on Iranian territory would have
the range to engage targets well beyond Iran,s borders into
Persian Gulf and Iraqi airspace, threatening U.S. and
regional partners.

¶5. (SBU) UNSCR 1747, passed on March 24, 2007, urged all
states to exercise "vigilance and restraint in the supply,
sale or transfer" of a broad range of conventional weapons as
defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on
Conventional Arms to Iran. While the S-300 does not
technically meet the definition within the UN Register for
any of the categories of items listed in paragraph 6 of UNSCR
1747, transfers of this type of system to Iran seriously
undercut the primary objective of UNSCR 1747 to further press
Iran to comply with the UNSCR 1737 requirement to suspend its
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and cooperate
fully with the IAEA.

¶6. (C) We have selected action addressee posts to engage the
GOR because we maintain strong bilateral relationships and
share common security interests, but also because we believe
these governments have potential leverage with Russia. In
particular, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have
increased their political-military cooperation with Russia.
These countries can legitimately make the point to Moscow
that they cannot have a close political-military partnership
with Russia, while Russia strengthens the hand of Iran,
arguably the greatest threat to each of these nation's
security.

Suggested Talking Points
-----------------------------------------

¶7. (SBU) Posts are requested to approach appropriate host
government officials regarding the possible transfer of the
S-300 air-defense system from Russia to Iran. Post should
draw from the following talking points.

--In the spirit of our bilateral cooperation, we request your
government,s support in urging Russia to not transfer a
highly sophisticated air defense system to Iran.

--In 2005 Russia signed a contract to sell the modern
long-range S-300 air defense missile system to Iran.

-- In 2006, after it was exposed that Iran was not in
compliance with its international nuclear obligations, Russia
assured us, it would not complete the transfer until Iran
changed course.

--Despite these assurances, we are concerned that Russia is
in a position to deliver the S-300 to Iran as soon as a
political decision is taken.

--Moreover, when we raised our concerns in recent
senior-level conversations with Russian officials, we were
not reassured by the Russian response.

--We request that you use your influence with Russia to
sharpen their decision against a transfer at this time.

--Though Russia has categorized the S-300 as defensive in
nature, it is a mobile system that can easily used to support
offensive operations.

--The most modern variant of the S-300, high-performance
surface-to-air missile system would greatly improve Iran,s
ability to defend large regions of its airspace up to 200 km
beyond its borders.

--With Iran in non-compliance of its international nuclear
obligations and continued meddling in regional affairs, this
is not the time for Russia to engage in arms sales with
Tehran.

-- We are also concerned about the implications of the
transfer of an air defense system to Iran. Such transfers
would undercut the broad objective of UNSCR 1747 to increase
pressure on Iran to suspend its proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities and cooperate fully with the IAEA by
denying arms transfers to Iran.

--(If appropriate) We believe you have particular leverage
given your expanded military cooperation with Russia. You
can legitimately argue that Moscow cannot be true partners in
the political-military realm while simultaneously
strengthening Iran, which is arguably the greatest threat to
your nation,s security.

End Talking Points
CLINTON


/tag/IR_1.html


09STATE16285     2009-02-22 20:08     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Secretary of State

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INFO RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 016285

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2029
TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC IR SYR TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA

CLASSIFIED BY: ISN - C. S. ELIOT KANG, ACTING FOR
REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraphs 6-9.

-------
SUMMARY
-------

¶2. (SBU) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Director General (DG) ElBaradei released his latest
reports on the status of the IAEA's investigations into
Iran and Syria's nuclear programs on 19 February 2009.
Both reports conformed to expectations in describing the
absence of any meaningful steps by either country to
address the serious issues that exist with respect to
their nuclear programs.

¶3. (SBU) With respect to Iran, DG ElBaradei's
description of the dichotomy between the stalled
investigation and rapid pace of Iran's centrifuge
advances is stark. The report underscores the number of
outstanding issues that need to be clarified regarding
possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program.
The IAEA simply notes that it has "still not received a
positive reply from Iran" regarding its request for
access to relevant "information, documentation,
locations or individuals." Consequently, "the Agency
has not made any substantive progress on these issues."
Iran's failure to cooperate with the IAEA in this regard
suggests Iran continues to wish to hide the nature of
these activities.

¶4. (SBU) At the same time, the IAEA reported that, far
from having complied with its UNSC obligation to suspend
its uranium enrichment and heavy water-related
activities, Iran has continued to expand its activities
at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and Arak Heavy
Water Research Reactor. Approximately 5,500 centrifuges
are operating, up from approximately 3,800 in November
¶2008. Of particular concern, the IAEA notes that since
February 2007, Iran has produced 1,010 kilograms of low
enriched uranium (LEU), a substantial increase over the
630 kilograms reported in November 2008. Approximately
1,300 kilograms of LEU would be sufficient for one
nuclear weapon if Iran decided to go that route.
Currently, this material remains under IAEA safeguards.
Nevertheless, the risk posed in an Iranian breakout
scenario, either from diversion of safeguarded nuclear
material or through the covert enrichment of undeclared
nuclear material, is higher than in the past. Morever,
Iran continues to deny the IAEA access to the Arak
reactor to conduct a Design Information Verification
inspection which would provide the IAEA assurances that
the construction of the reactor does not serve as a
pathway to divert nuclear material for weapons purposes.

¶5. (SBU) DG ElBaradei's report on Syria reinforces our
conclusion that Syria was engaged in a clandestine
effort to construct and operate a nuclear reactor at Al
Kibar. The report also helps to confirm that uranium
found via environmental samples collected at the site is
not naturally occurring, lending credence to the fact
that the facility in question was a reactor. Although
the report does not categorically dismiss Syria's
explanation that the uranium was from Israeli missiles
used in the attack on the reactor in September 2007, it
suggests that this explanation is highly unlikely.
Syria delivered an eleventh-hour letter on 17 February
2009 attempting to demonstrate a degree of cooperation
immediately before the report's release. The report
notes that the responses in the Syrian letter "were only
partial ... and did not address most of the questions
raised in the Agency's communications." Importantly,
the report also calls on Syria to allow access to other
locations and allow inspectors to take samples of the
debris removed from Al Kibar as soon as possible, noting
that these measures are "essential" for the IAEA to be
able complete its assessment.

---------------
Action Requests
---------------

¶6. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS: Posts are
requested to convey U.S. views regarding the IAEA
reports to appropriate host governments. Posts should
underscore that these reports demonstrate that neither
Iran nor Syria have taken any meaningful steps to
cooperate with the IAEA in the past six months. Posts
should stress that Syria's refusal to do so only deepens
concerns regarding the nature of its clandestine nuclear
activities. With respect to Iran, Posts should
emphasize that while Iran has stalled the IAEA's
investigation and still refuses to provide the IAEA with
requested transparency, its centrifuge program continues
to make progress. The net result is that in neither
case can the international community have confidence in
the exclusively peaceful nature of these nuclear
programs. For Iran, the UN Security Council has imposed
a mandatory requirement that it suspend all
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and cooperate
fully with the IAEA. On Iran, we should stress that
with international rights, come responsibilities. Iran
needs to live up to those responsibilities. We believe
that Iran's continued failure to do so is another
opportunity lost.

¶7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS CONT: With
respect to the upcoming 2-6 March 2009 IAEA Board of
Governors' meeting, Posts should stress the need for the
following from host governments:

-- Strong national statements on Iran and call on Iran
to impement its international nuclear obligations
without delay. Statements should urge Iran to take
advantage of this critical opportunity for engagement by
addressing the concerns of the international community
and underscore the need for full transparency with the
IAEA (including Iran's implementation of the Additional
Protocol) and cooperation with the IAEA's investigation,
as well as suspension of all proliferation-sensitive
nuclear activities;

-- Strong national statements on Syria and a demand that
Syria cooperate with the IAEA's investigation;

-- Strengthened statements on Iran and Syria from
regional or other groups, e.g., European Union, the
Group of 77 and China, the Non-Aligned Movement, the
Group of Latin America and the Carribean; the Africa
Group, etc. To the extent possible, Posts should
encourage host goverments to instruct their delegations
not to accept statements from any group to which they
are a member that would downplay the factual reports of
the IAEA, or undercut the Agency's ability to obtain the
necessary information and access needed to resolve these
serious issues; and,

-- Board members should support, by vote if necessary,
releasing the Syria report to the public. This is
essential for the public to appreciate the serious
nature of Syria's failure to cooperate with the IAEA.
This report will also demonstrate the level of
transparency in IAEA affairs that we believe Syria
should manifest in its approach to the IAEA.

¶8. (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR UNVIE: In addition to
conveying these messages to local IAEA Missions, UNVIE
should continue working to promote support within the
IAEA Secretariat and among IAEA Board Members for
continuing and expanding the investigation into both
Iran and Syria's nuclear activities and pressuring both
to cooperate with the respective investigations.
Mission is requested to place maximum effort into
securing strong national statements demanding Iranian
and Syrian cooperation with the IAEA by as many Board
members as possible, particularly those in the EU.
Mission should also work to support a P5+1 statement on
Iran. Mission's efforts to build support for such
statements should begin as soon as possible, and will be
facilitated by technical briefings on Iran and Syria's
nuclear efforts to Board members in Washington and
Vienna the week prior to the Board meeting. These
briefings will be provided by State and IC
nonproliferation experts. Mission is also requested to
ensure that the IAEA Director General's forthcoming
report on Syria is made public, including by laying the
groundwork for a vote in the Board if necessary. If
possible politically and statutorily, Mission should
seek the concurrent release of the November 2008 Syria
report, which was denied public release by NAM/Arab
intervention at the November 2008 Board meeting.
Mission should begin coordinating with likeminded Board
members at the earliest possible date.

¶9. (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW,
BERLIN, AND BEIJING: In addition to conveying U.S.
views regarding the Iran and Syria reports, Posts should
stress that the United States believes that the Iran
report reinforces the need for a strong P5+1 statement
demanding Iran's immediate and full cooperation with the
IAEA. Discussions regarding specific texts will be
addressed in Vienna and Washington.

---------------------------
POCS AND REPORTING DEADLINE
---------------------------

¶10. (SBU) Mission is requested to report on the status
of its efforts in advance of the Board. Richard Nephew
(202-647-7680) and Matt Goldstein (202-647-4196) are the
Department's POCs for this issue.
CLINTON


/tag/IR_1.html


09ASHGABAT248     2009-02-24 04:04     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Ashgabat

VZCZCXRO0500
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH
RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHAH #0248 0550457
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 240457Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2339
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4850
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T ASHGABAT 000248

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019
TAGS: IR PGOV PHUM RS TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: TURKISH AMBASSADOR CONCERNED ABOUT
POTENTIAL SHIPMENTS OF URANIUM TO IRAN

Classified By: Charge Richard Miles, reasons 1.4(B), (D), (E) and (F).

¶1. (C) The Turkmen Government announced earlier this month
that President Berdimuhamedov had signed a decree allowing
the state chemical concern "Turkmenkhimiya" to enter into a
contract with Ekomet-S of Russia for the transfer and burial
of radioactive waste. The waste was reportedly produced at
the Hazar chemical plant and at the Balkanabat iodine plant.

¶2. (S) In a meeting with the Charge on February 17, Turkish
Ambassador Huseyin Bichakli raised concerns about reports
that Turkmenistan and Russia plan to resume uranium
production in Turkmenistan. He said that he had learned from
sources that a Russian military delegation had visited
Turkmenistan in early January and visited the site of a
former "uranium" plant at Kizilkaya in Balkan Province. The
plant operated during the Soviet era. He said that the
delegation was also briefed on the planned North-South
railroad line from Russia to Iran, which includes a 700 km
stretch through Turkmenistan. Ambassador Bichakli said there
were rumors that the railroad would be used to transport
uranium processed at the currently inactive Turkmen uranium
plant to Iran.

¶3. (S) COMMENT: Ambassador Bichakli did not provide his
sources, but noted that for Turkmenistan to collaborate with
Russia to transport processed uranium to Iran, particularly
in a surreptitious manner, is inconsistent with its policy of
neutrality. Post will report any further information on this
issue. END COMMENT.
MILES


/tag/IR_1.html


09ABUDHABI192     2009-02-24 07:07     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Abu Dhabi

P 240739Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2167
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
IRAN COLLECTIVE
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5//
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000192


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MOPS MASS IR AE
SUBJECT: URGENT UAE REQUEST FOR AIR DEFENSE -- FIVE PATRIOT BATTERIES
THIS YEAR

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: UAE Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces convoked
the Ambassador to request the urgent deployment of five U.S. patriot
batteries in the UAE as an interim measure until the UAE's own
batteries are operational (anticipated in 2012). The UAE belief that
an increasingly likely pre-emptive Israeli attack on Iran would
prompt quick retaliation on U.S. allies (foremost among them the very
proximate UAE) prompted the request. End summary.

¶2. (C) On 22 February 2009, Ambassador Richard Olson, Defense
Attache (DATT) Colonel Bret Rider and Chief, US Liaison Office (USLO)
Colonel David Sprague were summoned to the office of the Chief of
Staff of the UAE Armed Forces (COS), where they were met by the COS,
LTG Hamid Thani al Rumaithy, Director Military Intelligence and
Security (MISS) MGen Eissa al Mazrouei, Commander of the UAE Air
Force and Air Defence (AF&AD) AVM Mohammed Swaidan al Qamzi and the
COSs office director BGen Faris Mohammed al Mazroui.

¶3. (S) Following very brief pleasantries the COS bluntly commented:
"I need to be open and frank with you, there are changes in the
region that concern us." On behalf of his government, the COS then
made an official request of the US government to deploy between four
and five Patriot batteries to the UAE during calendar year 2009. He
requested these batteries remain in place until such time as they can
be replaced by the UAE's own nine batteries, currently on order.

¶4. (S/NF) The UAE would place three of the US batteries in and
around Abu Dhabi, one battery at the port of Jebel Ali, and a final
battery somewhere else in the northern emirates (presumably Dubai).
The COS noted previous studies on the placement of the batteries are
on file and will help guide final placement. The COS stated the
batteries would be used to protect critical military and civilian
targets.

¶5. (S/NF) The COS noted that Iran will continue doing its best to
keep the entire region unstable. Iran is recognized as Israel's
biggest threat in the region and Israel will attack Iran with little
or no notice. Following an Israeli attack, the UAE is convinced Iran
will lash out against those who "help Israel," or the allies of
Israel's friends, most significantly the UAE. The COS noted the UAE
has the Patriot system on order and expects to take delivery in 2012.
He went on to mention the pending deployment of a single Patriot
battery to protect Al Dhafra Air Base -- which should be operational
within the next 30 to 60 days. The COS noted the UAE operational
capacity will come too late and the single US battery will be too
little to stop Iranian missiles if they attack sooner rather than
later.

¶6. (S/NF) Hamid Thani senses indications and warnings the Israeli
government now being formed will likely attack Iran. He thinks the
new (Netanyahu) government will be very determined to eliminate the
threat of Iranian missiles, especially nuclear tipped ones, which
they fear may come raining down on Israeli cities. He also stated
Israel would be justified to take such action as it must protect its
citizens just as any nation has the duty to do. He feels that a
breakthrough in international efforts in regard to Iran's armament
programs may slow Israel's actions. However, the COS knows that
Israel must maintain all its options. He also knows the Iranians
have toyed with the international community for over ten years as
they built their capability. He stated the Israelis are also very
aware of Iranian tactics.

¶7. (S/NF) When pressed on what type of event may precipitate an
Israeli attack, the COS thought the delivery of the Russian S-300
system could be the catalyst. The COS stated very flatly that "I
don't trust the Russians, I've never trusted the Russians or the
Iranians."

¶8. (S/NF) The COS went on to request continued and expanded
intelligence sharing between the US and the UAE. He asked the DATT
what advance warning the US could expect of an Iranian attack. He
quickly added that he asks the same question of his MISS chief at
least twice a week and gets no answer -- as he knows there is no good
answer. (Note: The COS served as the MISS chief prior to becoming
COS and knows very well the capabilities related to predicting
Iranian actions. End note.)

¶9. (C) The meeting ended nearly as quickly as it began with both
sides wishing each other good will and great success during the
International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) opening later in the day
(immediately following this meeting all of the attendees departed
directly for IDEX). The COS met with and most certainly briefed the
President, Prime Minister and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince (the de facto
Minister of Defense) as IDEX began.


OLSON


/tag/IR_1.html


09TELAVIV457     2009-02-26 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Tel Aviv

VZCZCXRO3204
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DE RUEHTV #0457/01 0571219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261219Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0661
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000457

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS IR SY
SUBJECT: CODEL CARDIN DISCUSSES IRAN, SYRIA, PALESTINIANS,
AND ISRAEL ELECTION WITH BENJAMIN NETANYAHU

Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY During their trip to Israel, CODEL Cardin
discussed Iran, Syria, Israel-Palestinian negotiations, and
the Israeli elections with Likud Party leader and candidate
for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu described a
nuclear Iran as the greatest threat facing Israel, and urged
strong economic sanctions backed by a viable military option
to confront a problem that he said threatened the region and
could prove a "tipping point" in world history. Describing
his approach to "economic peace" with the Palestinians,
Netanyahu suggested he would cut through bureaucratic
obstacles to Palestinian economic development to build a
"pyramid" from the "bottom up" that would strengthen the
Palestinian Authority, and offer the Palestinians a viable
alternative to radicalism. Netanyahu expressed support for
the concept of land swaps, and emphasized that he did not
want to govern the West Bank and Gaza but rather to stop
attacks from being launched from there. Netanyahu suggested
Syrian interest in peace negotiations with Israel were really
overtures to the United States, and described the Syrians as
firmly in the Iranian camp. Netanyahu expressed confidence
that President Peres would offer him rather than Kadima Party
leader Livni the opportunity of forming a coalition because
the bloc of center-right/right wing parties in the new
Knesset amounted to 65 seats. Netanyahu said his desire
would be to form a unity government with Kadima, but would
not agree to a rotating prime ministership. END SUMMARY

¶2. (SBU) As part of their February 14-17 visit to Israel,
CODEL Cardin met with Likud Party leader and candidate for
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 16 in
Jerusalem. Netanyahu was at the center of intense political
speculation about the formation of a governing coalition
following the extremely close Israeli national election of
February 10, which did not produce a clear winner. The CODEL
met with Netanyahu following meetings the previous day with
President Peres, and prior to meetings later in the day with
Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian Authority Prime
Minister Fayyad.

----
IRAN
----

¶3. (C) Netanyahu quickly launched into his oft-stated
position that Iran is the greatest threat facing Israel.
Noting that "Persia" already had two bases on the
Mediterranean (referring to Hizballah and Hamas), Netanyahu
complained that Iran's "tentacles" were choking Israel, and
that a new one grew back whenever one was cut off. Netanyahu
charged that Iran was developing nuclear weapons with the
express purpose of wiping out Israel, and described
preventing Iran from developing a nuclear capability as
Israel's highest policy priority. Netanyahu described five
threats that he saw emanating from Iranian nuclear
development: a direct threat to Israel; a direct threat to
other regional states; increased terrorist power under an
Iranian nuclear umbrella; a Middle East nuclear arms race;
and a destabilized Middle East, with Arab regimes
"terrified" of Iran in his view. Netanyahu, commenting that
he normally avoided political jargon, pointed to one phrase
that he said applied to this issue - "a tipping point."
According to Netanyahu, if Iran develops a nuclear weapon
capability it will "topple the peace process" and "change the
history of the world."

¶4. (C) When asked what advice he offered to the United
States, Netanyahu reported that he had spoken to
then-candidate Obama and said the method was less important
than the goal, and asked rhetorically whether the President
would allow Iran to "cross the nuclear threshold ... on his
watch." Netanyahu suggested there were many ways to pressure
Iran, which he saw as economically weak at the moment due to
plunging oil prices at the same time that the U.S. President
had strong international backing, a situation Netanyahu
described as the opposite of the past few years. He said he
would look forward (as Prime Minister) to discussing with
President Obama concrete measures to be taken against Iran.
Netanyahu said these would not be a substitute for
Palestinian negotiations, but that any result from such
negotiations would be "washed away" by Iran's attaining a
nuclear bomb.

¶5. (C) When asked how Iran could be isolated, Netanyahu
suggested a blockade as one possibility. The nuclear program
could be stopped if the U.S. led the international community
to "ratchet up" economic sanctions, but that these sanctions
would only work if Iran knew that the U.S. military option
remained viable. Netanyahu said he did not object to a U.S.
dialogue with Iran provided the talks were close ended,
perhaps two months, with fixed results, otherwise Iran would

TEL AVIV 00000457 002 OF 003


"take you to the cleaners." He said he agreed with the
Europeans' urging the U.S. to postpone any talks until past
the Iranian elections in June. Netanyahu said he did not
know for certain how close Iran was to developing a nuclear
weapons capability, but that "our experts" say Iran was
probably only one or two years away and that was why they
wanted open ended negotiations. He again urged "tough
negotiations" if military means were not used (and added
that Special Envoy Mitchell was both nice and tough.)
Netanyahu described the Iranian regime as crazy, retrograde,
and fanatical, with a Messianic desire to speed up a violent
"end of days." That was not the whole country, however, in
his view, as he said that "75 percent of the Iranian people"
oppose the regime, but that it governed with terror and would
be hard to overthrow. There was no single view from
Iranians, therefore, but there was from the powers that
dominate. He reiterated that strong economic action could
stop their nuclear development or possibly even bring down
the regime - as could "the U.S. military process."

-----------------
PALESTINIAN TRACK
-----------------

¶6. (C) Turning to peace with the Palestinians, Netanyahu
said the reason the process had not worked so far was that
while 70 percent of Israelis were willing to make
concessions, the same number were convinced that there was no
real Palestinian partner. Netanyahu warned that when Israel
left Lebanon is created a first Iranian base, that when it
left Gaza it created a second Iranian base, and if Israel
"promised" a third retreat from the West Bank it would see
the same results. There were three options, according to
Netanyahu - withdrawing to the 1967 borders (that would "get
terror, not peace"); doing nothing ("just as bad"); or
"rapidly building a pyramid from the ground up." Netanyahu
suggested a rapid move to develop the West Bank economically,
including "unclogging" bureaucratic "bottlenecks." He
promised to "take charge personally" (as Prime Minister) to
facilitate this bureaucratic reform, which would occur in
tandem with political negotiations and cooperation with
Jordan to build up Palestinian Authority security capacity.
Netanyahu noted that there were larger demonstrations
against the Gaza operation in Madrid and London than in the
West Bank. He said this was because the West Bankers
recognized that Hamas represents the prospect of "violent,
crazy" people in charge of their society; they should be
offered real alternatives in order to have the strength to
resist the radicals.

¶7. (C) Netanyahu said his "new approach" would also
include not continuing to fund a "bloated" Palestinian
bureaucracy. It would be aimed at direct development.
Netanyahu, noting that he had previously "turned around" the
Israeli economy (as Finance Minister), gave one example of a
problem he would fix as an electric powerline in the West
Bank that was held up by conflicting and competing agencies.
He said this powerline was needed and would create jobs, but
was held up not because the Palestinians were targeted, but
because that was how the Israeli bureaucracy worked for
everyone, including Israelis. When asked whether these
reforms could include room to modify security arrangements,
Netanyahu agreed that some of what the GOI calls security is
in fact bureaucracy. Pointing to what he described as strong
but unpublicized trade between Haifa port and Iraq via
Jordan, he suggested assembly points could be set up in the
West Bank for some goods, which would create thousands of
jobs. This would not be a substitute for a political
settlement, according to Netanyahu, but economic prosperity
would make peace possible, as occurred in Northern Ireland.

-----
SYRIA
-----

¶8. (C) Netanyahu said he was actually more optimistic about
dealing with the Palestinians than with Syria, because he was
confident that the Palestinian Authority wants Iran and its
proxies out. He said he was less sanguine about Syria, which
he complained straddles the fence all the time. The Syrians
might "talk about" a new (U.S.) relationship, but he did not
see them disconnecting from Iran. Netanyahu suggested that
Israel "giving up" the Golan would just result in assurances
that Syria would later "tear up." Describing King Hussein as
heroic, and noting that the King came from his "death bed" in
1998 to get then-Prime Minister Netanyahu and
then-Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat to reach an
agreement at the Wye River talks, Netanyahu said that when
Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, even King Hussein "snuggled up"
to the Iraqi leader out of necessity. Such is the reality in
the Middle East.


TEL AVIV 00000457 003 OF 003


-------------------
COALITION FORMATION
-------------------

¶9. (C) Despite finishing one Knesset seat behind Kadima and
its candidate Tzipi Livni in the February 10 Israeli national
elections, Netanyahu expressed complete confidence that
President Peres would offer him the opportunity to form a
government because the bloc of center-right/right wing
parties in the new Knesset has 65 seats compared to Livni's
potential bloc of 45 seats for center-left/left wing parties
plus 11 seats for Arab parties. Netanyahu said his desire
would be to form a unity government with Kadima, but would
not agree to a rotating prime ministership with Ms. Livni.
He explained that the one time Israel had a rotation came as
a result of an exact tie between the two political
coalitions, but this time the right wing bloc was much
larger.

¶10. (C) When asked about Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael
Beiteinu party, Netanyahu reminded the CODEL that Kadima had
in fact included Lieberman in their government in its earlier
stages. Netanyahu stressed repeatedly that he preferred a
unity government, and said the large security and economic
problems facing Israel called for the strength that a unity
government would offer. Livni "collapsed" left- wing votes
(from Labor and other parties) to score a one vote margin for
Kadima over Likud in the elections, but took no votes away
from the right, according to Netanyahu. When asked what he
might offer to Kadima, Netanyahu suggested Kadima would get a
few key ministerial portfolios, but did not elaborate. He
said that he while he was convinced a rotating Prime
Ministership would not happen, he was confident a unity
government could. Netanyahu said the government would not
include the Arab parties.

¶11. (C) Netanyahu promised that as Prime Minister his
government would not "go back" to unilateral withdrawals, and
would have a clear focus. On the economy, he said Israel was
not a huge economy such as the United States or China, and
that he would be able to turn things around quickly, as "a
small share of a declining market" was big for Israel. Asked
about settlements, Netanyahu noted that he had not
established any new settlements when he was Prime Minister.
Half of the West Bank, the area east of the ridge line and
the Jordan Valley, is virtually unpopulated and only contains
a few settlements. In the other half, Israeli and
Palestinian populations are intertwined. Once the
Palestinian Authority develops into a real partner it will be
possible to negotiate an agreement over territory,
settlements and "refined" Palestinian sovereignty without an
army or control over air space and borders. Netanyahu said
it would be too hard to negotiate agreements over Jerusalem
and refugees until the other issues are resolved. Claiming
that many Palestinians accept this point, Netanyahu said he
was not talking about a delaying tactic but rather a
temporary freeze, adding that he hoped PA Prime Minister
Fayyad would still be around since Fayyad also thinks along
economic lines.

¶12. (SBU) As an example of economic development, Netanyahu
spoke about expanding faith tourism. He said that it "defied
imagination" that the well-known site on the Jordan River
where John the Baptist baptized Jesus was "paralyzed" by a
GOI/PA jurisdiction dispute. With Jericho only a mile away,
Netanyahu offered to give an "easy", secure "envelope" for
transporting tourists from the Galilee to this part of the
West Bank. That would lead to "co-production" that would
provide large revenue streams of tourist dollars to the
Palestinians, from a population that was already coming to
Israel. He asked why Israelis would be less disposed to
make concessions to a viable Palestinian government and
society. Netanyahu agreed that West Bank checkpoints take
too long, and offered to look into express lanes, increased
staffing, and other possible solutions - as Prime Minister.


¶13. (U) CODEL Cardin has cleared this cable.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_1.html


09ANKARA321     2009-02-27 15:03     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Ankara

VZCZCXRO5154
RR RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0321 0581548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271548Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8939
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 5453
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000321

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019
TAGS: PREL ENRG EPET TU IR
SUBJECT: DEALS WITH IRAN BENEFIT PM ERDOGAN'S FRIENDS

REF: 08 ANKARA 2028

Classified By: Economic Counselor Dale Eppler for reasons 1.4 (B) and (
D)

¶1. (C) On February 22, local press reported that Turkey and Iran had established a joint venture company to develop gas in Iran and build a pipeline to bring this gas to Turkey and Europe. This JV was established to further the agreements reached in November 2008 and July 2007 MOUs between Turkey and Iran (reftel). In trying to undercover more about this deal, we spoke with several people. BOTAS Chairman Saltuk Duzyol said BOTAS was not included in the deal and that the agreement was made with a private company but declined to specify it. One of Energy Minister Guler's advisors, Musa Gunaydin, who is widely believed to be behind the Minister's push to do business with Iran refused to discuss the topic with us. xxxxx was more open. The Turkish company SOM Petrol has entered into a joint venture with Iran, Demir said. The owner of SOM Petrol is Sitki Ayan, a good friend of PM Erdogan. They both attended Istanbul Imam Hatip (religious high school). Ayan is in the PM's circle of friends including Mustafa Erdogan (PM's brother), Cihan Kamer (see para 2) and Mucahit Aslan. xxxxx. According to our research, xxxxx is active in port construction, fuel transshipments and other activities but doesn't appear to have any experience in upstream oil and gas development.

¶2. (C) In 2007, Kartet, an electricity generation and exporting company, signed a deal with Tavanir, Iran's state owned electricity company to import from Iran 1.4 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity to Turkey. Kartet applied to the Turkish authorities (the Electricity Markets Regulatory Board, EMRA) to get an electricity import license. In November 2007, a Turkish company called Savk Electricity, owned by PM Erdogan's friend Cihan Kamer, received a license from EMRA to import electricity from Iran. At that time, Kartet went public with the dispute and claimed Savk action's were unethical and illegal. Kartet Istanbul Managing Director Nuray Atacik told us on February 27 that Kartet had still not received any response from EMRA and had basically given up on the project. However, she added with a bit of glee, Savk Electricity has not been able to realize the deal either. “The Iranians prefer us and don't want to do a deal with a company that was forced on them,” Atacik said.

¶3. (C) Comment: If true, the PM's push of SOM Petrol to do the gas deal with Iran could actually slow progress on the deal. It is clear from the Savk Electricity case that Iran doesn't appreciate being assigned business partners. There are other reasons why this deal is on the slow-track, including lack of legal, regulatory and commercial framework for the deal and Iran's potential pique at the February 26 announcement that BOTAS won a USD 750 million arbitration case against Iran (although the award must still be accepted by Iranian authorities). End comment.


Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Jeffrey


/tag/IR_1.html


09ISTANBUL83     2009-03-03 06:06     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Consulate Istanbul

VZCZCXRO7492
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIT #0083/01 0620654
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 030654Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8801
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000083

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY;
ASHGABAT FOR TANBORN; BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE AND FLINCHBAUGH;
DUBAI FOR IRPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KDEM IR
SUBJECT: US-IRAN RELATIONS: WHY IRAN REFUSED THE US
BADMINTON TEAM

REF: IRPO DUBAI 95

Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: A trusted contact claims he was told by a
close advisor to Iranian President Ahmadinejad that Iran
denied visas for the planned February 4, 2009 visit of the US
women's badminton because of the USG's "bad faith" in
announcing the visit earlier than Iran had requested.
According to the contact, Supreme Leader Khamenei only agreed
to the visit after Ahmadinejad urged him to do so, and only
on the understanding that no public announcements would be
made until after the team's arrival in Iran. Instead, the
USG announced the visit on February 2, as the team was
awaiting Iranian visas in Dubai. The regime wanted to
maintain full control of media coverage of the event, to
avoid a replay of the 1998 US wrestling team visit, when
Iranian crowds were filmed waving American flags and cheering
the US team. The regime believed the USG issued the early
announcement to create a similar dynamic, and now Khamenei
and Ahmadinejad feel "burned." Comment: If accurate, this
scenario underscores the challenges to building trust with a
regime that feels an obsessive fear of losing control over
both the process and substance of possible engagement with
the USG. End Summary.

¶2. (S) "A first test": A trusted contact of ConGen
Istanbul's Iran Watcher who recently returned from a visit to
Tehran recounted a detailed explanation he said he received
from a close advisor to President Ahmadinejad over why Iran
refused to issue visas in early February to the US women's
badminton team. In comments that track with IRPO Dubai's
reftel reporting, our contact says he was told that Supreme
Leader Khamenei was initially opposed to allowing the visit,
but President Ahmadinejad urged him to accept it. Even
though planning for this cultural exchange began before the
Obama administration took office, the regime including
Ahmadinejad believed this represented an important early
gesture by the new administration to build confidence and
show respect, and therefore a "first test" whether Iran could
work effectively with the Obama administration.

¶3. (S) Maximum GOI control: According to the presidential
advisor, the Iranian side insisted on a "carefully
calibrated" sequence of timing as a key requirement for
allowing the visit to proceed. Iran believes it had a clear
understanding with the USG (working through the US and
Iranian badminton federations, which in Iran's case took
instructions directly from the President's office) that
announcement of the badminton team's travel to Iran and
participation in the Fajr Tournament would be embargoed until
the tournament's opening ceremony on February 5. Iran
demanded this condition because Iran's leaders still remember
with discomfort the 1998 US wrestling team's visit to Iran,
when -- because of what Iran now sees as a failure on its
part to insist on airtight control over media coverage of the
event -- Iranian and international press broadcast scenes of
Iranian crowds cheering wildly as the US team entered the
arena carrying an American flag and continued to cheer the US
team during its matches, sometimes even waving American flags
in support. Khamenei demanded that there be no possible
repeat of such a scene within Iran. Given that the badminton
tournament was a women's sporting event and women's sports
are not televised in Iran, the regime felt confident it could
maintain full control over the event itself, allowing press
coverage only of the opening and closing ceremonies. To
maximize its control, the regime insisted on an embargo over
any announcement or media coverage of the US team's
participation until the team's arrival, i.e., after the team
had been issued visas in Dubai and flown to Tehran. This
important detail was explicitly agreed between the sports
federations, representing (in Iran's view) an understanding
between the highest levels of the USG and GOI, the
Ahmadinejad advisor insisted to our contact.

¶4. (S) "We were burned": Thus, when surprised regime
leaders saw the February 2 State Department announcement of
the badminton team's participation in the Fajr Tournament,
according to our contact, they immediately assumed "bad
faith" on the part of the USG, concluding that this was an
deliberate effort by the administration to gain advantage
over the GOI and undercut the regime's control of media
coverage of the event. The regime's immediate response,
ordered by Khamenei, was to refuse to issue the visas. As
the Ahmadinejad advisor explained to our contact: "Battles
of this nature, when foreign visitors come to Iran to
participate in sensitive or symbolic events, must be on our
terms and under our full control. We had an understanding

ISTANBUL 00000083 002 OF 002


with the U.S. over how this would proceed, and we were
burned." He added that Ahmadinejad, having personally
persuaded a reluctant Khamenei to allow the visit, felt
particularly aggrieved, and speculated to his close advisors
afterwards that this was evidence of "anti-Iranian influence"
among recently appointed foreign policy officials in the USG.
In typical Iranian fashion, GOI spokesmen blamed the
cancellation on other factors, including (from the MFA) the
"time consuming process" of visa issuance and (from Keyhan
and other conservative mouthpieces) the USG's failure to
condemn Israel over Gaza. But according to our contact,
Tehran assumes Washington "fully understands the real reason"
for the cancellation.

¶5. (S) Comment: Although it may seem far-fetched that such
a non-political exchange visit would be cancelled over a
seemingly mundane detail like the timing of the press
announcement of the visit, in Iran's case this scenario is
entirely plausible. If accurate, this scenario highlights
the challenges to building confidence with a regime that
feels an obsessive fear of losing control over either the
substance or process of possible engagement with the USG.
Indeed, this underscores that to Iran the process of
negotiations may often be as critical to demonstrating
"goodwill" and to ensuring eventual success as the substance
of the negotiations. This scenario also illustrates the
regime's rigid expectation that, with regard to early
confidence-building measures from the USG (especially
involving CBMs likely to generate press coverage), the GOI
must feel fully in control over how such measures play out,
and that at the first sign of any deviation from what it
believes is an agreed process, its first instinct --
reflective of its acute fixation on self-preservation -- will
be to shut the process down and blame the other side. End
comment.

WIENER


/tag/IR_1.html


09BEIJING560     2009-03-04 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Beijing

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DE RUEHBJ #0560/01 0631255
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041255Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2655
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000560

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH
SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: CHINA SEEKS CLARITY ON U.S. IRAN POLICY,
OFFERS HELP IN TALKING TO IRAN

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: China is keen to understand the direction of
U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and is
willing to facilitate dialogue between the two sides,
according to an MFA official. China remains committed to the
P5-plus-1 process but values its bilateral engagement with
Iran. Nonetheless, the Iran should not take for granted its
economic relations with the PRC. Despite PRC urging that
Iran respond positively to American overtures, initial rounds
of direct talks with the Iranians on the nuclear issue would
be difficult, the official suggested. The official said that
it is too soon to contemplate what actions should be taken
should Iran develop a nuclear weapon. An academic contact
suggested that there is no "point of no return" on Iran's
development of nuclear technology and that the Iranians
believe they are in a strong bargaining position should some
form of new diplomatic engagement emerge. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations and the
international community's efforts to deal with the Iran
nuclear issue with Deputy Director Xu Wei of MFA's West Asian
Affairs Department Iran Division March 3. PolOff also met
with Li Guofu, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies
at the MFA-affiliated China Institute for International
Studies (CIIS) February 27.

China Seeks Clarity on Policy Review
------------------------------------

¶3. (C) MFA's Xu Wei told PolOff that China was closely
following the ongoing review of our Iran policy. He said
that China believed that the United States maintains a
leadership role in the Middle East and that the results of
the review will have an impact on Chinese engagement with the
region. He said that Beijing hoped for more clarity from the
United States on policy adjustments resulting from this
review, adding that China had been left to guess at how U.S.
policy might change on a very important set of shared
concerns. In the meantime, Xu stressed, China's overall
policy toward Iran had not changed, and China would continue
to emphasize the importance of stability in the Middle East
and its opposition to the development of nuclear weapons in
the region. Xu noted that additional clarity was especially
important because China perceives several voices in the USG
with different viewpoints on Iran speaking publicly on the
issue.

PRC Committed to P5-plus-1, Willing to Facilitate Talks
--------------------------------------------- ----------

¶4. (C) Xu stressed the need to resolve the nuclear impasse
through dialogue, and added that China remained committed to
the P5-plus-1 process, as indicated in its support for the
recent P5-plus-1 joint statement on Iran. He said that China
sincerely hoped that the outcome of our Iran policy review
would be direct U.S.-Iran talks, and offered China's
assistance in creating a channel for communication with the
Iranians.

Official: PRC Effective at Communicating with Tehran
--------------------------------------------- -------

¶5. (C) China and Iran continued to enjoy "good" relations in
both the political and economic realms, Xu said, but this did
not indicate that China supports all of Tehran's policies.
He said that China had developed strong communication with
the Iranian regime and used these channels to express to the
Iranian leadership the concerns of the P5-plus-1 and the Gulf
Cooperation Council over nuclear proliferation. Beijing
sought to persuade Iran to play a positive role in the
region, and Chinese communication with Tehran to that end was
effective, Xu said, adding that Iran's cooperation with the
IAEA and the P5-plus-1, though limited, was due in part to
Chinese intervention. China had made clear to Iran that
PRC-Iran economic cooperation should not be interpreted as an
indication that China is not serious about concerns over
nuclear proliferation or about working with the international
community to deal with the nuclear issue.

Talking to Iran Would Require Patience
--------------------------------------

¶6. (C) Xu said that the U.S. policy review had generated
debate within Iran over how to respond, especially over the
possibility of direct dialogue. China was urging the Iranian
regime to respond positively to American overtures, but Xu
said that based on his experience working on Iranian issues,
he believed the leadership will find it difficult to show a

BEIJING 00000560 002 OF 003


positive attitude in public. Xu counseled patience, saying
that he was concerned that expectations in the United States
on how Iran would respond may be too high. Still, he said
that the issues involved were too important for the United
States to fail to press forward with dialogue even if any
such discussions are difficult.

"Too Soon" to Contemplate Weaponization Concerns
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶7. (C) Pressed on how China would respond if Iran developed
nuclear weapons, Xu said that China took proliferation
concerns seriously and opposed such a development. However,
he indicated that China did not yet see Iranian development
of nuclear weapons as an immediate concern, noting that China
was willing to "wait and see how far Iran can go" in
developing nuclear technology before it would change its
position. He added that it was still too soon to contemplate
what actions should be taken should the Iranians develop a
nuclear weapon.

¶8. (C) CIIS's Li Guofu echoed this approach, saying that
while China followed the Iranian nuclear program closely,
China was not 100-percent convinced that Iran is pursuing
nuclear weapons. He indicated that observers who believe
there is a "point of no return" in Iran's technical
development of nuclear weapons were incorrect, because the
problem was fundamentally a political one and not technical.
He said that Iran was moving ahead with its nuclear program
without a clear internal position on whether it would want to
weaponize the technology, but added that Iran hoped to bring
the technology to the point where it could produce a nuclear
weapon in a short period of time. He stressed, however, that
in his view, a complicated series of steps remained between
the current level of technology and the point of
weaponization, including the necessity for a nuclear test.
Such a test, he indicated, would have a profound effect on
the political questions facing the international community.

U.S. Needs to Offer "Something Real"
------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Li said that direct U.S. engagement with Iran would be
complicated by the reality that there is little the United
States can offer at present that would persuade Tehran to
change its behavior. As the regime's confidence in its own
domestic legitimacy has grown, the value to the regime of
normalized relations with the United States has decreased.
Similarly, security guarantees would mean little to an
Iranian Government convinced that it can already ensure its
own security. Li stressed that the U.S. side would need to
be prepared to make concessions in any engagement, and would
need to offer "something real." Li sugested starting with
demonstrating a position of "mutual respect."

Iran Remains Suspicious of U.S. Intentions
------------------------------------------

¶10. (C) Based on his conversations with Iranian
policy-makers, Li said, Iran remained suspicious of U.S.
intentions. He suggested that dialogue with Iran should have
a "symbolic" beginning to avoid a false start. He said that
the two sides should first agree on principles not directly
related to the nuclear issue. He suggested that if the
Iranians show a willingness to suspend uranium enrichment,
the United States should be prepared to follow up immediately
with new cooperation. He stressed that the Iranian
leadership regarded itself an important player on the
regional issues that concern the United States, especially
efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.

IRI Official: nuclear Weapon Would Be "Disastrous"
--------------------------------------------- -----

¶11. (C) Li reported that he was told by a Deputy Foreign
Minister in Tehran that Iran considers itself a regional
power, but understands that if Iran were to develop a nuclear
weapon, the United States would likely deploy nuclear weapons
to the Persian Gulf region, which would be "strategically
disastrous" for Iran. He said that the official had told him
Iran wants to develop "nuclear capability" as a symbol of its
status as a regional power. The official told Li that Iran
was nevertheless willing to open a dialogue with the United
States.

Other Challenges to Opening a Dialogue
--------------------------------------

¶12. (C) Li said that the atmosphere had improved for
developing new engagement with Iran, but obstacles remained.

BEIJING 00000560 003 OF 003


The regime in Tehran continued to see opportunities for
changing Iran's engagement with the world under the new U.S.
administration, and there was debate in Iran on how best to
respond. Serious debate among the Iranian people on the need
for a nuclear program had yet to take place, Li stressed,
although the notion of weaponizing the results of the nuclear
program continued to generate debate among the Iranian
leadership. Li stressed that the Iranian leadership
continued to dismiss the notion of U.S. military action in
response to its ongoing nuclear development and was convinced
that suspension of uranium enrichment is not necessary for
starting a "new process" with the United States.

Election Politics also a Factor
-------------------------------

¶13. (C) Li said that this year's presidential election in
Iran would be an important factor in the chances for
meaningful talks with the United States. Noting that the
candidacy of former President Khatami posed the first real
challenge of the campaign to incumbent President Ahmadinejad,
Li stressed that Khatami would not have been able to announce
his candidacy without explicit approval from Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei. Unlike previous elections, other
reformist candidates had since dropped out of the campaign,
Li said, improving Khatami's chances. Still, the hard-liners
had acted to overcome their internal divisions in light of
the Khatami candidacy, and Ahmadinejad remained "likely" to
be re-elected. Li argued that the top-level blessing of the
Khatami candidacy indicated that the Supreme Leader deems
Khatami reliable enough and would not expect bold reforms
even if Khatami were elected. In the meantime, Li suggested,
Ahmadinejad might feel the need to demonstrate his hard-line
credentials in the run-up to the June election.

PRC to Iran: Don't Take Economic Cooperation for Granted
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶14. (C) Li said that China continued to value development of
its economic ties with Iran in order to maintain economic
growth. He noted that Chinese officials told their Iranian
counterparts that they are frustrated with the lack of
progress on the nuclear issue, progress which would create a
foundation for new investment in the energy sector.
According to Li, to prod the Iranians to show progress on the
nuclear issue, the Chinese had warned them not to take
China's economic interests in Iran for granted. Furthermore,
China's dependence on Iranian energy is decreasing given
recent improvements in Sino-Saudi relations (as evidenced by
President Hu's recent travel there) and their potential to
bring about increased Chinese access to Saudi energy
supplies.

PICCUTA


/tag/IR_1.html


09BAKU175     2009-03-06 09:09     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Baku

VZCZCXRO1853
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKB #0175/01 0650955
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 060955Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0863
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000175

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019
TAGS: PREL ETRD SNAR ECON AJ TU RU IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S MONEY LAUNDERERS, SANCTIONS-BUSTERS, AND
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD MONEY MAKERS: A BAKU SAMPLER

REF: A) BAKU 139 B) BAKU 132 C) BAKU 80 D) 2008 BAKU
917

Classified By: POLECON CHIEF ROB GARVERICK, REASON 1.5 (B and D)

Summary
---------

¶1. (S) According to widespread rumor, many Iranians in Baku
are involved full- or part-time in Iranian regime-related
profit making, sanctions-busting, money laundering, and
similar activities. Activities range from assisting Iranian
interests "on the side" of pursuing private activities, to
working primarily for Iranian government entities. These
Iranians' formal businesses in Azerbaijan include factories,
construction companies, trading companies, and shops, some of
which may be hollow companies hiding illicit or semi-licit
activities. Some are also said to be significant actors in
obtaining spare parts and equipment for the Revolutionary
Guard, raising revenues and managing money for it and/or
regime figures, or managing Iran-origin narcotics
trafficking. The list is a "sampler" of the types of
personnel and activities singled out to Iran watcher by
multiple sources as actively involved in Iranian
regime-supportive financial and procurement activities. The
list suggests the extensive and complex interconnection of
Iranian figures and activities that reportedly support
Iranian security organizations and regime figures. End
Summary.

¶2. (S) Baku Iran watcher received the information below from
a wide variety of independent Iranian and Azerbaijani sources
(strictly protect), including Baku-based Iranian students,
business figures, and human rights activists; a Tehran-based
Iranian exporter; a prominent businessman working in Iran;
the Executive Director of AmCham in Azerbaijan; an
Azerbaijani oil company executive; and a local partner in a
leading international management consulting firm. In almost
all cases the information below was related/confirmed
separately by at least three of the above sources.

¶3. (S) Please note that, while serious efforts have been
made to cross-check the information below and ignore
"indirect" claims, Iran watcher has no independent ability to
verify these allegations. Although some of these figures are
well known in Baku and/or among the resident Iranian
community, Baku Iran watcher has never met any of them. The
information below should be interpreted in this context.

¶4. (S) Begin List:

¶A. (S) Jamal Allavi. Three Iranian sources claimed that
Allavi is a close relative of the ex-Mayor of Ardebil, and a
former colleague/friend of President Ahmedinajad. He now
runs several Iranian companies (mostly trading), and is the
head of a provincial cooperative organization "Tavanee
Marzneshinan Fedayan Velayat," entitled to export and import
items with reduced restrictions. Allavi has a house in Baku
and frequently travels on business to Azerbaijan, Russia,
China, and Kazakhstan. He uses his businesses as a cover for
procuring and importing military spare parts and other items
needed by the Revolutionary Guard and other Iranian security
forces, bribing customs officials as necessary. A fourth
Iranian source noted that, while he did not know Allavi, the
company name is a "giveaway" of Revolutionary Guard/regime
connections.

¶B. (S) FNU "Lotfi". Runs a large artificial leather factory
in Ardebil ("Kharkhaneye Charmeh Masnui)", and other
businesses based in Iranian Azerbaijan. He is a close
associate of Jamal Allavi (entry "A" above), with whom he
cooperates in smuggling activities. He is an officer in the
Revolutionary Guard (possibly retired), and his businesses
are actually Revolutionary Guard-owned. He travels to
Malaysi, Singapore, Dubai, Turkey, and Iraq as well as
zerbaijan on Revolutionary Guard business. He als assists
Revolutionary Guard and/or Iranian intelligence operations by
"getting for them what they need," including communications
equipment and technical information.

¶C. (S) Adil Sharabiani. An Iranian currency exchange dealer
with "close links" to Tehran. He was formerly a manager of

BAKU 00000175 002 OF 004


Bank Melli Iran, and currently has a close business
relationship with the Xalq Bank, a medium-sized bank in Baku.
He came to Azerbaijan after going bankrupt in Iran under
murky circumstances. He is wealthy and reportedly works
closely with the Iranian "Foundation for the Oppressed"
(Banyadeh Mostazafan), overseeing its business and investment
activities in Azerbaijan, and advising the management of the
Foundation-owned Darya Soap Detergent company in Azerbaijan
(headed by one "Farzandeh"). He also assists another Iranian
foundation that is providing financial assistance to
Azerbaijani refugees from Karabagh with up to 300 Manat per
family per month (about $350).

An Iranian contact said that a friend had recently witnessed
Sharabiani delivering five million dollars in cash "from
Iran" to the Bank of Baku that was not entered on the books.
The Iranian source did not know whether the money represented
a personal payment to Sharabiani or a disbursement entrusted
to him for some other purpose. The anti-regime source
alleged that Sharabiani "periodically" makes such deliveries
to the Bank. An Iranian businessman separately told Iran
watcher that Sharabiani has "very good relations" with the
Iranian government, and is widely assumed by other Iranians
to be assisting both regime organizations and individual
regime/clerical figures in investment and money laundering
activities.

Note: The Xalq Bank was established using former staff of the
Bank of Baku (see 'E" below). It is one of the most popular
Baku banking venues in Azerbaijan for Iranian businesses and
Iranians in Iran. Two other popular banks for Iranians are
the "Royal Bank of Baku," owned by an Iranian-American (ref
C), and the "Bank of Baku." End Note).

¶D. (S) Kamal Darvishi. This individual and his three
brothers were famous fighters during the Iran-Iraq war.
Kamil rose to the rank of General in the Revolutionary
Guard, and formerly had important Teheran-area security and
intelligence duties. He and his brother Keyoumars began
coming to Azerbaijan regularly ten years ago. Although from
a very poor family, they are both extremely wealthy. Kamal
owns several road and other infrastructure construction
companies in Iran, and formerly effectively controlled much
of this sector in Iran (according to a Teheran businessman,
"no roads in Iran could be built without him or his friends
as a partner.)"

Darvishi formerly ran the "NASR" company, an alleged
Revolutionary Guard-controlled business in Iran. Some of his
business activities and networking reportedly aroused
suspicion, resulting in his official "retirement" from the
Revolutionary Guard. In recent years Darvishi has developed
a close business relationship/friendship with Azerbaijan
Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and with
Mammedov's assistance has won at least eight major road
construction and rehabilitation contracts, including
contracts for construction of the Baku-Iranian Astara
highway, the Baku-Guba highway, and the BaQ ring highway.
(Comment: We assume Mammedov is a silent partner in these
contracts. Mammedov's immediate family owns Azerbaijan's
largest commercial development company, and he is notoriously
corrupt even for Azerbaijan. Iran watcher has heard many
allegations from Azerbaijani contacts of creative corrupt
practices involving highway construction here. End Comment).


Iranian business and student contacts asserted that Darvishi
maintains close relations with the Revolutionary Guard and
Iranian intelligence. Two noted that he travels freely
abroad, in violation of ten-year legal limitations on
personal foreign travel by retired senior Revolutionary Guard
officers. An Iranian student reported that Darvishi is
recruiting among Iranian students in Azerbaijan for work in a
new company he is establishing here.

¶E. (S) Jamsheed "Jushkar" Mahmudoglu. He and his brothers
are Iranian Azerbaijanis who have obtained Turkish
citizenship. They are large shareholders in the Bank of
Baku, which is sometimes presented as a "Turkish bank." They
are originally from Tabriz, where the family were wealthy
gold and currency dealers who lost their business after the
Iranian Revolution. The family fled to Turkey and ultimately

BAKU 00000175 003 OF 004


obtained Turkish passports. Their business deals in
Azerbaijan and Iran are frequently entwined with the Oromi
brothers, another former Tabrizi-now-Turkish family active in
Azerbaijan and Iran. They and the Oromis set up the Silsila
General Trading company in Dubai under the aegis of the NAB
Group. In Iran they jointly own a company which produces
boilers on license from a German company (Bosch). In
Azerbaijan they cooperated in the establishment of the Baku
Electronics company and the Bank of Baku (the latter in
partnership with the family of former Minister of Economic
Development Farhad Aliyev, see below). Unlike the Oromis,
Jamsheed reportedly remains a major shareholder in this bank.

Two Iranian sources repeated "rumors" that this son is
working with a son of Ayatollah Rafsanjani in several
business ventures. Jamsheed has relations with prominent
Azerbaijani and Iranian business and government figures, and
allegedly does favors for Iranian government personnel,
including facilitating of desired foreign items and money
laundering. The President of AmCham in Baku (protect)
confirmed that Jamsheed is a major bank shareholder, and
originally from Iran. She nd other sources opined that the
bank is one of he more "professionally run" in Baku.
(Comment: The bank is known for its relations with Turkish
companies. The Bank of Baku was formerly controlled by the
brother of Farhad Aliyev, a former Azerbaijani Minister of
Economic Development who is currently jailed. According to a
prominent Azerbaijani business consultant (strictly protect),
Aliyev's position has been divided between the Azerbaijani
Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and the Head of
Presidential Security, Vahid Akhundov. End Comment).

¶F. (S) Shahram Oromi. An Iranian Azerbaijani who obtained
Turkish citizenship after the Iranian revolution.
Nonetheless, he attended university in Iran, graduating from
Iran Azad university (1993). He and his brothers Nadir and
Bahram established the "Turkish" NAB Foreign Trade company
(Deesh Ticaret Limited Sherkati) in 1988. The company
(headquartered in Istanbul) does extensive trading between
Turkey and the Middle East and Iran. It is active in
Azerbaijan, and also present in Russia and other CIS
countries. Since 1995 this company has been the distributor
of Hyundai cars in Azerbaijan, and a member of the family is
reportedly the Agent for Samsung in Turkey and Azerbaijan.
The consultant describes the Oromi brother's business mode as
based on "establishing insider monopolies or advantages via
relations with powerful government individuals and their
relatives" in the various countries in which they operate,
"using bribes, 'gifts,' or offers of a share in their
business."

The Oromis helped set up the Bank of Baku (see item "E'
above), and Shahram served in various positions (ranging from
Chief of the Financial Audit Department to Chairman) between
1999-2007, however they have recently sold most of their
shares in this bank to influential Azerbaijanis. The Oromi's
allegedly work cooperatively in areas requested by senior
Iranian figures, and several of their businesses may
facilitate regime (or regime member) interests. Shahram was
and remains close to former Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan
Ahmed Qazai.

¶G. (S) "Asgar" LNU (commonly known in Baku as "Agaya Asgar).
His private company is located at #16 Gorbanov Street in
Baku, next to the Nizami metro station. His formal business
is Iran-Russia timber and wood products export/import via
Azerbaijan. A native of Iranian Azerbaijan, Asgar has an
Azerbaijani wife and has lived in Baku for several years.
He works closely with political officers based at the Iran
Culture House (ref B). His wife is the cousin of the
Azerbaijani Minister of Education Misir Mardanov, and
Mardanov's brother is one of his business partners. Irada
Afetgizi, an Iranian who helped organize an anti-Israel
"Islamic world" conference held at the Baku Media Center in
2007, works in his office. Asgar owns two homes in Baku and
hosts visiting Iranian clerics and relatives of Iranian
regime officials and senior Revolutionary Guard officers. He
has close ties to Iranian government and Revolutionary Guard
organizations and individuals, and assists them in business
activities. He often travels to Moscow.

¶H. (S) Jabrail Naveed "Azerbaijani." A famous "fixer" for

BAKU 00000175 004 OF 004


Iranians in Azerbaijan (hence his nickname). He was head of
the Iranian Trader's Association in Azerbaijan until that
organization closed in the late 1990's. An Iranian
manufacturer and exporter from Tehran who has known the
family for years (strictly protect) noted that "he is very
wealthy, but doesn't flaunt it." He said that Naveed's wife
formerly worked in Iran as an officer in Bank Melli, where
she facilitated loans to unqualified regime bigwigs and their
cronies.

Three contacts separately claimed that Naveed has facilitated
Iran-related energy business ventures with the State Oil
Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), and illicitly exports (falsely
labeled) Pelite and other oil drilling materials and
chemicals and propane gas. Naveed also reportedly owns the
"Pingvin" iron workshop in Azerbaijan. The Tehran
businessman said that Naveed helps facilitate import of
sanctioned products into Iran from Russia and elsewhere via
the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakchevan, and said that he
himself is one of "many" legitimate Iranian exporters who
have been pressured into cooperating in this activity.
Naveed is a close friend of the head of Baku's Husseiniya
("Iranian") mosque, Mullah Ogagnejad, and oversees the
mosques' administration. Ogagnejad is a son-in-law of the
late Ayatollah Meshkini, and the personal religious
representative of Ayatollah Khameini in Azerbaijan (ref B).

¶I. (S) Safa Naveed. Son of Jabrail Naveed (above). A
graduate of Baku's Kavkaz university, he is currently a
Revolutionary Guard officer working at the Iranian Embassy in
Baku. He is a leadliaison with Iranian students in
Azerbaijan. AnIranian student described Safa's duties as
"spyig on" Iranian students in Baku, and an Iranian
businessman who has known the family for years told Iran
watcher that Safa Naveed has frequently boasted to him about
his and Iran's knowledge of what goes on in Azerbaijan,
extensive information networks here, and "ability to get
anything it needs." One contact described Safa as
"fanatically anti-Western."

¶J. (S) Asgar Jabbari. One of the "two Asgars" widely known
among Iranians in Baku (see "F" above). Son of the late
"Mullah Natiq," a famous hard-line orator during the Iranian
revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. Jabbari's wife is from
Azerbaijan, he owns a house here, and travels back and forth
regularly between Iran and Azerbaijan. His main official
business is exporting Iranian marble from Isfahan, where he
works with a large factory, which is actually a Revolutionary
Guard front company (Note: Iranian marble is commonly used in
Baku residential and office-building construction, which has
been undergoing a boom here until recently. End Note.)
Jabbari has close business relationships with senior Iranian
government officials, and carries out business activities and
buys real estate on their behalf. (Note: Jabbari's name is
of Arabic origin, but is more likely to imply religious piety
than Arabic heritage. End Note).

¶K. (S) Sabir Shaheen. Though reportedly mild-mannered and
well dressed, Shaheen is a well known mafia-like figure from
Iranian Azerbaijan who reportedly acts as a "liaison" between
the Iranian and Russian/Azerbaijani narcotics traffickers.
Although he officially operates a marble store on Baku's Karl
Marx street, the store is generally closed and Shaheen
himself is generally seen holding court at restaurants and
cafes along 28 May Street. (Note: Iran reportedly has one of
the highest per capita rates of heroin addiction in the
world, and heroin and other narcotics trafficking from Iran
to Russia and Europe via Azerbaijan has skyrocketed over the
last two years. See ref (D).

End List.
DERSE


/tag/IR_1.html


09BAKU179     2009-03-06 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Baku

P 061232Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0872
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PIORITY
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 012
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T BAKU 000179


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/7/2019
TAGS: ETTC ETRD ENRG UE UK TU AJ IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN SOURCE NAMES "U.K.-REGISTERED" COMPANY AS
IRAN SANCTIONS-BUSTER POSSIBLY SUPPORTING BUSHEIR PROJECT

Classified By: POLECON COUNSELOR ROB GARVERICK, REASON 1.5 (B and D)

¶1. (S) A well-connected Iranian businessman who owns a
Baku-based oil services company told Baku Iran watcher that a
company called "INSULTEC," owned by UK citizens of Indian
origin, has secretly provided cladding, thermal insulation,
and ancillary equipment to the government of Iran in a
variety of shipments via Turkey and the U.A.E. According to
the Baku source, whose company operates in Russia,
Kazakhstan, and the U.A.E. as well as Azerbaijan, the
materials allegedly sent by INSULTEC in falsely labeled
containers were of type that could be used in nuclear reactor
construction. Citing old Iran and Dubai based business
friends allegedly familiar with the issue, the source said
that INSULTEC has maintained a sanctions-evading relationship
with Iranian government companies for some time. Source said
that the company was officially headquartered in the U.K.,
and has offices in Germany, the USA, and elsewhere, its
manufacturing base and the bulk of its staff are in India.

¶2. (S) Perhaps more disturbingly, the source (who had just
returned from ten days in Dubai) said that he had been
informed by an Iranian friend who had collaborated in the
activity that INSULTEC recently helped facilitate a shipment
from the UAE to Iran consisting of twelve containers
(possibly labeled "insulation") of unknown material that may
not have actually originated with INSULTEC. The source sai
he was told by his friend that the shipment went by ship to
Bandar Abbas and was trucked immediately to a final
destination in Busheir. The friend told source that another
Iranian destination was falsely listed in the shipping
documents, presumably to hide the actually intended
destination of Busheir.

¶3. (S) The Baku businessman is a UK-educated engineer from a
prominent Pre-Revolution Isfahan family, and formerly owned a
large factory in Iran. He is a former national fencing
champion of Iran. former President of the Iran Fencing
Association, and Vice-President of an Azerbaijan sports
association. He has been based in Baku for more than ten
years, working primarily as a sub-contractor to BP and the
Cape Industrial Services company. While his oil services
company includes an insulation division that may be in
competition with INSULTEC, source has provided "inside"
information on many other Iranian issues (including
comprehensive data on the status of new Iranian oil refinery
construction) that does not relate to his private interests
in any way.

¶4. (S) Note: A quick google check revealed several companies
with the name INSULTEC in the title - these may or not be
affiliated. Based on the information provided by source
(currently in Iran, where he frequently travels), one
possible candidate could be "INSULTEC Chitral Ltd." End
Note.


DERSE


/tag/IR_1.html


09DAMASCUS179     2009-03-10 10:10     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Damascus

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #0179/01 0691040
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101040Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6078
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5717
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1010
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5090
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3843
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2339
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C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000179

H PASS
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IR, NEA/IPA
NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: PHUM IAEA KPAL PGOV PREL PTER IR IS IZ TU SY
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ASAD AND CODEL CARDIN DISCUSS A nuclear
IRAN, PEACE PROCESS, TERRORISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: CODEL Cardin, in a February 18 meeting with
President Bashar al-Asad, FM Muallim, Presidential Advisor
for Political and Media Affairs Shaaban, and Ambassador to
the U.S. Mustafa conveyed U.S. concerns regarding Iran's
pursuit of a nuclear weapon, Syrian human rights abuses, the
Israel-Syria peace process, upcoming Lebanese elections, and
Syrian support for terrorism. Senator Cardin encouraged the
SARG to address these issues in order to lay the groundwork
for a more productive future dialogue. Asad argued Syria
essentially shared the same position as the U.S. on the
majority of these issues, but Syria's approach toward solving
these problems was clearly different. Asad said the U.S.
needed to look at the larger regional political picture, as
Syria did, if it truly wanted to find satisfactory
resolutions. On Iran, Asad maintained IAEA monitoring would
ensure Iran's pursuit of nuclear power for civilian purposes
only. Regarding human rights, Asad stated Syria was making
progress, but the CODEL needed to understand this issue in
the larger context of Israel's aggression in Gaza, the
suffering of Palestinian refugees, and terrorist attacks on
Syria. Asad rejected the notion that Syria facilitated the
transit of foreign fighters into Iraq, pointedly asking the
CODEL what interest would he have in doing so? The upcoming
elections in Lebanon, Asad surmised, would not change the
composition of the government dramatically nor Syria's
determination to continue the process of establishing a full
diplomatic presence in Beirut. On future Israel-Syria peace
negotiations, Asad was more vague. He offered no specifics
on re-opening talks, but expressed Syria's desire for the
process to continue with U.S. involvement. Finally, in
response to the CODEL's repeated concerns about Syrian
support for Hamas and Hizballah, Asad remarked that these
were democratically elected organizations in the Palestinian
Authority and Lebanon; dealing with them was simply part of
the reality of politics in the Middle East. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------------
The Opening Gambit: Human Rights
--------------------------------

¶2. (C) Following a warm exchange of pleasantries in which
Senator Cardin thanked Asad for sending Imad Mustafa to the
U.S. as Syria's Ambassador ("He's in our offices so much
we've thought of charging him rent!"), Senator Cardin noted
the CODEL had come to Syria for two major reasons: (1) As a
fact-finding mission with an eye toward reinvigorating the
Syria-Israel peace process; and (2) to learn more about the
Iraqi refugee situation. Senator Cardin added "there are new
opportunities . . . The U.S. has a new president who wants to
work" with countries in the region. Regarding Syria, he
said, "there are areas of major concern," one of them being
Syria's human rights record. Senator Cardin told Asad he
could give specific examples of citizens jailed for their
political views. Asad responded, "we are a country in
process of reform. We aren't perfect. You are talking about
12 people out of 20 million. It's a process. We are moving
forward, not fast, but methodically." (NOTE: Asad's mention
of "12 people" refers to the 12 members of the Damascus
Declaration National Council convicted in October 2008 and
sentenced to two and a half years in prison. END NOTE).

¶3. (C) Asad admitted Syria had very strong security laws, but
argued they were necessary to protect the nation. The
members of the Damascus Declaration had been convicted for
their "contact with an individual in Lebanon who had invited
the U.S. to attack Syria. This is against our law." Senator
Cardin replied he realized this was a domestic issue; he was
not asking Syria to be exactly like the U.S., but Syria
should nonetheless adhere to widely accepted international
standards. Senator Cardin argued that "when the U.S. is
challenged, you see it on the front page of the newspaper"
and that such challenges were an important part of a national
dialogue. "You do not see this (freedom of expression)
anywhere in the region," Asad chuckled in reply, "let's talk
about Saudi Arabia."


¶4. (C) Widening the human rights conversation beyond the
scope of Syrian prisoners of conscience, Asad admonished the
CODEL for focusing on 12 individuals without taking into
account half a million Palestinian refugees in Syria alone,
and the continued suffering of people in Gaza. "Human
rights," Asad philosophized, "is related to the whole
upgrading of society. This will produce new laws." In a
final bid to put the subject of human rights to rest, Asad
stated he was a popular president and that if he were working
against his people, he would not enjoy such popularity.
"Don't worry about human rights, we're moving forward," he
said.

¶5. (C) Turning to conflict and reform in the region, Asad
observed many societies in the region (including Syria) were
experiencing a shift in political alignment to the right. As
a result, the process of political reform had become
increasingly difficult. Asad warned that countries, like
Lebanon and Algeria, which had strived for rapid reform in
the past, had only set the stage for more conflict. In the
case of Algeria during the 1980s, Islamists had tried to use
a sudden political opening to gain power and this had sparked
a conflict lasting twenty years. Similarly, Asad continued,
Lebanon's reform process and the May 29 elections had been
the cause of the subsequent sectarian violence. Asad
contended the real issues were "peace and fighting
terrorism."

-------------------------------
The Middle Game: A nuclear Iran
-------------------------------

¶6. (C) Senator Whitehouse raised Iran, agreeing with Senator
Cardin's assessment of the new political terrain and
asserting: "We have a moment of opportunity for new
policies." Whitehouse cautioned Asad that it was also "a time
for choices." The manner in which the U.S. would proceed
depended on "honest, sustained cooperation in the region," he
said. The senator emphasized the time-frame for this
cooperation was quite short. The one thing that could bring
it to a premature close would be Iran's development of
nuclear weapons. "If Iran insists," Senator Whitehorse
stated, "it will create an atmosphere challenging for
negotiations."

¶7. (C) Asad swiftly responded, "we're not convinced Iran is
developing nuclear weapons." He argued Iran could not use a
nuclear weapon as a deterrent because nobody believed Iran
would actually use it against Israel. Asad noted an Iranian
nuclear strike against Israel would result in massive
Palestinian casualties, which Iran would never risk.

¶8. (C) Second, he continued, the IAEA had reported no
evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran existed.
Arguing Syria and the U.S. were actually closer than they
realized on these issues, Asad said Syria adamantly opposed
any "weapons of mass destruction" in the Middle East. But as
signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear
Weapons (NPT) both Iran and Syria had the right to pursue
nuclear power for civilian purposes. Asad asserted demands
for Iran to "stop" its nuclear program were unproductive and
a violation of its rights under the NPT. Instead, he said,
"the argument should be about how to monitor their program,"
as outlined in the NPT. "Without this monitoring," Asad
warned, "there will be confrontation, and it will be
difficult for the whole region." Asad leaned slightly
forward and said: "Let's work together on this point."

¶9. (C) Senator Whitehorse replied, "I hope monitoring is
enough," noting the difficulty of such a project in a closed
society such as Iran. Asad responded an international system
for monitoring was in place and should be followed. Senator
Cardin interjected, "we believe Iran's goals are the opposite
of what you describe. We think they want to change the
equation" (of power in the region). Asad asked the CODEL to
put aside this point of view and focus on monitoring. Senator
Cardin said, "we agree on monitoring, but we think Iran

should give up its nuclear ambitions." Asad reiterated
monitoring was the best institutional way to control Iran's
nuclear program. Senator Wicker challenged Asad's assertion
Iran was not seeking to develop nuclear weapons and that
monitoring alone would work. Asad replied his impression was
that Iran's program was for peacful purposes with the caveat
"we have no evidence as we are not in Iran." Senator Wicker
advised Asad the international community assessed otherwise;
the question now was what the appropriate response to Iran
should be. "Everyone wants to avoid a military reaction," he
noted, "but it was the clear view of the former
administration and is the clear view of the current
administration that something will have to be done." Asad
observed "you have my impression. Everything you mention is
guessing. Monitoring will make everything clear."

¶10. (C) Representative Moore argued that while monitoring was
a mechanism appropriate to "nation states," it would not be
effective in controlling Iran's military proxies, Hamas and
Hizballah. She stated both Syria and Iran provided financial
support to the two groups and there was no way to rule out
categorically the possibility that Iran might provide nuclear
material to Hizballah. "The ability of the international
community to monitor Iran on NPT is understood. It's the
role of the proxies that is the problem," she said. Asad
replied, "if you don't trust the mechanisms of the NPT, let's
cancel it." He maintained these proxies "would go away" if
there was a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement. He
asked who had created these proxies? "We didn't and Iran
didn't. How were they created? By conflict because Lebanon
was occupied by Israel. It's normal to have resistance.
This is the reality we have to deal with."

--------------------------
Testing The Flank: Lebanon
--------------------------

¶11. (C) Senator Wicker asked Asad to give his prognosis for
the upcoming Lebanese elections, the prospect of Syria
sending an ambassador, and whether Hizballah would disarm.
In a tone of resigned pessimism, Asad replied that the
Lebanese elections would not make much of a difference. In
Lebanon, he explained, any party can get a "veto third."
Asad maintained the key issue was whether the Lebanese would
vote along political lines or sectarian lines. If the latter
occurred, then Shi'as would elect Shi'as, Christians would
elect Christians, and so on, which would result in conflict.
"If you don't have consensus, you will have civil war. This
is how it has always been in Lebanon," he said. Conflict in
Lebanon would preclude normal relations between the two
countries.

¶12. (C) On the subject of a Syrian ambassador to Lebanon,
Asad characterized the delayed appointment as being part of a
deliberate political process. Asad pointed out Syria had
opened an embassy and staffed it, actions they would not have
taken if they did not fully intend to send an ambassador.
Asad argued an appointment like this was a political step
requiring the proper timing. He added "we know who and when,
but we're not going to announce it today." Senator Wicker
deftly rejoined "we could make news!" eliciting laughter from
everyone, including Asad.

¶13. (C) Regarding the disarmament of Hizballah, Asad argued
"Hizballah has no specific interest in Israel besides
securing Lebanon's borders and preventing threats to
Lebanon's integrity, like Israel's daily violations of
Lebanese airspace." Asad noted Hizballah was the most
powerful political party in Lebanon, was democratically
elected, and if peace in the region were to be achieved, "the
small things" with Hizballah and Hamas would disappear.
"Let's talk about the peace. This is the big picture that
will solve everything." Asad likened the U.S.'s approach to
Hizballah to trying to patch an old suit when a new suit was
needed. Senator Cardin countered that peace would very
likely go forward if Syria would stop the arms flow to
Hizballah. The senator noted many countries thought Syria
was concerned about possible repercussions with Iran if it

were to take the initiative on stopping arms to Hizballah.
Asad responded Syria had been in negotiations with Israel
with no concern for Iran's opinion. He told the story of how
Iranian President Ahmedinejad called him just before the
Annapolis conference and implored him not to send anyone,
that it was a "bad meeting," but that they sent a
representative anyway. "I told him I know it (Annapolis) is
just a photo op. But I am sending someone anyway. We do
what we think is good for our interests; it's not dependent
on Iran," he contended.

------------------------------
A New Tempo: The Peace Process
------------------------------

¶14. (S) Senator Tom Udall asked what message Asad wanted the
CODEL to deliver to the new administration. Asad replied he
saw two key common interests between Syria and the U.S.:
peace in the region and combating terrorism. Asad argued
Syria had been at the forefront of fighting terrorism ever
since it put down the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. He claimed
that in the mid-1980s, Syria had sent a delegation to Europe
to articulate the need for a coalition to fight terrorism,
but nobody had listened. Asad said Syria wanted to know when
the U.S. would adopt a new approach toward terrorism, adding
that "it's not a question of how much you can destroy, but
how much dialogue you can make." The Europeans, Asad
continued, knew more about the region than the U.S. and he
urged the CODEL to turn to them for guidance. Asad stated
the U.S. and Syria shared a common interest on "70 percent"
of the issues at hand, the difference was all in "point of
view, principles, culture, and approach." Keen to press the
topic of engagement, Asad attempted to refute the idea that a
new dialogue would only make Syria stronger: "No, you make
yourselves stronger because you have interests in the region."

¶15. (C) Agreeing that dialogue was crucial and an essential
component of the Helsinki Commission, Senator Cardin advised
Asad that if he were serious about engagement, he would expel
Hamas leaders from Syria. Asad replied, "What if Hamas
supported peace?" Senator Cardin explained Hamas was a
symbol--it launched rockets into non-military areas and this
was the definition of terrorism. Asad replied Hamas was an
uninvited guest; it was really the very Muslim Brotherhood
organization Syria had combatted through the 1980s. "If you
want me to be effective and active, I have to have a
relationship with all parties. Hamas is Muslim Brotherhood,
but we have to deal with the reality of their presence."
Senator Cardin pointed out not expelling Hamas sent a signal
to the international community that Iran, given its support
for Hamas, might be making the decisions in Damascus.

--------------------------------
En Passant: The DCS, ACC and ALC
--------------------------------

¶16. (C) When confronted with Senator Cardin's observation
that the SARG's closure of the Damascus Community School
(DCS), the American Culture Center (ACC), and the American
Language Center (ALC) had hurt Syrians more than Americans,
Asad assured the CODEL that this was merely a public
relations gesture on his part. "We were attacked by the U.S.
army," Asad replied, "Seven civilians were killed. I had two
choices: fight the U.S. army or do something symbolic. It's
something temporary. You'll open it next year." Senator
Cardin told Asad he understood "symbolic gestures, but not
when they hurt your own people."

------------------------------
The End Game: Foreign Fighters
------------------------------

¶17. (C) "What interest does Syria have in letting foreign
fighters go to Iraq?" Asad pointedly asked in response to
Representative McIntyre's question about why Syria had not
done more to monitor and staunch the flow of transiting
fighters across the Syria-Iraq border. Asad continued: "Can
you stop the immigration of Mexicans into the U.S.? No. All

borders are porous. There is no army on the border; you
don't have soldiers on the border. Do your homework. My job
is to protect my people, not your soldiers. We have
terrorists. Two months ago there was a car bomb in Syria and
that car came from Iraq." (NOTE: We assume Asad is referring
to the September 27, 2008 car bomb attack against a SARG
military facility, though Syrian Military Intelligence has
reportedly stopped several cars rigged with explosives since
then. END NOTE). Asad noted that the lack of cooperation
with military forces in Iraq contributed to the problem.
With Turkey, he said, the border was more complicated and the
terrain worse, but because Syria enjoyed better cooperation
it was less porous.

¶18. (C) Asad recounted how when (then NEA A/S) William Burns
and representatives from the Army and CIA came to Damascus,
"we said we were ready to cooperate. We took the delegation
to the border, then after they left we waited for a proposal,
but nothing came of it. They didn't want to cooperate." Asad
added Syria lacked the financial and technical means, such as
night-vision goggles, to tighten its control of the area.
Asad then said, somewhat contradicting himself, that 80
percent of controlling the border was about controlling the
country. Representative McIntyre asked, "but are you willing
to monitor (the border)?" The president demurred, "this is a
different problem," at which point Ambassador Mustafa
interjected with "I will brief you on the details."

¶19. (C) The three main objectives Asad felt the U.S. and
Syria should work on were (1) Eliminating WMD in the region;
(2) pursuing a shared interest in a stable Iraq; and (3)
working for peace and combating terrorism. Asad re-affirmed
that Syria was not an enemy of the U.S., "I have saved
American lives." In 2002, Asad explained, he passed
information to the King of Bahrain about an imminent attack
on American citizens. Ambassador Mustafa added that then
Secretary of State Colin Powell had sent the Syrian
government a letter expressing his gratitude for its
assistance. If the U.S. wished for similar coordination in
the future, Syria could not begin security cooperation
without concomitant political cooperation, Asad stated.

¶20. (C) COMMENT: Beginning with the visit of President Carter
last December, President Asad's exposure to U.S. politicians
has steadily increased. This encounter was a good example of
how Asad has been able to hone his responses to U.S.
accusations that Syria is a bad actor in the region. At no
point in the conversation did Asad ask about the appointment
of a U.S. ambassador to Syria or economic sanctions, which
suggests to us that he is doing everything possible to avoid
the appearance of being the supplicant, despite the Syrian
press's heavy focus on Syria's desire to see an end to
sanctions and the appointment of a U.S. ambassador.

¶21. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We have heard anecdotally that
Asad was not pleased with the tenor or substance of his
meeting with the CODEL. The SARG is reportedly interpreting
the group's position on Iran, Iraq, Hizballah, and human
rights to be a continuation of, rather than a departure from,
the previous Administration's policy toward Syria. We note
that the CODEL's discussion with Asad was frank but cordial.
Senator Cardin and the CODEL members aired U.S. policy
concerns publicly from their perspective as elected
legislators in press remarks, framed in the context of their
desire to explore whether cooperation with Syria is viable.
The Syrian press and many of our interlocutors have come to
view re-engagement with the U.S. as a fait accompli, as
something long-overdue and very much owed to Syria. Asad's
displeasure with the CODEL may be his first recognition that
U.S.-Syria bilateral relations will require more on his end
than originally anticipated. END COMMENT.

-------------
Participants
-------------

¶22. (SBU) U.S.A.:
Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)

Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)
Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS)
Senator Tom Udall (D-NM)
Representative Mike McIntyre (D-NC)
Representative Gwen Moore (D-WI)
Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly
Mr. Fred Turner, Chief of Staff, CSCE
Mr. Alex Johnson, PSM, CSCE
Ms. Shelly Han, PSM, CSCE
Mr. Eric Pelofsky, PSM, SIC
Notetaker Anthony Deaton

Syrian Arab Republic:
President Bashar al-Asad
Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim
Presidential Advisor for Political and Media Affairs Dr.
Bouthaina Shaaban
Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustafa
Unidentified female notetaker
Unidentified male palace staffer

¶23. (U) Senator Cardin did not have a chance to clear this
report as of March 10.
CONNELLY


/tag/IR_1.html


09TELAVIV654     2009-03-19 14:02     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

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RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 5680
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0150
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3724
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RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1690
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 000654

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES FOCUS ON
IRAN, PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON

REF: TEL AVIV 605

Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

¶1. (S) Summary. MFA Deputy Director General for the Middle
East Yacov Hadas provided PolCouns March 16 with an overview
of Israel's relations with several of the Gulf states. Hadas
described Israel's relations with the Gulf as a function of
the Gulf Arabs' fear of Iran, but also as due to the Arabs'
belief in Israeli influence in Washington. Fleshing out some
of the points he had made earlier to NEA Acting A/S Feltman
(reftel), Hadas described Qatar's shift toward the radical
camp in the region as a "game" linked to Qatari rivalry with
Saudi Arabia. Hadas believes Qatar is feeling pressure from
Israel, Egypt and the Saudis, adding that he has been invited
to visit Doha for talks about how to resume normal
Qatari-Israeli ties. Hadas noted that while the Omanis are
generally correct in their dealings with Israel, they appear
not to recognize the seriousness of the threat from Iran. He
said that while the UAE is increasingly hostile to Iran, it
remains unclear how far they are willing to go in terms of
increasing financial pressures on Tehran. Hadas said the
Gulf Arabs feel that the U.S. does not listen to them and
therefore sometimes try to pass messages through Israel.
While he agreed that progress on the Palestinian track would
make it easier for the Gulf states to be open about their
ties to Israel, he cautioned that the Gulf states use the
peace process as an "excuse not to take action" against Iran
or in support of the PA. End Summary.

¶2. (C) PolCouns called on Deputy Director General for the
Middle East Yacov Hadas March 16 to follow up on Hadas' March
4 discussion with Acting A/S Feltman of Israeli-Gulf
relations. Beginning with Qatar, Hadas said there were signs
that various pressures on the Qataris were starting to have
an effect. Hadas noted that Qatar could only get its
humanitarian relief supplies into Gaza through Israel.
Qatari diplomats assigned to their Gaza consulate also had to
cross through Israel since Egypt would not allow them to
enter Gaza from Rafah. For now, the Israelis are not
allowing either Qatari assistance or personnel to cross into
Gaza. Hadas noted that he had been invited to visit Doha to
discuss reopening the Israeli trade office, which he saw as a
positive sign. He added that the Qataris needed to
understand that they could not expect to restore cooperative
relations with Israel without agreeing to reopen the trade
office.

¶3. (S) While Hadas was critical of the Qataris' treatment of
Israel since the Gaza operation, he stressed that he thought
Qatar's policies were not a matter of a shift in ideology
toward the radical camp, but linked to their rivalry with the
Saudis and, by extension, with Egypt. In private settings,
Hadas noted that the Qatari leadership harbored "no
illusions" about Iran. Prince Hamad had told the Israelis in
October 2006 that he believed Iran was determined to develop
a nuclear bomb no matter the cost. According to Hadas, Hamad
complained at the time that he felt the U.S. would not listen
to him and tended to believe what it heard from Iran.

¶4. (S) Hadas reiterated the point he had made to Feltman
regarding Oman, calling the Omanis the "most problematic" of
the Gulf states in terms of their view of Iran. With regard
to Omani contacts with Israel, Hadas said they were
"correct," but the Omanis never fulfilled their commitment to
open an Israeli office in Muscat. He said Oman has "its own
definition" of what poses a threat to the Gulf, partly due to
Oman's geographical location. He did not think Oman would be
willing to join the rest of the GCC against Iran.

¶5. (S) Hadas agreed that the UAE was increasingly hostile to
Iran, but there remained a question as to how far they were
prepared to go. The UAE has extensive trade and financial
relations with Iran, including money laundering, and it was
unclear whether they were ready to use these relations as
leverage. Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdallah has developed
good personal relations with Foreign Minister Livni, but the
Emiratis are "not ready to do publicly what they say in
private." (Note: It was clear from Hadas' remarks that
Israel's channel to Saudi Arabia does not run through the
Foreign Ministry.)


¶6. (S) Hadas said the Gulf Arabs believe in Israel's role
because of their perception of Israel's close relationship
with the U.S. but also due to their sense that they can count
on Israel against Iran. "They believe Israel can work
magic," Hadas commented. When considering a trilateral
U.S.-Israel-GCC partnership, Hadas suggested we bear in mind
that Iran's nuclear program is the primary source of concern
to the U.S. and Israel, while the Gulf Arabs also worry about
Iran for a host of historic and sectarian reasons.

¶7. (C) PolCouns noted that Arabs say that progress on the
Palestinian track would make it easier for them to publicly
engage Israel. Hadas countered that while peace with the
Palestinians is an Israeli interest and important in its own
right, it should not be the sum total of Israel's relations
with the Arab World. Arab League Secretary General Amre
Moussa had invented the "never-ending hurdle race" in which
Israel could never do enough to deserve a positive response.
The Israeli-Palestinian track should not serve as an excuse
for the Gulf to avoid action, whether against Iran or through
practical steps to support the Palestinian Authority.



********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_1.html


09AMMAN813     2009-04-02 05:05     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Amman

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S E C R E T AMMAN 000813

SIPDIS

NEA/ELA AND INR/TCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2029
TAGS: PREL PINR IR JO
SUBJECT: WARY OF U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT, JORDAN OFFERS WORDS
OF CAUTION

REF: A. STATE 25892
¶B. 08 AMMAN 3329
¶C. AMMAN 668
¶D. 08 AMMAN 3189
¶E. 08 AMMAN 2660
¶F. 08 AMMAN 3372

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for
evaluations of third-country reactions to possible U.S.
engagement with Iran. Jordan's leaders believe such
engagement would reward regional hardliners while undermining
Arab moderates - without convincing Iran to cease its support
for terrorism, end its nuclear program or drop its hegemonic
aspirations. Jordanian officials argue that the best way to
counter Iran's ambitions is to weaken the salience of its
radicalism on the Arab street by fulfilling the promise of a
"two-state solution," resolving other Arab-Israeli disputes,
and making sure that Iraq's political and security
institutions are not overwhelmed by Iranian influence when
the U.S. drawdown is complete. If U.S.-Iran engagement does
proceed in earnest, Jordan hopes to be closely consulted in
advance and for its interests to be taken into account. End
Summary.

Beware the Iranian Tentacles ... and Cut Them Off
--------------------------------------------- ----

¶2. (S) The metaphor most commonly deployed by Jordanian
officials when discussing Iran is of an octopus whose
tentacles reach out insidiously to manipulate, foment, and
undermine the best laid plans of the West and regional
moderates. Iran's tentacles include its allies Qatar and
Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian
territories, an Iraqi government sometimes seen as supplicant
to Tehran, and Shia communities throughout the region. While
Jordanian officials doubt dialogue with the U.S. will
convince Iran to withdraw its "tentacles," they believe they
can be severed if Iran is deprived of hot-button issues that
make it a hero to many on the Arab street, such as its
championing of the Palestinian cause.

¶3. (C) According to the GOJ analysis, Iran's influence
derives from the perception that Tehran is able to "deliver"
while moderates are not. The main failure of moderates as
cited by radicals is ongoing Palestinian suffering and
dispossession despite an international consensus favoring a
viable, independent Palestinian state living peacefully next
to Israel. The MFA's Deputy Director of the Arab and Middle
East Affairs Department, Muwaffaq Ajlouni, put it this way:
"Iran is not welcomed in the Arab world, but it is taking
advantage of helpless people." From Jordan's perspective,
the U.S. would benefit from pressing Israel to proceed to
final status negotiations, which would garner Arab support to
deal with shared security concerns about Iran.

¶4. (S) In Lebanon, the GOJ fears Iran's Hizballah proxy has
been given too much rope and could be poised to increase its
political influence during upcoming parliamentary elections.
The King sees the Lebanon-Israel War of 2006 as having
benefited Iran and Hizballah, by allowing a Sunni Arab street
enamored of "resistance" to see past its suspicions of the
Shia. And then-Foreign Minister Salah Al-Bashir in late 2008
described the spring 2009 vote as "when we will know who won
last May," referring to the outcome of the Doha Accords that
put an end to Lebanese infighting. Much like with the
Palestinian issue, Jordanian leaders have argued that the
only way to pull the rug out from under Hizballah - and by
extension their Iranian patrons - would be for Israel to hand
over the disputed Sheba'a Farms to Lebanon. With Hizballah
lacking the "resistance to occupation" rationale for
continued confrontation with Israel, it would lose its raison
d'etre and probably domestic support.

¶5. (S) In Iraq, signs of growing security and political
stability over the past year in particular have served
somewhat to calm Jordanian nerves about Iran's interference.
The King and others have cited indications that Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri Al-Maliki is showing himself to be a national
rather than a parochial or Iranian-controlled leader. During
the U.S.-Jordan Political Dialogue in November 2008, FM
Bashir noted that the Iraqi government had a "tendency to
appease Iran," but he saw increased Jordanian (and Sunni
Arab) diplomatic engagement with Baghdad as a potential
bulwark against Iran (Ref B). Positive trends
notwithstanding, many of our Jordanian interlocutors stress
that the U.S. should leave Iraq only when it "makes sense,"
and thereby avoid a political and security vacuum that could
be easily filled by Iran (Ref C).


Prepare for Iran to Disappoint
------------------------------

¶6. (S) Jordan's leaders are careful not to be seen as
dictating toward the U.S., but their comments betray a
powerful undercurrent of doubt that the United States knows
how to deal effectively with Iran. Foreign Minister Nasser
Joudeh has suggested the Iranians would be happy to let talks
with the U.S. continue for ten years without moving them
forward, believing that they can benefit from perceived
acceptance after years of isolation without paying a price.

¶7. (S) Upper House President Zeid Rifai has predicted that
dialogue with Iran will lead nowhere, arguing that if the
U.S., the EU, and the Arab states agree that under no
circumstances should Iran be allowed to obtain a nuclear
weapon, military force becomes the only option. "Bomb Iran,
or live with an Iranian bomb. Sanctions, carrots, incentives
won't matter," was how he put it to visiting NEA DAS David
Hale in November. While Rifai judged a military strike would
have "catastrophic impact on the region," he nonetheless
thought preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would
pay enough dividends to make it worth the risks (Ref D).

¶8. (C) Speaking to PolOffs in early February 2009, Director
of the Prime Minister's Political Office Khaled Al-Qadi noted
that the Gaza crisis had allowed Iranian interference in
inter-Arab relations to reach unprecedented levels. He urged
the U.S. to "understand the history," explaining that "after
the Israelis, the Iranians are the smartest. They know where
they are going and what they are doing." He doubted there
would be any diplomatic breakthrough before Iran's June
elections, partly because Iranian pragmatists cannot be
practical due to religious and ideological considerations.
He hoped any dialogue would be aimed at weakening hardliners,
many of whom believe their "Great Satan" rhetoric.

Talk If You Must, But Don't Sell Us Out
---------------------------------------

¶9. (S) If direct U.S.-Iran talks must happen, the Jordanian
leadership insists it not be at the expense of Arab
interests, particularly those of moderates like Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority.
Furthermore, they worry that engagement will set off a
stampede of Arab states looking to get ahead of the curve and
reach their own separate peace with Tehran. King Abdullah
counseled Special Envoy George Mitchell in February that
direct U.S. engagement with Iran at this time would just
deepen intra-Arab schisms and that more "countries without a
backbone" would defect to the Iranian camp. The Prime
Ministry's Qadi has assessed that Iran sought to "transform
the Israeli-Arab conflict into an Islamic-Israeli conflict"
and that this strategy was already working with Syria and
Qatar. Even more conspiratorially, then-FM Bashir in
September 2008 highlighed Arab fears to a visiting CODEL that
the United States and the West would allow Iran to play a
hegemonic role in Iraq and throughout the region in exchange
for giving up its nuclear program (Ref E).

¶10. (S) Asked late last year whether he advocated engaging
Iran or working against its interests without engagement, the
King told visiting U.S. Senators that U.S. should undertake
both approaches concurrently but that engagement needs to be
done "smartly" by setting benchmarks for behavior (Ref F).
International Affairs Director at the Royal Court Jafar
Hassan on April 1 operationalized Jordan's position as
follows: the U.S. must not only consult its friends in the
region, but declare that it is doing so publicly as a signal
to Iran that the Arabs are full parties to the U.S. policy
review. He called for the U.S. and the Arabs to work
together to determine what deliverables are required from
Iran, what subjects are appropriate for discussion, and also
to set clear redlines. (Note: Hassan said Jordan was trying
to work with its friends in the region to develop a
joint-Arab strategy, but that this has yet to materialize.
End Note.)

¶11. (S) Comment: Believing the U.S. is predisposed toward
engagement with Iran, Jordanian officials have avoided
forthrightly rejecting such overtures, but they remain
anxious that Iran will be the only one to benefit - at their
expense. Given Jordanian skepticism that Iran's regional
ambitions can be reined in, they probably see establishing
benchmarks as a way to keep U.S.-Iranian engagement limited
and short-lived. Re-engagement could trigger a review of
Jordan's relationship with Iran and with Islamic groups like
Hamas, with which Jordan held limited security talks last
year. When asked periodically whether by engaging with
Hamas, Jordan was undermining PA President Mahmoud Abbas,

official interlocutors simply pointed out that Israel meets
with Hamas through Egypt, that Syria and Iran are actively
engaged with Hamas, and that Jordan cannot be disengaged.
End Comment.


Visit Amman's Classified Website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman
Beecroft


/tag/IR_1.html


09ABUDHABI347     2009-04-05 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Abu Dhabi

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RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0644

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000347

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR S, S/SRAP HOLBROOKE AND S/SAGSWA ROSS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: 03/24/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM MOPS IR AF PK AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REITERATES IRAN CONCERNS FOR S/SRAP
HOLBROOKE

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: During a March 24 meeting with Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, Abu
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) expressed his grave
concerns about the Iranian threat to the region. MbZ said the
Iranian response to the Nowruz message was primarily for domestic
consumption, but that the Iranian leadership is concerned that
dialogue with the West represents a regime threat. He said Iran
would obtain a nuclear weapon unless the regime could be "split from
inside" before nuclear capability was achieved. Foreign Minister
Abdullah bin Zayed argued for continued Gulf consultation in
conjunction with any U.S. efforts to engage Iran. (Other topics
reported septel.) End Summary.

NOWRUZ STATEMENT
----------------

¶2. (S/NF) MbZ began by telling Amb. Holbrooke that Khamenei's
response to President's Nowruz statement was designed to send a
message to the millions of Iranians who saw the statement on the
Internet that there will be no debate on engagement with the United
States and/or the West. MbZ opined that Khamenei had to deliver the
message personally as an Ahmedinejad response would have fueled
domestic debate. Commenting that Khamenei was conveying Iran's
fundamental lack of trust in the United States, MbZ said the Iranians
want an apology "for everything from Carter to Bush." He added that
the uncharacteristic speed of Khamenei's response indicates the
extent of the perceived threat that improved relations with the West
might represent to the leadership's control over the country.
Specifically, the Iranian regime fears the United States will demand
the renunciation of its nuclear program, which would be politically
impossible.

nuclear WEAPONS A CERTAINTY, UNLESS REGIME FALLS
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶3. (S/NF) MbZ told Holbrooke he was "100 percent" convinced Iran will
complete its nuclear weapons program. He candidly stated his
personal belief that negotiations with Iran were irrelevant and a
military solution would only delay the program, not derail it. MbZ
said that there was a "third way" between these unacceptable options:
Iran is domestically very fragile, and the only way to prevent it
from acquiring nuclear weapons was to "split them from inside."

¶4. (S/NF) Turning to his concerns about an armed confrontation, MbZ
said war with Iran would only harm the UAE. He is deeply concerned
that the current Israeli government will initiate military action
without consultation. An Israeli attack on Iran would have little
impact on Iran's capabilities, but MbZ was certain Iran would
respond. MbZ argued that the leadership believes its own lies, which
were "proven" by Iran's success in Basra. Today's conventional
Iranian weapons would target the Gulf, while Iran continues to expand
its missile program with the hope of reaching the West.

CONSULT US
----------

¶5. (S/NF) UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan
(AbZ) stressed the importance of a continuation of the P5 plus 1 plus
GCC plus 3 coordination on Iran. AbZ said that such consultation in
2008 "agitated" Iran, but sent a message to Russia and China and
European allies that the Gulf is seriously concerned about Iranian
hegemony. Iran's regional hegemony and nuclear program are two
issues that the West cannot tackle separately. AbZ noted that
countries in the region ("some friends") are concerned that the
United States, especially under the current administration, would
engage Iran at the expense of ties with the region. AbZ said the
President's Nowruz message supported this theory. He concluded, "The
more you engage Iran, the more you must engage the Gulf states."
(Ambassador Olson's comment: Abdullah's reference to "friends" was
Emirati politesse - the UAE is deeply concerned that we are preparing
to trade, and is interpreting the Nowruz greeting in that way.)

¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this message.
OLSON


/tag/IR_1.html


09TELAVIV936     2009-04-28 08:08     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

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INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000936

SIPDIS

H PASS TO CODEL KYL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KNNP KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: CODEL KYL'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU:
WHAT WILL THE U.S. DO ABOUT IRAN?

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

¶1. (S) Summary. CODEL Kyl, accompanied by the Ambassador,
called on Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu April 6 in the
first official U.S. meeting with Netanyahu since he formed a
government. The main topics of discussion were stopping
Iran's nuclear program and Netanyahu's approach to
peace-making with the Palestinians. On Iran, Senator Kyl
raised ways to increase the effect of sanctions, including
possible legislation targeting Iranian imports of refined
petroleum. Adopting a forceful stance, Netanyahu asked
repeatedly what the U.S. plans to do if sanctions and
engagement fail to stop Iran's program. Calling Iran's
development of a nuclear bomb a world-changing event,
Netanyahu said all other issues become insignificant by
comparison. On the Palestinians, Netanyahu reviewed his
intent to pursue a three-track approach with political,
economic, and security aspects. While noting that his
government is conducting a review of Israeli policy toward
the Palestinians, Netanyahu asserted that there is agreement
within the government and among 80% of Israelis that the
Palestinians should be able to rule themselves, but with
limits imposed by Israel's security requirements. Netanyahu
said the only difference between his position and that of
opposition leader Tzipi Livni is over the name of the goal,
i.e. the two-state solution. In response to comments by
Senator Sessions that the Palestinian Authority needs
functioning courts and jails as well as police, Netanyahu
agreed but said he had not yet focused much on Palestinian
governance issues. Netanyahu said he wants to show the
Palestinians the benefits of peace, but with the proviso that
if Iran goes nuclear, peace will fail. Predicting that his
government would pleasantly surprise many critics, Netanyahu
concluded that he hopes to come up with a common approach
with President Obama. End Summary.

¶2. (U) CODEL Kyl, consisting of Senator Jon Kyl (R, AZ);
Senator Jeff Sessions (R, AL); Representative Jane Harman (D,
CA); Representative John Kline (R, MN); and Representative
Chris Carney (D, PA), called on Prime Minister Benyamin
Netanyahu April 6. The Ambassador, Congressional staff, and
Pol Couns (notetaker) participated in the meeting. Netanyahu
was joined by National Security Adviser Uzi Arad, Spokesman
Mark Regev, Policy Adviser Ron Dermer, former chairman of the
Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Kadima MK
Tzachi Hanegbi (Senator's Kyl's counterpart in the
U.S.-Israel Joint Parliamentary Committee on National
Security), and the Israeli Embassy in Washington's
Congressional liaison officer. The meeting was the first
official U.S. face to face contact with Netanyahu since he
formed his government.

What Will the U.S. Do About Iran?
---------------------------------

¶3. (S) After a brief discussion of the world economic crisis,
Senator Kyl raised Iran, noting the "sobering" briefings the
CODEL had received from senior Israeli defense and
intelligence officials the previous day. Kyl said the
Congress is looking at legislation that would target Iran's
imports of refined petroleum products, adding that there are
only four or five companies that supply refined petroleum to
Iran and the U.S. has considerable leverage over most of
them. Kyl added that Israeli experts had told the CODEL that
they thought such legislation would be helpful. Netanyahu
said nothing is slowing the progress of Iran's nuclear
program. The Prime Minister asked what will happen to the
Middle East if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon? If such a
prospect is unacceptable, what will the U.S. do as Iran
reaches the nuclear threshold? What will the U.S. do if
Pakistan is taken over by Islamic radicals?

¶4. (S) Representative Harman told Netanyahu that no one in
the CODEL disagreed with his analysis, but the U.S. should
give engagement an opportunity to see if it works. If it
does not, at least it would show the world that the U.S. had
tried. She added that Congress supports engagement on a
bipartisan basis. Senator Kyl added that the Europeans tried
to engage Iran for five years but it did not work. President
Obama will pursue engagement, but Kyl said he doubted it
would be successful. We should consider what to do in the
mean time. Netanyahu responded that the U.S. should move
quickly. Engagement should have a short time limit and a
specific goal, for example talk to the Iranians for four to
twelve weeks and make clear that the U.S. goal is an end to
their nuclear program. Leaning forward, Netanyahu repeated
his earlier question: "What will you do if it does not work?"


TEL AVIV 00000936 002 OF 003


¶5. (S) Netanyahu said that learning to live with a nuclear
Iran would be a big mistake which would lead to a different,
more dangerous world. While he noted that he could not say
for certain that Iran would use a nuclear weapon against
Israel, if Iran had a bomb Israelis would have to ask that
question every day. This is a historic moment, and leaders
have a responsibility to make decisions. All other issues
are insignificant by comparison. For a third time, Netanyahu
asked, "What are you going to do?"


Netanyahu's Approach to the Palestinians
----------------------------------------

¶6. (C) Senator Kyl asked the Prime Minister about his view of
the two-state solution. Netanyahu said he plans to engage
the Palestinian Authority quickly and will not tie political
talks with the Palestinians to developments with Iran.
Reviewing a now familiar formula, Netanyahu said he will
approach the Palestinians on parallel political, economic and
security tracks. Political talks would aim at achieving an
agreement within certain limits, the economic approach would
promote foreign and Arab investment and joint projects with
Israeli partners, while the security track would continue to
build up the PA's security forces. In order to do any of
this, Netanyahu noted, he will need a Palestinian partner.

¶7. (C) Representative Harman observed that the CODEL had
visited units of the PA's National Security Forces and the
Presidential Guard. PA Prime Minister Fayyad said he was
happy with the PA's security forces, and they want to take on
increased responsibility for security in Jericho and Jenin.
Netanyahu replied that Israel would be happy to let them do
more, but it is not clear what Hamas will do next. If Hamas
forces a confrontation, Israel will have to initiate further
military action in Gaza. Israel did not want to go back into
Gaza, but it will do what is necessary to protect its people.

¶8. (C) Netanyahu said his government is reviewing Israel's
policy toward the Palestinians. There is a consensus in the
government and among 80% of the Israeli public that the
Palestinians should be able to govern themselves. The only
limits on Palestinian sovereignty would be elements that
affect Israel's security. A Palestinian state must be
demilitarized, without control over its air space and
electro-magnetic field, and without the power to enter into
treaties or control its borders. Netanyahu concluded that he
and opposition leader Tzipi Livni "only disagree about the
name," i.e. the two-state solution.

¶9. (C) Senator Sessions noted that people everywhere want law
and order. Palestinians not only need to deal with
terrorism, they also need a functioning legal system. Moving
from a lawless system, the Palestinian Authority is showing
some pride, but police are not enough, they need courts and
jails that work. Economic development is impossible in a
lawless society. Netanyahu agreed this was a valid point and
uncharacteristically admitted that he had not focused much on
Palestinian governance. He added that international
assistance should provide funding for jails and courts. It
is possible to create crime-free zones and begin economic
development "in bubbles" which would then be expanded.
Senator Sessions noted that Lt. General Dayton is focused on
this issue. Representative Harman commented that "bubbles"
in the West Bank would not be enough, Palestinians need law
and order everywhere.

¶10. (C) Netanyahu said the "classic rhetoric" of the peace
process has been that if Israel withdraws, all will be well.
Now, however, if Israel withdrew from the West Bank, Hamas
would take over. Economic development would not be a
substitute for a political settlement, but it would change
the environment and show Palestinians the benefits of peace.
Israel has been trying to "build a roof without a foundation"
and it has not worked. Netanyahu said there was one proviso:
If Iran gets a nuke, peace efforts will fail.

¶11. (C) Netanyahu pointed to the example of Jordanian King
Hussein, whom he termed Israel's best Arab ally and a man
deeply committed to peace. Yet when Saddam Hussein took
Kuwait, King Hussein got on board with the Iraqis. In the
event of a nuclear Iran, "all the Arabs will become Qatar."
We should therefore move in parallel to work for peace with
the Palestinians while acting to stop Iran. Netanyahu said
he thought his government would pleasantly surprise many of
its critics. He concluded the meeting by saying that he
wants to coordinate Israel's positions with the U.S. and
hopes to come to a common position with President Obama.

TEL AVIV 00000936 003 OF 003



¶12. (U) CODEL Kyl has cleared this cable.




********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_1.html


09MOSCOW1111     2009-04-29 13:01     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Moscow

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 001111

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KACT IR RS
SUBJECT: FM LAVROV DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE AND IRAN WITH
CODEL LEVIN

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary. Foreign Minister Lavrov told visiting Codel
Levin April 15 that arms control issues were Russia's top
priority. Noting that Moscow was waiting for concrete
proposals, including specific language, from the U.S. on a
post-START treaty agreement, Lavrov said he recognized that
the U.S. would not want to address the link between offensive
and defensive weapons in the post-START negotiations, but it
would be important to have such a dialogue in the future.
Russia was interested in developing a joint missile defense
system (MD) with the U.S., but we should start "from
scratch," with joint threat assessments, determination of
necessary resources, and best location for MD assets. Lavrov
rejected a quid pro quo in which the U.S. would discontinue
its MD plans for eastern Europe in exchange for Russia
pressuring Iran to end its nuclear weapons program,
emphasizing that each issue should be considered separately.
He acknowledged that Moscow was concerned about Iran's
longer-range missile development and said Russia would be
prepared to undertake a "dual-track" approach towards Iran's
nuclear program; offering incentives to Tehran, but keeping
in reserve measures within the Agreed Framework. He
reconfirmed that Moscow had suspended the sale of S-300's to
Iran "for the moment." In a follow-on meeting, DFM Sergey
Ryabkov stressed that while Russia was interested in working
with the U.S. on MD, it would be difficult for Russia to join
a U.S. MD effort that included sites in Poland and the Czech
Republic, and urged that if the U.S. intended to pursue sites
in Europe, they should be further west and south, so as to
diminish the effect on Russian capabilities. Ryabkov
emphasized that "no one can deliver Iran to the U.S., except
the U.S. itself," and argued that, while the S-300 sale was
"frozen," the "less Moscow heard from Washington about it,
the better." End summary.

¶2. (C) In a meeting with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in
Moscow April 15, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Carl Levin (D-MI), together with SASC members Bill
Nelson (D-FL) and Susan Collins (R-ME) emphasized that they
were united in their hope that the U.S. and Russia could
strengthen their cooperation to address common challenges.
Noting the Senate's Constitutional role in ratifying treaties
and providing advice and recommendations on foreign policy
issues to the President, Senator Levin raised missile defense
(MD) as an issue that had divided the two countries, but
should unite them. He suggested that if Russia and the U.S,
could work together on MD, it would send a powerful message
to those who might threaten us, including to Iran.

¶3. (C) FM Lavrov welcomed the Senators' visit, and noted that
it was timely, coming two weeks after the first meeting
between Presidents Obama and Medvedev. He highlighted the
important role "Parliaments" play in building constructive
relationships and expressed the hope that the U.S. and Russia
could overcome the "inertia" that had characterized the
relationship in the past.

Arms Control, NPT
-----------------

¶4. (C) Lavrov said that arms control issues were Russia's top
priority. The U.S.-Russia agenda was positive, even though
we had differences. Moscow hoped the U.S. Administration
would submit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for
ratification, and would reconsider sending the "123"
Agreement to the Hill. He welcomed President Obama's remarks
supporting nuclear weapons reductions, saying that such
reductions were not just a matter of security for the U.S.
and Russia, but carried a political message that would be
important for the 2010 review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). While characterizing the elimination of nuclear
weapons as "a noble goal," Lavrov said it was not "an
immediate project." We needed to have some clear proposals,
which would give others a clear idea of the way forward. He
suggested that the next stage after the post-START
negotiations should consider how to engage others, such as
the UK, in discussions of further reductions, as well as
looking at tactical nuclear weapons.

¶5. (C) There was "a lot to do" on non-proliferation issues,
Lavrov said, including Iran and North Korea. Pakistan was a
concern, and we should think about engaging them as well as
India and Israel. The U.S. and Russia had cooperated to

MOSCOW 00001111 002 OF 005


address the danger of non-state actors acquiring nuclear
material though programs such as the Global Initiative to
Combat nuclear Terrorism and UN Security Council Resolution
¶1540. The U.S. and Russia should also look at ways to
strengthen the NPT regime, including how to universalize the
Additional Protocol. We should also work on issues like fuel
supply, the nuclear Fuel Center Russia had started, and
programs like the Global nuclear Energy Partnership.

Post-START
----------

¶6. (C) Lavrov expressed appreciation for the Senate's
confirmation of Rose Gottemoeller as A/S for VCI, noting that
the U.S. and Russia had a lot of work to do to achieve a
follow-on agreement to the START Treaty. The issue would be
discussed at the meeting between DVBR Director Anatoliy
Antonov and A/S Gottemoeller in Rome on April 24, as well as
in his meeting with the Secretary in Washington in May. The
teams would report to the Presidents in July, and hope to
reach a framework agreement by the end of the year. He said
that while the Presidents in their statement April 1 had
endorsed reductions below the Moscow Treaty limits and had
agreed to use many of the verification procedures of the
START Treaty, Moscow was waiting for more concrete proposals
from the U.S., including specific language.

¶7. (C) Lavrov highlighted the April 1 Joint Statement's
reference to the link between offensive and defensive
weapons, saying that the balance between the two that had
existed in the Soviet Union had been thrown off kilter when
the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty. He stressed that he
recognized this did not mean the U.S. would support
addressing the linkage during the post-START negotiations,
but it was important to have a discussion on it at some point
in the future.

Missile Defense and Iran
------------------------

¶8. (C) Senator Levin said the SASC was interested in
exploring the possibility of U.S. and Russia working together
on MD. The U.S. was focused on the threat from Iran, but he
recognized that Russia may have a broader perspective.
However, we were both opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran, which
would be able to put pressure on other countries in the
region. The U.S. also perceived the possibility of an
Iranian long-range missile as a threat. He noted that press
reports indicated that Medvedev had told Henry Kissinger and
the Hart-Hagel Commission that he was concerned that the
Iranian nuclear program was more of a threat than Russia had
previously believed. (Lavrov emphatically corrected this,
saying Medvedev had expressed concern about Iran's missile
launch). Noting that the U.S. had made commitments to Poland
and the Czech Republic, Senator Levin said the U.S. would
need to consider how to keep those commitments and include
Europe in a common MD program with Russia.

¶9. (C) Agreeing that MD should unite the U.S. and Russia,
rather than divide us, Lavrov said Russia was interested in
developing a MD system with the U.S., but the U.S. proposals
for an MD system in Poland and the Czech Republic ("3rd
Site"), disrupted the balance between the U.S. and Russia's
nuclear potential. He stressed that then-President Putin's
Kennebunkport proposal for a cooperative MD effort using
Russian resources, joint analyses and determinations of the
threat, and data exchange centers, was still on the table.
He welcomed President Obama's statement that if the Iran
nuclear issue were resolved satisfactorily, there would be
less need for the 3rd Site, but took care to emphasize that
Russia did not support a quid pro quo between Russia helping
to get Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and the U.S.
discontinuing its deployment in eastern Europe. These two
issues should be dealt with separately, on their own merits,
Lavrov stressed.

¶10. (C) Noting that the Congressional Budget Office had
presented three alternatives on the MD project, Lavrov said
this showed there were issues with the proposal. Hastening
to add that Russia did not endorse any of the three
alternatives, Lavrov commended the Administration's intent to
review them, noting this was the difference with the new
Administration: it was willing to listen and take the time to
analyze the alternatives, instead of saying "this is what

MOSCOW 00001111 003 OF 005


must be done; everyone must say yes sir."

¶11. (C) In response to Senator's Levin question why Russia
was not more concerned about Iran's missile capabilities,
since Russia was closer to Iran, Lavrov said Moscow was "not
complacent; we are closer." But whenever Russian negotiators
had protested to the U.S. side that the proposed radar could
cover Russia up to the Urals and the interceptors could reach
Russian territory, the U.S. response had simply been that the
system "was not aimed at Russia." As Medvedev and Putin had
said, "when there is something risky on the ground, you need
to take it into account." Russia had warned it would need to
take countermeasures if the 3rd site was deployed, and that
it would put missiles in Kaliningrad. Noting that Moscow
would announce soon just how much it had withdrawn from
Kaliningrad, Lavrov said he hoped the U.S. and Russia could
find common ground on MD.

¶12. (C) Lavrov cautioned that Russia did not perceive Iran in
the same way as the U.S. Iran for Russia was "much more than
a country which might cause concern in the international
community." Russia opposed Iran getting a nuclear weapon,
because Russia did not want any more "members of the nuclear
club," but Iran and Russia were historical and traditional
partners and neighbors, with a "rich bilateral agenda."
Lavrov said he was certain Iran wanted to have a full nuclear
fuel cycle and would negotiate from that basis. It was
unfortunate that the U.S. had not accepted the proposals a
few years before when Iran only had 32 centrifuges; now they
had over 5,000. Nonetheless, Russia wanted Iran to cooperate
fully with the IAEA and implement, and eventually ratify, the
Additional Protocol. As agreed to in the E3-plus-3
statement, Russia wanted Iran to prove the peaceful nature of
its nuclear program, in a verifiable way.

¶13. (C) Lavrov commended the new U.S. approach to Iran,
welcoming President Obama's readiness for the U.S. to engage
"fully" in talks with Iran. Willingness to discuss "all" the
issues was a welcome step, and one which Russia had been
advocating for several years, Lavrov said. Iran wielded a
lot of influence in the region, including on Afghanistan,
Iraq, Hizbollah, Hamas, Gaza, etc. Iran had long been
concerned about Israel, and saw Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons
competitor. Putin had asked Ahmadinejad during a meeting in
Tehran a few years before why he made such anti-Israeli
statements, but Ahmadinejad had not responded, only saying
that Iran was "not doing anything in the nuclear sphere
different from Brazil." Putin had replied that Brazil was
not in the Middle East. While Iran wanted to dominate the
region and the Islamic world, which was of concern to Arab
governments, the U.S. should realize that the "Arab Street"
considers Iranian leaders to be heroes.

¶14. (C) Noting that Russia was watching events in Iran
closely, Lavrov said Moscow would be prepared to undertake
the "dual-track approach," first offering incentives to Iran,
but keeping in reserve measures within the Agreed Framework.
The Administration's new approach "give us a much better
chance than we had in the past. We will do everything we can
to make it work," Lavrov said.

¶15. (C) Senator Nelson said he was encouraged by the FM's
remarks, noting that it might be possible to consider
cooperating on use of Russia's radars at Gabala and Armavir.
He said he hoped Lavrov was right that Iran would be deterred
from building a nuclear weapon, but he was skeptical. The
best deterrence might be for the U.S. and Russia to cooperate
on MD.

S-300 Sales
-----------

¶16. (S) Senator Levin said that Russia had taken a practical
and pragmatic step with the suspension of the sale of S-300
missiles to Iran, Senator Levin said. This helped make
Israel less nervous, and sent a message to Iran that the U.S.
and Russia were working more closely together on Iran issues.
Lavrov acknowledged that Russia was not supplying the system
"for the moment," but reiterated the usual mantra that
Russia's S-300 contract with Iran did not violate any
international or national laws or arms control regimes, and
that the S-300's were a defensive system only. He added that
nothing Russia had sold Iran had been used against anyone,
whereas U.S. weapons provided to Georgia had been used

MOSCOW 00001111 004 OF 005


against Russian soldiers. This did not mean the U.S. did not
have the right to sell weapons to Georgia, but Moscow did not
want a repeat of the August 2008 conflict. Overall, he said,
the Iranians had legitimate security concerns. They had been
attacked more than once by their neighbors, and saw
Pakistan's nuclear status as "competition for regional
leadership."

¶17. (S) In a follow-on meeting with DFM Ryabkov, Senator
Levin asked whether Iran believed the S-300 sale was canceled
or just suspended. Ryabkov replied that a contract existed,
and it was impossible to break a contract without
consequences. He repeated that Moscow had taken U.S. and
Israeli concerns into account, and at present Russia was not
providing any components of the system to Teheran. Thus, it
was "obvious the degree to which Iran was dissatisfied with
this," he said. But, the contract was not canceled, it was
merely "frozen," Ryabkov stressed. He argued that "the less
we hear from Washington about this, the better."

Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------------

¶18. (C) Senator Collins expressed appreciation for Russia's
allowing transit of non-lethal equipment to ISAF in
Afghanistan, and asked how the U.S. and Russia could work
together to counter terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Lavrov said Pakistan was a place were "a lot of problems
start for Afghanistan," and questioned the term "moderate
Taliban." He said the people on the UNSCR 1267 Committee
list should be "blacklisted for as long as possible," but for
anyone else, as long as they renounced terrorism, cooperated
with the Kabul government, and refrained from extremist
activity, it would be all right to deal with them.

Ryabkov Meeting
---------------

¶19. (C) In a follow-up meeting with DFM Ryabkov immediately
afterwards, Ryabkov cited the non-paper Lavrov had given the
Secretary in the Hague on March 31, and said there was
already a good basis to cooperate with the U.S. on MD.
Progress had been made in the NATO Russia Council on theater
missile defense, and Moscow believed there was more that
could be done there. But he reiterated Lavrov's position
that bilateral discussions would need to start from scratch.
He disagreed with Senator Levin's statement that the system
could not have a significant impact on Russia's nuclear
capabilities. He noted that Russia was more concerned about
the radar than the interceptor sites, because the former
could see the location of Russia's strategic forces, but even
with the interceptors, nobody could predict what would be at
those sites in 10 years' time. In response to Senator's
Levin's asking whether the deployments couldn't be limited by
an agreement, Ryabkov acknowledged that was a possibility,
but stressed that the radar could still be used with other
U.S. MD assets. The sites in Poland and the Czech Republic
were part of a global MD architecture, which, when linked
together, could almost "knock Russia out."

¶20. (C) Ryabkov stressed that while the U.S. and Russia were
not adversaries now, "intentions could change," whereas
"capabilities" were much harder to change. He noted that the
countries in eastern Europe saw the 3rd site as more of a
geo-political issue, bringing them closer to the West, than
as a response to a potential threat from Iran. "We are not
in a zero-sum game and we do not want to use your possibly
legitimate security concern as a geo-political pawn," Ryabkov
argued. Noting a link to the post-START negotiations,
Ryabkov said the greater the reductions in number of warheads
each side could possess, the more strategically important MD
became. He added that it would be politically difficult for
Russia to join a U.S. MD effort that included sites in Poland
and the Czech Republic. If the U.S. intended to pursue sites
in Europe, they should be further west and south, so as to
diminish the effect on Russian capabilities.

¶21. (C) In response to Senator Levin's question whether it
would be possible to develop a joint radar system with
Russian radars at Gabala, Armavir, and Moscow, connected to
U.S. AEGIS and THAAD systems, Ryabkov responded that he had
not considered such an idea before and would need to think
about it. Such a system, he noted, would become strategic,
and would lack the X-band capability of the radar proposed

MOSCOW 00001111 005 OF 005


for the Czech Republic, since all the systems cited were
early-warning radars only, but it could be an option.

¶22. (C) Ryabkov said Russia hoped it would be possible to
have a "meaningful dialogue" with Iran, and noted that
President Obama's remarks had had a strong impact in Teheran
and the Arab world. But it was still difficult to predict
how Teheran would react. He characterized the P5-plus 1
(E3-plus-3) statement as "very promising," but claimed
experience showed Iran would not make concessions under
pressure. He emphasized that it was "very clear that no one
can deliver Iran to the U.S., except the U.S. itself."

Civilian Space Cooperation
--------------------------

¶23. (C) In response to Senator Nelson's question about
prospects for increased civilian space cooperation and what
would happen when the U.S. was fully dependent on the Soyuz
spacecraft to reach the International Space Station, Ryabkov
said he saw no difficulty with meeting the U.S.'s needs, and
said we should both be forward-leaning. He noted that
RosCosmos had suggested to NASA that Russia cooperate on
development of the U.S.'s new spacecraft, but the idea had
not been pursued. Ryabkov proposed we discuss the issue
further with RosCosmos and said Moscow favored closer
cooperation with the U.S. and Europe in this area. While it
was not linked to MD, the more progress we could make on MD,
the better able we would be to move forward on other issues.

¶24. (U) Codel Levin did not clear this cable.
BEYRLE


/tag/IR_1.html


09CAIRO746     2009-04-30 15:03     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Cairo

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000746

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS PARM KPAL IS IR SO EG SU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL MULLEN'S MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN

Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. Key Points:

- (S/NF) During an April 21 meeting with Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, Egyptian
General Intelligence Service Chief Omar Soliman explained
that his overarching regional goal was combating radicalism,
especially in Gaza, Iran, and Sudan.

- (S/NF) On Gaza, Soliman said Egypt must "confront" Iranian
attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and "stop" arms smuggling
through Egyptian territory.

- (S/NF) Soliman shared his vision on Palestinian
reconciliation and bringing the Palestinian Authority back to
Gaza, saying "a Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be
calm."

- (S/NF) On Iran, Soliman said Egypt was "succeeding" in
preventing Iran from funneling financial support to Hamas
through Egypt. Soliman hoped that the U.S. could encourage
Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions and stop interfering in
regional affairs, but cautioned that Iran "must pay a price"
for its actions.

- (S/NF) Egypt is "very concerned" with stability in Sudan,
Soliman said, and was focusing efforts on convincing the
Chadean and Sudanese presidents to stop supporting each
others' insurgencies, supporting negotiations between
factions in Darfur, and implementing the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA). "Egypt does not want a divided Sudan,"
Soliman stressed.

----
Gaza
----

¶2. (S/NF) Soliman said radicalism was the "backbone" of
regional security threats, adding that radicalism in Gaza
posed a particularly serious threat to Egyptian national
security. Soliman said Egypt must "confront" Iranian
attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and stop arms smuggling
through Egyptian territory. "Egypt is circled by
radicalism," he continued, expressing concern over
instability in Sudan and Somalia as well. Egypt's own
successful campaign against radicalism in the 1990s provided
a useful lesson in how to counteract extremist groups by
reducing their ability to operate and raise funds, in
additional to educating people on the dangers of extremism.
Soliman noted that only the Muslim Brotherhood remained and
the Egyptian government continued to "make it difficult" for
them to operate.

¶3. (S/NF) "We do not want incidents like Gaza to inflame
public anger," Soliman said, adding that the Gaza conflict
put "moderate (Arab) regimes" in a corner. To prevent
another outbreak of violence, Egypt is focusing on
Palestinian reconciliation and a durable cease-fire between
Hamas and Israel. On reconciliation, Soliman explained, the
ultimate goal was to return the Palestinian Authority to
Gaza, as "Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be calm."
The problem, however, is that the PA cannot return to Gaza
without Hamas' acquiescence. Soliman said the PA must return
before the January 2010 Palestinian elections, or else Gazans
would be afraid to vote for moderates.

¶4. (S/NF) Stability in Gaza also depends on giving people a
more "normal" life, Soliman continued, saying Israel must be
convinced to regularly open the border crossings for
legitimate commercial activity. The current system - where
Egypt informs Israel of a humanitarian shipment and Israel
waits two days before accepting or rejecting the shipment for
transfer to Gaza - does not adequately meet people's needs.

¶5. (S/NF) On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman said he
expected the factions to return to Egypt on April 26 to
discuss his proposal on establishing a high committee
comprised of the various factions. The committee would be
responsible for preparing for the January 2010 elections,
monitoring reconstruction, and reforming the security
services in Gaza. On reconstruction, the committee would
issue licenses for companies eligible to participate on
projects, but the PA would decide who receives the money for
private and government contracts. Arab governments would
assist with reforming the security services and could base
security assistance out of Egypt. Soliman doubted that Hamas
would agree to the high committee, but said it was important

CAIRO 00000746 002 OF 002


to keep Hamas and Fatah talking, so they would not resort to
violence.

-----------------------
Iran, Counter Smuggling
-----------------------

¶6. (S/NF) Iran is "very active in Egypt," Soliman said.
Iranian financial support to Hamas amounted to $25 million a
month, but he said Egypt was "succeeding" in preventing
financial support from entering Gaza through Egypt. Iran has
tried several times to pay the salaries for the al-Qassam
Battalions, but Egypt had succeeded in preventing the money
from reaching Gaza. Soliman said the Egyptian government had
arrested a "big Hezbollah cell," which was Hezbollah's first
attempt to stand up a cell within Egypt. Iran was also
trying to recruit support from the Sinai Bedouins, he
claimed, in order to facilitate arms smuggling to Gaza. So
far, he continued, Egypt had successfully stopped Hamas from
rearming. Soliman noted that in six months, MOD will have
completed the construction of a subterranean steel wall along
the Egypt-Gaza border to prevent smuggling. He warned,
however, that people will find an alternative to the tunnels
to smuggle arms, goods, people, and money. Admiral Mullen
expressed appreciation for Egypt's efforts to combat
smuggling, adding that he hoped Egypt felt comfortable enough
to ask for additional border security assistance at any time.

¶7. (S/NF) Egypt has "started a confrontation with Hezbollah
and Iran," Soliman stressed, and "we will not allow Iran to
operate in Egypt." Soliman said Egypt had sent a clear
message to Iran that if they interfere in Egypt, Egypt will
interfere in Iran, adding that EGIS had already begun
recruiting agents in Iraq and Syria. Soliman hoped the U.S.
would "not walk the same track as the Europeans" in regards
to negotiating with Iran and warned against only focusing on
one issue at time, like Iran's nuclear weapons program. Iran
must "pay the price" for its actions and not be allowed to
interfere in regional affairs. "If you want Egypt to
cooperate with you on Iran, we will," Soliman added, "it
would take a big burden off our shoulders."

-----
Sudan
-----

¶8. (S/NF) Egypt is very concerned with stability in Sudan,
Soliman said, but asked for the U.S. to be "patient" with the
Sudanese government and give Egypt time to help the Sudanese
government deal with its problems. He applauded the
appointment of Special Envoy Gration and recent U.S.
statements on Sudan. Soliman said Egypt was focused on three
areas for promoting stability in Sudan: 1) repairing the
relationship between Chadean President Deby and Sudanese
President Bashir and stopping their support for each others'
insurgencies 2) supporting negotiations between the various
factions in Darfur, and 3) implementing the CPA. Soliman
encouraged a larger role for French President Sarkozy in
mediating between Chad and Sudan. He said that Southern
Sudan "feels no benefits from unity," and Egypt is trying to
bridge the "physiological gap" between north and south itself
by providing humanitarian assistance. "Egypt does not want a
divided Sudan," he stressed. Admiral Mullen replied that
Egypt's leadership on Sudan was critical and looked forward
to increased cooperation between Egypt and Special Envoy
Gration.

------------------
Piracy and Somalia
------------------

¶9. (S/NF) Admiral Mullen stressed that piracy was an
international crime that needed an international solution,
especially on support for trying captured pirates. The U.S.
did not want Somalia to become the next safe haven for
al-Qaeda after Pakistan, he stressed. Soliman replied that
there were not enough ships in the region to provide adequate
security against pirate attacks and recommended that the
international community, through the UN Security Council,
focus counter piracy efforts on the Somali shore.

¶10. (U) Admiral Mullen did not have the opportunity to clear
before his departure.
SCOBEY


/tag/IR_1.html


09TELAVIV1060     2009-05-13 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

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S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001060

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PREL MPOS KNNP IR IS
SUBJECT: REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH IDF INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF YADLIN

Classified By: DCM Luis G, Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

¶1. (S) Representative Robert Wexler (D, Florida),
accompanied by Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Rogin and DCM
Moreno, met with Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Chief, MG
Amos Yadlin, on Sunday 10 May 2009. MG Yadlin focused his
discussion on the preparations for the upcoming visit of
Prime Minister Netanyahu to the United States and the Iranian
nuclear program. MG Yadlin informed Rep. Wexler that the PM
was preparing intensely for his upcoming visit to Washington.
In addition to hours of policy review, the PM had been
provided significant amounts of intelligence from the IDI and
Mossad on Iran's nuclear program. The intelligence presented
included assessments of the current status of the Iranian
program; timelines, effects of sanctions; views of the
international community; and outcomes of engagement. The
differences that exist between the intelligence community in
interpretations of the Iranian nuclear program as well as the
relationship between Iran and the Palestinians were also
presented. MG Yadlin indicated that the IDF had presented
its information last week, leaving the cabinet on Friday 08
May 2009 to consider policy options and how information will
be presented during the upcoming visit to Washington.
Although no direct feedback was provided, MG Yadlin opined
that the PM appears determined on Iran.

¶2. (S) Rep. Wexler asked MG Yadlin to expand on the
differences in the interpretations of the intelligence. MG
Yadlin explained that until 2003, Iran had violated the
nuclear Proliferation Treaty by having a weaponization group
and although Iran could show civilian uses for a missile
program and a fissile program, there was no justification for
a weaponization group. He went on to say that Iran halted
its program in 2003 after the invasion of Iraq, but
reinvigorated the program in 2005. He expressed that some in
the US agree with this and others do not. He went on to
explain that Israel is not in a position to underestimate
Iran and be surprised like the US was on 11 September 2001.

¶3. (S) MG Yadlin explained that Israel tries to be more
precise than the US in estimating Iran's intentions and
timeline for obtaining a nuclear bomb. Iran is in the
position of wanting to pay only a minimum cost for its
current program. It does not want to be North Korea or what
Iraq was before 2003. Iran intends to keep resolutions and
sanctions at a certain manageable level and continue to
produce low enriched uranium until there is enough for
several bombs. MG Yadlin stated that Iran could decide to
produce a bomb by 2010, but Iran is waiting for the right
time in the future and that there are some who will always
doubt it despite the evidence.

¶4. (S) Rep. Wexler then asked about the prospect of
engagement. MG Yadlin said he does not oppose engagement,
and in fact gave a speech approximately six months ago
expressing that Israel needed to find a way to find positives
in engagement. He feels there needs to be an agreed upon
deadline; a measure for success or failure; and a plan B if
engagement does not work in order for engagement to have any
chance. He also expressed strongly that engagement should
have already started. MG Yadlin outlined four possible
outcomes of engagement. Two good outcomes would be the
Iranian nuclear program stopped or a failure of engagement
that allows Russia and China to see the US made all efforts
to prevent the program diplomatically and allows for greater
cooperation in the future. Two bad outcomes would be Iran
playing for time with no claim of failure on the part of
engagement or a bad bargain that still allows Iran to obtain
a nuclear bomb even if in a longer timeline. Rep. Wexler
went on to discuss that there is a third good option in that
the President may have better leverage with the American
public to support action if engagement efforts are attempted
and failed. Rep Wexler recommended that the Israeli people
need to consider the US perspective and public opinion. MG
Yadlin responded that he is not recommending the US enter a
third front, but it has to be understood that Israel sees
things differently and that Israel has to be ready and can
not remove the military option from the table. Rep Wexler
stated that he expected Israel would be pleasantly surprised
by the President's acceptance of all possible options in
regards to Iran.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_1.html


09TELAVIV1177     2009-06-02 06:06     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Tel Aviv

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001177

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS IR KWBG IS
SUBJECT: CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET WITH DEFENSE
MINISTER BARAK

Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Post hosted two CODELS during the week of
May 25: one from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led
by Senator Casey, the other from the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs led by Congressman Ackerman. Both
delegations met with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who
conveyed similar points on the Peace Process and Israel's
concerns about Iran. End summary.

Peace Process
-------------

¶2. (C) Barak began his meeting with the Casey delegation by
apologizing for being late due to what he described as an
"internal debate" at the Prime Minister's office regarding
the development of a response to President Obama's upcoming
speech in Cairo. He noted there are "perceived gaps" between
the USG and the GOI regarding the Peace Process, and
explained the GOI's internal debate is focused primarily on
how to ensure that the U.S. and Israel "trust each other."
Barak expressed confidence that PM Netanyahu is sincere in
wanting to "seize this opportunity and move forward" with the
Palestinians, but alluded to members of the coalition who do
not agree with this course of action.

¶3. (C) From his perspective, Barak told the Casey delegation
that the GOI was in no position to dictate policy to the
Palestinians or the USG regarding the Peace Process -- "it
takes two to tango, and three to negotiate," he said. Barak
noted that it is the GOI's responsibility to ensure that "no
stone is left unturned" regarding the Peace Process; if
efforts to achieve peace ultimately fail, then the GOI must
be able to state that every effort was pursued. He said he
personally had no objection to "two states for two nations,"
and panned Arab arguments for a bi-national state in Israel.
Barak said Israel envisions "two peoples living side by side
in peace and good neighborliness" as the final goal.

¶4. (C) With the Ackerman delegation, Barak focused on the
need for a regional approach to the peace process. He
supports a regional initiative for peace and cooperation for
the entire Middle East region to be launched by Israel. He
stressed as well the need to build trust and convince the
U.S. administration that the new Israeli government is
"serious in its efforts toward peace."

¶5. (C) Barak commented on political developments in the West
Bank and Gaza in both meetings. He said the GOI continues to
review its policy, and then added that the Palestinian
Authority has much to accomplish in terms of law enforcement,
a functioning judiciary, and regaining control of Gaza before
a "balanced" Palestinian state can be created. He has been
extremely impressed with the work of U.S. Security
Coordinator Gen. Dayton training PA security forces, and
commended Salam Fayyad's concrete, practical approach.

¶6. (C) Barak made clear in these meetings that he feels the
Palestinian Authority is weak and lacks self-confidence, and
that Gen. Dayton's training helps bolster confidence. He
explained that the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah
prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to
assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas. Not
surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers
from both. He stressed the importance of continued
consultations with both Egypt and Fatah -- as well as the NGO
community -- regarding Gaza reconstruction, and to avoid
publicly linking any resolution in Gaza to the release of
kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.

Iran/North Korea
----------------

¶7. (C) In his meeting with CODEL Casey, Barak said the GOI
believes its "keystone" relations with the USG remain strong.
He described the integral role the USG plays in preserving
Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), especially when
faced with threats posed by Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. He
noted that the GOI's positions on Iran are well known, and
described North Korea's recent nuclear test as a "second
wake-up call" (the first being the AQ Khan network). Barak
asked rhetorically how a lack of firm response to North Korea
would be interpreted by Iran's leadership, speculating the
USG would be viewed as a "paper tiger."

¶8. (C) In both meetings, Barak said "no option should be
removed from the table" when confronting Iran and North
Korea; engagement will only work in conjunction with a
credible military option, he said. Barak said he was

TEL AVIV 00001177 002 OF 002


personally skeptical that engagement would lead to an
acceptable resolution, and argued in favor of a paradigm
shift to confront the triple threat posed by nuclear
proliferation, Islamic extremist terrorism, and rogue/failing
states. He said a strategic partnership with China, Russia,
India, and the EU is essential in facing these threats.
Barak argued that failure to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran
would result in a nuclear arms race in the region as Turkey,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia look to acquire nuclear weapons.

¶9. (C) When asked if the USG and GOI have fundamental
differences of opinion when assessing Iran's nuclear program,
Barak said we share the same intelligence, but acknowledged
differences in analysis. He suggested that the USG view is
similar to presenting evidence in a criminal court case in
which a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
As such, USG standards are tougher -- especially following
the failure to find WMD in Iraq -- while end-products such as
the 2007 NIE unintentionally take on a softer tone as a
result. Barak said the fate of the region and the world
rests on our ability to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear
weapons -- as such, the standards for determining guilt
should be lower as the costs are higher.

¶10. (C) In both meetings, Barak described Iranians as "chess,
not backgammon players." As such, Iran will attempt to avoid
any hook to hang accusations on, and look to Pakistan and
North Korea as models to emulate in terms of acquiring
nuclear weapons while defying the international community.
He doubted Tehran would opt for an open, relatively
low-threshold test like the recent one in North Korea.
Rather, Iran will seek ways to bypass the NPT while ensuring
its program is redundant and well-protected to prevent an
irreparable military strike. Barak estimated a window
between 6 and 18 months from now in which stopping Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable. After that,
he said, any military solution would result in unacceptable
collateral damage. He also expressed concern that should
Iran develop nuclear capabilities, other rogue states and/or
terrorist groups would not be far behind.

Pakistan
--------

¶11. (C) Barak reinforced his message regarding Pakistan in
both meetings. He described Pakistan as his "private
nightmare," suggesting the world might wake up one morning
"with everything changed" following a potential Islamic
extremist takeover. When asked if the use of force on Iran
might backfire with moderate Muslims in Pakistan, thereby
exacerbating the situation, Barak acknowledged Iran and
Pakistan are interconnected, but disagreed with a causal
chain. To the contrary, he argued that if the United States
had directly confronted North Korea in recent years, others
would be less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons programs.
By avoiding confrontation with Iran, Barak argued, the U.S.
faces a perception of weakness in the region.

¶12. (U) CODELS Casey and Ackerman did not have the
opportunity to clear this message.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_1.html


09TELAVIV1184     2009-06-02 13:01     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2017
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001184

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP IR KWBG EG IS
SUBJECT: CODELS ACKERMAN AND CASEY MEETINGS WITH PRIME
MINISTER NETANYAHU

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b),(
d)

¶1. (S) Summary. CODEL Ackerman and Casey met separately May
26 and 27 with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. The Prime
Minister discussed his visit to Washington, focusing on his
discussions of Iran, a regional approach in support of
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and his approach to the
Palestinians and settlements, including his opposition to a
complete freeze on settlement construction. Netanyahu said
he was pleased with President Obama's approach to engagement
with Iran and on a regional component to peacemaking. On the
Palestinians, he reiterated his view that the Palestinian
Authority (PA) must declare its recognition of Israel as a
Jewish state, and also reviewed his thinking on the
importance of security for Israelis and his support for
increased Arab private investment in the West Bank. On
settlements, Netanyahu said he would take action against
illegal outposts and would not build new settlements or
confiscate more Palestinian land, but he insisted that he
would not support a complete freeze on construction, and
noted that his advisers would try to close the gap with the
U.S. on this issue. Members of the CODELs pressed Netanyahu
on the importance of finding ways to strengthen PA President
Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, as well as to address
humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Gaza. End summary.

Washington Visit
----------------

¶2. (S) Prime Minister Netanyahu told CODEL Ackerman that he
did not feel boxed in politically and that his coalition in
fact reflects the demands of the Israeli public to address
their concern about security. While some argue that
agreements bring security, Netanyahu said Israel's experience
of the past fifteen years proved that neither agreements nor
unilateral withdrawals brought security. Netanyahu said he
had told President Obama that while he would not condition
negotiations with the Palestinians on halting Iran's progress
toward a nuclear weapon, if Iran obtained such a weapon it
would destroy any progress made toward peace. He added that
Egyptian President Mubarak and Jordanian King Abdullah were
in complete agreement with him on that point.

¶3. (S) For the sake of both security and peace, the first
task is to stop Iran's nuclear program. Netanyahu noted that
the President had assured him that by the end of the year,
the U.S. will decide whether engagement is working and that
the goal is to stop Iran's program. The President told him
that all options remain on the table, a point confirmed by
Secretaries Clinton and Gates. Netanyahu said he and Mubarak
agreed that a nuclear Iran would lead others in the region to
develop nuclear weapons, resulting in the biggest threat to
non-proliferation efforts since the Cuban Missile Crisis.
This "nightmare scenario" is well understood in Washington,
he said.

¶4. (C) Turning to peace efforts, Netanyahu said the
President is bringing a fresh approach to regional peace
whereby the Arabs would enhance the Israeli-Palestinian
track. It will be especially important to get the Saudis on
board, he added. On the two-state solution, Netanyahu noted
that the President had stressed his support for two states.
He had told the President that Israelis did not want to rule
Palestinians. Netanyahu said he was prepared for
"arrangements" with the Palestinians that would entail some
limits on their sovereignty such as no Palestinian army, and
Israeli control over borders, airspace, and the
electromagnetic spectrum. Netanyahu asserted that seventy to
eighty percent of Israelis are ready to make concessions for
peace but they do not believe they have a Palestinian partner
since Hamas is in control of Gaza and Iran has a base on
Israel's border. How can there be peace without a new
situation in Gaza, he asked.

¶5. (C) Turning to settlements, Netanyahu noted that he had
told the President that both Israel and the Palestinians had
unfulfilled Roadmap commitments. Without elaborating, he
noted that there were written and oral understandings between
President Bush and Prime Ministers Sharon and Olmert on the
Roadmap. In Gaza, Israel dismantled twenty-seven settlements
but got six thousand rockets from Hamas in return.

Support the PA
--------------

¶6. (C) Chairman Ackerman commented that President Abbas and
Prime Minister Fayyad are necessary for progress, and noted
that both Israel and the U.S. will be in trouble if they are
replaced. Something needs to be done to help them stay in
power. They need material support but also the promise of

TEL AVIV 00001184 002 OF 003


statehood. Foreign investment in the West Bank would give a
real horizon as well. Netanyahu agreed, saying Gulf Arab
investors had been successful in transforming their own
societies and could make a great contribution to the
Palestinians. He added that he wanted to bring Gulf
investors into the West Bank since they would change reality
for the Palestinians but also give Israelis confidence.
Ackerman responded that this was a great idea, but it should
come from Abbas, not Israel. The more credit Abbas can take
for steps forward, the better.

¶7. (C) In response to a question about the PA security
forces' capabilities, Netanyahu commented that he supports
the PA's desire to keep Hamas at a distance. A national
unity government without Hamas' acceptance of the Quartet
conditions would serve Hamas' interests, adding that Israel
has a common interest with the PA to prevent a Hamas takeover
of the West Bank. Netanyahu said there is a steady flow of
Iranian weapons to Gaza through Sudan or Syria and then by
sea, but he said Egypt's performance in stopping the tunnels
has improved now that Cairo understands that the Iranian arms
pipeline is a direct threat to Egypt as well.

¶8. (C) On the economic side, Netanyahu said he wants to
establish a joint plan with the PA to improve conditions in
the West Bank. He cited Cyprus as an example of economic
prosperity leading to reduced political tensions. Sen.
Lautenberg pushed Netanyahu to &put Israel,s best face
forward8 in the West Bank, and to work with the PA on water
issues, conservation and health, where Israel could
contribute a great deal and there are many opportunities to
build cooperation that would benefit people. Netanyahu
responded that his ministerial committee on improving the
lives of Palestinians in the West Bank met earlier in the day
and that he is committed to overcoming the turf wars and
excessive caution that have undercut development efforts in
the West Bank in the past. He said the GOI is looking at
creative ideas, such as how to facilitate tourism to Jericho,
advance projects in water and agriculture, in addition to
promoting business (note: he estimated that there are 100
projects Israel is examining in the West Bank). &It is
beyond belief8 what can be done in the West Bank, he said,
but he hoped the PA would engage with Israel on these
efforts. Netanyahu added that the fact that there had not
been any large anti-Israel demonstrations in the West Bank
during Operation Cast Lead meant that Palestinians in the
West Bank want a better life, not confrontation with Israel.

¶9. (C) Representative Ellison, noting that he is the first
Muslim to be elected to Congress, said he visited Gaza in
February and met with NGO representatives who could deliver
assistance without the credit going to Hamas. He urged
Netanyahu to consider opening the Gaza crossings, adding that
Gazans he had met told him they want peace and would like to
get their jobs back in Israel. Netanyahu responded that he
is looking at ways to balance Israeli security with enabling
Gazans to have a normal life. The flow of money and weapons
to Hamas remains a problem since Hamas is extending the range
and payload of the rockets it possesses. In response to
Representative Ellison's comment that Israel should allow
USAID to return to Gaza, Netanyahu said he thought that it
might be a good thing to have USAID operate in Gaza.

Settlements and Outposts
------------------------

¶10. (C) Netanyahu said that illegal outposts were a legal
question and his government would enforce the law. The
outposts should be removed through dialogue with the GOI if
possible, but it should be done in any case. Regarding
settlements, Netanyahu said he wants to work with the U.S. on
the basis of the understandings reached with the Bush
Administration, i.e. that Israel will not build new
settlements or seize more land, but if families grow, they
will still have the right to build within existing settlement
boundaries. Now Israel is hearing that the U.S. wants no
construction at all. Israelis consider this position to be
unfair, he said. The question is whether the U.S. is seeking
a geographic or a demographic restriction on settlements.

¶11. (C) Netanyahu commented that Israel needs a common
understanding with the U.S. The U.S. position should be
"reasonable," since opposition to a total freeze cuts across
political parties in Israel. This is more of an issue with
the U.S. than with the Palestinians, Netanyahu asserted,
arguing that the PA will go along if there is an
understanding between Israel and the U.S. He noted that
Israeli officials were meeting with U.S. officials on this
issue, adding that there could be an understanding if the
U.S. wants one. Netanyahu commented that he understood there
should be no land seizures, but he could not tell settlers

TEL AVIV 00001184 003 OF 003


not to have children. In response to a question about GOI
incentives to settlers, Netanyahu's adviser Ron Dermer said
the Olmert government had already removed them. Netanyahu
said this was an issue that Israel could discuss further with
the U.S.

Iranian Threat
--------------

¶12. (S) Chairman Ackerman said that in his meetings with
Arab leaders, he found them all concerned about Iran. They
said it would helpful to resolve the Palestinian issue, but
Israel-Palestine is not the main threat to the region.
Netanyahu, following a similar comment during his meeting
with CODEL Casey, responded that there are no Arab leaders
who would tell the U.S. to wait on Iran until there is a
settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Ackerman also
explained that the U.S. will try engagement in order to
prevent an unwise and premature use of force. We will
tighten sanctions at the same time, for which we need the
support of the international community, Ackerman explained.
Netanyahu noted that Ahmadinejad had said he would not stop
Iran's nuclear program. President Obama had been clear in
his comments to Netanyahu that U.S. engagement would be
results-oriented and not open-ended. If engagement did not
work, the U.S. would gain the moral high ground, which would
help make economic pressure more effective. Ackerman agreed
that more pressure was needed and said we need to figure out
what the Russians and others want. Netanyahu said that in
contrast to North Korea, the Iranian nuclear and missile
programs were direct threats to Israel, Europe and U.S.
interests in the Gulf, and he emphasized that the program was
not defensive in nature. In response to a question from
Representative Jackson-Lee, Netanyahu encouraged quick action
on a bill in the Congress to pressure foreign oil companies
not to sell refined petroleum to Iran. This might not be
enough to stop Iran's program but it would send a strong
signal. Netanyahu also urged that the U.S. demand that Iran
stop all uranium enrichment since enrichment is the main
element of their program. He commented that Iran might try
to use the talks with the U.S. to continue or accelerate
their enrichment process. Netanyahu cautioned that he was
skeptical of the idea that the Iranian leadership could
change. They have a dangerous worldview, a violent
theocracy, but it may be possible to move them if they find
the U.S. strong and determined. Iran, he commented, is bent
on becoming a global and not just a regional power.

¶13. (U) CODELS Ackerman and Casey did not have the
opportunity to clear this message.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_1.html


09MOSCOW1488     2009-06-05 13:01     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Moscow

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3659
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001488

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IS SY GG RS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI FM LIEBERMAN IN MOSCOW

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Israeli FM Lieberman's June 2-3 visit to
Russia appears not to have broken new ground diplomatically,
but cemented Moscow's impression that the Russian-speaking
Lieberman is one of their own. The trip included meetings
with Medvedev and Putin, as well as a lengthy discussion with
FM Lavrov, during which Lieberman indicated that Israel was
not considering a military strike on Iran. Both sides agreed
to hold off on scheduling the Moscow ME conference until
after President Obama's visit to Moscow, and Lavrov quizzed
Lieberman on a possible U.S. plan to bring together Israeli
and Palestinian leaders. Lieberman rebuffed Lavrov's calls
for Israel to ease the pressure on Gaza and halt settlement
expansion, while Lavrov agreed to consider Lieberman's
request for Russian officials to visit the Israeli soldier
held by Hamas. Lavrov said that "nothing new" could happen
on Iran until the U.S. opened its dialogue with Tehran, and
repeated Russian concerns about the need to reach a
negotiated settlement with this "important neighbor." He
reiterated that Russia had not transferred S-300s to Iran,
but also had to consider its contract to provide the missiles
to Tehran. Lavrov thanked Israel for limiting military sales
to Georgia, but thought other countries were supplying
offensive weapons to Tiblisi, which could be emboldened to
start "another adventure." The FMs discussed expanding
bilateral economic ties, and Lavrov raised Russian concern
that Israel was partaking in "historical revisionism" that
sought to blame Russia for the Ukrainian famine of the 1930s.
End summary.

Behaved Like an Old Friend
--------------------------

¶2. (C) Israeli DCM Yuval Fuchs told us that FM Lieberman's
June 2-3 visit to Russia ran the gamut of international and
bilateral issues, from the peace process to the payment of
Soviet-era pensions to Russian speakers living in Israel.
His visit centered upon a two-hour June 2 meeting with FM
Lavrov that Fuchs characterized as a standard presentation of
views, during which "nothing breathtaking" was said.
Lieberman had a hectic day that began with a meeting at
Medvedev's home on the outskirts of Moscow, then the Lavrov
meeting at the MFA, a flight to St. Petersburg on a chartered
plane to see Putin, and dinner with Lavrov upon returning to
Moscow. On June 3, Lieberman had breakfast with former FM
Igor Ivanov (a personal friend), meetings with the heads of
the Duma and Federation Council international affairs
committees, discussions with Russian Jewish leaders, and a
press conference. He then departed Moscow for Minsk.

¶3. (C) Fuchs explained that Lieberman conducted his meetings
in Russian, shared stories about Moscow, and smoked, creating
a comfortable atmosphere with his Russian interlocutors. The
Israeli FM "behaved like an old friend" commented Fuchs, who
thought that the Russians acted as if they already knew him,
although it was too early to say whether this personal
diplomacy would have a measurable effect on already strong
Russia-Israel relations.

Lavrov-Lieberman
----------------

¶4. (C) Fuchs said that during the meeting with Lavrov, the
GOR's planned Moscow ME conference was not a central topic
for either side. Lieberman stressed the importance of
coordinating such efforts with the U.S., and said it would
not be appropriate to set the timing of a conference until
after President Obama's visit to Moscow. Lavrov agreed, and
said that Moscow did not want to hold a conference that would
not produce results. Lavrov asked Lieberman if Israel was
aware of an idea supposedly floated by S/E Mitchell to bring
together Israeli and Palestinian leaders; Lieberman said no.

¶5. (C) Lavrov pressed Israel to open checkpoints into Gaza,
and suggested posting international monitors to allay Israeli
concerns regarding smuggling. When Lavrov argued that Hamas
had stuck by the Gaza cease-fire, Lieberman retorted that
Hamas would break the cease-fire when it believed doing so
suited its needs. Lavrov also pressed Israel to freeze the
settlements, leading Lieberman to respond that "life goes on"
and settlement expansion was necessary to accommodate growing
communities.

¶6. (C) Fuchs said that Lavrov criticized the U.S. on several
fronts, telling Lieberman that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was
a "present" to Iran, and the U.S. decision to isolate Syria
was a "setback" for a comprehensive ME settlement.
Furthermore, the U.S. failure to "listen" to Russia, which

MOSCOW 00001488 002 OF 002


advised against Palestinian elections, had allowed Hamas to
come to power and eventually take over Gaza, thereby
strengthening Iran's position in the region.

Syria
-----

¶7. (C) Lavrov thought that the Turkish-led negotiations
between Israel and Syria had been positive, and said that
during his recent visit to Damascus, the Syrians indicated
that they were ready to renew talks either through Turkey or
Russia so long as they would include the future of the Golan
Heights. Lavrov said that he raised with Hamas leaders the
need to allow visits to captured IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.
Lieberman asked if Russian officials could visit Shalit, and
Lavrov directed DFM Saltanov to explore this possibility.

Iran
----

¶8. (C) Lavrov predicted that "nothing new" would happen with
Iran until after the U.S. began its dialogue with Tehran,
although he thought there was a better chance to get a "clear
answer" from Iran on P5 1 proposals under the current U.S.
Administration. He reiterated that Russia did not believe
there existed hard evidence that Iran's nuclear program had a
military dimension, and thought it transparent enough to
detect whether resources were directed to military uses.

¶9. (C) Lavrov expressed Russian interest in reaching a
negotiated solution to the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear
program, and the need for the West to normalize relations
with Tehran, a close Russian neighbor with which it shared
the Caspian and its resources. He raised Russian concern
that an Israeli attack on Iran would cause instability in the
region and an influx of refugees into the Caucasus. Fuchs
said that Lieberman responded that Israel "was not talking
about such a response" and understood that an attack would
cause a "chain reaction" within the region. Lieberman made
similar statements suggesting that Israel was not considering
attacking Iran during his press conference.

¶10. (C) Lavrov reiterated that Russia and Iran had signed a
deal to provide S-300s, but that Russia had not transferred
any weapons. The GOR did not intend to provide regionally
destabilizing weapons, but also had to take into account how
it would be perceived by others if Moscow failed to fulfill
its contract with Tehran.

Georgia
-------

¶11. (C) Lavrov expressed Russian appreciation for Israeli
steps to limit arms sales to Georgia to defensive weapons,
but raised concern that other countries were supplying
offensive weapons. He was also concerned that the recent
military exercises Georgia conducted with NATO might push
Tiblisi to undertake "another adventure".

Bilateral Issues
----------------

¶12. (C) Fuchs said that much of the discussion between Lavrov
and Lieberman focused on expanding bilateral ties, especially
in the economic sphere. They also touched upon parochial
issues of concern to Lieberman and his constituents, such as
the payment of pensions owed by the Soviet Union and Russia
to Russian-speaking Israelis.

¶13. (C) Lavrov raised Russian concern with "historical
revisionism" regarding the Soviet Era and Second World War,
which, he said, was particularly acute in Eastern Europe but
was also present in Israel. He cited Israel's official
recognition of the Holodomor, the 1930s famine that occurred
in Ukraine. Lieberman explained that by recognizing this
tragedy, Israel had not said Russia was guilty of causing it,
nor that it was an act of genocide.
BEYRLE


/tag/IR_1.html


09CAIRO1349     2009-07-14 11:11     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Cairo

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INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 001349

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MASS IR IZ KPAL IS EG
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN

REF: A. CAIRO 1227
¶B. CAIRO 746

Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. Key Points:

-- (S/NF) During a June 29 meeting with CENTCOM Commander
General Petraeus, Egyptian General Intelligence Service
(EGIS) Chief Omar Soliman shared his views on Iraq, Iran, and
ongoing efforts on Palestinian reconciliation.

-- (S/NF) On Iraq, Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were
taking a "new position" on supporting Iraqi Prime Minister
Maliki following the Iranian elections and described Egypt's
plans to increase cooperation with the Iraqi government.

-- (S/NF) Soliman believed that the Iranian elections and
Hezbollah's electoral defeat in Lebanon presented a "good
opportunity" to reduce Iranian regional interference,
including by improving Syria's relations with the Arab world.

-- (S/NF) On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman was
pessimistic that an agreement would be reached, but promised
that Egypt would "not give up" and would continue efforts to
undermine Hamas, including by preventing money and guns from
entering Gaza.

----------------------------
Iraq: Extending an Arab Hand
----------------------------

¶2. (S/NF) Soliman said Arab countries were looking for ways
to support Prime Minister Maliki during this "crucial time"
for Iraq. General Petraeus thanked Egypt for supporting the
Iraqi government, including by nominating a new Ambassador to
Iraq (ref A) and encouraging other Arab countries to "hold
out a hand in friendship." On President Mubarak's
instructions, Soliman explained, Egypt plans to increase
cooperation with Iraq on a wide variety of political,
security, and economic issues.

¶3. (S/NF) Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were taking a
"new position" on Iraq following the Iranian presidential
elections. He believed that Iranian leaders would "change
their attitude" towards neighboring countries and "supporting
terrorism" abroad, and would focus instead on domestic
issues. Iran cannot afford to "challenge the international
community now," Soliman opined. The challenge, Soliman
explained, was to "bring Iraq back to the Arab world" and
foster support for Maliki. According to Soliman, President
Mubarak told King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia "not to search for
another man," but should instead accept Maliki as Iraq's
leader and support him.

---------------------------------------------
Iran: Elections Present Opportunity for Arabs
---------------------------------------------

¶4. (S/NF) Soliman stressed that Egypt suffers from Iranian
interference, through its Hezbollah and Hamas proxies, and
its support for Egyptian groups like Jamaatt al-Islamiyya and
the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt will confront the Iranian
threat, he continued, by closely monitoring Iranian agents in
Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and any Egyptian cells.
Improving relations between Syria and the Arab world would
also undermine Iran's regional influence. Soliman noted "a
little change" in Syria's attitude on engaging with the Arab
world, adding that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia shared this
view and planned to visit Damascus soon "to help change
Syria's attitude."

¶5. (S/NF) Soliman anticipated that Hezbollah's recent defeat
in the Lebanese parliamentary elections would force the group
to "remain quiet for sometime" as they rebuild domestic
support and counter the perception that Hezbollah is a "tool
of outsiders." With Iran itself focusing on domestic issues,
he continued, it was a "good time to make changes" in Lebanon
and reduce Iran's influence. Egypt will support a Saad
Hariri government and the Lebanese army, Soliman emphasized.

¶6. (S/NF) Soliman said that Iran heeded Egypt's warning
against meddling in domestic affairs (ref B) and supporting
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. He received a "very
positive message" from Iran's intelligence chief indicating
that Iran would not interfere in Egypt. Egypt planned to
"remain quiet inside Iran" for the time being, but would
continue to recruit agents who "will do what we ask," if Iran
insists on interfering in Egypt. "We hope Iran will stop

CAIRO 00001349 002 OF 003


supporting Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and other cells"
within Egypt Soliman said, "but if not - we are ready."
Soliman said Iranian President Ahmadinejad wanted to attend
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Egypt July
11-16. If he did attend, President Mubarak would meet with
him and clearly explain that Iranian interference in "Arab
issues" was unacceptable. "We are ready for good relations
with Iran," Soliman noted, but only if Iran ceased
interfering and supporting terrorists in the region.

¶7. (S/NF) Because of domestic problems, Soliman believed that
Iran would seek better relations with the Arab world and
suspend its nuclear program for a period of time to avoid a
"war." He also anticipated Iran would try to strike more of
a "balance" between supporting its Hezbollah and Hamas
"tools" and trying to build better relations with the Arabs.
Soliman expressed concern that Iranian influence in Iraq
would spread after the re-deployment of U.S. troops out of
Iraqi cities and the eventual drawdown. General Petraeus
noted that 130,000 U.S. troops remain and that the drawdown
would be gradual. He expressed confidence that Iranian
influence could be contained if Arab countries moved
aggressively to support Iraq.

----------------------------------
Palestinian Reconciliation, Israel
----------------------------------

¶8. (S/NF) Soliman explained that Egypt's three primary
objectives with the Palestinians were to maintain calm in
Gaza, undermine Hamas, and build popular support for
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. On Gaza, Soliman said
Egypt worked closely with Israel to coordinate humanitarian
assistance shipments and was encouraging the Israelis to
allow more assistance into Gaza. Soliman said he was still
seeking a "tahdiya" (calm) agreement between Hamas and
Israel, but noted that Israel's lack of a Gaza strategy and
desire to keep Hamas under pressure made any agreement
difficult. On undermining Hamas, Soliman said Egypt has
"stopped" money and arms from entering Gaza. "Hamas feels
they are losing their capabilities," Soliman said, as they
are unable to re-arm using the tunneling network under the
Egypt-Gaza border. The pressure, especially from Egypt's
success at dismantling Hamas' funding mechanism, may render
Hamas "more flexible" than before.

¶9. (S/NF) Palestinians must believe that Abbas is capable of
securing a Palestinian state, Soliman stressed. He noted
recent positive developments in the West Bank, including
improvements in the Palestinian security forces and the
lifting of some Israeli roadblocks to facilitate commerce and
movement. He expressed concern, however, that continued
settlement activity, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's
recent "radical" speech, and insufficient economic
development in Palestinian areas were undermining the chances
for resuming peace negotiations. Soliman added that
President Mubarak may invite Nentanyahu and Abbas to Cairo if
efforts to re-start negotiations became "blocked."

¶10. (S/NF) Soliman briefed General Petraeus on his efforts to
facilitate Palestinian reconciliation. Reconciliation
remains elusive, he noted, as neither Hamas nor Fatah really
want an agreement. The Palestinian factions were currently
in Cairo, he said, for discussions on releasing detainees.
Talks were at an impasse, however, as Hamas had suspended
reconciliation talks until Abbas released all Hamas detainees
in the West Bank, which Soliman said Abbas would never
accept. Soliman also doubted that a reconciliation agreement
would be reached by July 7 as Egypt previously announced, and
anticipated that talks would be suspended for one-two months.
Despite the challenge and frustrations, Soliman promised
that Egypt would "not give up" on Palestinian reconciliation.
"It is hard," he continued, "but I am always optimistic. I
consider myself a patient man, but I am loosing patience."

-------------------
Syria, Yemen, Afpak
-------------------

¶11. (S/NF) Soliman hoped Syria would improve its
relationship with the Arab world and the U.S. and stop
serving as "Iran's lifeline" in the region. He also stressed
that Syria must cooperate with Iraq to improve border
security and stem the flow of foreign fighters. Soliman also
called on Syria to drop its insistence that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be solved before Syria will
reach an agreement with Israel on the Golan Heights.

¶12. (S/NF) Soliman expressed concern over instability in

CAIRO 00001349 003 OF 003


Yemen and said Egypt was trying to help President Saleh,
including by providing information on Iranian and Qatari
support to the al-Houthi insurgents. General Petraeus noted
U.S. efforts to improve Yemen's capacity to combat
extremists. On Pakistan, General Petraeus said he was
encouraged by the Pakistani military's operations in the Swat
Valley and Northwest Frontier Province, including their focus
on holding and rebuilding effected areas. Soliman credited
the Pakistani government for doing a better job of convincing
people that extremists pose a real threat to Pakistani
national security. On Afghanistan, General Petraeus stressed
the importance of arresting the downward spiral of violence
and improving governance after the September 20 national
elections.

¶13. (U) General Petraeus cleared this cable.
SCOBEY


/tag/IR_1.html


09ABUDHABI736     2009-07-20 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Abu Dhabi

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAD #0736/01 2011251
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201251Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2741
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000736

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2019
TAGS: PREL EFIN ECON IR AE
SUBJECT: CROWN PRINCE SOUNDS ALARM ON IRAN

Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b, d).

¶1. (U) This cable contains an action request in para 12.

¶2. (S/NF) Summary. On July 15, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner
joined Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan
(MBZ) and Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan (ABZ)
for a dinner covering a range of regional issues. MBZ expressed
serious concern over Iran's regional intentions and pleaded for the
U.S. to shorten its decision-making timeline and develop a "plan B."
He encouraged the U.S. to clearly communicate 'red lines' to the
Iranian Government, on nuclear and regional stability issues, with
direct consequences for transgressions. He painted to a nuclear Iran
as an existential threat to the UAE and invoked the well being of his
grandchildren while urging the U.S. to act quickly. MBZ asked for
close coordination between the U.S. and UAE to deal with the Iranian
threat. End Summary.

¶3. (S/NF) Secretary Geithner asked the Crown Prince for his views on
the situation in the region, particularly in Iran. Geithner
described the U.S. strategy on Iran, including our intention to move
forward with multilateral financial sanctions while waiting for Iran
to decide on its engagement with the U.S. He also conveyed
appreciation for the important support that UAE provides to other
regional trouble spots.

¶4. (S/NF) MBZ described a nuclear armed Iran as absolutely untenable.
He pointed to Iran's relentless ambitions to restore regional
hegemony as evidenced by destabilizing interference in Iraq, Lebanon,
Afghanistan and Palestine. He believes that 'all hell will break
loose' if Iran attains the bomb, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and
Turkey developing their own nuclear weapons capability and Iran
instigating Sunni - Shia conflict throughout the world. He said Iran
is surrounding Israel - driven by ideological conviction - and will
threaten Israel's existence should it go nuclear. At the same time,
he described Iran's ambitions as reflecting a desire to restore
Persia's great-power status, rather than driven by religious
convictions.

¶5. (S/NF) MBZ differentiated the long term threat posed by Iran from
other menacing states like North Korea or Syria. Where these other
regimes were ruled by small cadres of corrupt 'old guard' officials,
the Iranian regime has raised its next generation to carry out its
designs for hegemony. As such, the world will be dealing with Iran's
destabilizing ambitions for decades. MBZ assesses that the Iranian
regime has emerged from the recent election strife stronger and more
resolute.

¶6. (S/NF) While careful not to suQY.JQoWoRth Iran,
MBZ described a near term conventional war with Iran as clearly
preferable to the long term consequences of a nuclear armed Iran.
Without timely and decisive action by the United States, MBZ believes
that Israel will strike Iran, causing Iran to launch missile attacks
- including hits on the UAE - and to unleash terror attacks
worldwide. In his view, 'the map of the Middle East' would change.
He expects widespread civilian conflict to erupt as Iran sparks Sunni
- Shia violence worldwide (including the Eastern Province of Saudi
Arabia which he sees as the greatest vulnerability, along with Iraq,
in the Arab world). He speculated that such an event could unfold
within six months time and resolved that the UAE is prepared to
defend itself. He believes that an Israeli strike will not be
successful in stopping Iran's nuclear program, and therefore we need
to plan.

¶7. (S/NF) Regarding the recent election in Iran, MBZ cautioned that
Mir Hossein Musavi is no different than Ahmedinejad when it comes to
their nuclear ambitions, 'same goal, different tactic.' In this
respect, he regards Musavi as more dangerous than his competitor, as
at least Ahmedinejad was 'an open book.' He reminded Secretary
Geithner that Musavi and his advisors are part of the same group that
took the U.S. Embassy in 1979.

¶8. (S/NF) MBZ questioned Europe's basic understanding of the threat
posed by Iran, and wrote off their resolve to deal with the
situation. He was appalled by 'top European diplomats' that were
unconcerned by the possibility of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. He
shared his theory that Russia was trying to instigate conflict
between the U.S. and Iran as a means to weaken the U.S. and drive up
oil prices. He suggested we could use Russia's narrow views to help
persuade Russia to join international actions against Iran.

¶9. (S/NF) MBZ stated that financial sanctions would never be
sufficient to stop Iran, but allowed that the U.S. should continue
with such measures to demonstrate to the Arab world that we tried
everything. He pledged continued cooperation and support for
international sanctions and encouraged further action in the UN and
EU, as well as the U.S.
¶10. (S/NF) MBZ suggested that the key to containing Iran revolves
around progress in the Israel/Palestine issue. He argued that it
will be essential to bring Arab public opinion on board in any
conflict with Iran and roughly 80% of the public is amenable to
persuasion. To win them over, the U.S. should quickly bring about a
two state solution over the objections of the Netanyahu government.
He suggested working with moderate Palestinians that support the road
map, and forget about the others as there is no time to waste.

¶11. (S/NF) Foreign Minister ABZ urged the U.S. to make better use of
its allies in the region and engage Russia and China in a productive
way on this issue wherever possible. He urged clear and forceful
messaging to Iran and more regional gatherings (i.e. P+5+1 and GCC+3)
to increase pressure and isolation.

¶12. (S/NF) ACTION REQUEST: MBZ would like to visit Washington in late
July to discuss Iran with President Obama and other senior officials.
Treasury and Embassy recommend continuing the dialogue with MBZ as
soon as possible.

¶13. (SBU) This cable has been cleared by Andy Baukol, Department of
Treasury Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs.
GREENE


/tag/IR_1.html


09BEIRUT818     2009-07-20 14:02     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Beirut

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLB #0818/01 2011455
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201455Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5368
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3468
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3995
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000818

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
PARIS FOR JMILLER
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER MASS MARR MOPPS LE SY IR
PK, AF
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA TO PETRAEUS: PUSH SYRIA TO GET
BACK IN ARAB FOLD

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------

¶1. (C) Caretaker Prime Minister Fouad Siniora told visiting
Commander General of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) General
David Petraeus and the Ambassador June 30 that he was "quite
satisfied" with the outcome of Lebanon's June 7 parliamentary
elections. Siniora said that the Lebanese had voted for the
state and its institutions and confirmed that Lebanon could
practice its democracy without outside interference -- if
given the opportunity. He also thanked the United States for
sustained military assistance. General Petraeus
congratulated Lebanon on the peaceful conduct of the
elections and expressed hope that a cabinet would be formed
soon. Siniora continued that Lebanon was encouraged by and
supportive of President Obama's efforts to reach a
comprehensive Middle East Peace, but cautioned that
Palestinian resettlement should not come at the expense of
Lebanon. Siniora encouraged the U.S. to push Syria to
respect the sovereignty of other states (namely Lebanon) as a
way to bring Syria back into the Arab fold, rather than
continuing to align itself with Iran. General Petraeus hoped
that the obvious cracks in the Iranian system (illustrated by
the demonstrations that followed the Iranian elections) would
distract Iran from malign ambitions in the region. He also
briefed Siniora on U.S. military assistance in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) Meeting General Petraeus at his downtown Beirut
residence, Siniora was accompanied by his senior advisor Rola
Noureddine. General Petraeus and the Ambassador were
accompanied by Colonel Bjarne (Michael) Iverson, Executive
Officer; Colonel Mike Bell, Director - Commander's
Initiatives Group; Sadi Othman, Cultural Advisor and
Translator; Ali Khedery, Advisor; Lieutenant Colonel Dave
Wilson, Lebanon Desk Officer, Embassy Defense Attache
Lieutenant Colonel James Lantz, Office of Defense Cooperation
Chief Colonel Joshua Berisford and an Embassy notetaker.

LEBANON: A "MODEL"
FOR THE REGION
-----------------

¶3. (C) Caretaker Prime Minister Fouad Siniora welcomed the
one-day visit of the Commanding General of U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) General David Petraeus to Beirut on June
¶30. Siniora expressed his thanks for sustained U.S. military
assistance to Lebanon and asserted that U.S. security
assistance had contributed to the positive outcome of the
June 7 Lebanese parliamentary elections. Siniora said he was
"quite satisfied" that the majority March 14 coalition had
shown that its majority was decisive and not "fictitious," as
it had been described by others after the previous elections
in 2005. He described the electoral outcome as vote for the
state and its institutions. Siniora said that although
Lebanon was not the most important country in the world and
despite minor irregularities in the conduct of the elections,
Lebanon had shown that it could be a model of diversity and
democracy -- without outside interference -- in the region.

¶4. (C) General Petraeus congratulated Siniora on winning his
own electoral campaign and the Lebanese people for conducting
peaceful elections. In addition, he expressed hope that the
new cabinet would be formed soon. Siniora predicted the
government formation would likely "take some time" because of
debate about "blocking third" veto power for the opposition.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE:
NOT AT THE EXPENSE
OF LEBANON
------------------

¶5. (C) Siniora said that Lebanon was encouraged by and

supportive of President Obama's commitment to achieving a
comprehensive Middle East Peace. He said the U.S.
administration's recognition of the centrality of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was an opportunity to push the
Arab Peace Initiative forward and to finally achieve a
resolution. The Israelis, however, were being uncooperative,
he accused. In his June 14 speech, Israeli PM Benjamin
Netanyahu had said "yes" to a two-state solution with but
added "a thousand no's," Siniora analyzed. The ultimate fate
of Palestinian refugees, could not come at the expense of
Lebanon, Siniora cautioned. (Note: Lebanon has 12 Palestinian
rfugee camps. The GOL maintains that the Palestinins
should have the "right of return" and is agaist permanent
resettlement ("tawteen") in Lebanon. End note.)

SYRIA
-----

¶6. (C) Syria, Siniora said, has geopolitical significance.
He said Lebanon desired a mutually respectful relationship
with Syria and lauded the establishment of diplomatic
relations between Lebanon and Syria as a good first step.
However, other issues, such as border delineation and the
presence of PFLP-GC military camps, supported by Syria, on
the border, remain. Siniora commented on the signs of
increased U.S. engagement with Syria, but he advised the
United States to be careful not to give any rewards to Syria
without Syria taking action first. Most importantly, the
U.S. should not allow Syria -- or other states in the region
-- to use Lebanon as a platform or battleground; engagement
with Syria should not come at the expense of Lebanon, Siniora
said.

¶7. (C) General Petraeus assured Siniora that the U.S.
administration understood Lebanon's concerns. He told
Siniora that Syrian President Bashar Asad had invited him to
visit several times, but the time was not yet appropriate.
Syria, he added, continues to allow Al Qaeda-affiliated
facilitation networks to operate from its territory and allow
the transit of suicide bombers into Iraq. General Petraeus
added that the U.S. would like to see Syria return to the
Arab world and develop closer ties to the western world,
rather than continue to align itself with Iran.

IRAN
----

¶8. (C) On Iran, General Petraeus said that the crisis
following Iran's June 12 presidential election had revealed
significant cracks in the Iranian system. He said the
announced outcome of the election and subsequent
demonstrations showed that the "urban street" and the "young
street" were not supportive of Iranian Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei. Candidly, the U.S. would like these
events to distract Iran for awhile from its other ambitions,
such as pursuing its nuclear program, General Petraeus said.
Although, it was too early to determine whether the current
crisis had any significant impact on Iran's ability to
support Hamas, Hizballah, or limit its ability to train and
support foreign fighters in Iraq, he added. Siniora agreed
that there were definite cracks in the Iranian system and the
internal divisions should be exploited. However, Siniora
warned against Israel taking any military action against Iran
saying such action would only make the regional situation
worse.

¶9. (C) General Petraeus responded that it was not the U.S.
desire to see outside force used against Iran. Nonetheless,
he observed, there was a phenomenon in the Gulf states where
leaders were worried someone would strike Iran's nuclear
weapons program, while also worrying that someone would not.
Iran, he continued, had become CENTCOM's best recruiting
tool, and the number of partnerships and U.S. military
assistance agreements with Arab partners in the Gulf had
increased significantly.



PAKISTAN AND
AFGHANISTAN
------------

¶10. (C) Turning to other international developments, Siniora
said he had heard a rumor that Pakistan was ready to sell
some of its nuclear stock to other countries. General
Petraeus responded that this was almost certainly a rumor,
but he refused to discount the possibility that Gulf states
may "start shopping" if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon
capability. He added that during his recent visit to
Pakistan, it was clear that for the first time the Pakistani
military viewed the Taliban and other extremist groups as an
existential threat to Pakistan. The Pakistani people,
General Petraeus continued, were hugely supportive of its
military's efforts to fight against this extremist threat.
There were some early signs of some success from Pakistani
operations.

¶11. (C) In Afghanistan, the U.S. was increasing its troop
levels by 38,000 from the beginning of 2009 and doubling the
number of its helicopters, General Petraeus said. The war in
Afghanistan would be tough, and not easily won. One key will
be the ability of the Afghan government to "step up" to
provide governance and be seen to serve the people in areas
that have been cleared by Coalition and Afghan forces..
Afghanistan's presidential election was scheduled for August
20, General Petraeus added. It was likely, but not
guaranteed that current Afghan President Hamid Karzai would
win, he predicted.

¶12. (U) CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus has cleared this
message.
SISON


/tag/IR_1.html


09ABUDHABI744     2009-07-22 10:10     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Abu Dhabi

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DE RUEHAD #0744/01 2031011
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221011Z JUL 09 ZDK CTG RUEHDO #3763
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2753
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0485
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1746
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RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000744


NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA

E.O. 12958: 07/21/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS IR IS AF PK SY LE SA
QA, AE

SUBJECT: UAE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE (GSD) JULY 20 PLENARY SESSION AND
COS DIALOGUE

ABU DHABI 00000744 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B
AND D.


Summary
-------

¶1. (S/NF) In a July 20 plenary session of the GSD with a large UAE
delegation, accompanied by a smaller session with the UAE Chief of
Staff, the immediate focus was largely on Iran. Participants
reiterated the good defense cooperation that the U.S. and UAE enjoy,
while noting the need to improve coordination further to deal with
real and urgent threats in the region. In this regard, the UAE put
the threat of Iran's potential reaction to a "likely" Israeli attack
on its nuclear program at the center of scenarios to be considered.
Other issues, to include Yemen, counter-proliferation, Pakistan, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and extremism were also addressed, but
even these were often seen through the prism of Iranian intentions.

¶2. (S/NF) This message begins with the Chief of Staff's urgent plea
on "munitions" to deal with an unpredictable Iran, followed by a
synopsis of GSD plenary proceedings. A list of UAE participants is
included at para 20. End summary.

Chief of Staff Presses for Munitions:
Urgent about Iran's unpredictability
------------------------------------

¶3. (S/NF) In a brief session with principals only, Chief of Staff
Hamad Thani al-Romaithi (who also participated in the MbZ dinner and
was on his way to Lebanon later July 20) said the UAE cannot act
alone in the region and needs coherent plans -- especially to deal
with the unique threat of Iran. How to deter Iran without provoking
it is a challenge. Ambassador al-Otaiba emphasized how the proximity
of the UAE to Iran magnifies the threat perception; the CoS said UAE
military planning had to consider worst-case scenarios.

¶4. (S/NF) ASD Vershbow said the USG did not disagree with the UAE
evaluation of Iran's objectives, but that we need to work to prevent
them from achieving those objectives. Diplomacy is only one tool.
The USG wants to help provide the UAE with defensive capabilities and
our troop presence here should help act as a deterrent to Iran. We
don't want to signal that we will give up on diplomacy, yet in
parallel to that effort we intend to keep the pressure on Iran. We
appreciate the candor of our defense engagement with the UAE. We are
dealing with an unpredictable foe and need to take all precautions.

¶5. (S/NF) The CoS said Iran will remain a threat in any case, as its
objectives are constant. He added that if the Israelis strike, Iran
may lash out at the UAE and around the Gulf -- one can conceive of
many possible scenarios from missile strikes to attacks on isolated
islands to the exploitation of 130,000 Iranians living in the UAE.
The UAE therefore seeks ongoing support from the region's "main
actor," the U.S., and desires close defense coordination. The UAE's
friends in the GCC, on the other hand, are not always realistic in
their approach to Iran, he said, citing Arab misinterpretation of
"brotherly" Iraqi intentions with regards to Kuwait back in 1990.

¶6. (S/NF) ASD Vershbow said that our message to Iran is that threats
against our allies will not go unanswered. We need to be prepared in
case deterrence does not work, with the realization that with or
without nuclear weapons Iran seeks to be a dominant power in the
region. This is a very interconnected region, asserted the CoS. "If
I was in the Israelis' shoes, I would attack, to reduce the nuclear
threat." The first reaction may be that the Iranians launch missiles
against targets in Israel and then the Gulf, he added. Air Chief
Sweidan added that the UAE needs munitions on a tighter timeline than
previously assumed -- with urgent needs in 2010, 11, and 12. He said
the UAE Armed Forces could receive munitions from the U.S. inventory
and then replenish them later (he supplied the same list of
requirements as was relayed some months ago, noting that they had
only received a "political" answer to that inquiry thus far).

ABU DHABI 00000744 002 OF 004



¶7. (S/NF) The CoS was appreciative of Patriot deployments, progress
on command and control systems, and movement toward more effective
shared early warning, but lamented that other pieces of the air
defense puzzle require immediate attention. Ambassador al-Otaiba
reiterated the need to "borrow from U.S. inventories" to meet urgent
timelines. A/S Vershbow said we were leaning far forward for the UAE
on THAAD, for example, and would continue to look into opportunities
to assist, including filling gaps before UAE-purchased systems were
delivered.

¶8. (S/NF) Highlighting the importance of close defense coordination,
the CoS noted that in the event of an attack the UAE may have no time
to react. Taking the fight to Iran may require "passing over U.S.
aircraft carriers," for example, so we need to be in lock-step at all
phases of preparation and operation.

Introductory remarks
--------------------

¶9. (C) The Plenary session of the U.S.-UAE Gulf Security Dialogue
(GSD) convened July 20 at the Armed Forces Officers' Club, with newly
promoted Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Ali Hamad Subaih
al-Kaabi stating that the "small but significant" Gulf region makes a
large contribution to global peace and development and seeks enhanced
cooperation with the U.S. He cited UAE troops in Afghanistan, U.S.
use of UAE bases, a robust intelligence exchange, strong
counter-terror efforts, and improved border control as evidence that
the UAE shares common goals with the U.S. Citing the "high
importance" of strong relations among GCC members, he thanked the
U.S. for its role in the defense relationship and wanted to learn
more about U.S. strategies vis-a-vis Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Palestine.

¶10. (C) Assistant Secretary of Defense Vershbow, leading the U.S.
team along with Assistant State of State for Political-Military
AffairsShapiro, expressed confidence in the strength and future of
the bilateral relationship, anchored by common strategic interests.
Recounting shared priorities, he noted that the GSD was being taken
to a new level as we seek strategic synergy in facing real threats
like Iran -- which we are obligated to defend against. He called for
a more multi-lateral approach to counter-proliferation and cited the
need to prepare missile defenses. He lauded the UAE decision to host
LEADING EDGE 2009 and cited the 123 agreement with the U.S. as the
high standard on civil nuclear cooperation. The responsible drawdown
of U.S. troops in Iraq also calls for continued UAE support, he
emphasized, as Iraq seeks to assume responsibility for its own
security and integrate into the region. The UAE's advanced fighter
squadron, growing air defense net, participation in RED FLAG, and
leadership of CTF 152 are all indications of a maturing defense
capability.

¶11. (C) A/S Shapiro emphasized the USG desire to ensure regional
stability, counter extremism, curb WMD proliferation, and tackle the
inter-related challenges of the region holistically. He focused on
the threat from Iran, stressing that the USG was attempting a
diplomatic solution -- if possible -- and would proceed in
consultation with our friends in the region. Recounting the basic
components of our Iraq policy, he also highlighted the need to
strengthen the institutions of government in Lebanon and build
capacity within the Palestinian Authority.

UAE offers threat analysis: all Iran
------------------------------------

¶12. (S) The UAE's presentation of the primary regional threat
assessed that Iran's leadership "genuinely believes that it has
emerged victorious from its clash with the U.S.," with gains made in
Iraq, an expanding "Shi'a tide" in the region, an ongoing nuclear
program, missile modernization, and continued provocation of
resistance in Gaza. While Israel was able to neutralize to some
degree threats on its flanks in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008/9),

ABU DHABI 00000744 003 OF 004


Iran's main goals of regional influence were not inhibited. The UAE
assessment continued that Israel may act on its perception that only
"extreme" (and unlikely) UNSC action or unilateral Israeli military
action can slow Iran's nuclear goals. As Iran continues to reject a
political solution, the UAE must prepare for the fallout should
Israel act on its fears. With that, the briefer introduced a slide
on Iran's capabilities, with missile sites in the south of Iran and
concentric circles showing their likely range all covering UAE
territory.

¶13. (S) Iranian promotion of "Shi'ism," coupled with sleeper cells
in the region, magnify the threat articulated by the UAE. If
attacked, it may seek to obstruct shipping in the Gulf and control
(more) islands over which it does not have legitimate sovereignty.
Working in alliance with al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi'a, Iran
is poised to do damage of an unpredictable nature if/when provoked.
In sum, Iran continued as the traditional focus of the threat
briefing offered by the UAE at GSD sessions. Other regional concerns
noted in lesser detail included Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism, and piracy.

Strategic Cooperation
---------------------

¶14. (C) In further briefings, the UAE team highlighted good
operational cooperation with the U.S. and offered a review of the
maturing Critical National Infrastructure Agency (CNIA) which is
taking charge of security on land, along the coast, and off shore --
with an initial focus on Abu Dhabi but an intent to serve as a
federal agency. The U.S. Coast Guard and NYPD were cited as partners
in the growing CNIA mission, with a U.S. promise of first-time
"nuclear Security Training" in the near future.

¶15. (S) The UAE delegation received a draft "UAE National Defense
Strategy and U.S.-UAE Comprehensive Defense Strategy" document
outlining key priorities in the defense relationship (a document
proposed by UAE Ambassador to Washington Yousef al-Otaiba). Without
immediate comment on the substance of the USG draft, al-Kaabi said
the UAE would reply via embassy channels and looked forward to
continuing the dialogue.

Q&A on Iran, Yemen
------------------

¶16. (C) When the floor was open to general discussion, two topics
dominated: Iran and Yemen. The UAE asked whether the USG had any
new information since the December 2007 NIE regarding Iran's nuclear
weaponization program; the U.S. team noted that a new estimate was in
progress but it was premature to comment. The DMI representative
also noted that Iran exploits crises for its own advantage, making
the defusing of crises like Palestine and Lebanon imperative if we
are to keep Iran in check. In the case of Palestine, he added
optimistically, it is time to "cut to the chase" and deal with final
status issues; Lebanon is also ripe for progress, he suggested,
without a drawn out process.

¶17. (S) On Yemen, the UAE said it shared a U.S. concern that a
"failed state" could emerge on the Arabian Peninsula, with terrorist
partners and Iranian influence further poisoning the mix. A
collapsed Yemen "gives us Afghanistan," said Commander of the Air
Force and Air Defense Major General Hamad bin Suweidan al-Qamzi, and
then it presents a long-term threat to the region. He said the UAE
was coordinating economic development support for Yemen while also
trying to assist with political reconciliation. He noted the dangers
of "another Somalia." ASD Vershbow hoped the UAE could help secure a
unified GCC approach to Yemen, as time is running out on the
seccession question and Yemen cannot afford a "two front" war with
both seccesionists and the Al-Houthi insurgency. In a brief
discussion of Pakistan, all agreed that Islamabad needs to focus
resources to fight insurgency rather than obsessing with India as its
potential military foe.


ABU DHABI 00000744 004 OF 004


Positive Conclusions
--------------------

¶18. (C) Enhanced U.S.-UAE cooperation to counter troublesome
financial flows and cash smuggling -- solidified during a recent
visit by Treasury Secretary Geithner -- was noted by the Charge as
another area of productive engagement. Both sides also put in very
positive words about the role of the Air Warfare Center which has
become a proud center of excellence for the region.

¶19. (S) In closing, al-Kaabi raised Iran yet again, noting that its
leadership is not likely to change fundamentally and therefore the
threat is likely to continue. He looked forward to ongoing
discussion of the defense strategy discussed earlier as we continue
to pursue a common vision.

¶20. (SBU) UAE delegation:

--- Staff Major General Ali Hamad Subaih al-Kaabi, Deputy Chief of
Staff
--- Staff Major General (Pilot) Hamad bin Suweidan al-Qamzi,
Commander of Air Force and Air Defense
--- Staff Colonel Abdullah Saeed al-Hamoodi, Intelligence and
Military Security
--- Lt. Colonel (Dr.) Albadr Shareef al-Shatri, Intelligence and
Military Security
--- Staff Brigadier General Khalfan al-Kaabi, Ground Forces
--- Staff Colonel (Pilot) Salim Saeed, Ground Forces
--- Staff Lt. Colonel Abdullah al-Yamahi, Directorate of Joint
Operations
--- Brigadier General (Dr.) Humaid Ali al-Kitbi, Purchasing
Directorate
--- Staff Colonel Saeed Rashid al-Shihi, CNIA
--- Staff Brigadier General Mohamed Murad al-Baloushi, Air Forces
--- Colonel (Engineer) Ahmad Sultan, Air Forces
--- Staff Lt. Colonel Engineer Jamal Mohamed al-Ameri, Air Forces
--- Major Juma Sultan, Air Forces
--- Staff Major (Pilot) Ali Saleh, Air Forces
--- Major (Pilot) Abdullah Sultan al-Mazroui, GSD secretariat for
plenary

¶21. (U) The GSD traveling party approved this message .

GREENE


/tag/IR_1.html


09ABUDHABI754     2009-07-23 09:09     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Abu Dhabi

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000754

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA

E.O. 12958: 07/22/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS IR IS AF PK SY LE SA
QA, AE

SUBJECT: (S) MbZ HOSTS GULF SECURITY DINNER WITH ISA ASD VERSHBOW AND
PM A/S SHAPIRO

CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B
AND D.

REF A SECRETARY'S LETTER TO MBZ ON PUMA HELICOPTERS
REF B SECSTATE 76108


¶1. (S) Summary: Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ, also
Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces and de facto defense
chief) hosted a July 19 executive session of the Gulf Security
Dialogue in Abu Dhabi (July 20 plenary with UAE uniformed officers
reported septel). The U.S. delegation was led by Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow and
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew
Shapiro. MbZ called for advanced U.S.-UAE joint military
coordination and faster delivery of FMS items to respond to a
worst-case scenario in Iran. As with other senior U.S. officials
(but with increasing alarm and a shortening time frame), MbZ focused
on the Iranian threat and his belief that an Israeli pre-emptive
strike on Iran is likely in a matter of months. ASD Vershbow assured
MbZ of the U.S. commitment to UAE security; A/S Shapiro relayed that
this visit was his first since taking his new position - reflecting
the importance we place on the relationship. Discussions also
centered on UAE military and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan
and Pakistan and the peace process. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) hosted a
working dinner with U.S. Gulf Security Dialogue delegation the
evening of July 19. The U.S. Delegation was led by Assistant
Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro and
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Alexander Vershbow and included RADM William Payne, Ambassador, and
DCM. The UAE was represented by Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Hamad Thani al-Rumaithi, Ambassador to the U.S. Yousef al-Otaiba,
Under Secretary of the Crown Prince's Court Mohamed al-Mazrouei,
Deputy Chief of Staff Ali Hamad al-Kaabi and Air Force Chief Mohammed
Swaidan al-Qamzi.

Joint Planning for Worst-Case Scenario in Iran
--------------------------------------------- -

¶3. (S) In a three-hour working dinner, MbZ focused primarily on his
overarching concern -- the threat from Iran, stressing as he has with
other senior U.S. officials that U.S. engagement with Iran will
ultimately fail and that he fears a surprise (Israeli pre-emptive
strike on Iran) in a shorter timeframe than USG estimates (he fears
it could happen this year). ASD Vershbow assured MbZ of the U.S.
commitment to UAE security; A/S Shapiro relayed that his trip to the
UAE was his first since taking on his new position, reflecting the
importance we place on the relationship.

¶4. (S/NF) MbZ reiterated his belief that an Israeli pre-emptive
strike against Iran was increasingly likely, saying he was convinced
the Netanyahu government was prepared to act against Iran, and that
he agreed with Israeli intelligence assessments regarding how close
Tehran is to achieving its nuclear ambitions. The Iranian response
to a pre-emptive strike, predicted MbZ, would be attacks on U.S.
allies in the region, foremost among them the UAE; Iran may also
unleash terrorist cells against western interests around the world.
ASD Vershbow explained that the USG assessment differed in timeframe
-- we do not anticipate military confrontation with Iran before the
end of 2009 -- stressing, however, that denying Iran's nuclear
ambitions and stemming its efforts to achieve regional hegemony were
foremost among U.S. international security concerns.

¶5. (S) In response to MbZ's position that ultimately engagement
efforts with Iran would fail, both ASD and A/S made clear than while
the USG continues to press for a diplomatic solution, the offer of
engagement is not opened-ended and will not come at the expense of
Gulf security.

ABU DHABI 00000754 002 OF 004



¶6. (S) Referring to the Iran Region Presence Office (IRPO) in Dubai,
MbZ asked "how's that office doing?" He did not demonstrate any
particular concern or sensitivity regarding IRPO activities in UAE.
MbZ said that the Iranian regime was in trouble internally and would
move swiftly to oppress post-election opposition. As for Rafsanjani,
MbZ said he was a "survivor" who would not succeed in a leadership
bid because he will not act unless he is one-hundred percent sure he
will win. Again turning to his primary security concern, MbZ
suggested that Tehran would likely accelerate its nuclear program to
draw attention away from its internal weakness and to foment
nationalism among its citizenry. "Time is not on our side", he said,
hinting that a move should be made against Iran and "the sooner the
better."

Russia
------

¶7. (C)ASD Vershbow briefed MbZ on the positive outcome of POTUS's
recent talks in Moscow. MbZ said that he had met with Putin in June
and he did not believe Russia saw a nuclearized Iran as a challenge
to its interests, nor did Putin appreciate the threat of regional
proliferation in response to an Iranian bomb. He encouraged the U.S.
to continue to press the Russians saying he believed if the Russians
came over to our side, (with regard to tougher sanctions), the
Chinese would follow. MbZ said his he would travel in late July to
Beijing, where he will surely press the Chinese on Iran. ASD
Vershbow suggested he urge the Chinese to send Iran a message by
diversifying its oil imports away from Iran.

Afghanistan - Neighbors Not Doing Enough
----------------------------------------

¶8. (S/NF) MbZ complained that Arab regimes are not doing enough to
help in Afghanistan. He said that as of one month ago, he surveyed
the region and found that only Oman had funded its Tokyo conference
pledge of $2 million. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Qatar in
particular for not doing their part, saying that the Saudis clearly
did not see how important it was to their own interests.

¶9. (S/NF) MbZ criticized other regional leaders for playing both
sides and for "dating" Iran. MbZ compared the current situation to
pre-WWII Europe saying, "Ahmedinejad is Hitler," and neighboring
capitals believe erroneously that they can prevent Iranian
retaliation by playing nice or signing agreements with Tehran. "They
think the are backing the winning horse," MbZ explained, emphasizing
that if they think that by appeasing Iran they will avoid Iranian
retaliation "then they are seriously mistaken, Sir."

National Defense Strategy
-------------------------

¶10. (S) Throughout the discussions, MbZ repeatedly called for
coordinated military planning for the worst-case scenario of an
unpredictable Iranian response to an Israeli strike, stressing that
U.S.-UAE preparations must begin now well before commencement of
hostilities. Both sides agreed that improved coordination was a good
idea, with ASD Vershbow utilizing the opportunity to push for a UAE
national defense strategy. (Note: GSD July 20 plenary meeting
reported septel. End Note.)

Pakistan - 14 Additional PUMAs
------------------------------

¶11. (C) Passing a letter from Secretary Clinton thanking the UAE for
its transfer of 14 U.S.-origin PUMA helicopters to Pakistan, A/S
Shapiro thanked MbZ for the UAEG's partnership and regional
leadership in providing assistance to Pakistan as well as its
long-term participation in the coalition in Afghanistan. MbZ updated
the delegation on delivery status, saying that 10 of the promised 14

ABU DHABI 00000754 003 OF 004


had been delivered and the remaining 4 would shortly follow. He
added that efforts were underway to find and purchase additional
helicopters, announcing (for the first time that we have heard this)
the UAE's intentions to provide Pakistan with an additional 14 PUMAs.

Humanitarian Aid for CT
-----------------------
¶12. (C) In the context of defeating AQ in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
MbZ called for Arab and Muslim regimes to do more to stem terrorist
financing, whether it means closing down charities, business
interests, "whatever is necessary." He also pointed to the
zealousness of Arab fighters vice Afghani nationals. Nine-five
percent of Arab fighters go to Afghanistan knowing they are going to
die for ideological reasons. Afghan nationals, on the other hand,
are more practical. "This makes one of them [Arabs] more valuable to
AQ than ten or more Afghan fighters." Afghanis, MbZ pointed out,
have tribes, families, homes -- therefore the best way to counter
local extremism in Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, is
to improve the quality of life.

¶13. (SBU) MbZ described UAE humanitarian commitments of $300 million
to build "model villages" in Afghanistan, complete with housing,
hospitals and schools. He invited the USG to join the UAE, Germany
and France in this effort. A/S Shapiro stressed the urgency of the
displaced persons crisis in the Swat region of Pakistan, suggesting
the UAE consider housing aid in this region. MbZ replied "Why not?
We will try to help wherever needed."

MbZ on Pakistani Leadership
---------------------------

¶14. (S/NF) MbZ shared his assessment of the current Pakistani
leadership saying President "Zardarni is dirty but not dangerous,"
while Prime Minister Sharif is "dangerous but not dirty -- this is
Pakistan. Sharif cannot be trusted to honor his promises. MbZ
continued that a new personality may emerge but for the time being
the UAE position was to play a helpful role by supporting the PM.

Lebanon - Support for LAF and PM Hariri
---------------------------------------

¶15. (C) ASD Vershbow reiterated our request that the UAEG assist the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by funding the purchase and transfer of
some of 56 U.S.-origin tanks from Jordan to Lebanon, noting our
appreciation of the UAE's earlier funding of the first 10 tanks.
This would help capitalize on the positive outcome of the elections
and help reduce Hezbollah's (and Iran's) influence in Lebanon.
Promising to look into what the UAE could do to help with this
matter, MbZ asked if we had made the same request to Doha. ASD
replied that we had and that he would do so again when he arrived in
Qatar July 20.

¶16. (C) Reiterating his favored theme of the generation gap in
regional leadership (UAE having already passed the baton to the
younger generation), MbZ praised Lebanese PM Saad Hariri, saying he
was a good man. "He feels very threatened at the moment (presumably
by the Syrian regime), and it is important we do not lose him." A/S
Shapiro agreed, pointing to U.S. security assistance as proof of our
concern and suggested that the UAE support U.S. efforts to strengthen
Lebanese government institutions as the best opportunity to build GOL
stability and security.

July 18 Nasrallah Speech
------------------------

¶17. (S) MbZ pointed to Hezbollah SYG Hassan Nasrallah's July 18
speech, saying he believed it reflected a change in Hezbollah's tone
due to calculations that its Iranian backers were currently in a
weakened state post-Presidential elections. MbZ said that Nasrallah
is likely suffering from decreased financial support, at least for

ABU DHABI 00000754 004 OF 004


the next six months.

Behavior Change in Syria - I Think Not
--------------------------------------

¶18. (S/NF) Vershbow pointed to recent progress with Syria on border
control issues to stem the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq as a
small step forward in effort at eliciting behavioral change from
Damascus. MbZ showed no confidence that Syria could be separated
from the Iranian camp. "If you want my opinion," replied MbZ, "I
think not." He advised that Syria had a lot of options and that,
judging from past behavior, the regime would continue hedging on key
regional issues (Iran, support for Hezbollah, peace process) for the
foreseeable future.

Praise for Bahraini Crown Prince
--------------------------------

¶19. (C) MbZ said that a two-state solution was the only option for
solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue. MbZ praised the Bahraini
Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al Khalifa for his "courageous"
(July 17) editorial in the Washington Post (ref B), commenting that
not enough Arab countries we on the right side of this issue.

¶20. (U) ASD Vershbow and A/S Shapiro cleared this message.


/tag/IR_1.html


09TELAVIV1688     2009-07-30 10:10     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

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S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001688

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG CH IR SA LE IS
SUBJECT: PM A/S SHAPIRO'S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL

REF: GRUBB-MILLER 07/22/09 E-MAIL

Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

¶1. (S) Summary: Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
Affairs Andrew Shapiro met with a number of GOI officials on
July 22-23 to stress the importance of the U.S.-Israeli
political-military relationship, and to discuss among other
issues Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). GOI
interlocutors continued to press for the opportunity to
review the QME report prior to its submission to Congress,
and presented an official response to a U.S. non-paper on
potential arms transfers to Arab countries. In that respect,
the MOD proposed technical discussions in Washington on
August 3 to further discuss GOI concerns over the potential
F-15SA transfer to Saudi Arabia. GOI officials continued to
express reservations regarding U.S. arms transfers to
Lebanon, and requested the opportunity to further discuss
U.S. strategy and intentions with respect to the Lebanese
Armed Forces. GOI interlocutors raised continued concerns
over the Iranian nuclear weapons program, noting that any
policy of engagement be done in conjunction with tougher
sanctions and for a finite period of time before turning to
other "options on the table." Other issues raised by GOI
officials included the Peace Process, Israel's export control
system, and potential Israeli exports to China. Both sides
agreed in principle to the next session of the Joint
Political Military Group (JPMG) in October or early November
in Israel. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) On July 22, A/S Shapiro met with MOD Director
General Pinchas Buchris, MOD Political-Military Director Amos
Gilad, Defense Export Control Directorate Chief Eli Pincu,
and participated in a roundtable discussion led by J5
Strategic Division Chief Brigadier General Yossi Heymann. At
the MFA on July 23, A/S Shapiro met with Director General
Yossi Gal and participated in a roundtable discussion led by
Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar and
Export Control Director Roey Gilad. A/S Shapiro also
participated in a strategic tour of Israel, and visited
Israeli defense company Plasan-Sasa.

U.S.-Israeli Relationship
-------------------------

¶3. (SBU) A/S Shapiro stressed the importance of the
U.S-Israeli political-military relationship, noting the
significance of visiting Israel on his first overseas trip in
his capacity as Assistant Secretary for the
Political-Military Affairs Bureau. GOI interlocutors
appreciated the opportunity to resume dialogue on this
important aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. MOD DG
Buchris noted the two still relatively new administrations in
the United States and Israel, and the importance of limiting
the number of misunderstandings in the future.

Qualitative Military Edge
-------------------------

¶4. (S) GOI officials reiterated the importance of maintaining
Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). They said that
Israel understands U.S. policy intentions to arm moderate
Arab states in the region to counter the Iranian threat, and
prefers such sales originate from the United States instead
of other countries like Russia or China. However, Israel
continues to stress the importance of identifying potential
risks that may become future threats or adversaries, and for
this reason maintains several objections as indicated in the
official GOI response to the QME non-paper on potential U.S.
arms sales to the region (ref e-mail to PM/RSAT separately).

¶5. (S) GOI officials also expressed continued interest in
reviewing the QME report prior to its submission to Congress.
A/S Shapiro reiterated that the report was based on an
assessment from the intelligence community, and therefore not
releasable to the GOI. He referenced previous points made to
the Israeli embassy in Washington regarding the report, and
welcomed any comments the GOI might have -- although such
comments should be delivered as soon as possible as the
report is already overdue. Israeli interlocutors appreciated
the classified nature of the report, but also made clear it
was difficult to comment on the report's results without
reviewing its content or intelligence assessment. In that
respect, Buchris and other GOI officials requested that the
QME process be reviewed in light of future QME reports.

¶6. (S) GOI interlocutors attempted to make the argument that
moderate Arab countries could in the future become
adversaries -- and that this should be taken into account in
the QME process. During a roundtable discussion led by the
MFA's Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar,
the MFA's Center for Policy Research gave intelligence briefs
on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon to further support the
argument that these countries could become future foes.
Policy Research Center interlocutors reviewed succession
concerns in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Bar argued that a
perceived closure in the capability gap between Israel and
Arab states, coupled with a nuclear-armed Iran, could compel
moderate Arab states to reassess the notion that Israel was a
fixture in the region.

¶7. (S) Typically frank, MOD Political-Military Chief Amos
Gilad was not certain how much longer Egyptian President
Mubarak would live, and questioned whether his son Gamal was
ready to assume command. Gilad said the Egyptian military
led by Defense Minister Tantawi continues to train and
exercise as if "Israel was its only enemy." He added that
there were disturbing signs on the Egyptian streets, as women
are dressed more conservatively, and that peace with Israel
"is too thin, too superficial." On Saudi Arabia, Gilad said
that King Abdullah does not hate Israel, but his chief
priority is the survival of the regime.

¶8. (S) The GOI official response to the arms transfer
non-paper includes several objections, such as the potential
transfer of systems for the F-15SA to Saudi Arabia, including
the Enhanced Paveway II, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System,
and AESA radar. Buchris said the GOI is ready to establish a
working group to discuss the F-15SA transfer, and proposed an
Israeli technical team accompany BG Heymann to Washington (in
town for a missile defense meeting) on August 3 to discuss
the issue further. Buchris said the sale of the F-15SA was
not the problem, but rather the weapons systems included on
the planes and the location of the planes in Saudi Arabia.

Lebanon
-------

¶9. (S) The GOI remains concerned about U.S. arms transfers to
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and has requested the
opportunity to discuss further U.S. intentions regarding the
LAF. A/S Shapiro said the results of the Lebanese elections
represented a turning point, and rejection of Hizballah and
its Iranian sponsors. The need to build up Lebanese
institutions, including the army, was now more important than
ever, he argued. A/S Shapiro said the LAF has thus far
demonstrated a solid record of accounting for U.S. systems
transferred to Lebanon.

¶10. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the elections in Lebanon
were positive, but countered that Hizballah's influence
remains strong. He argued that items such as the Cessna
Caravan and the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) lack
sufficient mitigation measures, which creates the potential
for an incident along the Israel-Lebanese border. Amos Gilad
said the GOI does not believe the LAF will attack Israel.
However, given the ties between Hizballah and the LAF, he was
certain the IDF would eventually face the LAF in any conflict
with Hizballah.

¶11. (S) Analysts from the MFA's Center for Policy Research
argued there has been no dramatic change in the political
arena despite the March 14 coalition's significant victory in
the elections. They said the fragile political situation in
Lebanon is currently stable, but Hizballah still possesses an
unofficial veto over policy. Long term prospects will be
tested by the Hariri Tribunal and Hizballah's desire for a
reprisal to the 2008 Mughniyeh assassination. MFA Policy
Research analysts further argued that the LAF faces
tremendous pressure following the recent explosion of a
Hizballah arms cache near the Lebanese-Israeli border. MFA
DG Yossi Gal noted that UNIFIL had been prevented from
investigating the explosion, and raised the recent crossing
by Lebanese citizens into Israeli territory to plant Lebanese
and Hizballah flags. He said French and Italian delegations
had praised the GOI's restraint in these cases.

¶12. (S) A/S Shapiro asked if the election results might be
the result in part of a backlash in the Christian community
against Hizballah; the Policy Research analysts countered
that the results were indicative of several factors,
including the influx of Saudi money and an unstable
opposition camp. They agreed that Hizballah leader Nasrallah
might be a bit chastened following the elections, as
suggested by A/S Shapiro, but that Hizballah continues to try
and undermine the March 14 coalition.

¶13. (S) During the MOD roundtable discussion, BG Heymann also
acknowledged the positive results of the elections. However,
he feared the outcome did not represent the real power of the
Shi'ites in Lebanon. He agreed that moderates and the LAF
must be strengthened, but expressed deep concerns about
ongoing cooperation between Hizballah and the LAF. He also
said that such aid to Lebanon be paired with efforts to halt
smuggling and directly weaken Hizballah.

¶14. (S) BG Heymann also cited concerns regarding mitigation
measures for the Caravan and Raven in order to prevent an
"accidental engagement" by the IAF. Overall, he was
skeptical that these systems would benefit the LAF, and said
the GOI would appreciate a more in-depth conversation
regarding U.S. intentions and overarching strategy with
respect to the LAF. Heymann suggested further talks to
coincide with the August 3rd F-15 technical discussion in
Washington; MFA DDG Bar echoed this request. A/S Shapiro
offered to take that back to Washington for review. If it
proved too difficult on short notice to bring together
interagency experts to discuss US intentions with the LAF,
A/S Shapiro suggested it be included in the Joint Political
Military Group talks later in the fall.

Iran
----

¶15. (S) Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons remains the GOI's
primary focus. Buchris stated bluntly that it was not clear
to him where U.S. policy was heading with regard to Iran. In
separate meetings, Buchris and Amos Gilad said that Israel's
preeminent priority is to prevent Iran's nuclear weapons
program, which if realized would cause a nuclear arms race
across the Middle East as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt
pursue similar programs in response. Gilad was skeptical

that engagement would work, noting Iranian desires to
"establish a new empire" and pointing to Iranian support for
Hizballah and "Hamastan." Buchris added that the United
States' desire to engage with Iran should be accompanied by
tough sanctions, and only pursued for a finite period of
time; MFA DG Gal concurred. Alluding to a potential military
strike, Buchris said "all options must remain on the table,"
and acknowledged that part of his job was insuring Israel was
ready to employ such an option, no matter how undesirable it
may be.

¶16. (S) A/S Shapiro made clear that a nuclear armed Iran was
unacceptable to the United States. He referenced Secretary
Clinton's July 15 foreign policy address at the Council on
Foreign Relations, noting the offer of engagement with Iran
-- but reinforcing that such an offer is not indefinite. A/S
Shapiro argued that an Iranian rejection of our offer to
engage will only help bolster international support for
increased sanctions. He also pointed to the uncertain
situation following the Iranian elections -- it was unclear
at this point how the regime in Tehran will react to our
offer of engagement. That said, he repeated that the
engagement offer was not unlimited, noting that the United
States will reassess its engagement strategy with Iran later
this fall.

¶17. (S) A/S Shapiro cited a commonality of interests with the
Gulf States, which also view Iran as the preeminent threat --
we should take advantage of this commonality, he said.
During the J5 roundtable discussion, IDF interlocutors
expressed skepticism that proposed military assistance to the
Gulf would help against Iran, as some of the systems slated
for delivery are not designed to counter the threats, nuclear
and asymmetrical, posed by Iran. A/S Shapiro agreed that
assistance to Gulf states should not diminish Israel's QME,
but argued that it sends a signal to those countries (as well
as Iran) that they have strong allies in the West. It also
helps convince these regimes that their best interests lie
with the moderate camp rather than with Iran.

¶18. (S) Buchris said the lack of an appointed U.S. special
envoy focusing on Iran suggested the United States did not
believe Iran was a priority. A/S Shapiro reassured Buchris
that Iran was a top priority as President Obama and Secretary
Clinton are intensely focused on Iran. The fact that Tehran
has not responded to our offer of engagement makes a special
envoy responsible for negotiations not as important, A/S
Shapiro said -- in any case, much of the discussion will be
behind the scenes.

¶19. (S) Buchris referenced a press report from Secretary
Clinton's trip to Jakarta in which she said the United States
would consider providing a defense umbrella for moderate Arab
countries in the Middle East should Iran acquire a nuclear
weapon. Buchris argued that such a statement already
conceded the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran. MFA Deputy
Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar also raised
the Secretary's Jakarta statement; A/S Shapiro stated that
the Secretary's comments did not indicate a new policy
approach, but were meant as a deterrent factor toward Iran's
nuclear weapons ambitions -- not as a concession -- and that
journalists covering the trip attempted to make more out of
the statement than was intended.

¶20. (S) Amos Gilad referenced Russia's potential sale of the
S-300 missile system to Iran, noting that Russian
interlocutors initially denied the S-300 contract with Iran,
and then later admitted it had been signed but added that the
system would not be delivered for political reasons.
However, Gilad said the Russians would reassess this
political calculation should the United States continue to
pursue missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech
Republic. He speculated that the Iranians would continue to
put pressure on Russia to sell the system rather than pursue
alternative Chinese systems. He said the Russians appear
committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,
but he personally had doubts about their intelligence
capabilities following their lack of knowledge regarding the
Syrian nuclear project.

Peace Process
-------------

¶21. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the Palestinian Authority
was doing a "good job" in the West Bank, noting respect for
Palestinian Security Forces (PASF) as they take more control
of security -- giving them the chance to succeed was
important, Buchris said. He also commended the work of
United States Security Coordinator Gen. Dayton in training
the PASF. That said, Buchris argued the way ahead would be
difficult, given the divide between Hamas and Fatah.
Reconciliation talks between the two have stalled -- Amos
Gilad said both sides are "more interested in swallowing one
another" than negotiating. Behind the scenes discussions
with Hamas by European countries and even U.S. visitors have
not helped the situation, Buchris said. A/S Shapiro deferred
to Special Envoy Sen. George Mitchell's efforts, but noted
Secretary Clinton's point that a stronger PA will offer an
alternative to Hamas. He also stressed Secretary Clinton's
remarks during her July 15 speech that the United States will
not engage with Hamas unless it has accepted the Quartet
principles.

Export Control
--------------

¶22. (C) MOD Defense Export Control Directorate (DECD) Chief
Eli Pincu reviewed the export control system, emphasizing an
improved process, but also acknowledging the potential for
improvement. He gave a brief presentation regarding Israeli
export controls, including enhanced legislation,
cross-ministry coordination, enhanced enforcement, and
increased industry outreach and training. He noted 780
registered exporters in Israel; for 2009, 31,373 marketing
licenses had thus far been issued, with 1,198 denials and 219
returned without action. MFA Export Control Director Roey
Gilad stressed the partnership between the MOD and MFA on
export licenses, and explained the system's dispute
resolution mechanism in the event the MFA and MOD disagree on
a particular case.

¶23. (C) Both Pincu and Roey Gilad noted that the GOI
continues to seek assistance in closing export control
loopholes, including brokering. Pincu noted that brokering
had been included in the Defense Export Control Act, but that
accompanying implementation legislation had not yet entered
in to force. Pincu said the GOI had consulted with Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, and Japan on its brokering laws,
and planned to raise it during the annual defense export
control working group to be held in Washington in October.
Roey Gilad and other DECD officials also hope to travel to
Washington in the near future to further discuss brokering
issues.

China
-----

¶24. (C) MFA Export Control Director Roey Gilad reiterated
that the GOI in no way desires to compromise U.S. national
interests with respect to exports to China. He noted,
however, that the U.S. Department of Commerce created in 2007
a list of exemptions for certain items if sent to validated
end users in China. Gilad questioned whether the same
exemptions might be possible for Israel. As it currently
stands, the GOI must pursue any export to China through the
bilateral statement of understanding with the United States.
While the statement calls for expeditious resolution of any
requests to export to China, it often takes up to 80 days to
obtain approval. By that time, Gilad said, China has often
found the item through another supplier. Moreover, the
Israeli export control system requires a 20-working day
turn-around on all export license requests -- which is not
possible, given the length of time required to obtain an
answer from the United States. A/S Shapiro offered to raise
the issue in Washington.

JPMG
----

¶25. (SBU) A/S Shapiro suggested the next session of the Joint
Political Military Group (JPMG) convene shortly after the
Jewish holidays, most likely in October or early November.
GOI officials agreed in principle, and will look at the
calendar and propose dates.

¶26. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared this cable.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_1.html


09RPODUBAI316     2009-08-03 11:11     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Iran RPO Dubai

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INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0475

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000316

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/3/2019
TAGS: PREL PROP PGOV PINR IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD?

DUBAI 00000316 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran
Regional Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (U) This is a joint cable by the Iran Regional Presence
Office and the Dubai Regional Media Hub.



¶2. (S/NF) Summary: Since Iran's June 12 presidential elections,
Arab media have intensely focused their coverage on the
demonstrations in Iran and the international community's
response to the government crackdown. Whereas in recent years
the Arab media have limited their commentary to Iran's external
relations -- particularly its regional ambitions and the
international implications of its nuclear program -- during the
post-election crisis Arab commentators have, for the first time,
poked a hole in the veneer of the Islamic Republic's internal
political system and explored its underpinnings more closely,
often challenging the system's very legitimacy in on-air
commentary. A number of these commentators have opined that
Ahmadinejad has, at least in the near term, lost standing among
some moderate Arabs, who have come to view Ahmadinejad's
administration as oppressive, unpopular, and undemocratic, much
as they criticize many Arab governments. However, all of the
Arab media figures we spoke to emphasized that Arab criticism of
Ahmadinejad has not necessarily led to increased support for
U.S. policy in the region. On the contrary, closer analysis
suggests that Ahmadinejad's eroding popularity in the Arab world
has created a scenario in which any U.S. effort to engage the
current Iranian government will be perceived by a wide spectrum
of Arabs as accommodation with Ahmadinejad.



ALL EYES ON IRAN

----------------



¶3. (S/NF) Iran's post-election crisis has dominated the Arab
media's news coverage for the past seven weeks. The
demonstrations have garnered special coverage on Al-Arabiya and
have consistently been among the top headlines on Al-Jazeera.
The marketing director of the Middle East Broadcasting Company
(MBC), parent company of Al-Arabiya, told IRPO/DRMH that
Al-Arabiya's viewership has skyrocketed since the June 12
election. Al-Arabiya's news website has also experienced a
dramatic increase in visits from users living in the region
between Tripoli and Amman, which the marketing director, a
native of Lebanon, attributed to the tremendous interest Sunni
Arabs have in watching the drama in Iran unfold. Coverage of
Iran's election aftermath is not limited to straightforward news
reporting; editorial pages, media commentaries, and the Arab
blogosphere have also been abuzz with debate over the
demonstrations, the international community's response, and the
implications of these events for the Arab world. While Iran's
elections may no longer command daily headlines in the Western
media, nearly all the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke
recognized that the Arab street remains firmly focused on the
recent unrest and continuing political drama playing out in Iran.



THE BENEVOLENT DICTATOR'S FALL FROM GRACE?

------------------------------------------



¶4. (S/NF) A Syrian journalist and blogger, who owns a media
consultancy firm in Dubai, believes that many in the Arab street
initially viewed Ahmadinejad when he came to power in 2005 as a
"benevolent dictator." Citing the tradition of the Mahdi, the
media consultant argued that both Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are
taught from early childhood to await the arrival of a strong and
unimpeachable figure who will lead the Muslim world. The media
consultant maintained that even secular Arabs view the world,
albeit unintentionally, with this ingrained mindset. Our
contact argued that Ahmadinejad played in to this narrative, and
when Ahmadinejad arrived on the international stage many Arabs
saw him, in contrast to their own flawed leaders, as a humble
and pious man who was brave enough to stand up for his people
and the greater Muslim world by confronting Israel and the West
head on. However, both the intensely competitive campaign
period and the forceful reaction by the Iranian people to the
official election results have led some moderate Arabs to
rethink Ahmadinejad's true disposition. The election, the media
consultant said, led some Arabs to understand that despite his
astutely crafted and well-marketed image in the Arab world,

DUBAI 00000316 002.2 OF 003


Ahmadinejad is resented by many Iranians for domestic
mismanagement, incompetence, and corruption. Because of this
public fall from grace, so the media consultant told us,
Ahmadinejad is no longer the "untouchable, holy figure" in the
Arab world he once was -- his flaws have brought him down to the
level of the Arab world's own imperfect leaders. An Al-Arabiya
executive, speaking at a recent conference, said that the
election aftermath had destroyed the image many Arabs had of the
Islamic Revolution, and Ahmadinejad's legitimacy as a leader was
now open to question. [NOTE: The media consultant attributed
Iran's perceived "victories" over the U.S. and the West to
Ahmadinejad, as opposed to Supreme Leader Khamenei. While
conventional wisdom in the West is that Khamenei has the final
say over Iran's most vital interests, including the nuclear
program, the consultant's comments suggest that the Arab street
views Ahmadinejad as much more influential in the Islamic
Republic's decision-making system.]



POST-ELECTION CRISIS NOT A SILVER BULLET FOR ARAB REGIMES

--------------------------------------------- ------------



¶5. (S/NF) Ahmadinejad's fall from grace notwithstanding, most of
the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke agreed that Arab
governments have a limited ability to capitalize on
Ahmadinejad's missteps because of the skeletons in their own
closets. Al-Arabiya's former Tehran bureau chief observed that
Arab regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who no doubt
would like to exploit Ahmadinejad's current vulnerabilities,
have remained noticeably silent. In his view, they realize that
any statement condemning Tehran's crackdown on peaceful
dissidents would appear untenably hypocritical in the eyes of
their own citizens. He considers this public silence yet
another "missed opportunity" for Arab leaders to take a stand to
counter Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and further detract from his
popularity with the Arab street.



NEW SPACE TO DISAGREE WITH AHMADINEJAD AND THE U.S.

--------------------------------------------- ------



¶6. (S/NF) All of the Arab commentators and news media figures
we spoke to agreed that the U.S. "played it right" throughout
the post-election crisis by staying away from detailed public
comments that could be perceived as interventionist. However,
the Arab commentators were quick to distinguish between
criticism of Ahmadinejad in the Arab street and support for U.S.
policies. The Syrian media consultant said that the heated
debates before the election, in which the three challengers --
Mousavi, Karroubi, and Reza'i -- publicly criticized Ahmadinejad
for corruption and economic mismanagement, made it clear to
Arabs that this election was about Iran, not the U.S. This
distinction, coupled with the U.S.' restraint in commenting on
the election, provided an unprecedented window for Arab
commentators to criticize Ahmadinejad without appearing to side
with the U.S.



¶7. (S/NF) Examples of this played out during two separate
appearances by the Dubai Regional Media Hub Acting Director on
live panel discussions on Abu Dhabi TV and Lebanese New TV
regarding regional issues, including events in Iran. Whereas
fellow Arab panelist resolutely disagreed with her comments in
support of U.S. policy in the region, in particular the peace
process, they felt free to openly criticize Ahmadinejad's
government, which they refrained from doing in the past, for its
internal crackdown and regional ambitions. One Saudi
commentator contrasted Turkish regional mediation, which he
described as a positive force in the region, with Iranian
regional intervention, which he called pernicious and
destabilizing. A Lebanese commentator noted the irony of Iran
accusing outsiders of interfering in its internal affairs when
there is not "one corner of the Arab world" where Iran does not
intervene behind the scenes.



AHMADINEJAD DOWN BUT NOT OUT

DUBAI 00000316 003.2 OF 003



----------------------------



¶8. (S/NF) As Al-Arabiya's Tehran bureau chief noted, while
Ahmadinejad's image may have taken a hit in the Arab street as a
result of the government's handling of domestic dissent, the
damage is not necessarily permanent. In his view, the Arab
street is notoriously emotional and "could easily be turned to
support Ahmadinejad once again" with some trumped up slogans and
public bravado. The bureau chief believed that, in the
perceived leadership void left by Arab leaders on regional
issues, Ahmadinejad could rally public opinion by capitalizing
on any number of sensitive issues for the Arab street, most
prominent among them Israel, at upcoming international fora.
The Syrian media consultant, too, cautioned the U.S. not to
overestimate any erosion in Ahmadinejad's popularity with Arabs.
In his opinion, Ahmadinejad has only lost standing with a
segment of moderates in the Arab street; he believes that most
Arabs are so polarized, either for or against Ahmadinejad, that
the allegations of voter fraud and the violent post-election
crackdown on protesters will not permanently sway their
positions one way or the other.



ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN: NO PLEASING THE ARAB STREET

--------------------------------------------- ----



¶9. (S/NF) Comment: Once the dust settles on Iran's
post-election crisis, Arabs will look to see if the U.S. deals
with Ahmadinejad as it pursues its nuclear nonproliferation
agenda despite the lingering questions over the legitimacy of
his election. If the U.S. enters negotiations with
Ahmadinejad's government, moderate Arab observers may argue that
the U.S., for the sake of its own national interest, has cut a
deal at the expense of pro-democracy advocates -- just as many
in the Arab street believe the U.S. has done with a number of
Arab regimes. Those Arabs who continue to support Ahmadinejad,
on the other hand, may perceive negotiations as a personal
victory for a humble leader who brought the U.S. to its knees
through steadfast resistance. Thus, Ahmadinejad's "fall from
grace" in the Arab world may have created yet another obstacle
to improved Arab perceptions of the U.S. -- in which engagement
with an Ahmadinejad-led government is now a potentially
lose-lose scenario in which Arabs at both ends of the pro- and
anti-Ahmadinejad spectrum will consider negotiations with
Teheran an accommodation with the Iranian president.
RICHARDSON


/tag/IR_1.html


09DOHA502     2009-08-10 11:11     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Doha

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000502

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS QA XF ZP ZR YM IR JO LE
SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETINGS IN QATAR

Classified By: Amb Joseph LeBaron for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

(C) SUMMARY
-------------

¶1. (C) During their July 20-21 visit to Qatar, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security
Affairs, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, and State
Political-Military (PM) Assistant Secretary Andrew Shapiro
held meetings with Qatar's military Chief of Staff, Major
General (MG) Hamad al-Attiyah and the Crown Prince Tamim bin
Hamad al Thani. MG al-Attiyah and the Crown Prince tried to
assure the Assistant Secretaries that Qatar used the Chief of
Staff's visit to press Iran to respond to U.S. offers of
engagement and to dismiss as "rubbish" Iranian efforts to
blame the election crisis on U.S. and UK special services.
The U.S. affirmed displeasure with Iranian behavior, and said
the U.S. would not tolerate Iranian pursuit of nuclear
weapons. ASD Vershbow suggested now was the time for Qatar
to distance itself from Iran and its proxies and urge Iran to
end its destabilizing behavior.
¶2. (C) MG al Attiyah and the Crown Prince repeated the
Qatari position that they felt the need to engage all their
neighbors and that Qatar could perhaps influence Iranian
behavior through its engagement. MG al-Attiyah also
expressed disappointment that the Large Aircraft Infrared
Counter Measure (LAIRCM) system is not available to be
installed on Qatar's recently purchased C-17 aircraft. ASD
Vershbow said he would look into the issue further and that a
formal response from the SecDef would be forthcoming. The
Chief of Staff also said no decision had been made on
fulfilling an earlier U.S. request to provide funding for the
refurbishment of Jordanian tanks being provided to Lebanon.
When ASD Vershbow requested that Qatar use its good offices
to help the U.S. in Yemen and induce a change in Hamas's
behavior, the Chief of Staff expressed irritation that
U.S.-Qatar friendship did not extend to issues of importance
to Qatar, such as LAIRCM. END SUMMARY

U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
-----------------------

¶3. (C) U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for
International Affairs Vershbow and Assistant Secretary of
State for Political-Military Affairs Shapiro, joined by
Ambassador, met July 20-21 over dinner and in a separate
office call with Chief of Staff (COS) Major General Hamad
al-Attiyah. The U.S. visitors thanked the COS for Qatar's
continued hospitality and support and for hosting our
presence at both Camp As Sayliyah (CAS) and Al-Udeid Air Base
(AUAB).

C-17 PURCHASE
-------------

¶4. (C) BG General al-Malki (Commander of the Fighter Wing and
Chairman of the Transport Committee) informed ASD Vershbow
that the first C-17 was on schedule for delivery and would
depart California on August 11 with an ETA at AUAB O/A August
¶15. In addition, BG General al-Malki mentioned his
disappointment at the delay of the pilot training program,
which will further delay the aircraft from becoming
operational. In response, ASD Vershbow reassured him that
USG would work to resolve the issue.

¶5. (C) COS al-Attiyah expressed his concern to ASD regarding
the C-17 LAIRCM. The COS stated that he was greatly
disappointed over USG disapproval of Qatar's application for
LAIRCM. Al-Malki pointed out that other nations had acquired
the system and that Qatar's exclusion added to his
frustration. The COS said he did not want to elevate the
matter to Qatar's civilian leadership. He believed that
Qatar's leaders would question the benefits of the
U.S.-Qatari military relationship if the concern were to be
raised.

¶6. (C) ASD Vershbow responded that a letter would be
forthcoming from SECDEF explaining that Qatar would be
receiving the same aircraft as received by the United States
Air Force (USAF). Vershbow further clarified that the LAIRCM
was an additional add-on, for which transfer to Qatar had
been disapproved. Vershbow recommended that Qatar pursue
other options, noting he was unaware that other nations had
access to the LAIRCM system for transport aircraft. ASD
Vershbow said he would look into the matter, adjust the
SECDEF letter as necessary and respond formally to the GOQ.
COS and al-Malki stressed Qatar's desire to use aircraft
jointly with the U.S. and Coalition Forces.

IRAN
----

DOHA 00000502 002 OF 003



¶7. (C) ASD asked the COS to recount his visit to the Islamic
Republic of Iran. COS briefed that his first visit to Iran
was short in duration. The Qatari delegation praised
President Obama's Cairo Speech while in Iran and urged the
Iranians to take steps to avoid isolating themselves
internationally. Further, the Qataris suggested that the
Iranians seek engagement and rapprochement. ASD Vershbow
said this was the right message, and those who have contacts
with Iran should use every opportunity to persuade Iranian
leaders to end their destabilizing behavior.

¶8. (C) ASD Vershbow reiterated the need for Iran to take
steps to convince the international community that it was not
pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, and to end its support
for Hamas, Hizballah, and other extremist groups. He said
we understand why Qatar, because of its close proximity and
its economic and political ties to Iran, felt the need to
engage with Iran. Qatar should help the Iranians to avoid a
conflict with the U.S. and the international community,
remarking that "friends do not let friends drive drunk."

¶9. (C) COS al-Attiyah responded that while Iran expresses a
desire privately to change its behavior, these could be
meaningless platitudes. The COS reiterated that the GOQ
opposes any Iranian pursuit of a military nuclear capability,
noting that it would destabilize the region. COS further
suggested that the USG continue its own dialogue with the
Islamic Republic. COS al-Attiyah closed the discussion by
making clear that, with respect to Iran, "while we're
neighbors, we're not friends." He summed up his recent visit
to Tehran as an overture to maintain open channels of
communication with Iran.

LEBANON
-------

¶10. (C) ASD asked if the GOQ had a response to an earlier
request to the Prime Minister by Secretary Gates to help fund
the transfer of 55 M1A1 tanks from Jordan to Lebanon. COS
said he was aware of the request, but that no decision had
been made. He added that he had discussed the issue during a
recent CHOD conference with Jordanian and Lebanese
representatives.

HAMAS
-----

¶11. (C) ASD Vershbow raised Qatar's ties with Hamas, and told
the COS that Hamas needs to be encouraged to rejoin the
Palestinian Authority and the Peace Process. He added that
there should be "no blank checks, no checks at all," for
Hamas. ASD suggested that Qatar was in a position to
influence Hamas; if Qatar helped bring about a change in
Hamas's behavior, it could enhance the U.S.-Qatar strategic
relationship. COS undertook to relay that message to the
Amir and Crown Prince. While the COS underscored that Qatar
wants a good relationship with the U.S., he noted there were
times when USG decisions sent a different signal, such as the
USG's decision on LAIRCM. COS al-Attiyah rhetorically asked,
"Are we friends or not?"

YEMEN
-----

¶12. (C) ASD Vershbow asked if Qatar, or the GCC as a whole,
would be renewing efforts to help solve the troubles in
Yemen, citing Qatar's previous mediation efforts. COS
al-Attiyah responded that GOQ had engaged Yemen in the past,
but noted that maintaining productive dialogue is difficult,
given Yemen's economic plight and decentralized tribal
society. The COS added that the GOQ was unsure how Yemeni
President Saleh plans to curtail the violence there. He also
noted that there is little military cooperation between the
Qatar Armed Forces (QAF) and Yemen, but that he would make
the GOQ leadership aware of the ASD's interest. The COS said
that the GCC had earlier presented a "unified package," but
its efforts in Yemen had failed. COS al-Attiyah recommended
that this subject be addressed at the Manama Dialogue in
December.

NSS and CIP
-----------

¶13. (C) ASD commended the COS on the upcoming
CENTCOM-GOQ-Naval War College effort to develop a National
Security Strategy. Qatar and others in the region need to
place more emphasis on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
added the ASD. COS al-Attiyah agreed and said he was looking
forward to this effort. (Note: OMC Qatar will escort an
interagency Qatari delegation back to Tampa August 11-13 to

DOHA 00000502 003 OF 003


begin this process.)

CLOSING REMARKS
---------------

¶14. (C) COS ended the discussions by stating that he valued
the U.S.-Qatar relationship. The GOQ was committed to the
friendship forged between the two nations, he said. COS said
he is looking forward to the P4 visit and expressed his
desire to invite the P4 to his beach house as schedules
permit.

COMMENT
-------

¶15. (C) Qatar clearly registered its disappointment in not
receiving LAIRCM for its C-17. We believe this could fester
into an open wound in the vital U.S.-Qatar security
relationship. The Chief of Staff is particularly sensitive
about the issue, since Qatar's senior leadership (the Amir
and Crown Prince) holds him responsible for maintaining a
close and productive U.S.-Qatar military relationship.
However, given the Qatari leadership's perception of the
Chief of Staff's inability so far to get LAIRCM, senior
leadership may start to question the Chief of Staff's
assurances about the strength of the U.S.-Qatar military
relationship. End Comment.

¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by Assistant Secretary of
Defense Alexander Vershbow.
LeBaron


/tag/IR_1.html


09BEIJING2438     2009-08-25 09:09     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Beijing

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002438

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2029
TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH
SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: SCHOLAR SUGGESTS U.S. NEGOTIATE SE
CRETLY WITH IRAN

REF: BEIJING 1803

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.
4 (b/d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The unstable post-election political climate
in Iran likely precludes the initiation of formal
negotiations with Iran on ceasing its uranium enrichment
program, according to a PRC scholar. Though Iran is sincere
in wishing to reach out to the United States on broader
bilateral issues, it remains wary of "falling into a trap" in
bilateral negotiations. Under these circumstances, the
scholar suggests, the United States should undertake "se
cret" talks with Iran that would entail a U.S. concession
allowing Iran some nuclear enrichment activities in return
for Iran's adherence to a strict IAEA safeguard agreement,
its cessation of support for Hamas and Hizbollah, and
cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan. China has encouraged
Iran to enter into negotiations with the United States,
according to our contact, while the United States is involved
in regional conflicts where Iran could play a positive role.
However, the scholar stressed, pressing for additional
sanctions through the P5-plus-1 mechanism would be
counterproductive and put China in a "difficult position" of
having to side with either the United States or Iran. END
SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the
MFA-affiliated China Institute for International Studies
(CIIS) and frequent media commentator on Middle East issues
XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff August 24 that though the unexpected
turmoil surrounding the June 12 Iranian election had
politically weakened both President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and
supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, both they and
opposition candidate Mir Hussein Moussavi were "one side of a
coin" in that none of them supported the suspension of Iran's
uranium enrichment activities.

Post-Election Atmosphere Not Right for Negotiations
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶3. (C) Li argued that Ahmadinejad's congratulatory letter
sent to President Obama following the 2008 U.S. elections had
been a sincere indication of the Iranian leadership's
willingness to talk. Li said he had learned that former
Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati had discreetly
contacted USG officials prior to the June 12 presidential
election in Iran, agreeing to resume bilateral contacts after
the election concluded, but that the turmoil and the
lingering instability in Iran had prevented movement on that
initiative. Li reported that his contacts in Iran had
recently said that the Iranian political climate
post-election was still not stable enough for the leadership
to engage in public negotiations on the nuclear issue.

"Obama Factor"
--------------

¶4. (C) Li said an additional factor adding to the Iranian
leadership's reticence to reach out to the United States was
President Obama's positive image among the Iranian public.
("Obama is with us," was an example of public sentiment
reported to him by his Iranian contacts.) Despite the fact
that the leadership was satisfied with President Obama's
statements after the June election, Iranian leaders were wary
of "falling into a trap" in negotiations with United States.
Li suggested that Khamenei remained suspicious of the United
Kingdom, France and Germany based on the Iranian leadership's
perception that these countries had played a role in stirring
post-election turmoil.

Grand Bargain in the Works?
---------------------------

¶5. (C) Li stated that Iran agreeing to suspend uranium
enrichment unilaterally or completely was a "non-starter."
Li cited unnamed contacts in the United States "with close
access to policy-makers on Iran" to support his belief that
the United States would be willing to accept some
internationally-supervised uranium enrichment by Iran. This
would be a concession, Li said, that "the Europeans would
have great difficulty accepting." To make such a concession
diplomatically palatable, Li continued, the United States in
return would expect Iran's cessation of support for Hamas and
Hizbollah, among other terrorist groups in the region, and
its cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, Li
suggested, the United States would expect Iran to agree to a
stricter IAEA safeguard agreement that would control Iran's
nuclear activities and include terms that would be integrated
into the NPT as a basis for further safeguards governing all

BEIJING 00002438 002 OF 002


NPT signatory countries (reftel). He stated that before
agreeing to a low level of Iranian enrichment activity, the
United States would insist Iran implement a
six-to-twelve-month freeze on nuclear enrichment activities.

¶6. (C) Li stressed that any Iranian nuclear program
negotiations, which he believed would be lengthy, should be
"se cret" and seek to produce a "win/win" scenario for both
countries. Li stated that Iran had doubts about the USG's
ability to enter such a bargain, given U.S. political
pressures, and that to the Iranians, a signal of U.S.
sincerity to move forward might come through an unofficial
visit along the lines of Henry Kissinger's late June trip to
China to discuss North Korea sanctions or former President
Clinton's early August visit to Pyongyang to effect the
release of the two American journalists, which in his view
had allowed the atmosphere for negotiations with the DPRK to
improve. Li suggested that former President Clinton could
perhaps secure the release of the American hikers detained by
Iranian authorities. Li stated that the key element of a
Kissinger visit would be the former Secretary of State's
ability to have discreet, private and informal discussions.

China Urges Iran to Reach Out to the United States
--------------------------------------------- -----

¶7. (C) Despite U.S.-Iranian tensions, the PRC had encouraged
Iran to take advantage of current circumstances to mend ties
with the United States, according to Li, arguing that the
United States would be more open to making concessions now
because it was in a relatively weaker position tending to a
number of trouble spots around the world, including the
Middle East and South Asia, and needed Iran's help in Iraq
and Afghanistan. However, as the United States regained its
position of strength, according to Li, its willingness to
make concessions would disappear. Li reported that MFA West
Asian and North African Affairs Department Director General
Song Aiguo had affirmed to him recently that China "would do
whatever it could" to assist communication between the United
States and Iran. Asked whether Iran viewed China as a fair
broker, Li said, "Iran trusts nobody." While Iran understood
China's interests in Iran, the Iranian leadership believed
that when pushed to make a choice, China would side with the
United States over Iran.

P5 plus 1: A Show for Public Consumption
----------------------------------------

¶8. (C) Li stated that the P5-plus-1 process "was for public
consumption" and that expectations of its success should be
minimal. Acknowledging the increasing pressure for
additional sanctions given Iran's current unresponsiveness to
offers of engagement, Li stated that pushing for additional
sanctions would play to the hard-liners' advantage in Iran
and not bring any change in Iranian behavior. In addition,
the prospect of imposing additional sanctions would put China
in a "difficult position" of choosing between its interests
vis-a-vis the United States and Iran, a choice it hoped to
avoid.
HUNTSMAN


/tag/IR_1.html


09ISTANBUL336     2009-08-28 14:02     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Consulate Istanbul

VZCZCXRO3507
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DE RUEHIT #0336/01 2401409
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281409Z AUG 09
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9152
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000336

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR MURRAY; BERLIN FOR ROSENSTOCK-STILLER; BAKU FOR
HAUGEN; ASHGABAT FOR TANGBORN; BAGHDAD FOR POPAL; DUBAI FOR
IRPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2025
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS ECON ETRD IR TU
SUBJECT: (C) IRAN: A XXXXX CONTACT SHARES VIEWS FROM A RAFSANJANI BUSINESS ALLY ON KHAMENEI'S CANCER AND RAFSANJANI'S NEXT STEPS

Classified By: Consulate General Istanbul Deputy Principal Officer Win Dayton; Reason 1.5 (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: A XXXXXXXXXXXX businessman who represents the XXXXXXXXXXXX company XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with us a discussion he recently had with a XXXXXXXXXXXX he described as close to Rafsanjani. The XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed Rafsanjani told him Supreme Leader Khamenei has terminal leukemia and is expected to die in months. As a result, Rafsanjani decided to stop challenging Khamenei, and instead is preparing the ground to have himself appointed Khamenei's successor. If he succeeds he will dismiss Ahmadinejad and call for XXXXXXXa new election, according to the XXXXXXXXXXX. The XXXXXXXXXXXX told our contact there was a growing “invisible general strike” in Iran, whereby hundreds of thousands of workers were going to work but not really working, to show their dismay at the election results. XXXXXXXXXXXX End Summary.

¶2. (C) We met XXXXXXXXXXX with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX recently returned from meetings in Tehran with XXXXXXXXXXXX executives, including a Board of Directors member named XXXXXXXXXXXX.

¶3. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX is a strong Mousavi supporter who expected to be a potential candidate for Minister of Industry in a Mousavi government. XXXXXXXXXXX said that XXXXXXXXXXXX explicitly described the June 12 election results as massive fraud, a view he said was shared by almost all business executives and company directors throughout Iran. He claimed the fraud was perpetrated by “six or seven Sepah (IRGC) Generals” who were afraid the IRGC would be sidelined if Mousavi won. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted to XXXXXXXXXXXX that he personally knew the director of information technology for the Interior Ministry's election supervision office. XXXXXXXXXXXX described this official as being involved in tabulating the vote count electronically XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that this official was promptly arrested by IRGC security agents, jailed, and eventually executed. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the real tabulation results showed Mousavi winning 16 million votes in the first round, with Karroubi coming in second place and Ahmadinejad lagging in third. (Comment: These figures track with the supposedly genuine vote tally figures circulated after the election by pro-Mousavi supporters.)

¶4. (C) Khamenei has cancer: XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that Rafsanjani remains vehemently opposed to Ahmadinejad but is biding his time because of a serious health crisis affecting Supreme Leader Khamenei: a terminal case of “blood cancer” (leukemia). XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that he heard from Rafsanjani that Khamenei is likely to die within a matter of months. As a result, Rafsanjani has stopped campaigning within the Assembly of Experts to challenge Khamenei, and now is focused on “letting nature take its course.” Following the Supreme Leader's passing, Rafsanjani will try to mobilize the Assembly of Experts to appoint him as the new Supreme Leader. If he is successful – though clearly he would face stiff opposition from Ahmadinejad allies in that Assembly – he would then invite Ahmadinejad to resign and call a new election. Because Rafsanjani, Mousavi, and their close supports are anticipating this scenario, they are currently “laying low.” XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that he did not expect to see opposition leaders calling for any further demonstrations or provocative activities in coming months that might undercut Rafsanjani's efforts to position himself as a future Supreme Leader.

¶5. (C) “Invisible” general strike: XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX told him that a growing portion of the Iranian workforce was ISTANBUL 00000336 002 OF 003 engaged in an “invisible general strike” against the regime to protest the contested election result. He claimed that hundreds of thousands of Iranian workers in all sectors (public and private) throughout the country had superficially resumed their pre-elections routines and habits. They were going to work every day, but once at work they were doing nothing or working at a bare minimum pace. The realization that such an “invisible strike” could hurt the regime almost as much as an overt general strike, but without the same risks, was spreading. XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted to XXXXXXXXXXXX that Iran's manufacturing and industrial production levels, already strained, are starting to suffer even more precipitously as this effort becomes more widespread. Seeking Commercial Advice ————————

¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX

¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX

Comment
——

¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX has proved to be a credible interlocutor in the past and XXXXXXXXXXXX favorably predisposed to the United States. This is the first time he shared observations from the XXXXXXXXXXXX. We cannot independently assess the veracity of that information, but we note that rumors have long circulated that Supreme Leader Khamenei has cancer and is in rapidly declining health. If true, Khamenei's departure would indeed offer Rafsanjani a propitious opportunity to exert control over the appointment of a successor, though such an event would likely precipitate factional infighting extending well beyond the closed-door confines of the Assembly of Experts. That Rafsanjani would be able to secure his own appointment as Iran's next Supreme

ISTANBUL 00000336 003 OF 003

Leader in the event of Khamenei's near-term death is far from certain, and indeed is only one of many potential succession scenarios that could unfold. The observation about an “invisible general strike” is noteworthy, but we have not heard similar descriptions from other contacts; we will query several Iran-based contacts on it.

¶10. (C) As a businessman, XXXXXXXXXXXX's primary motivation in pursuing deals with Iranian companies is, of course, the profit motive. But XXXXXXXXXXX, he is a true believer in the idea that significantly expanding western commercial relations with Iran would raise pressure on Iranian companies (and indirectly the Iranian government) to reform their economic behavior and modernize the way they do business, resulting – potentially – in a more moderately-behaved Iran. From our perspective such a linkage is unlikely in the current political climate in Iran. XXXXXXXXXXXX.
WIENER


/tag/IR_1.html


09BEIJING2494     2009-09-01 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Beijing

VZCZCXRO6005
OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHTRO RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #2494/01 2441218
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011218Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5857
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002494

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH
SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: CHINA IN WAIT-AND-SEE MODE BILATERALLY
BUT PUSHING FOR DIALOGUE

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: China is biding its time until the political
crisis in Iran reaches a clearer resolution and the
Ahmadinejad government consolidates power, and will signal
its renewed engagement by sending a high-level delegation to
Tehran once the political situation has been resolved,
according to an MFA official. Our contact reaffirmed China's
commitment to the P5-plus-1 process and assessed that Iran is
attempting to keep the door to negotiation with the United
States open despite the turmoil surrounding the June
election, but cautioned that a complete halt to uranium
enrichment is an unattainable goal. China continues to urge
Iran to respond positively to the P5-plus-1 offer for talks,
and these entreaties have been passed directly to Supreme
Leader Khamenei. Iran reportedly requested to upgrade its
relationship with Beijing to a "strategic partnership," but
China refused. A Communist Party official told us that the
CCP is seeking to increase its relations with six major
political parties and factions in Iran and deepen its
understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East. He repeated
China's standard position on the Iran nuclear issue and
suggested that the U.S. offer economic incentives to persuade
the Iranians to enter into talks on the nuclear issue. He
dismissed concerns that negative perceptions in the Middle
East of China after the July violence in Xinjiang province
would affect China's diplomacy with Iran. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations with MFA West
Asian Affairs Department Iran Division Deputy Director Ni
Ruchi August 31. In a separate meeting the same day, Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison
Department (CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa)
Director Wu Baocai gave PolOff the Party's perspective on
Iran and the nuclear issue.

Holding Back Bilaterally until Political Dust Settles
--------------------------------------------- --------

¶3. (C) MFA Iran Division Deputy Director Ni said that the
political turmoil in Iran had yet to settle and that China
was still waiting for the situation to calm further before
re-engaging fully in bilateral relations. He argued that the
internal divisions that had played out in the June
presidential elections had existed well before the violent
aftermath of the June election. China had been aware of the
potential for conflict among those divisions to spill into
the street and had taken a cautious approach before the
election. He said that the Chinese government understood
that the election was a strong indication of deep-seated
divisions within the Iranian government, but stressed that
the contested election had not fundamentally undermined the
current government and that China would continue with its
normal engagement with Tehran.

¶4. (C) China would signal its re-engagement, Ni reported,
with a high-level delegation to Tehran, but there was no
timetable for such a visit yet because the leadership in
Tehran was still fully focused on consolidating power. He
noted that during his mid-August visit to Iran, protestors
had continued to take to the streets to express
dissatisfaction with the election. Ni reaffirmed China's
commitment to the P5-plus-1 process, stressing that the U.S.
and China not only had common interests in Iran, but the
scope of this common interest was increasing.

Iran Keeping the Door Open?
---------------------------

¶5. (C) Ni said that China had taken note of efforts by the
Iranian government to keep a path open to direct negotiations
despite the ongoing political turmoil. He claimed that
Tehran had refrained from overplaying its accusations of the
U.S. role in the election turmoil, preferring to point the
finger at European countries, indicating that the Iranian
leadership was interested in maintaining the possibility of
direct talks. Ni said that the election had caused the
Iranian leadership to reexamine seriously its foreign policy,
particularly on the nuclear issue, adding that Iran's nuclear
development had suffered technical setbacks recently, which
had also forced the leadership to consider how to move
forward.

China Lobbying but Total Halt to Enrichment Unattainable
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶6. (C) Ni reported that China continued to urge Iran at every
level of their engagement to respond positively to the
P53-plus-1 offer of direct talks and cease uranium enrichment

BEIJING 00002494 002 OF 002


activities. He said that Chinese leaders had pointed out to
their Iranian counterparts on many occasions that the United
States had shown "restraint" in its public comments during
the June election aftermath, and that Iran was missing an
important opportunity by refusing to respond to the P5-plus-1
offer. Ni said that China's message encouraging greater
engagement had been passed directly to Supreme Leader
Khamenei. He cautioned that Tehran would not be able to
respond positively to P5-plus-1 overtures until it had
reinforced its position at home, and that a "100-percent"
halt to uranium enrichment had become an unattainable goal.
Ni said that China continued to believe that fresh sanctions
would be ineffective in persuading Iran to cease enrichment
activities and would be counter-productive by increasing the
unity of the various factions in Iran behind the nuclear
program and the current government. Ni argued that the
regime in Iran would emerge from the crisis in a weakened
position and thus more likely to negotiate with the P5-plus-1
on the nuclear issue.

Iran Seeks "Strategic Partnership" with an Unwilling PRC
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶7. (C) Ni said that Iran had requested that Beijing upgrade
its relationship with Tehran, presumably to counter Western
pressure, by lobbying Beijing to label its relationship with
Iran a "strategic partnership" as it does for Russia and
other countries. Ni said that China had so far refused to do
so and Iran was frustrated with China's continuing insistence
that the two countries shared merely "normal" relations.

Party Seeks to Increase its Interaction with Iran
--------------------------------------------- ----

¶8. (C) CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department
(CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa) Director Wu
Baocai told PolOff August 31 that the CCP was seeking to
increase its relations with six major political parties and
factions in Iran. He noted that links between the CCP and
Iranian political parties had lagged behind the growth in
relations between executive branches and far behind the
increase in economic links. He said that deepening
understanding among the CCP leadership of the U.S. position
on Iran was another emerging priority for his office and that
he was open to continued exchanges with the U.S. on the
nuclear issue.

CCP Perspective on Iran nuclear Program
---------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Wu said that CCP officials were increasingly concerned
through 2008 at the possibility of the United States taking
military action against Iran's nuclear program but assessed
that such a possibility was much lower in 2009. He noted
that sanctions had not only failed to change Iranian behavior
and create meaningful effects in Iran but were negatively
affecting the countries joining in the international effort
to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear activities, citing as an
example constraints placed on Chinese banks from doing
business with Iran. He said that he believed the
international community was unlikely to be able to persuade
Iran to fully abandon its enrichment activities and suggested
the U.S. offer modest economic benefits as an incentive to
persuade Iran to enter into dialogue. Wu reiterated China's
strong opposition to Iran using its nuclear technology to
develop nuclear weapons but stressed the right of all
countries to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Iran Relations Unaffected by Xinjiang Violence
--------------------------------------------- -

¶10. (C) Wu dismissed concerns that dismay in Iran and other
parts of the Middle East over China's treatment of ethnic
Uighurs in Xinjiang province would complicate China's
diplomacy with Iran. While acknowledging that some
high-level religious leaders in Iran had been highly critical
of China in the wake of the July violence in Xinjiang, he
said that Beijing was seeking to counter the danger of China
becoming a target for anger in the Muslim world by
significantly increasing its media outreach in the Middle
East, citing the recent establishment of an Arabic-language
version of government-run CCTV.
HUNTSMAN


/tag/IR_1.html


09RPODUBAI379     2009-09-14 13:01     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Iran RPO Dubai

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DE RUEHDIR #0379/01 2571344
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141344Z SEP 09
FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0531
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0532

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000379

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: KHAMENEI SAYS SYSTEM WILL "ACT DECISIVELY" AGAINST
OPPONENTS

REF: DUBAI RPO 378

DUBAI 00000379 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 11 Supreme Leader Khamenei gave the
main Tehran Friday Prayer sermon. In his comments Khamenei
sought to characterize his treatment of opposition in line with
the practices of both the first Shia Imam Ali and also with that
of his predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini. He said while criticism
within the framework of the existing political system was
acceptable, those fundamentally opposing the system and seeking
to harm the nation's security will be dealt with decisively. In
keeping with previous warnings about the "soft overthrow" of the
existing order, he cautioned against dissolution from within,
saying that the only way to prevent this was to remain true to
religion, revolutionary principles, and to Khomeini's teachings.
The recent Presidential election with its massive turnout
proved to the world that "regardless of whom the people voted
for" they still believed in the system. Referring to Iran's
position on the international stage, Khamenei said Iran took
pride in standing against the oppressive nature of its enemies
and that Iran wouldn't be cowed into relinquishing its rights,
"nuclear or non-nuclear." He called for a large turnout on the
September 18 Qods Day march in support of the Palestinian
people, although warning that this event should not be used to
"sow dissension," an implied reference to the fact that "Green
Path" oppositionists are reportedly seeking a massive turn-out
on this day as a show of strength.



¶2. (C) SUMMMARY (CONT): Although Supreme Leader Khamenei 's tone
was consistently mild, Iranian press and IRPO contacts have
interpreted this speech as a clear warning to the "Green Path"
oppositionist leaders to cease and desist, an interpretation
reinforced by the contemporaneous release of a Judiciary panel
report stating that Mehdi Karrubi's allegations of prisoner
abuse were both baseless and also politically motivated, and the
forwarding of this case to judicial authorities for possible
prosecution (reftel). END SUMMARY.



¶3. (U) On September 11, Supreme Leader Khamenei gave both Tehran
Friday Prayer Sermons (normally there are two, the first
covering ostensibly religious topics, the second focusing more
on issues of the day). As the date fell on the anniversary of
the martyrdom of Imam Ali, the first Shia Imam, the topic of his
first sermon was the government of Imam Ali. Although
putatively non-political in nature, Khamenei used this sermon to
set the stage for themes to which he would refer back in his
second, political, sermon. He pointed out the moral nature of
Imam Ali's government, adding that "when religion is separated
from politics, politics becomes immoral and secular." In an
implicit comparison with current times, he also stressed that
Imam Ali consistently preferred to be lenient in dealing with
those who opposed him, until and unless there was a threat to
the system, at which point he would act decisively.



TYPES OF CONFLICT



¶4. (U) In the start of his second, political speech, Supreme
Leader Khamenei said he wished to address his remarks to those
in Iran's political sphere. Dissension had been a feature of
the Islamic Republic since its founding. These conflicts have
had different causes, to include theoretical differences of
opinion, conflicts of interest and clashing personalities.
Referring implicitly to his comments on the management style of
Imam Ali, Khamenei said that Khomeini's normal method for
dealing with dissension and conflict was to use moderation and
leniency. In an implicit reference to Mir Hossein Mousavi and
Mehdi Karrubi, each of whom has referred back to his own
revolutionary credentials, Khamenei said that at times Khomeini
had to deal with conflicts even with those who had solid
revolutionary backgrounds, at the level of the Prime Minister
(i.e. Mousavi himself), President (Khamenei himself) and even at
levels above the President (a reference to Khomeini's dismissal
of Supreme Leader-designate Ayatollah Montazeri).



¶5. (U) Khamenei said the system didn't seek to stifle those who
"think differently" (note: 'digar andishan," a term used to
refer to the intellectual current associated, inter alia, with
the Khatami-ist 'Second of Khordad' movement). It was good for
Iran's officials to have critics point out weaknesses if those

DUBAI 00000379 002.2 OF 003


doing so act within and accept the basic principles of the
system, and the government will not move against such criticism.



¶6. (U) However, again drawing the link to Imam Ali, Khamenei
said that during Khomeini's time if there were danger of
infiltration of "harmful principles" into the system, and if
this conflict were in some way a threat to core principles,
Khomeini would then "act decisively." The regime, much like any
human being, had to defend itself against such an attack.
Linking his actions to those of Imam Ali and Khomeini, Khamenei
said that today also the regime will act if it senses that
someone is acting against its principles and security.



AVOIDING CORRUPTION FROM WITHIN



¶7. (U) In keeping with recent dominant public warnings about
"soft overthrow" and "soft wars," Khamenei turned to the theme
of corruption from within, both at an individual and societal
level. At an individual level, deviation from principles and
susceptibility to corruption were to be avoided at all costs, as
small slips and mistakes could lead to larger ones in a slow and
gradual process. The cure for such threats is self-awareness,
piety and the ongoing moral policing of friends and family. If
such impiety is happening to a government official the problem
is worse, as it affects society.



¶8. (U) At a societal and governmental level, deviation from
principles and susceptibility to corruption can happen in much
the same manner. The decay comes from within, and although on
the outside the society can still appear like an "Islamic
Republic," on the inside it could suffer degradation and decay.
In this regard, societal dynamics can either be positive or
negative. Positive dynamics means moving ever closer towards
justice and religion, which improves social, political and
economic conditions and also improves society's abilities to
stand up to one's enemies. But a society with negative dynamics
will have growing class and social differences and worsening
political and economic conditions. Instead of using freedom for
growth, such a decaying society will abuse freedom to pursue
corruption, sin and dissension. Such negative dynamics also
cause the society to "feel weak and retreat" in the face of
one's enemy, unilateral disarmament and relinquishing one's
rights, nuclear and non-nuclear, which is another sign of
societal decline.



ELECTION



¶9. (U) Supreme Leader Khamenei said the June 12 Presidential
election with its massive turnout was a glorious triumph for the
Islamic Revolution. The turnout demonstrated to the world that
the Iranian people believed in their system of government now
more than ever, "regardless of who voted for whom. After the
election, the enemy sought to create disturbances in order to
diminish Iran's achievement and weaken the peoples' confidence
in the system, but to no effect. There will be similarly large
turnout in future elections, Khamenei predicted, showing the
ongoing support of the people.



IRAN'S ENEMIES



¶10. (U) Supreme Leader Khamenei said all governments have
enemies, but what is important to note is the nature of one's
friends and enemies. Iran's friends are Muslim nations and
peoples throughout the world, and the oppressed of the world.
Its enemies are the thieves and oppressors of the world, and
Iran should not be scared to be the enemies of the U.S. and the
U.K. It was important for Iran to show strength in the face of
such enemies.




DUBAI 00000379 003.2 OF 003


QODS DAY



¶11. (U) Supreme Leader Khamenei said that many on the global
stage have tried to bury the issue of Palestine, but Iran has
prevented that, a fact which has upset "the U.S. and the
Zionists." He called for a massive turnout of support on the
September 18 Qods Day Rally in Tehran, and cautioned all that no
one should use this event to sow dissension, an implicit
reference to "Green Path" opposition plans to use this
authorized march as a show of its own strength.



¶12. (C) COMMENT: Although his tone was mild, Iran oppositionist
press in addition to IRPO interlocutors with ties to the "Green
Path" opposition have said that, in the words of one source,
"Khameni's speech was being viewed ominously in Iran,"
especially when viewed in conjunction with the contemporaneous
release of a Judiciary panel report stating that Mehdi Karrubi's
allegations of prisoner abuse were both baseless and also
politically motivated, and forwarding the case to judicial
authorities for possible prosecution (reftel). According to one
executive branch official, Khamenei's speech has made "the
specter of the arrest of Karrubi - and possibly even Mousavi at
a later stage" all the more probable.



¶13. (C) COMMENT (CONT): Contrary to Khamenei's assertions and as
evidenced by recent comments by IRGC Commander Jaafari, the
regime's interpretation of legitimate dissent has constricted
dramatically, with Jaffari equating "soft overthrow" with those
seeking to change Iran's behavior in any way. Certainly,
Khamenei seems to be trying to regain the high ground he
forfeited by descending so openly into the political fray, as
shown by his attempts to draw comparisons among himself,
Khomeini, and Imam Ali. Separately, the Supreme Leader's
formulation of "relinquishing ones rights, nuclear or
non-nuclear" as a sign of societal dissolution and immorality
indicates that Iran will continue to adhere to its hard public
line in advance of any future negotiations. Finally, it is also
worth noting that Supreme Leader Khamenei made no endorsement,
either explicit or implicit, of President Ahmadinejad, saying
only that the recent Presidential election was good due to the
turnout, "regardless of who voted for whom." END COMMENT.
EYRE


/tag/IR_1.html


09ASHGABAT1182     2009-09-16 11:11     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Ashgabat

VZCZCXRO6903
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RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
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RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0111
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 001182
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2019
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL TX UNESCO
SUBJECT: IRAN: WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? XXXXXXXXXXXX DIPLOMAT SHARES HIS PERSPECTIVE

ASHGABAT 00001182 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Acting DCM Peter Eckstrom, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: XXXXXXXXXXXX's advised in a recent conversation with Ashgabat Iran Watcher that the U.S. would be ill-advised to begin talks with Iran, that it would be great disappointment to Iranians who have found hope in President Obama's message of change. He called Iran's leadership “untrustworthy,” and described the three main groups that he said are sustaining the regime: the “clerical establishment, the paramilitaries and the Bazaaris (merchant class).” XXXXXXXXXXXX finds little difference between any of the major figures in Iran, including most members of the opposition. END SUMMARY.

A TRIANGULAR BASE OF SUPPORT

¶2. (C) In a XXXXXXXXXXXX conversation with Iran Watcher, XXXXXXXXXXXX described his country's present political climate, stating that “nothing has changed” in either the power structure or how major decisions are made in Iran. He described the Iranian regime as a “total dictatorship,” whose continued survival depends on a “triangular” power base made up of the clerical establishment, the “bazaari” (merchants), and the “paramilitaries” (Revolutionary Guards and Basij). He said the three groups are so enmeshed, so dependent on one another, including through arranged marriages and business dealings, that the severance of any one of the three from the others would cause the regime to collapse. Supreme Leader Khamenei makes no decisions without consulting with son Mojtabah, he said, who is reputed to be “running his father's office,” in close consultation with Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi and Kayhan editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari.

¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX compared the regime to the dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini, and said the only difference was that Iran, unlike Nazi Germany, has had the “foresight” not to invade another country militarily, thereby preventing, in his view, any “concerted or effective international response” to its human rights violations or support for terrorism abroad. The demonstrations that began after the June presidential election and continue still are the manifestation of a youthful population that is “fed up” and demanding their “most basic human rights.” He observed that the stress that thirty years of repression is more and more causing the population to suffer from psychological problems.

ENGAGEMENT?…NOT WITH THIS GOVERNMENT

¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was adamant that for the U.S. to enter into direct talks with Iran's leadership would be a mistake. Not only, he insisted, is the Iranian leadership “untrustworthy,” and dominated by a group of “messianics,” who base crucial decisions about domestic and foreign policy on a belief in the imminent return of the “Missing” (Twelfth) Imam. More importantly, he said, so many Iranians are pinning their hopes on President Obama's message of change, that for the U.S. now to negotiate with a government that continues to repress and violate the most basic rights of its citizens would be a huge disappointment, a blow to their own aspirations for change in Iran.

THIS IS NOT 1980

¶5. (C) He said Iran is no longer the country or society that rallied around the war effort when Iraq invaded them in 1980. On the contrary, he said, many people he knows are actually saying things like, “Where is Israel? Why don't they just attack us and put an end to this leadership?” He said, however, that new sanctions on necessities such as fuel, would meet with immense public anger as they would mostly affect those who rely on gasoline to commute or make a living.

ASHGABAT 00001182 002.2 OF 003 THE EDUCATION SYSTEM: A TOTAL MESS

¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated that if one counts both teachers and educators, about a third of the country is part of the education system. He lamented the government's “squandering” of its greatest national resource, the 70% of the population who are under the age of 29, with what he called “substandard schooling.” “Such a youthful population, properly educated and trained, could be Iran's greatest asset,” he said. Twenty percent of the population is illiterate, and the rest is comprised of two groups: those who are educated and informed (i.e. the voters who supported Mousavi and Karroubi), and the other, lesser-educated group more likely to follow the dictates of the government and the clerical establishment.

DETAINEES RELEASED AFTER PAYMENTS OF CASH

¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that people detained following the June election have had to pay large sums to be released. He described the parents and grandparents of Nazak Afshar, the French embassy local employee arrested and later released in August, as financially “ruined” after having to pay $500,000 for her release. “It took everything they owned,” he said, “they have absolutely nothing now.” Those whose families have no assets at all “don't have a prayer” of getting out, he said.

AHMADINEJAD OR MOUSAVI: SHADES OF GRAY

¶8. (C) In XXXXXXXXXXXX's view, the recent presidential election presented no real choice to the Iranian public, just the “facade” of one, because Mousavi “himself is an insider, part of the establishment,” and was even responsible as prime minister during the 1980's for the creation of the dreaded “morality police.” He said that the authorities made a big mistake in not allowing Mousavi to win the election in accordance with the popular vote. “They could have controlled him, nothing would have changed, but their actions have now unleashed a frustration and an anger that they cannot control.” He is equally unimpressed with former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani, whom he deems, “just as interested in their personal fortunes over the interests of the people as everyone else,” citing in particular the violent crackdowns on the student population that took place during Khatami's presidency.

THE ANSWER?…STOP THE FLOW OF CASH

¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the sanctions regime as ineffective. The infusion of cash from abroad is keeping the Iranian regime afloat 30 years after the revolution, including (indirectly, mostly through the UAE) from the U.S. and Europe. Large amounts of money for investment in the markets, especially Tehran's booming real estate market, is keeping the Bazaaris content. Investment in the sale of commodities, for example, brings a return of 50% per year, he said, and investors in real estate can double their money in just a few months. “The Bazaaris are the key to everything, just as they were in 1979,” he said. “To see an end to this regime, cut off the funds coming through Dubai. If the regime loses the support of the Bazaaris, that will be the end of it.” He considered it telling that, when the government attempted to impose a V.A.T. last winter, merchants went on strike and the bazaars were closed for several days. By comparison, he said, the bazaar has not closed once since the election in June, even during the demonstrations and mass arrests that followed.

¶10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶11. (C) BIO NOTE AND COMMENT: XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX does nothing to hide his disdain for Iran's theocracy. In his view, it is a regime that is fundamentially flawed and incapable of reforming itself, respecting basic human rights, or becoming a responsible member of the international community. His scathing criticism is not directed only at Iran, however. He also expressed disappointment at the UN, and what he termed it's “shameful silence in the face of such blatant human rights violations” in Iran. XXXXXXXXXXXX. END COMMENT.
CURRAN


/tag/IR_1.html


09STATE96222     2009-09-16 15:03     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Secretary of State

VZCZCXYZ0030
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 161515Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 096222

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2034
TAGS: ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER MASS FR CH IR
SUBJECT: (S) FRENCH FIRM SELLING INFRARED DETECTORS TO
CHINA

Classified By: EUR/PRA Acting Deputy Director Matthew Hardiman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is an action request to Embassy Paris. Please
deliver the points in paragraph 4 as soon as possible. These
points may be left as a non-paper.

-------
SUMMARY
-------

¶2. (S/NF) We have information the French firm Sofradir and
its subsidiary Ulis continue to sell cooled and uncooled
infrared detectors to a Chinese firm for incorporation into
thermal imaging systems. We believe the Chinese firm,
Zhejiang Dali Technology Company Ltd, is actively selling its
thermal imaging systems to Iranian defense entities. Iranian
military access to Chinese thermal imaging systems that rely
on high-grade French infrared detectors could increase the
threat to US and allied forces operating in the Gulf region.
We want to request the Government of France to act
immediately to terminate this activity by Sofradir and Ulis
so China cannot use French components to manufacture weapons
systems and sell them to Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism.


-------------------------
ACTION REQUEST/OBJECTIVES
-------------------------

¶3. (S/NF) Post is requested to approach appropriate host
government officials as soon as possible to pursue the
following objectives and to deliver the talking
points/non-paper in para 4 below:

-- Inform French officials we have information the French
firm Sofradir and its subsidiary Ulis continue to sell cooled
and uncooled infrared detectors to China's Zhejiang Dali
Technology Company Ltd for incorporation into thermal imaging
systems.

-- Stress that Zhejiang Dali Technology is actively selling
its thermal imaging systems to Iranian defense entities and
that the use of high-grade French infrared detectors in this
technology could increase the threat to US and allied forces
operating in the Gulf region.

-- Ask the French government to investigate, share with us
the results of its investigation, and act to have Sofradir
and Ulis immediately terminate this activity.

-- Emphasize to French officials that infrared detectors are
critical components of high performance thermal imaging
systems and are controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement,
Section 6.A.2.a.3.

¶4. (SECRET/REL FRANCE) BEGIN TALKING POINTS

-- In the interest of transparency and enhanced cooperation
on nonproliferation matters, we would like to share the
following information:

-- We have information that the French firm Sofradir and its
subsidiary Ulis continue to sell both cooled and uncooled
infrared detectors to China's Zhejiang Dali Technology
Company Ltd for incorporation into thermal imaging systems.

-- Our information indicates the Chinese firm is actively
selling its thermal imaging systems to Iranian defense
entities.

-- Iranian military access to Chinese thermal imaging systems
that rely on high-grade French infrared detectors could
increase the threat to US and allied forces operating in the
Gulf region.

-- Infrared detectors (IRD) are sensors and critical
components of high performance thermal imaging systems. IRDs
are controlled under Wassenaar Arrangement, Section 6.A.2.a.3.

-- IRDs are used in the core assemblies for advanced
targeting pods, long-range reconnaissance systems, gimbaled
imaging systems in manned and unmanned airborne
reconnaissance and combat aircraft, Forward Looking Infrared
(FLIR) sensors, tank targeting systems, submarine periscopes,
and missile seekers.

-- Diversion of the subject components could be harmful to
our shared national security interests. If these IRDs were
included in the optical targeting mechanism for tanks and air
defense systems, they could potentially be used to degrade US
superiority in night combat operations.

-- We ask that you carefully consider the consequences of
such sales.

-- We also welcome any further information about this case
that may come to light in the course of any French
investigation into the matter.

END TALKING POINTS

---------------------
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
---------------------

¶5. (U) Post is requested to please report the results of its
efforts within seven business days following receipt of this
cable.

----------------
POINT OF CONTACT
----------------

¶6. (U) ISN/CATR POC is Michael Rolleri
(RolleriMJ@state.sgov.gov; 202-647-0255).

¶7. (U) Post's assistance is greatly appreciated.
CLINTON


/tag/IR_1.html


09RPODUBAI389     2009-09-24 14:02     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Iran RPO Dubai

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FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0543
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM TELECOM CENTER MACDILL AFB FL
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0426
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0544

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000389

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: CLERICAL CONFAB STIFFS RAFSANJANI FOR SUPREME LEADER

REF: RPO DUBAI 384

DUBAI 00000389 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyer, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Oppositionist hopes that Iran's clerical class
would mobilize to oppose Supreme Leader Khamenei's post-election
policies appear sharply diminished in the wake of the first
Assembly of Experts meeting since the June 12 Presidential
election. Not only did the Assembly, which has the power to
appoint, supervise and dismiss the Supreme Leader, give a
ringing endorsement of Khamenei's rule and his handling of the
post-election crisis, it did so in the conspicuous absence of
its Chair, Ayatollah Rafsanjani. Moreover, leaks of the
closed-door proceedings to the conservative press indicate that
at least two prominent members of this clerical deliberative
body excoriated Rafsanjani for his failure to support Khamenei
during the unrest. Despite his absence at the closure of the
Assembly of Experts meeting, Rafsanjani was compelled to
publicly endorse the closing statement while seated at the knee
of the Supreme Leader during a September 24 press conference.
END SUMMARY.



Assembly of Experts: A 'Deliberative' Body



2 (C) The Majles-e Khobregan, or Assembly of Experts (AOE), is a
Constitutionally-mandated deliberative body composed of 86
directly-elected senior clerics from across the country. By
law, the Assembly must meet for a minimum of two days twice a
year. Though theoretically vested with the power to appoint,
supervise and dismiss the Supreme Leader, in practical terms the
Assembly's only real responsibility is to appoint the Supreme
Leader's successor should he die or become incapacitated. As
such, the AOE's last noteworthy act was appointing current
Supreme Leader Khamenei after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's 1989
death. Every subsequent meeting has ended with the issuance of
a perfunctory statement lauding the Assembly's decision to
appoint Khamenei and praising his leadership. Nevertheless,
according to Article 111 of the Constitution, the Assembly can
find Khamenei unfit for office; accordingly, control of the AOE
remains a (potential) check on the Supreme Leader's otherwise
unbridled power.



¶3. (C) The Assembly is currently chaired by Ayatollah Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was re-elected to the two-year term of
Speaker in March 2009. At the time of his re-election, he
garnered 51 votes, an improvement over the 46 votes he received
in 2007, despite efforts by hardline conservative clerics, led
by Ayatollahs Mesbah-Yazdi and Ibrahim Yazdi, to unseat him.



First Meeting since the Election



¶4. (C) On September 22-23 the AOE convened for the first time
since Iran's disputed June 12 election. Rafsanjani opened the
sixth official meeting of this Fourth Assembly of Experts by
again cautioning that a "suspicious faction" is trying to create
rifts among Iran's leaders and by condemning the "atmosphere of
insults and dispute" that has prevailed since the June
presidential election. He also promised that "system insiders
of good will" are developing a plan to resolve Iran's domestic
political problems. His opening statement was followed by
reports to the body by Judiciary deputy Mohsen Ejei
(Intelligence Minister during the presidential election and its
aftermath) and Revolutionary Guards Commander Jaafari.
According to press reports, at least sixteen Assembly members
spoke.



¶5. (C) Though summaries of the closed-door proceedings released
by Rafsanjani's office did not reflect any discord among the
members and indeed indicated the body's support of him,
conservative Iranian press charged Rafsanjani's office with
'censoring' coverage of the proceeding, reporting that at least
two prominent members sharply criticized Rafsanjani for failing
to support the Supreme Leader after the disputed election. One
quotation prominently featured in conservative news outlets was
Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah al-Hoda rhetorically
asking Rafsanjani, "why after twenty years, have you remained
silent in the face of these unprecedented insults (to the
Supreme Leader)?"

DUBAI 00000389 002.2 OF 002





¶6. (C) More tellingly, Rafsanjani did not attend the second and
final day of the meeting, with recently retired former Judiciary
Head Ayatollah Shahrudi chairing in his absence. Hardline
conservative Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami (the same cleric who
replaced Rafsanjani as Qods Day prayer leader - reftel) read the
Assembly's final statement, which was an unqualified if not
fawning endorsement of the Supreme Leader himself and his "wise
policies" for quickly extinguishing the post-election "flames of
sedition." Khatami noted that Rafsanjani, despite his absence,
agreed with "every point" of the final statement, which also
credited Khamenei for dismissing the fraud allegations as part
of a plot to undermine the Islamic Republic. The final
statement was also noteworthy in its perfunctory congratulations
to President Ahmadinejad for his election victory, and its more
sincere admonishment of Ahmadinejad to scrupulously follow
Supreme Leader Khamenei's guidance.



¶7. (C) COMMENT: Following the disputed June 12 presidential
election, many speculated that the axis of a Rafsanjani
counter-attack would focus on rallying clerical support to his
cause. However, the rumored AOE "emergency session" never
convened, and absent such a meeting it remained unclear how much
support Rafsanjani had among this body that reflects the
political leanings of Iran's traditional senior clergy. Now
that the AOE has met, it is clear that the clerical cavalry
isn't coming over the horizon anytime soon. Furthermore, the
AOE final statement, seen in conjunction with the removal of
Rafsanjani as Qods Day Speaker (reftel), indicates in the
clearest terms yet that in the most severe crisis of his career,
Rafsanjani is unable to mobilize his once vast and influential
patronage network to achieve his political ends. And given that
Rafsanjani's presumed power is serving as at least a partial
deterrent to further regime moves against Mousavi, Karrubi and
Khatami, the results of this two-day AOE session bode ill for
the leadership of the oppositionist "Green Path of Hope." END
COMMENT.
EYRE


/tag/IR_1.html


09STATE100153     2009-09-25 18:06     2010-11-28 18:06     UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY     Secretary of State

UNCLASSIFIED STATE 00100153
O 251814Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 9888

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 100153

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IR KNNP MNUC PARM
SUBJECT: EXISTENCE OF A COVERT URANIUM ENRICHMENT
FACILITY IN IRAN

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph
3 for action.

¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The United States is aware that
Iran has been secretly building another enrichment
facility, in addition to the one at Natanz. Some other
governments are also in possession of similar
information. The United States, France, and the United
Kingdom briefed the IAEA on Thursday, 24 September on
this facility. The United States remains committed to a
diplomatic resolution of international concerns with
Iran's nuclear program. These concerns are reinforced
by the existence of this facility. Immediate,
unconditional cooperation by Iran with the IAEA is
essential to address these concerns and to ensure that a
diplomatic process has a chance to succeed.

¶3. (U) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested to inform
senior host government officials of the existence of a
covert uranium enrichment facility in Iran using the
points contained in paragraph 4. Posts are NOT
authorized to provide a copy of the points. Washington
understands that, in a previous iteration of this
message, a non-paper was authorized. If points have
already been conveyed in writing, posts are instructed
to request discretion on the part of host government
interlocutors. If asked about coincidental claims by an
Iranian exile group of previously unknown nuclear
weaponization sites, posts should convey the following,
IC-cleared point:

-- We do not believe that these other sites that you
refer to are the Qom enrichment site. There are many
suspect sites, including these others, that we monitor.

¶4. (U) BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

-- We have acquired substantial, specific information
that Iran has been secretly building another enrichment
facility ? in addition to Natanz.

-- The facility is located near the city of Qom, Iran,
and has been under construction for several years. The
facility is located in an underground tunnel complex on
the grounds of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Base.

-- Earlier this year, we developed information that gave
us increased confidence that the facility was a uranium
enrichment site.

-- The site is under the management of the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, but unknown to all but the most
senior AEOI officials.

-- The site is intended to hold approximately 3000
centrifuges but we do not know what type of centrifuge
Iran intends to employ there. We assess an enrichment
plant containing 3000 centrifuges is not adequate to
produce regular fuel reloads for civilian nuclear power
plants, which require a much larger number of
centrifuges.

-- Based on our understanding of the status of the
facility, we assess that Iran will not be able to begin
enriching uranium there before at least 2010. Iran is
continuing construction of support buildings at the
facility. Intelligence indicates that earlier this
year, Iran was installing the infrastructure required
for centrifuges.

-- Iran may claim that this facility is for civilian
nuclear fuel production. The Iranian government
continues to claim that it is not pursuing a nuclear
weapon. Yet this facility is too small to be viable for
production of fuel for a nuclear power reactor. It may
be well-suited, however, for a military purpose.

-- We are aware that some other governments are in
possession of similar information.

-- We learned this week that Iran has sent the IAEA a
letter indicating that it is constructing a pilot fuel
enrichment facility and that the "required
infrastructure has been established."

-- The letter provides no details and states that

STATE 00100153 002 OF 002


"further complementary information will be provided in
an appropriate and due time." We assume this new
enrichment facility is the facility that we and other
governments have been tracking.

-- We, the UK and France have briefed the IAEA on the
information that they have so that they can fully
investigate the facility. The President, with his UK
and French counterparts, plans to make an announcement
Friday morning in Pittsburgh.

-- We firmly believe that the existence of a new
centrifuge facility in Iran constitutes a serious
violation of Iran's international obligations.

-- Iran was required to suspend all uranium enrichment-
related activities in UN Security Council resolution
¶1737. This legally-binding requirement has been
reaffirmed in three subsequent UNSC resolutions.

-- When Iran decided to build this facility, it was
obligated to declare this to the IAEA. It failed to do
so.

-- What is clear is that Iran once again has engaged in
a deceit of the international community. The President
made clear that we are serious about using diplomacy to
find a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear
program, but in order to do so, Iran needs to be
transparent and truthful.

-- It is now time for Iran to prove to the international
community that it is willing to play by the rules. We
urge your public support on this matter as we head into
the October 1 meeting with Iran.

-- It will particularly important that Iran understand
that it must end the pattern of deception and once and
for all commit itself to full transparency. It is time
for Iran to come clean on the questions about its
weaponization studies and to implement the Additional
Protocol.

-- The Ministers of the P5+1 held a productive meeting
on the margins of the UN General Assembly. They stated
their expectation that Iran will be prepared to take
constructive steps when it meets with the P5+1 on
October 1st. In light of this new and troubling
information, the burden is clearly on Iran to prove the
exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. It
is essential that Iran accept that the process in Geneva
must be real an address their nuclear program. We are
prepared to engage in a real process but will not be a
party to a phony one.

-- We hope that we can count on your public support for
holding Iran to its international obligations.

END TALKING POINTS

¶5. (U) Posts are requested to report any substantive
responses. Richard Nephew (ISN/RA, 202-647-7680,
NephewRM@state.sgov.gov) is the Department's POC for
this cable.

¶6. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
CLINTON


/tag/IR_2.html



/tag/IR_2.html


09MOSCOW2529     2009-10-06 14:02     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Moscow

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002529

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR RS IR AF UP GG
SUBJECT: ASD/ISA VERSHBOW'S SEPTEMBER 30 VISIT TO MOSCOW:
BILATERAL COOPERATION, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, MISSILE DEFENSE,
MILITARY/DEFENSE COOPERATION

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for
reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During consultations with GOR officials on
September 30, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for
International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow discussed
ways to implement bilateral cooperation in a number of key
areas of mutual interest. Both sides praised progress since
the "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations during the first
Obama-Medvedev meetings, though both agreed that concrete
actions are necessary to realize true cooperation. ASD
Vershbow emphasized that the reset needs to be reciprocal and
noted that Iran would be a critical test case. Both sides
expressed interest in further cooperation on Afghanistan,
especially in the sphere of counternarcotics. While the
Administration's missile defense announcement has met with a
generally positive reaction in the Russian media, Duma and
Security Council representatives made clear they had
questions about the later phases of the new U.S. plan and
questioned whether the U.S. would be prepared for cooperation
going beyond information exchange. Russian interlocutors
acknowledged the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear program, but
stressed Moscow's skepticism about sanctions. Throughout the
meetings, ASD Vershbow emphasized that Russia's efforts to
assert a regional sphere of influence posed a threat to the
reset in bilateral relations, and reiterated the U.S.
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial
integrity of Georgia, Ukraine and other partners in the
region. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) OVERVIEW OF MEETINGS: ASD Vershbow met with the
following GOR officials: Viktor Mikhaylovich Zavarzin
(Defense Committee Chairman of the State Duma), Aleksandr A.
Gorbunov (Chief of the Main Directorate for International
Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense), General
Yuriy Nikolayevich Baluyevskiy (Deputy Secretary of the
Security Council and former Chief of Defense), Aleksey
Nikolayevich Borodavkin (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs),
and Grigoriy Borisovich Karasin (First Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs and State Secretary). He also met informally
with academic experts and pundits and gave an interview to
Interfax.

--------------------------------------------- ---
U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION -- WORDS ARE NOT ENOUGH
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶3. (C) At all meetings, ASD Vershbow and his Russian
interlocutors noted that U.S.-Russia relations since the
"reset" have been moving in the right direction, with
opportunities for increased bilateral cooperation in areas of
mutual interest. The Bilateral Presidential Commission and
associated working groups will be useful to inject momentum
into our work. However, ASD Vershbow stressed that words
alone or mere information exchanges are not enough, and the
reset must be reciprocal. Both sides need to take action to
implement agreements already concluded and to pave the way
for additional areas of work and to identify concrete
projects for cooperation. Mechanisms for enabling these
efforts need to be established (e.g., the Ministry of Defense
is currently undergoing a major organizational reform, which
has hampered efforts for implementing the previously approved
2009 military-to-military work plan, and both sides need to
ensure that planned events are conducted).

¶4. (C) ASD Vershbow agreed that next steps must be taken in
other areas where we have agreed to cooperate previously
(e.g., implementing a ballistic missile joint threat
assessment, a Joint Data Exchange Center, and the lethal
transit overflight in support of efforts in Afghanistan that
was agreed to at the July summit). The U.S. and Russia must
be united in addressing common threats, such as the nuclear
and ballistic missile programs of Iran and North Korea.

¶5. (C) During his meeting with MOD International Military
Cooperation Chief Gorbunov, ASD Vershbow emphasized that
transparency should be a major aspect of cooperation.
Vershbow observed that DoD has been very open with the
Russians about sensitive issues. For example, DoD has shared
information about efforts to help prepare Georgian troops for
deployment to Afghanistan in support of ISAF efforts;
however, the Russians have not reciprocated in this vein
(e.g., their Zapad 2009 and Ladoga exercises).

¶6. (C) Both Duma Defense Committee Chair Zavarzin and
Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy stressed that
they are ready to work on all areas of mutual interest on the
BILATERAL COOPERATION, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, MISSILE DEFENSE,
MILITARY/DEFENSE COOPERATION

condition that Russia's voice be heard. In particular,
Zavarzin cited the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
(1997-2002) in which Russia claims its views were ignored,
the NATO-Russia Council (the PJC's successor) in which Russia
"still did not have a full say," and Russia's interest in
working on anti-missile defense since 2000 which "did not pan
out." ASD Vershbow acknowledged that both NATO and Russia
bore responsibility for areas where cooperation was not
successful, but suggested that we need to look ahead rather
than debate the past.

--------------------------------------------- ------
RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY REFORM POSES CHALLENGES TO
MIL-TO-MIL COOPERATION
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶7. (C) The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) is in the midst
of major reform. International Military Cooperation Chief
Gorbunov described the main goal of the reform as the
creation of the "most effective military force in the world,"
despite existing limitations (e.g., demographics, large
landmass and borders, resources, and various threats along
the borders). He identified two distinct processes as part
of the reform -- building of the armed forces and control of
the forces. Today, Russia is focusing on building the
forces, including a large influx of civilian personnel in
management and specialist roles, improving pay/benefits of
service members, improving quality of equipment, and trying
to change decision-making processes at all levels. Gorbunov
emphasized that these changes are intended to make Russia a
strong competitor, but also a reliable partner.

¶8. (C) Gorbunov explained that the reform process is having
a significant impact on the Main Directorate for
International Military Cooperation (GUMVS) at the MOD. The
Foreign Liaison Directorate (UVS) is being closed on October
1, and a new International Liaison Directorate is being
created. Because of these changes, correspondence will be
slow over the next six weeks or so, which will impact the
Attache Corps in Moscow. Gorbunov offered his personal
assistance during this period.

¶9. (C) ASD Vershbow raised the Bilateral Defense
Consultations (BDC) which the U.S. had proposed for November,
and suggested the possibility of a broader dialogue between
the MOD and DoD on policy and strategy issues to complement
State-MFA exchanges. Vershbow explained that DoD's proposed
BDC topics (including confidence-building measures and
transparency, risk reduction and notification procedures,
expanded military technical cooperation, etc.) were carefully
considered, but we welcomed Russia's suggestions for
additional topics. Gorbunov responded that the MoD agrees
with the general notion of the BDC, but stipulated that the
General Staff needs to identify the right experts to address
topics to be discussed, and they plan to propose other topics
for consideration. He gave no indication as to when a
response would be provided.

--------------------------------------------- --------------

AFGHANISTAN: NARCO-TRAFFICKING, TERRORISM, ILLICIT FINANCE
--------------------------------------------- --------------

¶10. (C) ASD Vershbow's meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister
Borodavkin and MOD International Cooperation Chief Gorbunov
particularly focused on Afghanistan. Borodavkin mentioned
that Russia views Afghanistan not only as a threat, but as an
opportunity for cooperation with the U.S. and other countries
(e.g., NATO), and suggested that ISAF could play an important
role in fighting illegal drug trafficking. He recalled that
the U.S. and NATO had participated in the March 2009
conference held in Moscow at which counternarcotics was a top
priority.

¶11. (C) When asked by Borodavkin about whether more U.S.
troops will be sent to Afghanistan, ASD Vershbow explained
that General McChrystal's assessment is being reviewed at the
highest levels. He noted that while the situation in
Afghanistan has not gone as well as hoped over the past six
months, the U.S. cannot allow the Taliban to regain control.
Expansion and training of the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), improving governance, and economic assistance are all
still essential components of the U.S. strategy in
Afghanistan and we will continue to seek cooperation in these
areas.

¶12. (C) Borodavkin introduced a number of proposals for
increased Russian contribution. He said that Russia would
like to launch cooperation with the U.S. on the economic
rehabilitation of Afghanistan and referred to a clause in the
July Summit Joint Statement that without economic
improvement, terrorism and other threats cannot be
eliminated. Borodavkin suggested tripartite cooperation
(Russia-U.S.-Afghanistan) to reconstruct the Soviet-era
Salang Tunnel to provide a much needed reliable
transportation route. The Russians have already undertaken a
technical study on this project and Borodavkin said that with
adequate resources, it would be a useful cooperative effort.
(Note: Borodavkin's staff confirmed that the MFA has
submitted a proposal to the State Department on the Salang
Tunnel.)

¶13. (C) Russia considers narco-trafficking to be its highest
priority vis-a-vis Afghanistan. Borodavkin said Russia is
ready to help the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Interior
Ministry in these efforts. He noted that Russia is already
providing counternarcotics training to the Afghans at the
Domodedovo Center, and mentioned Russian counter-narcotics
chief Ivanov's statement that he is ready to provide
increased assistance on bilateral and multilateral levels
such as NATO and the OSCE. Both Borodovkin and Vershbow
agreed that while the U.S. and Russia are currently working
together on this and the related issue of threat financing
through the Bilateral Presidential Commission, we need to
address these problems more forcefully. Illicit financing
has been raised at Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
and OSCE meetings, offering one area of possible cooperation.

¶14. (C) At his meetings at the MOD and MFA, ASD Vershbow
expressed appreciation for Russia's expression of interest in
providing weapons and equipment to the ANSF, and requested
that any such help be made in the form of donations with no
fees attached, as those charges would have to be paid for by
the U.S. He underscored that some of the equipment/weapon
donation requests provided to Russia are intended to support
counter-narcotics efforts, so the U.S. hopes Russia will be
able to provide this support. ASD Vershbow also asked that
Russia work with the Combined Security Transition Command -
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to ensure that ANSF priority
requirements are met and provided a list of requirements.


¶15. (C) Borodavkin said that Russia will be able to supply
limited numbers of weapons to the ANP as aid and will
consider selling more weapons to the ANP and the Afghan
National Army (ANA). He also expressed concern that there
are unlicensed (counterfeit) Russian weapons on the market,
which are of inferior quality. Gorbunov explained that
donating equipment and weapons to Afghanistan is a
presidential decision, which would entail President Medvedev
asking the military services to donate items from current
stocks.

¶16. (C) Borodavkin also asked ASD Vershbow's perspectives on
the European proposal for a conference on Afghanistan after
the new Afghan government is established. ASD Vershbow said
the U.S. saw merit in this idea as a means of seeking
additional international support for Afghanistan, but noted
that the timing of the initiative will depend on
Afghanistan's domestic politics; given the problems with the
Presidential elections, conditions were not yet right.

¶17. (C) Borodavkin mentioned the work of the Afghanistan
sub-working group under the Bilateral Presidential Commission
and stated that the Foreign Ministry is hoping that Amb.
Holbrooke can reschedule his planned visit to Moscow.
Borodavkin requested that ASD Vershbow pass on the invitation
to Amb. Holbrooke.

¶18. (C) ASD Vershbow also raised the lethal transit
agreement signed at the July summit in his meetings with
Gorbunov, Borodavkin, and Zavarzin. He underscored the
importance of a timely Duma decision now that the General
Authorization has been delivered. ASD Vershbow expressed
hopes that the inaugural flight of the agreement could take
place prior to Secretary of State Clinton's visit to Moscow
on October 12-14. Zavarzin thought the Duma would approve
the agreement without any problem; Borodavkin confirmed that
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working on the request,
but warned that they do not have the sole voice on this
matter.

---------------------------------------------
MISSILE DEFENSE DECISION: NEITHER CONCESSION


NOR THREAT TO RUSSIA
---------------------------------------------

¶19. (C) ASD Vershbow discussed the recent U.S. missile
defense decision during each of his consultations. In his
meeting with Duma Defense Committee Chairman Zavarzin, ASD
Vershbow observed that the Russian press may have been overly
positive in its assessment of the September 17 announcement,
focusing on the cancellation of the Program of Record rather
than the new MD architecture. While the new phased adaptive
approach to MD does not pose a threat to Russia, there will
likely continue to be missile defense elements in
central-eastern Europe, with an SM-3 site in Poland if the
Government of Poland agrees. However, the physical
characteristics of the new system are different from the old,
and the U.S. believes Russia has no basis for concern that
the system could threaten its strategic forces. The new
architecture will be more effective and be able to provide
protection to vulnerable parts of Europe more quickly.
Vershbow emphasized that the U.S. intends to be open about
the new architecture, citing information available through
congressional testimony and other open sources. The U.S. aim
is to make this a project for NATO because the system is
designed to protect all of NATO's territory (starting in
southeastern Europe, where the current threat is, but
eventually covering all of NATO).

¶20. (C) ASD Vershbow affirmed the U.S. also views missile
defense as an opportunity for cooperation with Russia against
a common threat, noting Secretary of Defense Gates' support
for cooperation on missile defense. Vershbow emphasized to
Zavarzin and Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy
that we should begin by implementing the Joint Data Exchange
Center (JDEC), on which the Russians had postponed a decision
until after the U.S. missile defense announcement. Vershbow
told Zavarzin and Baluyevskiy that linking radars could
follow, which could then lead to broader areas of cooperation
that could be implemented either bilaterally or within the
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) framework. He suggested that U.S.
and Russian experts explore concrete ways to implement
military technical cooperation, noting that such cooperation
would be mutually beneficial and would send a strong signal
to Iran that could help in resolving the nuclear issue.

¶21. (C) Zavarzin acknowledged that the Russian political
elite has no illusions about missile defense and understands
this was a U.S. decision with no quid pro quo expected from
Russia. Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy noted
that the system's planned capability to intercept ICBMs does
raise some of the same concerns Russia has had before.
Zavarzin agreed that we need to identify specific projects to
work on together, but that Russia wants to ensure its voice
will be heard. Both Zavarzin and Baluyevskiy stressed the
need to develop bilateral cooperation methods, potentially by
linking existing U.S. and Russian early warning systems to
gather and share information about threats. They also asked
whether the U.S. was prepared to go even farther, to include
joint technology projects, which would of greater interest to
Russia than information exchange.

---------------------------
U.S.-RUSSIAN UNITY ON IRAN?
---------------------------

¶22. (C) ASD Vershbow discussed the serious test that Iran's
nuclear program will pose to both Russia and the U.S. in the
coming months, noting that our interests coincide in many
ways, even if they are not identical. The U.S., he stated,
wants to see if diplomacy can succeed, but we need to be
realistic and be prepared for tougher measures if diplomacy
fails. Citing the recently exposed covert nuclear facility
and the recent missile tests, Vershbow described the
situation as urgent, and said that the U.S. was encouraged by
President Medvedev's recent comment that sanctions might
become necessary.

¶23. (C) ASD Vershbow mentioned that the Islamic world is
very concerned about Iran's nuclear program (e.g., several of
its Arab neighbors have asked the U.S. for Patriot missiles
and other measures to protect them against Iranian attack).
The ability of the U.S. and Russia to work together on the
Iran challenge over the next few months will be just as
important as our work on missile defense will be over the
next few years. ASD Vershbow stressed that if we fail to
stop Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, we could have a
"volatile, possibly explosive," situation in the Middle East.


¶24. (C) In their respective meetings, Duma Defense Committee
Chairman Zavarzin and Security Council Deputy Secretary
Baluyevskiy agreed that Iran is a concern, but said that
Russia continues to work closely with them and that sanctions
cannot be pursued until after diplomatic efforts have been
made. Deputy Foreign Minister Borodavkin expressed concern
that sanctions could be ineffective (citing past experience
in Iraq) and could have a negative impact on the wider
Islamic world.

----------------------------------------
RUSSIA'S "SPHERE OF PRIVILEGED INTEREST"
----------------------------------------

¶25. (C) ASD Vershbow stated in several meetings that our
interaction in the post-Soviet space continues to be a
sensitive issue and, if not handled carefully, could
undermine recent gains in bilateral relations. In this
regard, President Medvedev's proposed amendment to the law on
use of Russian forces overseas has raised many questions.
Duma Defense Committee Chairman Zavarzin said that Russia
will not interfere with the U.S. as it engages with nations
in the region, and that there is no cause for concern
regarding the legislation about use of Russian forces -- it
is intended to protect Russian citizens living in those
countries and that other countries have similar provisions.

¶26. (C) UKRAINE: ASD Vershbow spoke of his visit to Ukraine
immediately preceding his arrival in Moscow, and cited
Ukrainian concerns about Russian respect for Ukraine's
sovereignty and borders. Vershbow stated that the U.S.
continues to support the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security
Assurances and Ukraine's freedom to choose its security
relationships, and encourages Russia to reaffirm its
adherence as well. He suggested that President Medvedev's
open letter to Ukraine had been counter-productive. The U.S.
favors close and mutually beneficial Russian-Ukrainian
relations -- this is not a zero-sum game.

¶27. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin said that Ukraine is
Russia's closest neighbor, and is a "key partner" in
international activities. Russia is not trying to influence
Ukraine, but wants a stable Ukraine and a secure
neighborhood. He also said that Russia cannot ignore
attempts to depict it as a major threat to Ukraine. Foreign
Minister Lavrov will be visiting Ukraine this week to meet
with Ukrainian Acting Foreign Minister Khandogiy and there
even is a possibility that Medvedev and Ukrainian President
Yushchenko will meet at a summit of CIS countries shortly
after that. Karasin said that Russia wants to deal with
Ukraine in a normal way and that Ukrainian citizens are the
ones to decide what they want.

¶28. (C) GEORGIA: Security Council Deputy Secretary
Baluyevskiy, Zavarzin, and Karasin asked why the U.S. is
providing military assistance to Georgia when it threatens
stability in the Caucasus region. This causes concern and
Russia cannot allow renewed aggression against Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. ASD Vershbow explained that as a matter of
principle, the U.S. will help Georgia protect its sovereignty
and independence, but stated that the U.S. is not rearming
Georgia, as Russia has repeatedly alleged. Since the August
2008 war, there has been no U.S. lethal assistance to
Georgia; DoD funds were transferred to the State Department
for humanitarian purposes. In the short term, the U.S. is
proceeding with great care and focusing on training,
education, and helping prepare Georgia to participate in
Afghanistan under the command of U.S. Forces. At the same
time, Georgia is a sovereign state with the right to
self-defense. We do not accept any arms embargo, and we may
provide weapons to Georgia in the future.

¶29. (C) Zavarzin made a point of saying that Russia does not
dispute Georgia's sovereignty, but it cannot allow new acts
of aggression; a regional consensus is necessary. Karasin
said that, in Russia's view, the current Georgian leadership
is irresponsible. ASD Vershbow reiterated that the U.S. had
made clear to Georgia that there is no military option
regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia and that the Georgians
need to take a long view on reintegration of the territories.
Karasin noted some successes in repairing relations since
last August, including the Geneva talks that enable the
Georgians to talk directly to the Abkhaz and Ossetians.
Vershbow said that stability in the Caucasus and creating
conditions to help improve Georgian-Russian relations is very
important to the U.S.


¶30. (C) Karasin mentioned the EU independent report on the
August 2008 conflict in Georgia, which had just been released
on the afternoon of September 30. ASD Vershbow mentioned
that he looked forward to reading the report and stressed
that even if we do not agree completely on the report's
findings, we need to look ahead and promote stability in the
region, including an international presence in the
territories. Karasin said that international presence in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia must be discussed with the Abkhaz
and the Ossetians (not the Russians). Russia has "bilateral
agreements" with them, and Russian border guards are
protecting them to help restore stability.

¶31. (C) Karasin asked whether the U.S. intends to establish
a military presence in Georgia by contributing personnel to
the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). This would be a serious
problem for Russia, as they believe it would send the wrong
message to President Saakashvili that he could use force
again. ASD Vershbow said there has been lots of speculation
on this subject that was not based on fact. If the EUMM did
make such a request in the future, the U.S. would consider
it, but this would likely involve civilian monitors.
Vershbow added that Russia needs to fully withdraw its forces
from positions beyond the line of the outbreak of hostility,
per the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement, since this non-compliance
was a continuing source of tension. Karasin insisted that

Russia was in compliance, while acknowledging that the U.S.
does not see it that way.

------------
OTHER ISSUES
------------

¶32. (C) EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY: In response to
Baluyevskiy's inquiry about President Medvedev's proposed
European Security Treaty, ASD Vershbow acknowledged there
could be ways to improve the effectiveness of existing
conflict-prevention mechanisms, but that the U.S. and most of
our allies did not see a need for new structures or a new
treaty. However, the U.S. is ready to engage with Russia on
this issue in the Corfu process and other fora.

¶33. (C) CENTRAL ASIA: Karasin inquired about the Manas
Transit Center and the numbers of U.S. military personnel
that would be deployed under the new arrangement. ASD
Vershbow said that he did not have precise figures. However,
in contrast with the previous agreement, security for the
facility is now being provided by the Kyrgyz, which reduced
the U.S. presence somewhat.

¶34. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this cable.
Beyrle


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09MOSCOW2531     2009-10-06 15:03     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Moscow

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002531

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS IR
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV, PUTIN, AND RUSSIA'S IRAN POLICY

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite Russian President Medvedev's
September 24 remarks that sanctions against Iran might be
necessary, other government officials and experts here
caution that Russia will remain, for the time being,
reluctant to pursue a tougher line against Tehran. The
consensus among the Russian political elite is that
maintaining a dialogue with the Iranians and exhausting
diplomatic avenues is preferable to imposing sanctions in the
near term. While Medvedev as president is responsible for
controlling arms and nuclear technology transfers, Prime
Minister Putin remains closely identified with decisions on
Iran policy, including the sale of civilian nuclear
technology and weapons, which provides a boost to powerful
state enterprises. According to Deputy FM Ryabkov, Putin's
relative silence on Iran since Medvedev's statements does not
signal any difference between them on sanctions. End
Summary.

Medvedev on Sanctions: Few Official Echoes
------------------------------------------

¶2. (C) Russian Government officials, including Prime Minister
Putin, have not yet echoed President Medvedev's public
statement that Russia would consider the imposition of
sanctions on Iran if the world community ran out of other
options. Asked about Russian views on the Qom revelation in
New York September 25, FM Lavrov adopted a strikingly softer
tone than in the just released Kremlin statement. He noted
that Iran had acted positively by notifying the IAEA about
its plans to construct a new nuclear facility, and complained
that some of Russia's "partner countries" in the P5-plus-1
had not shared information about the Qom facility earlier.
Lavrov stressed that Iran's cooperation with the world
community as a member of the NPT with non-nuclear status
could prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

¶3. (C) Before the most recent P5-plus-1 meeting in Geneva, PM
Putin said that Russia would not support "significant"
changes to its approach on Iran. Ariel Cohen, a senior
fellow at the Heritage Foundation, said Putin and Lavrov told
him in early September that they are opposed to tougher
sanctions and the use of force against Iran. Russian Deputy
Foreign Minster Sergei Ryabkov said September 29 that Iran's
recent proposals presented a "broad field for dialogue."
Ryabkov added that whether sanctions against Iran might
become inevitable was a "completely separate issue, one that
we are not yet ready to address." He stressed Russia's
position was to do everything possible to find a "diplomatic,
political solution to the Iranian nuclear problem."

¶4. (SBU) While expressing concern over Iran's missile
program, Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitriy Rogozin stressed
September 29 that Russia preferred political dialogue over
tough measures that could trigger an "arms race in the
region." Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey
Kislyak said September 24 that sanctions were not the way to
resolve the problem; rather, the point was how to find a
"political solution that would eliminate this problem." The
priority was to "start a serious dialogue with our Iranian
partners in seeking a way out of the situation."

¶5. (C) Russia's message to domestic audiences also remains
unchanged. Despite Medvedev's carefully worded comments on
sanctions in New York (called by one analyst here "a jewel of
diplomatic casuistry"), even prominent Russians with ties to
the Kremlin's domestic propaganda machine believe Russian
support for Western sanctions is highly unlikely. Medvedev
advisor Gleb Pavlovskiy, President of the Effective Policy
Foundation, and Maksim Shevchenko, President of the Russian
World Foundation, even spoke in favor of completing Russia's
frozen S-300 surface-to-air missile deal with Iran.

Interpreting Putin's Silence
----------------------------

¶6. (C) PM Putin's lack of public comment on the possibility
of Iran sanctions after President Medvedev's public statement
does not indicate disagreement between them on Iran, DFM
Ryabkov told Ambassador Beyrle October 3. Ryabkov repeated
his comments, made in Geneva during P5-plus-1 talks, that
Russia had not ruled out the possibility of sanctions, but
would begin to contemplate them only as an absolute last
resort.

¶7. (C) Most political commentators and analysts here have
been echoing the same statements. Tatyana Stanovaya of the
Center for Political Technologies thought that Medvedev's
seemingly more positive statement indicates no real
rapprochement with the U.S. on Iran. Rather, she said, his
words are carefully calibrated to indicate a welcoming of
U.S. willingness to use the P5-plus-1 format and engage in
actual discussions with Iranian officials.

¶8. (C) Nevertheless, Medvedev's New York comments and the
September 25 Kremlin statement mark a definite toughening of
Russian rhetoric on Iran. Pravoe Delo co-Chairman Georgiy
Bovt told us October 5 that Medvedev's use of the word
"sanctions" represents a policy change. Boyt cautioned that
Medvedev's words would probably resonate with only a distinct
minority of Russian society. He believes it will be hard for
Medvedev to sell Iran sanctions to the Russian bureaucracy
without the full support of Putin. At the Sochi Economic
Forum, Putin blasted the U.S. for not allowing the export of
certain high technology to Russia. Boyt thinks Russia might
ask for an easing of these restrictions in exchange for
supporting sanctions.

Sanctions: Economic Implications
--------------------------------

¶9. (C) Despite Medvedev's presidential authority over arms
transfers, Putin undoubtedly retains a critical, if not
decisive role over an issue with such significant domestic
economic implications as the transfer of nuclear technology
and armaments to Iran. Russia and Iran currently have
limited military cooperation, so the effect of any lost
revenue from arms sales to Iran would be small. While the
sale of S-300s to Iran, for example, would only net Russia
from USD 750 million to USD one billion, future military
sales could be considerably larger.

¶10. (C) Several years ago Iran was a stable source of hard
currency and this cash flow helped Russia preserve its
nuclear construction sector. The importance of Russia's
trade with Iran has decreased, but Russian exports to Iran
last year still exceeded USD 3 billion. In the currently
depressed Russian economy, that is not an insignificant
amount. In addition, great potential for future economic
gain to Russia exists via civilian nuclear technology sales
and increased military cooperation.

¶11. (C) As the world's largest exporter of oil and gas,
Russia also benefits significantly from the "instability
premium" embedded in world oil prices due to tensions with
Iran. Even a USD 5 per barrel instability premium would net
Russia almost USD 9 billion per year for oil and
approximately USD 2-4 billion from its gas exports. Finally,
given Iran's position as the second largest owner of gas
reserves, Russia's gas sector clearly benefits from the lack
of international investment in the development of Iran's
natural gas sector.

Life without Iran
-----------------

¶12. (C) Russia could profit from alternatives to its
continued support for Iran. For example, news reports
indicate that Saudi Arabia has offered to purchase the
Russian S-400 system for USD two billion in an effort to
force Moscow to back out of the S-300 deal with Iran.
Medvedev cited Arab League concerns about Russia's close
relationship with Iran when he stated that Russia's stance on
Iran might be changing.

¶13. (C) Israel also is clearly pushing Russia to take a
firmer stance towards Tehran, in light of recent press
reports that PM Netanyahu personally delivered a list of
Russian scientists who contributed to Iran's nuclear program.
Conversations with Israeli diplomats in Moscow indicate that
Israel believes there may be even more to Iran's program than
is now known to the GOR and Russian decision makers. They
hint that Israeli disclosures on Russian participation could
force Moscow into taking a harder line.

COMMENT
-------

¶14. (C) Success in moving Russia to support tougher actions
against Iran will require a coordinated strategy involving
our friends and allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia.
The strategy may need to include the continuation of
diplomatic efforts like the P5-plus-1 process and perhaps
include new ways of engaging in dialogue with Iran. A
strategy created by a broad international consensus must
offer Moscow a series of options that will challenge the
stubborn mentality here that instinctively opposes common
cause with the West on Iran. Sanctions would have a major
impact on the Russian economy, and especially to the domestic
constituencies like RosOboronexport and RosAtom. The fact
that the economy and these key state-controlled enterprises
are part of Putin's portfolio only reinforces the certainty
that he will remain the key decision maker on any imposition
of sanctions. Key to the GOR's calculations would be any
politically salable alternatives that benefit them both
economically and politically. End comment.
Beyrle


/tag/IR_2.html


09MANAMA611     2009-10-19 10:10     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Manama

VZCZCXRO3314
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DE RUEHMK #0611/01 2921055
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 191055Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8977
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
RHMFISS/USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
RUQVSAN/USCENTAF DEPLOYED
RHIUFAA/USCENTAF SWA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000611

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2029
TAGS: PREL MARR IR AF BA
SUBJECT: AFCENT COMMANDER'S MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE
SALMAN FOCUSES ON IRAN

REF: MANAMA 599

Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During USAFCENT Commander Mike Hostage and
CDA's October 12 meeting with Crown Prince Shaikh Salman bin
Hamad al Khalifa, the CP assured them that Bahrain would keep
the pressure on Iran to live up to the commitments it made in
Geneva (reftel). Lt Gen Hostage explained that the threat
posed by Iran was leading the U.S. to pursue a Regional
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (RIAMD) strategy with GCC
countries. Shaikh Salman welcomed this and stressed that
Bahrain wanted to be part of the solution to the GCC's
defense integration challenges. Lt Gen Hostage and the
Charge thanked him for Bahrain's commitment to contribute a
small contingent for the effort in Afghanistan. End Summary.

IRAN AND REGIONAL AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE:
------------------------------------------

¶2. (S) On October 12, U.S. Air Forces Central (USAFCENT)
Commander Lt Gen Mike Hostage and Charge d'Affaires called on
the Crown Prince. The CP commended COMAFCENT for now being
forward deployed to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar because it was
important to spend time with the U.S.' counterparts in the
Gulf. If more U.S. troops were added into Afghanistan, and
Iran tried to delay the process begun in Geneva, Shaikh
Salman commented that there would be tough months ahead for
the region. As the P5 1 pursued its carrot and stick
approach with Iran, Salman wondered if Tehran would pursue a
"tit for tat" in its military posture. Because of the lack
of sophisticated intelligence gathering among the Gulf
states, the CP observed that the press "plays a propaganda
war into our psyche." He decried Iran's interference in Iraq.

¶3. (S) Lt Gen Hostage explained that, because of the threat
posed by Iran to the region, his primary goal was to work on
establishing Regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense
(RIAMD) between the U.S. and the GCC states. First, this
involved integrating the U.S.' own air and missile defense
assets (Navy Aegis, Army Patriots, etc.). Then he would
offer to link each Gulf state into a Shared Early Warning
(SEW) Common Operating Picture (COP), to the extent that each
government was willing to participate. The U.S. would share
the same picture to all, and each could add as much
information as it liked, while keeping data it did not wish
to share behind a secure firewall.

¶4. (S) The CP responded that this would be the largest game
changer because it would be a permanent fixture and would
affect Iran's ability to project power. He thanked the U.S.
for the two U.S. Patriot batteries stationed here and said he
would like to help further integrate the Gulf states into
RIAMD project because it would not be enough without
everyone's participation. He cautioned, however, that the
U.S. would have to lead the effort and it would have to be
bilaterally with each government, with a multilateral system
as the long-term goal. He asked whether and where the U.S.
would deploy a THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense)
system to the Gulf. Gen Hostage replied that the location
was not yet certain, but yes, THAAD would be deployed within
a year, and would prove to be a very capable mid-course
intercept system. Prince Salman worried that, in an attack
scenario, Iran would try to swarm and overwhelm specific
targets and we would all have to be ready for that.

¶5. (S) Lt Gen Hostage pointed to the Air Warfare Center in
the UAE as a Center of Excellence (COE). A COE for RIAMD
could be established there as well as a training vehicle to
help the Gulf states get comfortable with the technical
solutions so they could share information. Shaikh Salman
said he wanted Bahrain to be part of the solution. He noted
that Bahrain had been the first GCC government to participate
in Task Force 152 and it liked to be a leader. "Consider us
serious partners," he stated.

IRAN: TO DEGRADE OR DETER?
--------------------------

¶6. (S) Lt Gen Hostage asked for the CP's views of Iran's
willingness to deal in good faith with the P5 1. Shaikh
Salman said his views had not changed - Iran's behavior would
continue to be problematic. However, he speculated that the
reason Iran had changed course and cooperated with the P5 1
in Geneva was due to Russian President Medvedev's comment at
UNGA that sometimes sanctions were unavoidable. CDA pointed

MANAMA 00000611 002 OF 002


out that as the P5 1 pursued a dual track strategy of
engagement and preparing for sanctions, the GCC countries'
roles would be important. Confirming that Bahrain would do
what it could to keep the pressure on Iran, the CP lamented
that Gulf countries had few levers on China. He thought that
if Saudi Arabia were to sell more oil to China, it would help
provide some leverage.

¶7. (S) The CP asked whether Russia had shipped its S-300 air
defense system to Iran yet. Lt Gen Hostage said no. Salman
said he was sure that the international community would have
to wait until the next election in Iran to see real internal
changes. The regime was still in firm control and
Ahmadinejad was consolidating his power, even as the economy
was failing. The world would need a strategy led by the U.S.
"We are still a ways away from knowing whether force is
necessary," the CP stated.

BAHRAIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶9. (C) The CP asked whether the U.S. was changing its goals
in Afghanistan to a strategy of reconciliation and power
sharing with some elements of the Taliban while targeting
senior Al Qaeda figures. Lt Gen Hostage said a way had to be
found to let the Afghans live in their, not our, version of
peace, but he wondered whether it could be done on our
timeline. Shaikh Salman counseled patience as with the
implementation of the surge in Iraq. Lt Gen Hostage and
Charge thanked him for Bahrain's commitment to contribute a
company from its security forces to provide inner perimeter
security at a coalition base in Afghanistan. Shaikh Salman
stated that his father King Hamad had approved a budget of
USD 13 million for the deployment the day before, so the
troops would have the necessary equipment.

¶10. (C) The CP asked whether the U.S. would still need to
deploy aerial refueling tankers to Isa Air Base. Lt Gen
Hostage related that AFCENT's problems with the Manas Air
Base (Transit Center) in Kyrgyzstan had been resolved.

HENZEL


/tag/IR_2.html


09BEIJING2932     2009-10-22 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Beijing

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DE RUEHBJ #2932/01 2951203
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O 221203Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6544
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002932

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH
SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: PREMIER WEN PUSHES RAHIMI ON DIALOGUE;
CHINA URGES COOPERATION WITH IAEA, P5-PLUS-1

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On the margins of Shanghai Cooperation
Organization high-level meetings October 15, PRC Premier Wen
Jiabao urged Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza
Rahimi to move forward with direct talks with the United
States and offered PRC support to do so, according to an MFA
official. Wen reportedly reiterated that Iran had the right
to peaceful nuclear technology, but stressed China's
opposition to Iranian development of nuclear weapons. Our
MFA contact claimed that China recognizes the importance of
seizing the present opportunity and that the Iranian side did
as well. The PRC assesses that Iran's willingness to
negotiate over the nuclear issue comes from Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, not President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
but the Iranian regime remains divided over the June election
and its aftermath. Our contact urged the U.S. to downplay
sanctions and seek positive, even if symbolic, benefits to
provide Iran in response to progress in the talks. China has
been pushing Iran to improve its cooperation with the IAEA
and assesses that Iran will make good on its offer to allow
inspectors into the Qom nuclear site. Beijing believes that
Iran's nuclear technology is not as advanced "as some
believe." Iranian Embassy officials in Beijing expressed
satisfaction to the Chinese with the outcomes of the October
1 P5-plus-1-plus-Iran meeting and were particularly positive
on the bilateral meeting with the U.S. side, according to the
MFA. Our contact argued that a constituency within Iranian
society that advocates flexibility on the nuclear issue is a
force in politics, but that the government will need any
negotiations to accrue benefits to Iran given the strength of
the conservative camp. END SUMMARY.

Wen Pushes Iranian Vice President on nuclear Issue
--------------------------------------------- -----

¶2. (C) MFA West Asian Affairs Department Iran Division Deputy
Director Ni Ruchi told PolOff October 21 that Premier Wen
Jiabao's October 15 meeting with Iranian First Vice President
Mohammad Reza Rahimi had been brief due to the press of other
issues at the SCO Summit. Ni said that the Chinese side had
raised the nuclear issue and urged Iran to cooperate with the
international community. Wen had pushed the Iranians to move
forward with direct talks with the United States and offered
Chinese support to do so. Wen had stressed that while Iran
had a right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, China
opposed Iran's development of nuclear weapons. Ni claimed
that Rahimi had responded positively on prospects for talks
with the United States and said that the Iranians were
considering how best to do move forward with dialogue.

Beijing Wants to Seize the Moment, as Does Tehran
--------------------------------------------- ----

¶3. (C) Ni emphasized the importance for China of the October
1 bilateral talks between the U.S. and Iran in Geneva. He
noted that China had a very positive outlook for improved
U.S. relations with Iran, a development that would be helpful
for progress on the nuclear issue. China recognized the
importance of seizing the present opportunity, Ni said, given
the poor long-term prospects for Iran to improve relations
with the international community should progress fail to
materialize in the near future. He said that the Iranian
side also understood the uniqueness of this opportunity and
the importance of demonstrating progress. He said that
Beijing assessed that Iran was willing to make a deal with
the U.S. on the nuclear issue, adding that this willingness
came from the Supreme Leader, and that President Ahmadinejad
was not the decision-maker on the issue. Ni cautioned,
however, that the Iranian regime remained divided over the
June election and its aftermath, complicating efforts by the
P5-plus-1 to negotiate with the regime.

Trust-Building a Priority for PRC
---------------------------------

¶4. (C) Ni stressed the need at present to find ways to
increase Iran's trust in the intentions of the P5-plus-1. He
urged the United States to de-emphasize the push for
additional sanctions and to seek positive, even if symbolic,
benefits to give Iran in response to progress in the talks.
He expressed concern that increased pressure from the
international community would strengthen the consensus of
hard-liners in the Iranian regime. Ni reported that Iranian
diplomats had claimed that while they had a high degree of
confidence in President Obama's intentions, they remained
suspicious about his ability to deliver on those intentions
given political realities in the United States. He argued
that China's political efforts to persuade Iran to negotiate

BEIJING 00002932 002 OF 002


in good faith represented an important contribution to the
P5-plus-1 effort to deal with the nuclear issue.

PRC Urges IAEA Cooperation, Downplays Technical Progress
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶5. (C) Ni said that China had been pushing Iran to improve
its cooperation with the IAEA and take a positive attitude in
order to allow the agency to develop trust in Iran's
intentions. Beijing understood that technical meetings at
the IAEA this week had achieved progress, Ni said, adding
that China hoped to see progress on the Tehran Research
Reactor fuel proposal. China assessed that Iran would allow
inspectors into the Qom site, Ni said. He stressed, too,
that Iran's nuclear technology was not as advanced "as some
believe," and that Iran's overall level of industrial
development represented a serious impediment to development
of nuclear technology and particularly to weaponization. He
noted that of the 5,000 centrifuges in Iran, less than half
were actually in operation.

Iranian Side Upbeat on October 1 Meeting
----------------------------------------

¶6. (C) Ni said Iranian embassy contacts in Beijing had
expressed satisfaction with the outcomes of the October
meeting in Geneva, calling the event a "success." Though
concerned that sitting down with the U.S. would be "a
mistake," the Iranians had left the U.S.-Iran bilateral
meeting wanting to continue the process. Ni suggested that
some within the Iranian regime understood the need for a
change in political direction, particularly after the
difficult June election. He also reported that the Iranians
were putting renewed focus on creating an effective plan for
economic development.

MFA: U.S. Should Incentivize, Reward Iranian Progress
--------------------------------------------- --------

¶7. (C) On direct U.S.-Iran talks, Ni urged the U.S. side to
make a clear statement abandoning the notion of regime
change. He suggested seeking a "cooperative partnership"
with Iran on shared concerns such as security in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and in doing so, recognizing Iran as a major
regional power. He recommended offering concrete and
immediate benefits, especially economic incentives and a
relaxation of existing sanctions, in response to positive
overtures by the Iranian side. These efforts could start
small, he added, but should be focused on sending a clear
signal of sincere intentions to Tehran.

Iranian Leadership Feels Street Pressure on Negotiations
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶8. (C) Ni reported that based on his travel to Iran,
considerable debate was taking place among ordinary Iranians
over the utility of the nuclear program. Many Iranians did
not see the use in having nuclear technology and saw it only
as a source of problems, while others saw value in the
possession of nuclear technology but were reconsidering this
view because of progress in talks with the United States. In
contrast, a more conservative constituency in Iran was
disinclined to make any concessions to the international
community on the nuclear issue. In light of this division in
society, Ni argued, the Iranian leadership would not make
concessions without meaningful and visible compensation.
HUNTSMAN


/tag/IR_2.html


09ANKARA1583     2009-11-03 16:04     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Ankara

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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1134
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 6459
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
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RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001583

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC TU IR
SUBJECT: WORKING ERDOGAN BACK INTO THE FOLD ON IRAN

REF: ANKARA 1561 (EXDIS)

Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: During an October 21 meeting with MFA
Undersecretary Sinirlioglu, the Ambassador challenged Prime
Minister Erdogan's recent dismissal of international
community allegations that Iran intends to acquire nuclear
weapons as "gossip." The Ambassador emphasized Iran will be
the single most important topic when Erdogan and POTUS meet
in Washington December 7. In contrast to Erdogan, President
Gul November 2 pressed Iran to be transparent with IAEA
inspectors. We will urge Gul and senior Turkish bureuacrats
to curb Erdogan's damaging defense of Iran's nuclear
activities. End Summary

¶2. (C) During an October 21 meeting with MFA Undersecretary
Sinirlioglu, the Ambassador challenged PM Erdogan's public
statement, made the previous day while he was in Tehran,
dismissing allegations of Iran's intent to acquire nuclear
weapons as "gossip." Holding a copy of President Obama's
Pittsburgh Summit comdemnation of Iraq's nuclear ambitions,
the Ambassador asked Sinirlioglu if "this was the 'gossip'"
to which Erdogan had referred. The Ambassador emphasized
that Erdogan's statement made Turkey vulnerable to
international community criticism should Iran balk on IAEA
inspection of its Qom reprocessing facility or second-party
reprocessing of its low-enriched uranium stockpile. Erdogan
was, in effect, allowing the Iranians to infer a weakening of
the international community consensus against them. The
Ambassador warned Sinirlioglu that Washington was now
wondering if it could any longer count on Turkey to help
contain Iran's profound challenge to regional peace and
stability.

¶3. (C) Implying Erdogan's use of the term "gossip" was
unconfirmed, Sinirlioglu claimed that the Turkish government
"fully supports the P5-plus-1." He asserted the prime
minister's principled opposition to nuclear weapons in the
region. He argued Erdogan's rhetoric is a tactical effort to
gain him credibility with the Middle Eastern street so he can
better place the anti-nuclear weapons message. Though Turkey
"doesn't believe in sanctions," Sinirlioglu said, "we will
support consensus" in the Security Council. The Ambassador
responded that Iran would be the single most important topic
of conversation when Erdogan and POTUS meet in Washington on
December 7.

¶4. (SBU) In marked contrast to Erdogan, President Gul
November 2 said Turkey is against nuclear weapons in its
region and the world, "especially in neighboring countries."
In remarks to reporters while enroute to Slovakia, Gul
reaffirmed Turkey's preference for diplomatic means (as
opposed to the use of military force) to compel Tehran's
adherence to its international obligations, but insisted that
Iran "...must be transparent and open to IAEA inspection in
order to overcome suspicions."

¶5. (C) Comment: Erdogan's recent comments on Iran's nuclear
program amount to a defense of Tehran's defiance of the
international community's will. His desire for a "good"
Washington visit is the goad we will continue use to try to
turn him back towards the international community consensus
on Iran. We will also emphasize to Erdogan's senior
bureuacrats and, when the opportunity arises, to President
Gul their interest in reining in Erdogan on Iran.

JEFFREY

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"


/tag/IR_2.html


09MANAMA642     2009-11-04 06:06     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Manama

INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00
DOEE-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 DS-00 DHSE-00 EUR-00 FAAE-00
FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 MOFM-00
MOF-00 VCIE-00 NRC-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 OES-00 NIMA-00
PM-00 GIWI-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00 FMPC-00 IRM-00 SSO-00
SS-00 NCTC-00 SCRS-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00
SCA-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SRAP-00 SWCI-00 SEEE-00 SRND-00
SANA-00 /000W

R 040644Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
SECSTATE WASHDC 8999
INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL
USMISSION USNATO
COMUSNAVCENT
SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T MANAMA 000642


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR ENRG BA AF IZ IR NATO
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS WITH KING HAMAD: IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, NATO AWACS, ENERGY

Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an hour-long meeting on November 1 with
CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus, Bahrain's King Hamad said
Arab states need to do more to engage Iraq, discussed
Afghanistan and the positive role India could play, urged
action to stop Iran's nuclear program, and reviewed regional
plans for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. END SUMMARY.

2.(C) IRAQ: King Hamad fully endorsed General Petraeus's
point that increased Arab engagement and influence would help
frustrate Iranian designs in Iraq. He added that the Arabs
need Egyptian and Saudi leadership in this matter and that he
had tried to make this point to the Saudi government, but
with little effect.

3.(C) AFGHANISTAN: General Petraeus praised Bahrain's
commitment of a police company for internal security at FOB
Leatherneck. King Hamad confirmed that he would personally
see the force off at the airport on December 16. This date
will be the 10th anniversary of the King's assuming the
throne, and General Petraeus said that U.S. air assets would
be available on the 16th to transport the company to
Afghanistan. King Hamad inquired about the extent of India's
involvement in Afghanistan and noted that Bahrain saw India
as very positive force in the region. "It's a new era," he
said. "They can be of great help."

4.(C) IRAN: King Hamad pointed to Iran as the source of much
of the trouble in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He argued
forcefully for taking action to terminate their nuclear
program, by whatever means necessary. "That program must be
stopped," he said. "The danger of letting it go on is greater
than the danger of stopping it." King Hamad added that in
light of these regional developments, Bahrain was working to
strengthen GCC coordination and its relations with allies and
international organizations. He specifically mentioned NATO
and confirmed that Bahrain had agreed to the Alliance's
request to use Isa Airbase for AWACS missions, although the
detail on numbers and timing have yet to be discussed.

5.(S/NF) BAHRAIN AIR SHOW AND nuclear ENERGY: King Hamad
asked General Petraeus for his help in encouraging U.S.
aircraft manufacturers to participate in the inaugural
Bahrain Air Show, scheduled for January 2010. He said that
France was pushing the Rafale and would be there in force,
although he agreed with Petraeus that the French fighter was
yesterday's technology. Warming to the subject of French
commercial diplomacy and referring to President Sarkozy, King
Hamad said, "The UAE will give him a hard time soon," over
France's proposed deal for nuclear reactors. "They're not
happy with the project he's offered them." King Hamad also
mentioned that Bahrain was studying options for using nuclear
power to generate electricity. He said he had asked the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Public Works to
present him recommendations and invited the Ambassador to
discuss with them possible U.S. involvement. Post will do so.

ERELI


/tag/IR_2.html


09BERLIN1403     2009-11-05 16:04     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Berlin

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DE RUEHRL #1403/01 3091603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051603Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5694
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001403

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREF MNUC AF RS IR KPAL KWBG GM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT TO
BERLIN, NOVEMBER 8-10

Classified By: Ambassador Phillip Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Berlin warmly welcomes you to
Germany for the historic 20th Anniversary of the Fall of the
Berlin Wall. Berlin is hosting all four-powers and EU
leaders at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate to mark this occasion.
Your visit includes meetings with Chancellor Merkel and
Foreign Minister Westerwelle. Chancellor Merkel will likely
raise concern about General Motors' November 3 decision to
keep its German subsidiary, Opel, and Westerwelle may likely
raise his interest in removal of nuclear weapons from
Germany. You may wish to encourage from them:

-- Assurances that the proposed Afghanistan conference will
not slip past January and that Germany will go immediately to
the Bundestag if increases in contributions are warranted;
-- Support for including banking and insurance relations with
Iran in calculations for possible new sanctions, and no
backsliding on export controls;
-- Assurances that Germany and the EU will work with the U.S.
at Copenhagen and not seek to isolate;
-- Agreement to tone down the public rhetoric on Opel;
-- German prodding of Russia to engage constructively on
security issues and human rights.

Recognizing Germany's prominent and international role on
this occasion is important to Merkel. She is still trying to
get a sense of working with the new Washington Administration
and seems uncertain at times. Of course, Westerwelle is
learning the ropes and being watched by Merkel to see if he
can be an effective FM for her. Alternatively, Merkel may
look to new Defense Minister zu Guttenberg (CSU) to play an
alternative role on foreign policy. End summary.

Political Climate
-----------------

¶2. (C) The political divisions that marked the recent
election campaign, culminating in the October 28 swearing-in
of a center-right coalition led by Chancellor Merkel, will be
swept aside for your celebratory visit. Merkel just returned
from what she considers an exceptional visit to Washington,
which front-paged her address to Congress in every
publication. Merkel will be focused on setting her
priorities for the next legislative term -- she gives a major
state of the union-like address on November 10 on all issues
-- and will seek U.S. cooperation in promoting economic
recovery and growth (Opel, regulation), progress in
addressing climate change (Copenhagen), and strengthening
Germany's international profile (Afghanistan). Westerwelle
will have spent a total of some two days work in the foreign
ministry by the time your arrive. His ministry is not sure
what he wants yet.

Economic Climate
----------------

¶3. (C) Germany's export-driven economy is showing initial
signs of recovery from its deepest recession since WW II.
For the full year 2009, GDP will shrink around 5%, but should
show modest growth of 1% next year. Unemployment has
remained relatively low thanks to government-subsidized
programs, but is expected to rise next year. Given the
government's record budget deficit, there is heated debate
over the wisdom of the new coalition's proposed tax cuts,
intended to boost growth. Germany was pleased with the
outcome of the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, but is keener on
the G-20's regulatory agenda than addressing global
imbalances.

¶4. (C) GM's sudden decision on November 3 to cancel the sale
of its European subsidiary Opel in a deal underwritten by the
German government shocked and angered Germans. Merkel's
chief economic advisor told the Ambassador November 4 that
Merkel was so furious at GM's about-face that she refused to
take a call from GM CEO Fritz Henderson. Merkel subsequently
called the President. Federal and state governments are
demanding that GM immediately pay back 1.2 billion Euros in
bridge loans they had extended to the car maker. What
particularly irked the Germans was that GM had failed to
forewarn them of their latest flip-flop after months of
laborious negotiations and a total of 4.5 billion Euros in
loans/guarantees in exchange for promises to retain most Opel
jobs and plants in Germany. (Merkel found out about the GM
decision just hours after delivering her address before
Congress.) The Opel story has dominated the news November
4-5. Opel workers are likely to strike in the next few days,
and politicians and others are citing the GM action as
another example of American "turbo-capitalism."

Berlin 00001403 002 of 003



Iran/Export Controls
-----------------------

¶5. (C) You should express appreciation for Merkel's strong
statement during her speech to Congress that there should be
"zero tolerance" for Iranian acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction. You should stress the importance of German
support for EU measures or measures taken by "like-minded"
countries should a UNSCR be unattainable due to a possible
Iranian rejection of the engagement track. With Westerwelle,
it remains imperative that you raise the importance of P5 1
unity again. In addition, you should stress the particular
importance of continued German leadership on export control,
particularly in light of recent interdictions of Iranian arms
shipments. The new German coalition seeks to expand exports
by normalizing German export control policy (of arms and
dual-use items) with the EU. Germany contends that its
intention is to raise the EU to the German standard, but the
danger is that German standards could be watered down to an
EU lowest common denominator.

Arms Control/Disarmament
------------------------

¶6. (C) Westerwelle is on a bit of a tangent by publicly
calling for removal of nuclear weapons from Germany, although
he insists that Berlin will not act unilaterally. This gets
him attention and he then offers assurances that everything
must be done in the NATO context, but it distracts from other
issues. This is one of the few foreign policy positions that
distinguishes his FDP from Chancellor Merkel's CDU, and
Westerwelle may feel pressed to mention this. The MFA
emphasizes that Westerwelle's position does not necessarily
mean that Germany intends to cease participation in the NATO
nuclear share. Germany may be willing to maintain its fleet
of dual-capable aircraft, but have the applicable nuclear
weapons stored in the U.S. or elsewhere. Westerwelle also
understands that some Allies may want to maintain their
current stock of NATO nuclear weapons. Your meeting with
Westerwelle is a good opportunity to emphasize any red lines
or concerns we have before this effort gets too far down the
road. For its part, the Chancellery, MFA and MOD are
uncomfortable with Westerwelle's push and sees no reason to
tackle this issue right now.

Afghanistan: Small Window for More Troops
-----------------------------------------

¶7. (C) FM Westerwelle has strongly defended German
engagement in Afghanistan, both military and civilian, as
vital to German national security interests. However, he
supports the Chancellor's recent decision to put off any
consideration of deploying additional German soldiers until
after the proposed international conference on Afghanistan
early next year, notwithstanding the significantly
deteriorated security situation in the north. The new
government sees the
conference as critical for setting a new framework and
benchmarks for the international engagement in Afghanistan,
as well as for prescribing what is expected of the Afghan
government in return. It is in our interest to capitalize on
the Germans' sense of "ownership" of the north in getting a
commitment from Westerwelle to seriously re-consider a troop
increase after the Afghanistan conference early next year,
if, in fact, he and Merkel rule out any increase before then.
Within this context, it would be important to acknowledge
that Germany is the fourth largest provider of civilian
development assistance in Afghanistan and is an enthusiastic
supporter of the U.S. Focused District Development (FDD)
civilian police training program, which it joined in January
of this year.

Middle East
-----------

¶8. (C) You should thank Merkel for her strong statements
before Congress where she stressed the overarching importance
of Israel's security and a two-state solution. In general,
Merkel has been very supportive of U.S. efforts in the Middle
East. She is now planning the second round of German-Israeli
government consultations, likely before the end of the year.
She may raise this with you and seek your advice on messages
to Netanyahu. We understand that Westerwelle may also be
planning to visit Israel. The MFA said that Westerwelle may
seek a greater German role to promote peace, for example to
offer German support in coordinating Middle East policy with
the EU. According to the MFA, Westerwelle may also raise the
concept of creating some type of OSCE-like security structure

BERLIN 00001403 003 of 003


for the Middle East.

Reluctance with Overseas Deployments
------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Germany continues to wrestle with the issue of
overseas deployments. Westerwelle, and the FDP in general,
tend to be more skeptical than Merkel's CDU on this topic and
this is reflected in the government coalition agreement. The
coalition agreement calls for a "gradual reduction" of German
participation in UNIFIL "with the perspective of bringing it
to an end." Similarly, the agreement calls for a "critical
review" of the "multitude" of parliamentary mandates for the
Bundeswehr to participate in counterterrorism and piracy
operations off the Horn of Africa, again with a view toward
reducing them. It would be helpful for you to emphasize how
important we view Germany's contributions to these
international operations.

Russia/Energy Security
----------------------

¶10. (C) We expect Germany to be less forgiving of Russian
bullying of its eastern European neighbors through cut-offs
of natural gas supplies, especially given the departure of
former Foreign Minister Steinmeier -- known for his
relatively pro-Russian views. Still, we expect Germany to
continue to place a heavy emphasis on maintaining good
relations with Russia, believing that constructive engagement
and assistance with modernization are the best way to deal
with this difficult "strategic partner." Germany is Europe's
largest energy user and is highly dependent on Russia for
energy supplies, but Berlin does not view this as a
vulnerability, believing that Moscow is equally dependent on
Germany as a consumer. Germany nevertheless recognizes that
it must diversify its sources of supply, routes, and means of
energy generation to gain greater energy security.

Climate Change
--------------

¶11. (C) As the Chancellor's remarks underline, German
officials want strong U.S. leadership going into the
Copenhagen Summit. They are advocating for a unified US/EU
position towards the major emerging economies, particularly
China and India, to urge them to commit to ambitious national
actions at Copenhagen. They are looking for signals of our
commitment to domestic and international actions that will
allow us to collectively meet science-based targets. German
leaders recognize the challenge of passing climate change
legislation in the U.S. and have lowered their expectations
for the possibility of reaching a legally binding agreement
next month at Copenhagen. They have begun to describe the
Summit as one step in a larger process -- a politically
binding framework -- and may be preparing the German public
for a less ambitious outcome.

Mission Germany
---------------

¶12. (SBU) Madam Secretary, the U.S. government presence in
Germany currently numbers 744 US direct-hire (USDH)
employees, 683 locally engaged (LE) staff, and 951 USG EFMs
and a State operating budget of $153 million annually. This
includes a Frankfurt cohort of over 500 USDH employees whose
responsibilities support USG operations globally. Berlin's
USG presence -- over 500 USDHs and LE staff -- is centered in
the new Chancery next to the Brandenburg Gate. The LE staff
includes many employees who have worked for the USG for over
30 years. Mission Germany is on the cutting edge of using IT
solutions xxxxx.
MURPHY


/tag/IR_2.html


09BERLIN1433     2009-11-12 17:05     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Berlin

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO MNUC PARM KNNP GM IR RU AF
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HEUSGEN ON AFGHANISTAN,
MIDDLE EAST, IRAN, DETAINEES, RUSSIA, NUKES AND BALKANS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Chancellery National Security Advisor
Christoph Heusgen told EUR A/S Phil Gordon and Ambassador
Murphy in a November 10 meeting in Berlin that Germany
strongly preferred that the proposed international conference
on Afghanistan be held outside the country to make it easier
to press Karzai to commit to the necessary reforms. On the
Middle East, Heusgen thought Netanyahu had to do much more on
settlements if there was to be any hope of re-starting
negotiations. On Iran, Heusgen hoped for some conclusion by
early next month on whether the diplomatic track was going to
bear fruit so that this issue could be discussed at the
December 10 EU Summit. Heusgen said Germany was ready to
discuss taking Guantanamo detainees, but stressed the
importance of dealing directly with the Ministry of Interior
and keeping the negotiations confidential. While arguing for
being rhetorically supportive of the Medvedev European
Security proposal, Heusgen shared U.S. skepticism about a new
treaty and an OSCE Summit hosted by Kazakhstan. Heusgen
distanced the Chancellery from the proposal to remove all
remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Germany, stressing
the need to get reciprocal cuts from the Russians. Also
discussed was CFE, the Macedonian name issue and Bosnia. END
SUMMARY.

AFGHANISTAN

¶2. (C) Heusgen confirmed that Germany would only announce
additional resources for Afghanistan after the proposed
international conference, which Chancellor Merkel and UK PM
Brown are now proposing for January 28 in London. He said
the conference is key because this is where the Germans
expect the Afghan government to make specific commitments to
improve governance and to gradually begin assuming
responsibility from the international community. President
Karzai had to be put under international pressure to perform
according to prescribed benchmarks. Toward that end, the
Chancellery felt strongly that the conference should be held
outside of Afghanistan and not on Karzai's "home turf."
Heusgen complained that the German and U.S. embassies in
Kabul are on "a different track" and pushing for a conference
in Kabul. It was important to "make up our minds" quickly on
the way ahead. If the conference slipped to February or
later, and the UK were no longer able to host it in view of
the upcoming parliamentary elections there, then Germany
would be willing to.

¶3. (C) Heusgen at first expressed concern that the U.S. would
undermine international leverage on Karzai by rolling out its
new strategy and resource commitments before he made any
reciprocal commitments to reform. Gordon assured him that
the formal U.S. roll-out would only come after the November
19 inauguration, where Karzai is expected to "say the right
things" in his inaugural address. Gordon also highlighted
the need to coordinate on the U.S. roll-out to avoid the
perception that the U.S. was "Americanizing" the
international effort in Afghanistan. It should be announced
as a common strategy and not as a U.S. strategy to which the
Allies then respond. Heusgen agreed in principle, but
indicated that Germany would stick to its approach of holding
back on any announcement of new commitments until after the
international conference.

MIDDLE EAST

¶4. (C) Referring to the Secretary's recent public statements
on settlements, Heusgen said that Germany "perceives this
differently" and thought Netanyahu needed "to do more" in
order bring the Palestinians to the negotiating table. With
Palestinians in East Jerusalem getting notices from Israeli
authorities that their houses will be destroyed, it would be
"suicide" for President Abbas to move under the current
circumstances. Heusgen said he could not fathom why
Netanyahu did not understand this. He suggested pressuring
Netanyahu by linking favorable UNSC treatment of the
Goldstone Report to Israel committing to a complete stop in
settlement activity. Gordon said that making a direct
linkage between the two would almost certainly be
counterproductive, but agreed that it was worth pointing out
to the Israelis that their policy on settlements was making
it difficult for their friends to hold the line in the UNSC.
Heusgen said this certainly would be an issue when Netanyahu
and "half of his cabinet" visit Berlin on November 30 for
bilateral government consultations.

IRAN

¶5. (C) Heusgen praised the U.S. for its patience with Iran,

BERLIN 00001433 002 OF 003


but noted that at some point, it would be necessary to move
to the second track in order to maintain credibility.
Heusgen said that he and his British counterpart agreed that
ideally, there would be some conclusion on this by early next
month so that the way ahead could be discussed by EU leaders
at their summit on December 10. Gordon agreed that there had
to be a time limit, noting that President Obama had given the
Iranians "by the end of the year" to respond favorably. He
also noted that the U.S. could support a Turkish role in the
proposed exchange of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel if
that would make it easier for Iran to accept the deal.
Gordon indicated, however, that Turkish PM Erdogan needed to
be careful about losing credibility in Washington if he
continued to make comments about Ahmadinejad being his
"friend."

GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

¶6. (C) Heusgen noted that now that the Bundestag election was
past, Germany was ready to help on detainees, as it had
promised earlier. He advised the USG to work directly with
new Interior Minister de Maiziere, rather than going first to
MFA and the Chancellery, which had irritated de Maiziere's
predecessor and made him less willing to cooperate. In this
regard, he thought that it would be helpful if DHS Secretary
Napolitano made direct contact with de Maiziere. Heusgen
also suggested that the discussions be kept confidential
until MOI had come to a decision on which detainees to accept
and in which state they would be settled. Premature public
disclosure could doom the whole initiative. Heusgen said
that Uighurs would be "too difficult," but that Germany could
probably accept "2-3 others." (Comment: The reluctance about
Uighurs is due to the expected negative reaction of the
Chinese government. End Comment.)

EUROPEAN SECURITY PROPOSAL AND POSSIBLE OSCE SUMMIT

¶7. (C) Heusgen said that while the West should try to react
positively to whatever the Russians propose in advancing the
Medvedev European security proposal, nothing should be
accepted that would undermine current European security
institutions, including the OSCE. He shared Gordon's
misgivings about a proposed treaty. He was also skeptical
about the idea of an OSCE Summit in Astana, agreeing that
Kazakhstan's human rghts record and the lack of substantive
agenda items made it unattractive. Heusgen suggested that an
OSCE Summit be offered to the Russians on the condition they
solve the frozen conflict in Transnistria, which he said
Moscow could accomplish "in about a month."

TACTICAL nuclear WEAPONS

¶8. (C) In response to Gordon's question about how the
government planned to take forward the commitment in the
coalition agreement to seek the removal of all remaining
nuclear weapons from Germany, Heusgen distanced the
Chancellery from the proposal, claiming that this had been
forced upon them by FM Westerwelle. Heusgen said that from
his perspective, it made no sense to unilaterally withdraw
"the 20" tactical nuclear weapons still in Germany while
Russia maintains "thousands" of them. It would only be worth
it if both sides drew down. Gordon noted that it was
important to think through all the potential consequences of
the German proposal before going forward. For example, a
withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany and perhaps from
Belgium and the Netherlands could make it very difficult
politically for Turkey to maintain its own stockpile, even
though it was still convinced of the need to do so.

CFE

¶9. (C) Gordon asked for Heusgen's views on a German CFE paper
that had been delivered to the State Department just a few
days earlier. Heusgen said he did not know anything about
it, claiming that he did not follow this issue closely or
"believe in it." He noted that MFA "loved this disarmament
business," which was okay, but it had to be balanced or the
"Russians will sit there and laugh."

MACEDONIAN NAME ISSUE

¶10. (C) Gordon briefed Heusgen on the current state of the
negotiations, noting that the two key issues were the
geographic modifier and international usage. Heusgen noted
that the Chancellor knew PM Macedonian Gruevski through their
common membership in the European People's Party and would be
willing to engage him on this issue if that would be helpful.

BOSNIA

BERLIN 00001433 003 OF 003



¶11. (C) Heusgen revealed that Serb President Tadic was coming
to Berlin the week of November 16 for consultations. He
noted that while Tadic always claimed to be tough on
Republika Srpska PM Dodic, he needed to be tougher. While
expressing pessimism about whether it would ever be possible
to turn Bosnia into a "working state," Heusgen agreed it was
important to keep trying.
MURPHY


/tag/IR_2.html


09TELAVIV2482     2009-11-16 08:08     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Tel Aviv

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG SY IR SA LE TU
IS
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW MEETS WITH
SENIOR ISRAELI DEFENSE OFFICIALS

Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

This is a re-transmission of USDAO TEL AVIV 3188.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 1 and 2, Assistant Secretary of
Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs, Ambassador
Alexander Vershbow, met with a number of senior Israeli
defense officials in Israel including: Ministry of Defense
(MOD) Director General (DG) Pinchas Buchris; Head of MOD
Political Military Bureau Amos Gilad; Assistant Chief of
Defense Major General (MG) Benny Gantz; and Head of MOD
Intelligence Analysis Production Brigadier General Yossi
Baidatz. The Israelis expressed positive views on continued
U.S.-Israel cooperation particularly on Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge (QME) and the ongoing Juniper Cobra missile
defense exercise. Israeli officials explained that they were
going through an unprecedented period of calm due to the
deterrent effect of Operation CAST LEAD, but that below the
surface were a number of significant dangers. They continued
to emphasize that Iran represents the greatest strategic
threat to the region, both its nuclear program and its "axis"
with Syria, Hezbollah, and HAMAS. They also expressed
skepticism about Palestinian President Abbas's future, given
his weakened position as a result of his handling of the
Goldstone Report and his inability to get the full settlement
freeze he had pushed for; they questioned his ability to
restart peace negotiations. Israeli officials were concerned
about the deteriorating Turkey-Israel relationship and
discussed threats emanating from both Syria and Lebanon. END
SUMMARY

-------------------
Bilateral Relations
-------------------

¶2. (S) ASD Vershbow's trip to Israel came as a number of
high-level Israeli and American officials were meeting on key
issues. On October 31, Secretary of State Clinton arrived in
Jerusalem for talks on the peace process with Prime Minister
Netanyahu, Defense Minister Barak, and Foreign Minster
Lieberman. In addition, EUCOM Commander Admiral Stavridis
arrived in Israel on November 1 to observe the Juniper
Cobra-10 ballistic missile defense exercise. The ASD's visit
also came in the wake of recent high-level discussions on
Israel's QME in Washington, and the October 21 meeting of the
Joint Politico-Military Group in Tel Aviv.

¶3. (S) On QME, ASD Vershbow asked for Israel's assessment of
recent discussions, and across the board, Israeli officials
expressed gratitude for U.S. efforts on this front and voiced
optimism on the steps moving forward. Amos Gilad
acknowledged the sometimes difficult position the U.S. finds
itself in given its global interests, and conceded that
Israel's security focus is so narrow that its QME concerns
often clash with broader American security interests in the
region. Israeli officials acknowledged the impressive nature
of the QME dialogue mechanisms recently established, but
stated that the results of the process are what truly matter.
MG Benny Gantz defined successful QME relations as "the
effective process plus the right mitigations." While not
explicitly saying it, Gantz seemed to acknowledge that Israel
does not expect that all QME decisions will break in its
favor, but that Israel only expects a fair and equitable
process that incorporates "intimate dialogue." DG Buchris
thanked Versbhow for the recent success of the JPMG and said
he looks forward to convening the first meeting of the agreed
upon working groups by the end of November. Vershbow stated
that the technical working group discussions would be
launched soon, and that he was looking forward to future
Israeli participation on this issue.

------------------------
Iran Remains Top of Mind
------------------------

¶4. (S) Israeli officials continue to uniformly emphasize that
Iran's nuclear program and regional hegemonic ambitions are
the greatest strategic threats to Israel. They view Iran as
the center of a radical axis that includes Syria, Hezbollah
and HAMAS.

¶5. (S//NF) Israel continues to offer a worst-case assessment
of the Iranian nuclear program, emphasizing that the window
for stopping the program (by military means if necessary) is

rapidly closing. General Baidatz argued that it would take
Iran one year to obtain a nuclear weapon and two and a half
years to build an arsenal of three weapons. By 2012 Iran
would be able to build one weapon within weeks and an arsenal
within six months. (COMMENT: It is unclear if the Israelis
firmly believe this or are using worst-case estimates to
raise greater urgency from the United States). Amos Gilad
explained his view of the repercussions of an Iranian nuclear
capability stating that it would give Iran a free hand in
supporting "HAMAStan" in Gaza and "Hezbollahstan" in Lebanon.
Gilad also argued that Saudi Arabia would definitely react
to a nuclear Iran by obtaining a weapon (with Pakistani
assistance) and Egypt would almost certainly follow. He was
less sure about whether Turkey would respond by pursuing a
nuclear weapon. Regardless, the security situation in the
region surrounding Israel would be dramatically altered
should Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

¶6. (S//NF) ASD Vershbow queried various Israeli officials
about their view of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
proposal and Iran's recent equivocation on the agreement.
Israeli officials uniformly expressed support for the
agreement but made clear that by itself it was not
sufficient. They stated that it was only one stop on the way
to containing the Iranian nuclear program and that it must be
followed by a freeze-for-freeze agreement and eventually the
full suspension of uranium enrichment, as well as the end of
work on the newly disclosed site at Qom. They warned that
the TRR agreement by itself could serve as a major victory
for Iran if it legitimized in the world's eyes Iran's right
to enrich uranium on its own soil. None of the Israeli
officials expressed surprise about Iran's apparent reversal
on the TRR agreement, as they viewed this as typical Iranian
negotiating style and part of an Iranian strategy of delay.
Amos Gilad stated that Iran would never agree to anything
that contradicted its overall strategic goal of achieving a
nuclear weapons capability.

¶7. (S) When queried about how the U.S. views the Iranian
response, ASD Vershbow explained that the United States was
still seeking greater clarity on what was the real Iranian
bottom line. We may need time to ascertain whether Iran's
response was in fact a serious walk-back or whether it would
be willing to abide by the initial TRR agreement that had
been agreed to in principle in Geneva on October 1. However,
he also emphasized that American patience is not unlimited
and that if the TRR agreement did collapse, the U.S. would
likely begin pursuing the pressure track.

¶8. (S//NF) Israel was also highly concerned about Iran's
support for proxies, with General Baidatz emphasizing that
there are multiple bases in Iran where IRGC, Quds Force,
Hezbollah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives
all train together and share knowledge. MG Gantz also
emphasized Iran's role as a weapons supplier to Syria and
that Syria actively facilitated arms transfers to Hezbollah.
He expressed concern about Iranian shipments of weapons via
Sudan to Egypt and into Gaza. On the Russian delay in
delivery of the S-300 (SA-20) to Iran, Gilad voiced
satisfaction with the train of events, acknowledging Prime
Minister Netanyahu's "secret" visit to Moscow and President
Obama's engagement with Medvedev had both played a role.
Gilad was worried about Russian readiness to support tough
sanctions on Iran. ASD Vershbow said the Russians' signals
on sanctions were mixed, but they seemed genuinely concerned
about recent Iranian missile tests and the revelation of the
Qom facility.

-------------------
West Bank and Gaza
-------------------

¶9. (S) Of particular interest throughout the meetings was the
subject of the Palestinian political situation. It was
widely agreed that President Abbas is currently in a weakened
political state, and Israeli officials generally cast a dour
assessment of Abbas's future. In one exchange, Amos Gilad
stated his opinion that Abbas will not survive politically
past the year 2011. Gilad further stated that Abbas is
facing unprecedented criticism within the Palestinian
Authority over his handling of the Goldstone report, and that
this, coupled with a stubborn HAMAS, has weakened Abbas
considerably. The Israelis said the perception in the Arab
world was that the U.S. had encouraged Abbas to take

difficult positions on Goldstone and settlements only to walk
away from him. ASD Vershbow queried Gilad over measures that
could be taken to bolster Abbas. Gilad responded by stating
that Israeli-Palestinian peace discussions need to be resumed
immediately, but without preconditions, and that both parties
need to seek further cooperation on a range of issues --
specifically on the security sector front. Gilad expressed
optimism over the current atmosphere in the West Bank, citing
improvements in the security and economic spheres, and
further stated that the reduced Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
footprint in the West Bank has made conditions ripe for
advancing the relationship. Gilad closed, however, on a
sourer note by stating that the Government of Israel has
little faith in the Palestinian negotiating team.

¶10. (S) ASD Vershbow transitioned off the political
discussion to focus on the Palestinian Authority Security
Force (PASF). Specifically, Vershbow highlighted the concern
that Palestinian forces were seen as lacking real authority,
and therefore asked for steps that could be taken to give the
PASF more visible control of security. Israeli officials
responded by citing the decreased number of direct- action
incursions, checkpoints and patrols, and seemingly drew a
correlation between reduced IDF activity and increased PASF
authority (COMMENT: Despite Israeli assurances, U.S. and
Palestinian officials continue to highlight the corrosive
effect of regular Israeli incursions). MG Gantz cited
Palestinian security sector reform as a major accomplishment,
stating that on-the-ground coordination between the PASF and
IDF units has improved dramatically. Despite these positive
developments though, Israeli officials repeatedly underscored
the importance of retaining the right to disrupt terrorist
operations in the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, they
stated that if Israel allowed a weak and untrained security
force to take over in the West Bank in the short term, the
result will be deterioration of the Israel-Jordan
relationship over the long term. The prospect of poor
Israeli-Jordanian relations, according to Amos Gilad, is
unacceptable, and would result in the loss of "strategic
depth" for Israel.

¶11. (S) ASD Vershbow urged his Israeli counterparts not to
soley focus on the short-term "here and now," but rathr to
envision the possible benefits that a strongand viable West
Bank could have for Israel's secrity situation in the
future. Vershbow used thi point to springboard to the issue
of HAMAS and aza, asking whether success in the West Bank
coud serve as a "magnet" and help solve the Gaza problem.
He asked if Israel had made any headway in tems of an
information operations campaign to better communicate with
the people of Gaza. Israeli officials offered very little in
the way of a communications strategy or long-term vision for
the territories, but reinforced Israel's core belief that
HAMAS has only sinister motives, and that any attempt Fatah
might make to improve its standing in Gaza would only be met
with HAMAS opposition. General Baidatz articulated Israel's
concern by highlighting recent intelligence that HAMAS is
trying to acquire from Iran (and potentially test-fired the
previous weekend) the 60 km-range Fajr-5 rocket that could
reach Tel Aviv. These actions, according to Baidatz and
other officials, make any discussion of Palestinian
reconciliation both premature and unrealistic. Ambassador
Vershbow sought further clarification on this point, querying
Israeli officials over the level of public support for HAMAS.
Specifically, the ASD asked if there was any way to
undermine support for HAMAS vis-a-vis the peace process.
Amos Gilad responded simply by saying that one of Israel's
biggest concerns is the atmosphere created by disjointed
peace talks. Specifically, Gilad stated that political
promises of peace, unification, and reconciliation --
concepts that are never realized -- are only resulting in a
climate of uncertainty that is unhealthy. On this matter,
Gilad mentioned that Egypt's role in pushing reconciliation
is not helpful and often counterproductive, but that he
expects Egypt to continue floating the idea at future
junctures.

¶12. (C) In bringing up the Goldstone Report, DG Buchris
emphasized that the Government of Israel took extraordinary
steps to mitigate civilian casualties, despite HAMAS's
deliberate use of civilians as human shields. He stated that
the IDF made over 300,000 phone calls to alert civilians
before bombing legitimate military targets. He also compared
Israeli operations in Gaza to U.S. operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan and stated that Israel would do whatever was
necessary to protect its population. In response, ASD
Vershbow recalled U.S. support for Israel in handling of the
Goldstone report, and offered to share U.S. experience in
investigating incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan as the GOI
considered whether to conduct an additional investigation.

--------------------
Anxiety Over Turkey
--------------------

¶13. (S) Israeli officials also expressed growing anxiety over
the Turkey-Israel relationship after the Turkish cancellation
of Israel's participation in the ANATOLIAN EAGLE joint
exercise. They expressed their belief that the strategic
relationship with Turkey is critical, but that PM Erdogan's
views have increasingly penetrated into the military and have
been part of the reason for the deterioration in relations as
Turkey looks East rather than West. Gilad believes this is
understandable as Turkey's EU accession prospects look
increasingly doubtful, and they must balance their relations
with both regions to succeed.

¶14. (S) Baidatz stated that the Turks have an agenda to
contain any Kurdish influence in Iraq and that to achieve it
they need to improve their relations with Iran and Syria. In
his view, the worst possible outcome would be a new
Turkey-Iran-Syria-Iraq axis in the Middle East. Gilad also
noted that Turkey wanted to improve its relationships with
Iran and asserted that it had made some very aggressive plans
recently to support HAMAS. However, he had a less
pessimistic view than Baidatz, stating that Turkey had played
a positive role in Iraq and that generally the Turks' agenda
was for a stable Iraq that would be commercially beneficial
to Turkey. Gilad stated that he was skeptical of any
political rapprochement between Israel and Turkey in the near
term, but that Israel would continue to foster the
military-to-military relationship because of its strategic
importance.

¶15. (C) Gilad also queried ASD Vershbow about what Israel
might do to improve its relationship with Turkey. Vershbow
explained that Turkey wants to be influential in the region
and that if it jeopardizes its relationship with Israel, it
will undermine its status and its leverage as an evenhanded
mediator. He also commented that Erdogan's ideological views
may lead him to focus on Turkey's Islamic neighbors, but he
is also a realist who will not want to jeopardize Turkey's
ties to the U.S. or NATO. The U.S. and Israel should be
patient with Turkey and stay engaged, encouraging the Turks
to play a constructive role in the region. He stated that at
the upcoming bilateral defense talks between the U.S. and
Turkey in December, he and Under Secretary Flournoy would
emphasize the need to improve Israel-Turkey relations.

----------------------------
Quiet on the Northern Border
----------------------------

¶16. (S) Israeli officials remain pleased with the "quiet"
nature of its northern border -- something they attribute to
the deterrent effect Israel has built up following OPERATION
CAST LEAD and the 2006 war in Lebano. However, according to
Israeli officials, it i a foregone conclusion that strong
cooperation eists between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
and ezbollah. The level of cooperation far exceeds wht
many assume is simply the day-to-day problem of corruption
within the ranks. On the contrary, Israel believes that
LAF/Hezbollah cooperation is a matter of national policy.
Amos Gilad attributed this dynamic to elements of
nationalism, stating that Lebanese government and military
officials choose not to confront Hezbollah out of patriotic
zeal. Moreover, according to Gilad, any information shared
with the United Nations Interim Force-Lebanon (UNIFIL) goes
directly to Hezbollah by way of the LAF.

¶17. (S) Israeli officials have major concerns over
developments within Hezbollah -- specifically, its
relationship with Syria and Iran. General Baidatz spoke of
this relationship and drew attention to the existing supply
of Fateh-110 long-range missile that Iran sent to Syria.
Israeli officials believe these missiles are destined for
Hezbollah. According to Baidatz and others, if the delivery
were to occur, this would significantly alter Israel's

calculus. Under such a scenario, the looming question for
Israeli policymakers then becomes: "to strike or not to
strike."

-----------------
Optimism on Syria
-----------------

¶18. (S) General Baidatz offered an Israeli intelligence
assessment that if Syria were able to achieve peace with
security and obtain greater U.S. involvement, it may pull
away from Iran's orbit. He explained that President Assad
used his "negative assets," namely Hezbollah and HAMAS, to
make himself relevant and that ultimately Assad wants it all:
the Golan Heights; peace with Israel; better relations with
the U.S.; a strong relationship with Iran; and a continued
relationship with Hezbollah. Ultimately, Gen Baidatz
asserted that if Assad had to choose one thing, it would
likely be peace with Israel. ASD Vershbow asked if Hezbollah
could be sustained without Syrian support. Baidatz
acknowledged the difficulty in answering this question, but
stated his belief that it would be a gradual process before
Hezbollah could completely wean itself from the Syrian
support apparatus and that, ultimately, both Hezbollah's and
Iran's flexibility would be significantly reduced.

-------------------------------
Mil-to-Mil Relations with Egypt
-------------------------------

¶19. (C) Amos Gilad commented that he would like to see a
complete peace with Egypt, but noted there was very little in
the way of Egyptian-Israeli military relations and that Egypt
continued to train its military for war with Israel. Gilad
stated that Egypt was not likely to attack Israel and did not
represent a short-term threat, but that at the very least it
was necessary to have modest contact between Egyptian and
Israeli officers. He expressed frustration by describing
Egypt and Israel's "frozen peace" and that neither side knows
anything about the other. He noted that the last high-level
military visit for Egypt was in 1991.

¶20. (S//NF) Israeli officials agreed that Egypt's
counter-smuggling efforts have improved, particularly since
Operation CAST LEAD in January. However, they stated that
gaps still exist and that Egypt needs to focus its efforts on
stopping Bedouin smuggling in the Sinai. Gilad said he was
disillusioned with the technical monitoring solution; tunnels
continue and smuggling is increasing even with U.S.
assistance along borders with Egypt.

--------------------------------------------- ---------------
Iron Dome and Juniper Cobra - Strengthening the Relationship
--------------------------------------------- ---------------

¶21. (S) On Iron Dome, DG Buchris (Assisted by retired General
Nagel) briefed ASD Vershbow on the latest developments,
stating that Iron Dome is planned to have an initial
operating capability by the spring of 2010, and that
technological advancements have made the system much more
viable defending against short range rocket attacks from Gaza
or Southern Lebanon. Buchris also emphasized the need for
additional USG support to help fund additional production of
Iron Dome to protect the civilian population in both the
North and the South. Buchris also noted progress on the
upper- and medium-tier ballistic missile defense systems
(Arrow-3 and David's Sling, respectively). In an earlier
meeting, MG Gantz quantified the importance of fielding
adequate missile defense systems by citing critical Israeli
infrastructure such as Ben Gurion Airport and the Ashkelon
electricity plant. Suffering the loss or damage of places
such as these, according to Gantz, would be a major blow to
Israel and, therefore, every effort to
stand up a capable missile and rocket defense shield should
be taken.

¶22. (S) After Gantz highlighted three areas of focus for the
IDF (deterring conventional threats, responding nimbly to
asymmetric threats, and developing an integrated missile
defense system), ASD Vershbow asked for Gantz's initial
impression of the Juniper Cobra-10 exercise. Gantz stressed
the importance of this exercise, and stated that so far it
had been a success. ASD Vershbow stated that the timing of
Juniper Cobra was somewhat fortuitous, given the recent

developments with Iran. On the larger issue of missile
defense, ASD Vershbow stressed U.S. efforts to try and
persuade Russia to become more involved in missile defense
cooperation, but stated that Russia's realization that the
new U.S. missile defense approach in Europe is more effective
than the previous one is causing the Russian leadership to
ask many questions about the system.

-------
Summary
-------

¶23. (S) All of ASD Vershbow's interlocutors carried a
consistent message emphasizing that: Iran remains Israel's
greatest threat; recent events have weakened President Abbas;
the PASF have performed well in the West Bank; and the
relative calm on all Israel's borders does not obscure the
fact that Israeli intelligence is seeing significant activity
and planning by Iranian surrogates, namely HAMAS and
Hezbollah, with facilitation from Syria. These threats
suggest that Israel must remain vigilant and prepared for the
calm to end one day.

¶24. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this message.
CUNNINGHAM


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09TELAVIV2500     2009-11-18 14:02     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG CH IR RU SA LE TU IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP: EXECUTIVE
SESSION (PART 1 OF 4)

Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (S) Summary: During the Executive Session of the 40th
Joint Political Military Group (JPMG), U.S. and Israeli
counterparts continued discussion on the creation of four new
Qualitative Military Edge (QME) working groups. GOI
interlocutors continued to raise concerns regarding the F-15
sale to Saudi Arabia. Both sides agreed that continued
pressure be applied to Iran, especially following the
disclosure of the nuclear facility in Qom. GOI participants
expressed concern regarding Chinese and Russian cooperation
with respect to enhanced Iranian sanctions. The GOI also
raised dual citizenship concerns with respect to access to
sensitive technology, and noted from its perspective Turkey's
disturbing change of course toward Syria and Iran -- and away
from Israel. This is the first in four cables (septels)
reporting on the JPMG. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) Israeli Participants:

-- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director
General
-- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military
Chief
-- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense
Attache to the United States
-- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York
-- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
-- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5
-- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau
-- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General

U.S. Participants:

-- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs
-- Luis Moreno, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
-- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense
-- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff
-- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian
and Jordanian Affairs, NSC
-- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
-- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv

Qualitative Military Edge
-------------------------

¶3. (S) The Executive Session continued discussion from the
September 30 Qualitative Military Edge (QME) meeting in
Washington. Both sides presented their primary points of
contact for the four newly proposed working groups focusing
on previous agreements, mitigation measures for the F-15 sale
to Saudi Arabia, technical mitigation issues, and
intelligence/policy. Agreement was reached to begin working
on the details of each working group's meeting schedule and
timeline.

¶4. (S) The GOI continued to express concern over the F-15
sale to Saudi Arabia. U.S. participants noted that the USG
is unable to provide more detailed information about the sale
until Saudi Arabia officially sends a Letter of Request
(LOR). The GOI expressed additional concerns about
stationing these new aircraft at Tabuk airfield in the
northwest corner of Saudi Arabia -- close to the Israeli
border. U.S. participants stated the USG understanding that
this should not be an issue, as the Saudis are considering
stationing new Typhoon aircraft at Tabuk. The GOI also
raised AMRAAM sales to Jordan; U.S. participants explained
that the new C-7 AMRAAM is an export version with
capabilities similar to the C-5 version -- and therefore
provides little to no increase in capabilities.

Iran, China and Russia
----------------------

¶5. (S) Both sides expressed concern over the recent
revelation regarding Iran's nuclear facility at Qom, and
agreed that increased pressure should be applied directly and
internationally against Iran in order to better determine
Tehran's motives and next steps. Both sides agreed that the
facility at Qom should be inspected immediately. One member
of the Israeli delegation expressed the opinion that some
consideration be given to "shutting Qom operations down
completely" to prevent further progress on obtaining a
nuclear weapon. That said, the GOI argued that the
international community not become bogged down on the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR) and Qom, thereby diverting focus from

TEL AVIV 00002500 002 OF 002


the bigger issue of Iran's nuclear program.

¶6. (S) Several questions were raised about China's position
on Iran's efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. Both sides
agreed that continued engagement with China and Russia is
needed -- as well as building a consensus in Europe. The USG
speculated, and the GOI concurred, that China will follow
Moscow's lead. USG participants argued that China would seek
to avoid an international confrontation over Iran. The GOI
described 2010 as a critical year -- if the Iranians continue
to protect and harden their nuclear sites, it will be more
difficult to target and damage them. Both sides then
discussed the upcoming delivery of GBU-28 bunker busting
bombs to Israel, noting that the transfer should be handled
quietly to avoid any allegations that the USG is helping
Israel prepare for a strike against Iran.

¶7. (S) The GOI made the case for "crippling sanctions";
cooperation between the United States, Europe, Russia and
China will be necessary in order for these sanctions to be
effective. U.S. participants stressed the USG position that
any discussions with Iran on this subject be finite; the USG
will continue to monitor whether negotiations are making
progress. The GOI stated that it is not convinced the
Iranians will negotiate in good faith unless there are
visible and clear threats. U.S. delegation members described
eight lanes of sanctions, and outlined a plan to "pivot to
apply appropriate pressure" on those points and tracks that
have the most impact. U.S. participants concurred that 2010
is a critical year -- but the continued application of
pressure is vital.

¶8. (S) Regarding Russia, the GOI was not confident that
Moscow will be helpful in any Iranian sanctions effort -- GOI
participants opined that Russia is considered a "mystery"
with respect to their views on Iran. The GOI raised the
Russian S-300 sale to Iran, noting that the transfer is still
pending. GOI participants argued that Moscow seeks a return
to superpower status, but there are contradictory trends
regarding Russia's internal condition.

Dual Citizenship Issues
-----------------------

¶9. (S) The GOI raised the issue of dual citizenship within
the context of access to sensitive technology. U.S.
participants acknowledged Israeli concerns, noting that the
issue is being worked at the highest levels of the USG to
reach consensus on how to proceed. The GOI recommended
obtaining a waiver similar to the relationship from which
Canada or Australia benefit.

Turkey
------

¶10. (S) The GOI raised the current direction the Government
of Turkey has taken toward Syria and Iran -- and away from
Israel. Israeli participants argued that Turkey has been
supportive of Hamas in Gaza while pursuing a more "Islamic"
direction with the goal of becoming a regional superpower.
The GOI argued that the Turkish military is losing its
ability to influence government decisions and strategic
direction. After this past year, GOI participants said they
have a "bad feeling" about Turkey. The GOI noted that the
Israel Air Force (IAF) Commander in the past wanted to speak
to the Turkish Air Force Commander, but his Turkish
counterpart declined.

¶11. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.
CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_2.html


09TELAVIV2502     2009-11-18 14:02     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG IR SA LE IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF 4)

Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

¶1. (S) Summary: As part of the 40th Joint Political Military
Group (JPMG), U.S. and GOI counterparts discussed security
issues in the Near East region. GOI officials expressed
support for the P5 plus 1 engagement process with Iran, but
doubted the process would lead to any change in Iranian
behavior -- Iran will use the engagement process as an
opportunity to continue its pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs Andrew
Shapiro stressed that engagement with Tehran was not "open
ended"; the United States is preparing sanctions in the event
engagement does not prove successful. GOI interlocutors
continued to express concerns regarding U.S. support of the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); U.S. participants reiterated
U.S. support of the LAF as a counterweight to Hizballah. A/S
Shapiro noted NEA, with PM participation and support, plans
to brief the GOI on the U.S. policy regarding Lebanon in the
near future. In a continuation from the JPMG Executive
Session, GOI interlocutors made the argument that U.S. arms
transfers in the region could potentially arm future enemies
of Israel. GOI officials expressed frustration over the
Goldstone Report; U.S. officials advocated sharing lessons
learned regarding confronting terrorists in
civilian-populated areas. GOI officials noted improved
counter-smuggling efforts from Egypt regarding arms transfers
to Gaza via the Sinai. However, they argued that Egypt can
and should do more to prevent the flow of arms. U.S.
delegation members also briefed on U.S. policy in Iraq, and
expressed concerns about the current situation in Yemen.
This is the third of four cables (septels) reporting on the
JPMG. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) Main Israeli Participants:

-- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director
General
-- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military
Chief
-- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense
Attache to the United States
-- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York
-- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
-- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5
-- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau
-- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General

Main U.S. Participants:

-- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs
-- James Hursch, Director, DTSA
-- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense
-- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff
-- Beth McCormick, Deputy Director, DSCA
-- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian
and Jordanian Affairs, NSC
-- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
-- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
-- Robert Maggi, PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy
-- Kevin Maloney, Licensing Director, PM/DTCL

Plenary
-------

¶3. (S) MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris began the
plenary, stating this was "perhaps the most important JPMG to
date." He pointed to the threat of a nuclear Iran, and
expressed hope that U.S. leadership will find a way to stop
Iran. Otherwise, a nuclear-armed Iran will "impact the
stability of the world," Buchris said. A/S Shapiro described
this 40th JPMG as a key forum and the primary mechanism in
the political-military dialogue between the United States and
Israel. He said the United States wants to "re-energize" the
JPMG, with the goal to "bring back strategic elements" into
the discussion. A/S Shapiro highlighted the importance of
mutual understanding and transparent dialogue.

Iran
----

¶4. (S) MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad presented a
strategic overview. He began with Iran, reciting President
Obama's statement made during a visit to Israel prior to
becoming president that the United States would not tolerate
a nuclear Iran. Gilad said Israel concurs, and described
current dialogue with Iran as the "most sensitive stage" and
Iran's "last chance." He said Iran remains determined to

TEL AVIV 00002502 002 OF 004


reach the "nuclear option," which he described as
"intolerable." He quoted former President and Ahmadinejad
opponent Rafsanjani as saying Iran "only needs one bomb for
Israel," implying that Iran will continue to threaten Israel
regardless of its leadership.

¶5. (S) A/S Shapiro noted that the United States shares
Israel's concerns that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons
program. He said that the United States is beginning with
engagement, but at the same time is preparing tougher
measures should engagement fail. A/S Shapiro stressed that
engagement was not "open ended" -- the United States needs to
see concrete steps and tangible results from the P5 1 talks.
He noted concerns over the Qom facility; if Iran does not
respond to engagement, then the United States will move
toward stronger steps such as sanctions. DASD Kahl
reiterated that it is not our intention to allow Iran to "run
out the clock," and noted that engagement also serves to
build international consensus on sanctions. MFA Deputy
Director for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar argued that the
United States must present a clearer message to the Europeans
on what is expected of them regarding sanctions.

¶6. (S) A representative from Mossad said Tehran understands
that by reacting positively to engagement, Iran can continue
to "play for time" and avoid sanctions while pursuing its
strategic objective to obtain a military nuclear capability.
From Mossad's perspective, there is no reason to believe Iran
will do anything but use negotiations to stall for time so
that by 2010-2011, Iran will have the technological
capability to build a nuclear weapon -- essentially reducing
the question of weaponizing to a political decision. Mossad
said Iran's main crisis is in the political sphere -- the
current regime is weaker than prior to the elections, but
does not face significant risk as its security apparatus
remains loyal, while the opposition lacks a charismatic
leader. The goal of the regime, therefore, is to calm down
the domestic political environment -- Khamenei realizes the
frustration demonstrated following the elections has not
disappeared. BG Smith asked if Khamenei's death might change
the political landscape; Mossad noted no information to
suggest a change in Khamenei's health, while those
surrounding him appear more loyal than ever.

¶7. (S) Mossad believes Iran wants to become a regional
hegemon, and is dictating its agenda by using Hamas and
Hizballah as force multipliers. In that respect, Iran is
very creative in finding ways to transfer weapons systems to
its proxies. Mossad said Tehran also understands the effort
to split Syria from Iran's influence, and is working hard to
deepen its relationship with Syria as a result. DASD Kahl
argued that Iran is weaker regionally today than in recent
years. He noted progress in Iraq, the results of the recent
Lebanese elections, and outreach to Syria as signs of a
weaker Iran. DASD Kahl also noted increased U.S. credibility
in the Muslim world, while the crackdown following the
Iranian elections exposed the current regime as brutal to the
region and in Europe.

Hizballah/Lebanon/Syria
-----------------------

¶8. (S) Gilad addressed threats posed by "Hizballahstan" and
"Hamastan," noting that Hizballah/Hamas-Syria-Iran
cooperation has strengthened. He noted that rockets from
Lebanon can now cover the entire territory of Israel, while
ballistic missiles -- although not new -- remain Israel's
most serious threat with adversaries having the capability to
target Israeli citizens and major cities. IDF J5 Col Shimon
Arad noted four main trends in Lebanon: 1) internal political
deadlock since the elections; 2) Hizballah's growing military
capabilities; 3) Lebanon as a volatile military arena; and 4)
Lebanon's susceptibility to outside influences, including
Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. He recommended improved
US.-Israel coordination, and called for an exchange of views.
Arad also recommended creating Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
deconfliction measures, demanding improved LAF performance,
and exerting greater pressure on Syria and smuggling.
Finally, he called for sanctions on the Iranian Republican
Guard Corps (IRGC), trilateral meetings with the Lebanese and
UNIFIL to deter Hizballah, and bolstering UNIFIL by extending
Gen. Graziano's tour for an additional six months.

¶9. (S) A/S Shapiro acknowledged the GOI's desire for
specifics regarding U.S. policy on Lebanon, and hoped to
invite GOI representatives to Washington in the near future
for a full brief led by NEA, with PM participation and
support. He cited the need to provide an alternative to
Hizballah, which explains U.S. goals to strengthen the LAF as
a counterweight. DASD Kahl argued that any LAF cooperation

TEL AVIV 00002502 003 OF 004


with Hizballah is pragmatic given the LAF's current weakness.
He noted that U.S. assistance has been temporarily put on
hold since there is still no Lebanese government. Kahl also
argued that prospects for better relations with Damascus
depend on Syrian desires for better relations with the United
States and the return of the Golan Heights. Arad argued that
more must be done to weaken radicals and cease smuggling.
Gilad said the GOI cannot envision a government in Lebanon
without Hizballah, and said the LAF will come to the defense
of Hizballah if attacked by Israel -- thus, a strengthened
LAF hurts Israel.

QME
---

¶10. (S) Turning to U.S. regional arms transfers, Gilad
suggested Qualitative Military Edge (QME) as a "codename" for
potential threats against Israel. Israel currently enjoys
peace with regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates -- but the future is uncertain, and each
of these regimes faces the potential for change, he argued.
U.S. weapons -- "the best in the world" -- level the playing
field by reducing the need for training -- and could
ultimately aid a future enemy of Israel, Gilad said. A/S
Shapiro stressed the importance of transparency -- while
there may be differences between Israel and the United States
in terms of a regional assessment, the key is to ensure that
there are no surprises, he said.

Peace Process
-------------

¶11. (S) Gilad described the Middle East peace process as a
"pillar" of Israeli security. He quoted PM Netanyahu and
President Peres that Israel remains sincerely committed to
peace. Gilad noted however, that the re-launching of
negotiations is complicated by the split in Palestinian
leadership. He said a weak and corrupt PA had lost Gaza
despite Israeli warnings. Gilad said 2010 will prove pivotal
with Palestinian elections looming and Egyptian mediation
efforts to broker reconciliation between Hamas and the PA
having failed. That said, he noted that Israeli-PA security
and economic cooperation in the West Bank continues to
improve as Jenin and Nablus flourish, and described
Palestinian security forces as the "good guys." NEA/IPA
Director Tom Goldberger said Special Envoy Sen. Mitchell
continues his mission, and noted that Egyptian reconciliation
efforts were meant to strengthen the PA, not weaken it.

Goldstone Report
----------------

¶12. (S) Gilad addressed Israel's immediate neighbors within
the context of the Goldstone Report. He said Israel has
checked "all the details" of the report, and have concluded
that the report's accusations are "baseless." Buchris said
the report sets a bad precedent for countries trying to
protect its citizens from terrorists; he noted 300,000 phone
calls from the IDF to houses in Gaza ahead of strikes in the
effort to prevent civilian casualties -- "no other country
has taken such steps," Buchris argued. A/S Shapiro
highlighted strong U.S. opposition to the report's referral
to the UN Security Council, noting the report's biased
mandate.

¶13. (S) Gilad said Israel only entered Gaza after Hamas
violated the ceasefire or "tahdiya," which many Israelis felt
was "humiliating" and left Defense Minister Barak open to
criticism. Gilad characterized Operation Cast Lead as a
success that accounted for humanitarian issues; the IDF
showed restraint in the operation because Israel did not want
to re-occupy Gaza. DASD Kahl advocated sharing perspectives
and lessons learned on strategic communication to more
effectively confront terrorists in civilian-populated areas.
NSC Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs Prem Kumar
noted continued UNSC interest in the Goldstone Report, and
asked Israel to inform the United States on any additional
efforts or investigations the GOI was taking to help deflect
any further damage from the report.

Egypt/Counter-Smuggling
-----------------------

¶14. (S) Gilad said Israel was frustrated by its Arab
neighbors -- including specifically Egypt -- for supporting
the Goldstone Report, which complicates the peace process.
Israel continues to benefit from good security cooperation
with Jordan, he said. Gilad argued that Egypt could stop
smuggling into Gaza "completely," and questioned whether
Egypt should be judged by its efforts or results. Gilad

TEL AVIV 00002502 004 OF 004


stressed the latter, and argued Egypt can do more on
counter-smuggling. Finally, he noted Israeli concerns that
Egypt continues to prepare for a potential future military
confrontation with Israel, while no Egyptian military
officers visit Israel.

¶15. (S) A/S Shapiro outlined U.S. military assistance to
strengthen Egyptian border security, counter-terrorism,
peacekeeping and civil defense efforts. He said the United
States is working with Egypt to improve regional security
efforts, such as counter-smuggling. Regarding the Gulf
States and Saudi Arabia, A/S Shapiro stressed efforts to
improve energy security and counter-terrorism, while
bolstering the capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) in the face of the Iranian threat. Finally, he noted
U.S. withdrawal from the Anatolian Eagle exercise following
the Turkish decision to suspend the IDF's participation. A/S
Shapiro said the United States has been delivering the
message that Turkey must improve its relationship with
Israel.

¶16. (S) PM Counter-Piracy Coordinator Maggi briefed on the
counter smuggling technical discussion meeting (septel). He
cited the importance of working with Israel's neighbors --
including especially Egypt and Turkey -- to prevent Iranian
weapons from entering Gaza. Maggi said more pressure should
be applied in the EU and UN to gain more latitude -- and
possibly further action from the EU. He said tracking cash
flows, and increasing prosecutions and incarcerations were
important, with the ultimate goal of increasing cooperation
and momentum. Goldberger said Egypt sees Hamas as a national
security threat, and added that Egypt had closed 200 tunnels
since the beginning of 2009.

¶17. (S) Goldberger noted Egyptian domestic political
sensitivities, and questioned whether more commercial and
humanitarian goods could be allowed through the Gaza border
crossings. Gilad strongly stated that there were no limits
on commercial goods through the border crossings. Goldberger
asked about construction materiel like cement; Gilad said the
GOI would not allow Hamas to build bunkers -- goods such as
cement or iron would not be allowed because of their military
applications. He also argued that smuggling is a lucrative
business for all involved, including the Egyptian government,
and said the best way to stop the smuggling was to increase
arrests and incarcerations. Goldberger mentioned U.S.
economic and development assistance efforts in Sinai. He
noted that most requests to third countries to deny arms
transfer overflights are based on Israeli intelligence;
additional information/intelligence from the GOI would ensure
greater cooperation. Bar raised prosecuting shipping
companies complicit in arms transfers to Gaza; A/S Shapiro
said he would take that back to Washington for further
consideration.

Iraq/Yemen
----------

¶18. (S) On Iraq, DASD Kahl noted there are currently 125,000
U.S. soldiers in Iraq, which will be reduced to 50,000
soldiers by September 1, 2010 with complete U.S. troop
withdrawal by the end of 2011. He noted the U.S. goal of
establishing a long-term strategic relationship with a
sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. A/S Shapiro and
DASD Kahl briefed the GOI on U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi
military to complete its counterinsurgency force, transition
the military to a force that can defend its borders, and
align the Iraqi military more closely to the United States.

¶19. (S) DASD Kahl pointed to the growing threat (al Qaida, al
Houthi insurgency, and southern secessionists) in Yemen. He
said the United States is attempting to prevent Yemen from
heading toward an "Afghanistan-type scenario" with general
lawlessness and increased ungoverned spaces. BG Smith noted
that al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to
fester in North and sub-Saharan Africa. He said Egypt is
actively involved in countering AQIM with 3,800 soldiers in
Sudan -- this should be encouraged and expanded.

¶20. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.


CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_2.html


09STATE120288     2009-11-21 01:01     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Secretary of State

VZCZCXRO4858
OO RUEHDBU RUEHMR RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #0288/01 3250135
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 210127Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO IAEA MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 STATE 120288

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019
TAGS: PREL IR
SUBJECT: U.S. POSTURE ON IRAN'S nuclear PROGRAM AND NEXT
STEPS

Classified by NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey D. Feltman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs
3-5.

SUMMARY
-------

¶2. (C) Iran's continued reluctance to cooperate with
international efforts to build confidence and
transparency in its nuclear program will be of
increasing concern to U.S. diplomacy in the weeks ahead.
Of particular note is Iran's apparent refusal to date to
agree to an IAEA proposal for Iran to exchange a
significant portion of its stockpiled low-enriched
uranium (LEU) for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR), and the IAEA report of November 16 indicating
serious unresolved questions about Iran's nuclear
intentions. Department requests posts to draw on the
attached narrative in explaining and securing support
for recent U.S. and P5+1 efforts to engage Iran on its
nuclear program, particularly in the lead-up to the IAEA
Board of Governors meeting on November 26. End Summary.


OBJECTIVES
----------

¶3. (C) FOR ALL POSTS (except Moscow, Paris, Beijing,
London and Berlin): Please draw on narrative beginning
in paragraph 7, and hard questions and answers in
paragraph 12 to brief host governments on:

-- Persistent U.S. efforts to engage Iran throughout
2009;

-- Iran's disappointing follow-up to its commitments
with P5+1 in Geneva on October 1;

-- Details of the TRR proposal and the
flexibility the U.S., Russia, France and the IAEA, have
demonstrated to deal with Iranian concerns; and

-- Key findings and implications of the IAEA Director
General's November 16 report on Iran; and

Posts should also begin laying the foundation for
possible future action in response to Iran's non-
cooperation, including at the IAEA (BoG) meeting on 26
November and prudent preparation in the event of a
decision to pursue increased pressure on Iran.

¶4. (C) SPECIAL REQUEST FOR MOSCOW, PARIS, BEIJING,
LONDON, AND BERLIN: Please inform host government that
we are delivering this message to IAEA members,
consistent with consultations among Political Directors
in the P5+1 process. Posts may share the general tenor
of our message but do not need to deploy the points
themselves with host governments.

¶5. (C) Posts should not leave any part of this message
in writing with host governments.

DEADLINE
--------

¶6. (U) Posts should report the results of their efforts
by November 25. Elisa Catalano (NEA/FO, 202-647-9533,
CatalanoE@state.sgov.gov) and Richard Nephew (ISN/RA,
202-647-7680, NephewRM@state.sgov.gov) are the
Department's POCs for this activity.

BACKGROUND
----------

¶7. (SBU) Since the 1 October 2009 meeting of the P5+1
Political Directors and representatives from Iran, the
United States has been working closely with its partners
to fulfill the commitments reached in Geneva and engage
with Iran to build international confidence in the
peaceful nature of its nuclear program. In particular,
we have focused on supporting the IAEA's proposal for
refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR),
facilitating the IAEA's inspection of the previously
clandestine uranium enrichment plant at Qom, and
pressing for a follow-on meeting between P5+1 Political
Directors and Iranian representatives explicitly on

STATE 00120288 002 OF 008


Iran's nuclear program.

¶8. (C) The results since October 1 have been
disappointing. It increasingly appears that Iran will
decline the IAEA's proposal on TRR, though a definitive
answer remains outstanding. In the lead-up to the IAEA
Board of Governors (BOG) meeting on November 26, Iran
may try to blame the apparent failure of the TRR
agreement on intrusive and inflexible demands by western
powers, rather than its own reluctance or inability to
reach agreement on the IAEA proposal which responded to
Iran's request for assistance and was created on the
basis of Iran's own commitments made in Geneva.
Although Iran granted IAEA access to Qom, Iran did not
cooperate with all of the IAEA's requests for access to
information and personnel and there remain serious
questions about Iran's intentions for the facility.
Finally, Iran so far has refused a further meeting with
the P5+1 to discuss its nuclear program. The United
States is now discussing with its P5+1 and other
partners potential next steps, including how to handle
these issues at the next meeting of the IAEA BOG.

¶9. (SBU) IAEA Director General (DG) ElBaradei released
his latest report on Iran on November 16. The report
makes clear Iran's continuing lack of transparency and
cooperation with the IAEA on its nuclear program,
including in assessing a possible military dimension to
its program. As expected, the uranium enrichment
facility at Qom (also known as the Fordow site) was a
central element of the report, and the IAEA states that
Iran's previous failure to declare the facility is
"inconsistent" with its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement. The IAEA's report highlights that revelation
of the Qom facility raises concerns of additional
clandestine nuclear sites in Iran and has asked Iran to
confirm that there are no other undeclared nuclear
facilities; Iran has yet to respond to this IAEA
request. Iran continues to defy UNSC resolutions and
IAEA BOG resolutions calling on it to adopt the
Additional Protocol and to provide the access necessary
for the IAEA to provide assurance as to the absence of
additional undeclared nuclear activities.

¶10. (C) The P5+1 "dual track" policy towards Iran
includes both engagement and pressure if Iran does not
engage constructively. President Obama, Secretary
Clinton, and others have identified the end of the year
as a key period for assessing Iran's responsiveness. If
Iran continues to refuse to take meaningful steps to
meet its international obligations, the international
community must be prepared to take strong collective
action on the pressure track.

KEY DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES AND POLICY NARRATIVE
--------------------------------------------

¶11. (U) Posts should draw on the following key messages
and policy narrative in briefing host governments.

Key Messages
------------

-- We, in coordination with our international partners,
have demonstrated our willingness to engage
constructively and respectfully with Iran to address
long-standing international concerns over its nuclear
program. Our approach has clearly and consistently been
based on the P5+1's dual track strategy.

-- Iran so far has failed to accept a very good and
balanced IAEA proposal to facilitate the refueling of
the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) which would have
fulfilled an Iranian request, addressed a humanitarian
need of the Iranian people, and served as a confidence-
building step to create an opportunity for further
progress.

-- We look forward to close consultations on how best to
persuade Iran to engage constructively as we approach
the IAEA's Board of Governors meeting on November 26 and
beyond.

Policy Narrative
----------------

-- Since President Obama took office, he has made clear
the willingness of the United States to engage with Iran
and to seek a new relationship based on mutual respect.

-- He has authorized the United States' full
participation in diplomatic discussions between the five
permanent members of the Security Council and Germany

STATE 00120288 003 OF 008


and Iran without pre-conditions.

-- The United States has stated its support for Iran's
full right to a civilian nuclear program within IAEA
guidelines, provided Iran meets it international
obligations and carries out its responsibilities within
the NPT framework.

-- As a way to build confidence, the United States, with
Russia and France, has also supported the IAEA's
proposal to positively respond to Iran's request for
nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), in
spite of Iran's continuing violation of UNSC resolutions
and noncompliance with IAEA requirements on its nuclear
program.

-- However, almost one year into the Obama
administration, Iran has not taken practical, concrete
steps that would begin to create confidence in its
nuclear intentions. Iran:

o Continues to enrich uranium despite UNSC
requirements that it suspend such operations;
o Revealed it had been building a secret uranium
enrichment facility at a military base near Qom,
in violation of its safeguards agreement ;
o Continues to refuse cooperation with the IAEA in
addressing the full range of IAEA questions about
the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program;
o Has not accepted the IAEA proposal to refuel the
TRR; and
o Since meeting with representatives of the five
permanent members of the Security Council and
Germany in Geneva on October 1, has refused all
subsequent efforts to schedule another meeting to
discuss its nuclear program.

-- Iran's failure to take advantage of these numerous
opportunities raises serious questions about the
intentions of its nuclear program that deserve urgent
international attention. We look to work closely with
your government in the run-up to IAEA Board of Governors
meeting on November 26 and beyond to develop an
appropriate international response.

Tehran Research Reactor
-----------------------

-- The IAEA, Russia, France and the United States
cooperated closely and flexibly to find a way to
positively respond to Iran's request for fuel for the
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) so that it could keep
running to meet humanitarian medical needs beyond 2010.

-- The TRR refueling proposal offers Iran the
opportunity to convert its stockpile of low enriched
uranium (LEU) into higher-enriched fuel with the help of
Russia and France. The proposal's elements are simple:

o Iran would transfer a portion of its LEU
necessary for fuel production in one batch to
IAEA custody outside of Iran before the end of
the year;
o Russia would further enrich the LEU to meet fuel
requirements; and
o France would fabricate the fuel assemblies and
return them to Iran before Iran's fuel supplies
are depleted before the end of the year.

-- In addition the United States expressed a commitment
to work with the IAEA to improve safety and control
features at the TRR.

-- The U.S., France and Russia took great risks in
supporting the deal, especially in light of Iran's
continuing violation of successive UNSC resolutions and
IAEA requirements, including its secret construction of
a uranium enrichment facility near Qom, and its
continuing enrichment operations.

-- We did so because the arrangement would begin to
build confidence and would give Iran and the
international community more time to reach a
comprehensive negotiated solution to Iran's nuclear
program, while fulfilling Iran's humanitarian needs.

-- When Iran expressed concern about the reliability of
the proposal, the United States and its partners
expressed to the IAEA a willingness to address Iran's
concerns, including through:

o a U.S. offer to formally join the deal as a
signatory;

STATE 00120288 004 OF 008


o a readiness of the five permanent members of the
Security Council and Germany to guarantee the
deal through a political statement of support;
o a willingness to help secure finance for the
movement of the LEU and fuel;
o an openness to move the LEU to any number of
locations outside of Iran; and
o a willingness to support the IAEA's holding
material equivalent to the fuel in escrow in a
third country as a guarantee for Iran of the
fuel's ultimate delivery.

-- After reaching an agreement in principle in the deal
following talks with the E3+3 in Geneva on October 1,
and following further technical discussions at the IAEA
October 19-21, Iran has so far failed to accept the
deal.

-- This raises a question about Iran's intentions. If
Iran is enriching uranium to meet its civilian reactor
fuel needs, why would it not accept an international
offer (with significant guarantees) to provide its LEU
for fuel to power the TRR to meet its humanitarian
needs, particularly when it does not have the capability
to produce the fuel on its own?

-- This question is troubling in the context of Iran's
continued enrichment activities in defiance of UNSC
resolutions; its secret construction of an enrichment
facility on a military base near Qom; its refusal to
cooperate with the IAEA in answering questions about the
peaceful nature of its nuclear program; and its refusal
to meet with the five permanent members of the Security
Council.

P5+1
----

-- Together with our P5+1 partners, the United States
informed Iranian representatives in Geneva on October 1
of our willingness to discuss any items of concern to
Iran - both bilaterally and multilaterally - in addition
to our concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

-- On October 1, Iran's representatives committed to
meet again before the end of the month based on an
agenda that included Iran's nuclear program. Since that
time, however, the Iranian government has refused all
invitations to meet if its nuclear program would be on
the agenda.

-- Iran's continued refusal to engage on its nuclear
program with the P5+1 deepens our concerns about Iran's
intentions for its nuclear program.

The IAEA Director General's Report on Iran
------------------------------------------

-- The IAEA report makes clear that Iran has failed to
cooperate fully and transparently with the IAEA. Key
aspects of the report include:

---- Iran's new centrifuge facility at Qom - built in
violation of Iran's UNSC obligations and not declared to
the IAEA as required - has been inspected, but its
purpose and origin remain unknown. And, Iran has not
yet cooperated with all of the IAEA's requests for
access to information and personnel. Iran's failure to
provide the IAEA with early design information regarding
the Qom facility has been deemed "inconsistent with its
obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its
Safeguards Agreement" by the IAEA. Furthermore, the
relatively small size of the facility at Qom is
inconsistent with Iran's assertion that it is to provide
fuel for Iran's civilian reactors, raising questions
about the planned use of the Qom facility.

---- The Agency noted that Iran's failure to declare the
Qom facility also "reduces the level of confidence in
the absence of other nuclear facilities under
construction and gives rise to questions about whether
there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran that had
not been declared to the Agency."

---- These concerns have been compounded by the
continued pace of Iranian enrichment and steadfast
refusal to abide by the UNSC's legal requirement that
Iran suspend all such work. Instead, Iran continues to
produce low enriched uranium and estimated its stockpile
at 1763 kilograms at the end of October.
Notwithstanding a reduction in the number of enriching
centrifuges by approximately 600 since August 2009, this
is roughly a similar rate of production as Iran has

STATE 00120288 005 OF 008


achieved for the past year.

---- Iran continues to install and test additional
centrifuges, with more than 1,000 new centrifuges added
since August 2009.

---- The IAEA has discovered a previously unknown cache
of heavy water in storage at Esfahan, and has requested
Iran to explain its origin. It is important to note
that UN Security Council resolutions include a ban on
supplying Iran with heavy water.

---- It also asked Iran to provide further information
describing an analytical laboratory that Iran says it
plans to install underground at Esfahan.

---- There has been no progress made in addressing
issues associated with Iran's efforts to develop a
nuclear warhead, despite a year having passed since the
last such conversation and many open questions that
surround this work.

-- If Iran wishes to begin to resolve international
concerns, it should comply with its international
obligations, cooperate fully with the IAEA, grant the
access requested (such as to individuals and workshops
associated with past weaponization efforts, and to
individuals responsible for managing Qom), and answer
the questions it has been asked. Iran has created this
confidence deficit and it is up to Iran to restore the
international community's trust.

Next Steps
----------

-- The United States and its partners believe that the
troubling questions surrounding Iran's nuclear program
deserve the full and urgent attention of the
international community.

-- We look forward to working with your government to
promote the active involvement of the IAEA and the
international community in addressing these unresolved
questions.

-- We will be in touch with you in the days ahead to
share ideas on how to approach the issue at the IAEA
Board of Governors meeting that will begin on November
¶26.

-- Beyond the Board of Governors meeting, we would also
like to intensify our consultations on next appropriate
steps in the international community based on the dual
track policy (engagement and pressure) to persuade Iran
to bring its nuclear program into full compliance with
its international obligations.

HARD QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
--------------------------

¶12. (U) We have also compiled the following questions
and answers to draw from should Posts require them:

On The TRR Proposal
-------------------

-- Why must Iran surrender all of its LEU in one batch,
and why must it be before the end of the year?

o The TRR proposal was developed both to supply
Iran with the fuel required for the continued
operation of the reactor, and also as a measure
to build confidence in Iran's peaceful intentions
and its seriousness to negotiate with the E3+3.
o By agreeing to the transfer of 1200 kilograms of
LEU (enough to equal the last fuel supply
agreement Iran signed for the reactor with
Argentina in the early 1990s), we aimed to lessen
international concerns that Iran was attempting
to create a stockpile of uranium to contribute to
an eventual breakout from the NPT. This would
consequently allow more time for negotiations
with the E3+3 on the broader nuclear file.
o The transfer by the end of the year is needed to
ensure that Iran receives the fuel required for
the reactor before December 2010, when the
reactor will run out and be forced to shut down.

-- What risk does the LEU stored in Iran pose to the
international community? Isn't it under full IAEA
monitoring?

o Yes, this LEU is currently under IAEA safeguards.

STATE 00120288 006 OF 008


o However, given Iran's long history of IAEA
safeguards violations and NPT noncompliance, the
international community cannot trust that Iran
will not interfere with IAEA monitoring or
withdraw from IAEA safeguards or the NPT
altogether.
o This project will remove an immediate source of
concern and establish some confidence in Iran's
peaceful intent and willingness to comply with
its obligations.

-- How can Iran be sure it will ever receive the fuel
assemblies for the TRR in the current international
environment, in which many openly seek to diminish
Iran's nuclear capacity?

o We and our E3+3 partners have each made political
commitments at the highest levels to the
fulfillment of this project. Should Iran agree
to it, Iran will receive the fuel required.
o All participants in this project are taking
risks. Iran stands in violation of the NPT, its
IAEA safeguards agreement, and three Chapter VII
UNSC resolutions. This project offers Iran an
opportunity to establish confidence in its
peaceful intentions, a confidence that has eroded
due to Iran's continued non-compliance.

-- Can Iran simply purchase the fuel from an
international supplier, as some have advocated in Iran?
o The UN Security Council resolutions do permit
Iran to Iran can purchase low-enriched fuel from
an international supplier if it wishes.
o However, we are confident Iran would not find a
willing supplier given the concerns surrounding
its nuclear program and its continued defiance of
the international community.
o Outside of the context of the IAEA proposal
before Iran, we would oppose such a deal.

-- How would the E3+3 respond if Iran announced it had
"no choice" but to make its own fuel for the TRR?
o Under three UN Security Council resolutions, Iran
is required to suspend all uranium enrichment-
related activities. We have offered Iran a way
to secure the necessary TRR fuel without further
violating these obligations. Enrichment
activities to produce its own fuel for the TRR
would be a violation of current UNSCRs.
o Further, Iran is not currently able to produce
the fuel. Reconfiguration of Iranian centrifuges
to produce the required enrichment level (19.75%)
would cause serious international concern and
could permit Iran to produce a stockpile of even
greater enriched uranium than it has currently
(Iran's current enrichment level is 3.5%). This
would increase the risk of a near-term Iranian
breakout from the NPT and sprint to producing
nuclear weapons.

On Demands to Suspend Enrichment
--------------------------------

-- Iran suspended enrichment once before in response to
international demands, and received no benefit. Why
should Iran trust the international community now?

o Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment and other
activities in the past was intended to support a
diplomatic process. Unfortunately, Iran
terminated that diplomatic process in August 2005
by abandoning suspension.
o However, prior to that point, Iran's temporary
suspension avoided its being reported to the UN
Security Council and the sanctions that would
have likely come along with that report.
o The requirement of suspension imposed by the UNSC
in resolution 1737 is intended to restore that
diplomatic process and to lead to a final
resolution of international concerns with Iran's
nuclear program.
o This was codified in UNSCR 1737 when the UNSC
stated its intention to suspend implementation of
the measures adopted by the UNSC if Iran returned
to negotiations through suspension of its nuclear
and related activities.
o Trust is in short supply on both sides. It is
for that reason that we have offered Iran several
opportunities for reciprocal, confidence-building
steps (e.g., "freeze for freeze" and the TRR
proposal).

-- What about recent reports indicating the Iranian

STATE 00120288 007 OF 008


enrichment program has not grown. What is the
significance of this stagnation?

o Iran has slowed or scaled back the enrichment
program several times since the project became
public in 2002.
o There are many possible explanations for the
stagnation of the Iranian enrichment program,
including technical issues with the centrifuges
and general system maintenance.
o Regardless of Iran's lack of progress in its
enrichment program, it continues to enrich and
stockpile LEU. This activity in violation of
three United Nations Security Council resolutions
calling for full suspension of its nuclear and
enrichment related activities, and increases the
risk of a near-term Iranian breakout from the NPT
and sprint to producing nuclear weapons.

Israel's nuclear Program
------------------------

-- Why is there not equal attention to Israel's nuclear
status? Does it not also destabilize the region?
o The United States has long supported universal
adherence to the NPT treaty and continues to
believe that all states that have not done so
should join the Treaty and accept the full-scope
IAEA safeguards on all of their nuclear
activities.
o It is extremely difficult, however, to make this
case to a non-NPT state when its neighbors are in
violation of their own NPT obligations, and when
the international community has not demonstrated
the political will necessary to enforce
compliance.
o Iran's failure to comply with its NPT and IAEA
obligations bears out these concerns and
undermines attempts to secure universal adherence
to the NPT. It became a party to the treaty and
proceeded to violate its obligations under it for
over twenty years, presenting a fundamental
threat to the entire nonproliferation regime.
o Returning regional states to full compliance with
their NPT obligations would be an important step
toward NPT adherence by all states in the region.
An Iranian nuclear weapons capability also serves
as a destabilizing factor in the region, possibly
triggering proliferation across the Gulf in
response to a mounting threat posed by Iran. Not
only does this undermine the entire nuclear
nonproliferation regime, but risks further
instability in the region.

Qom Facility
------------

-- How can you say that the Qom facility was secret,
when it was Iran that announced its existence and
invited IAEA inspectors to visit?

o Iran was required to declare the existence of
this facility to the IAEA the moment the decision
was made to construct it, not several years into
its construction. This is a requirement of
Iran's IAEA Safeguards Agreement (contained in
Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's
Safeguards Agreement).
o This code was modified after revelations
surrounding Iraq's nuclear program were made in
the early 1990s.
o Iran was the last state to agree to the revised
code, but it did so in March 2003. Iran
attempted to revert to the early form of the code
(which requires notification only 180 days prior
to the introduction of nuclear to the facility)
in March 2007. The IAEA consistently has
rejected that Iran has the legal ability to make
such a change.
o We also believe that Iran made the decision to
declare the facility not to conform to its legal
obligations, but because it had become aware that
the secrecy of the facility had been compromised.

-- Iran claims it needs such a hardened facility as
Fordu because for years both the US and Israel have
threatened to bomb its nuclear sites. Is it not
surprising Iran would try to keep its location a secret
to have an emergency back-up facility?

O Iran's own failure to meet its obligations for
transparency and IAEA monitoring of sensitive
nuclear installations is the cause for the

STATE 00120288 008 OF 008


international community's concerns that
surrounding its nuclear program.
o Iran's decision to construct yet another
clandestine site only deepens these concerns.

P5+1
----

-- Why should Iran discuss its nuclear program with the
self-appointed P5+1? Isn't the IAEA the proper place
for Iran to engage on its nuclear program with the
international community?

O We welcome Iran's engagement with the IAEA. But
despite its rhetoric, Iran has not engaged with
the IAEA. Iran has refused for several years to
answer the IAEA's questions (even before the IAEA
reported Iran to the UNSC for its myriad
violations of its international obligations).
o The E3+3 mechanism evolved as a means to
negotiate a solution precisely because Iran was
refusing to engage with the IAEA on the concerns
regarding Iran's nuclear program.
CLINTON


/tag/IR_2.html


09STATE122950     2009-12-01 17:05     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Secretary of State

VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2950 3351728
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 011724Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T STATE 122950

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2034
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA GE IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S SHIG USING INTERMEDIARIES IN EFFORT TO
PROCURE TEST EQUIPMENT FROM GERMAN FIRMS (S)

REF: A. 2008 STATE 029412 AND PREVIOUS
¶B. 2008 BERLIN 000372
¶C. 2008 BERLIN 000637
¶D. STATE 019370 AND PREVIOUS
¶E. BERLIN 000263
¶F. BERLIN 000542

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASON 1.4 (C).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Berlin, please see
paragraph 4.

¶2. (S) Background and Objective: We want to advise German
officials of information indicating that as of June 2009, two
Iranian intermediary firms offered test equipment manufactured
by the German firms Rohde & Schwarz and Hottinger Baldwin
Messtechnik (HBM) to Iran's primary developer of liquid-fueled
ballistic missiles, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
(SHIG).
While this equipment is not controlled by the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it could be used in
ballistic missile testing applications. Moreover, SHIG made
specific requests for items manufactured by Rohde & Schwarz
and HBM, and goods produced by the two firms were the targets
of previous, long-running procurement efforts by SHIG and the
Iranian procurement network Farazeh Equipment Distributor
Company (FEDCO, which may have been acting on behalf of SHIG)
(Refs). In both cases, German officials investigated the
information we provided and sensitized the firms to their
concerns. (Note: In the HBM case, the company reported that
it did receive a request from Evertop Services (a FEDCO
affiliate), but that the request was rejected. End note.) We
want to share this new information with German officials and
encourage them to continue their efforts to prevent SHIG or
other Iranian entities of proliferation concern from procuring
sensitive items from Rohde & Schwarz and HBM.

¶3. Action Request: Request Embassy Berlin approach
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.

¶4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL GERMANY)

-- We would like to alert you to information of proliferation
concern and request your assistance in investigating this
activity.

-- Between 2007 and 2009, we discussed with you on numerous
occasions information indicating that Iranian entities of
proliferation concern were seeking equipment manufactured by
the German firms Rohde & Schwarz and Hottinger Baldwin
Messtechnik (HBM).

-- Specifically, we advised you that the Shahid Hemmat
Industrial Group (SHIG, Iran's primary developer of liquid
fueled ballistic missiles) and entities affiliated with the
Farazeh Equipment Distributor Company (FEDCO) were engaged in
efforts to procure Rohde & Schwarz and HBM equipment.

-- We were pleased to subsequently hear that German officials
had sensitized representatives of both firms to proliferation
concerns related to SHIG and FEDCO, and that HBM had rejected
a request from Evertop Services, an entity affiliated with
FEDCO.

-- We now want to share with you related information
indicating that as of June 2009, SHIG was seeking test
equipment via Iranian intermediaries from both Rohde & Schwarz
and HBM.

-- Specifically, we understand that the Tehran-based Heydari
Ofogh Sanat Anvar Company offered SHIG an ESIB model
electromagnetic interference test receiver and spectrum
analyzer manufactured by Rohde & Schwarz.

-- We also understand that the Iranian company Hamim
Commercial offered SHIG pressure transducers and other
equipment produced by HBM.

-- While this equipment is not controlled by the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it could be used in
ballistic missile testing applications.

-- We do not know if the Iranian intermediaries are already in
possession of the Rohde & Schwarz and HBM equipment, but
wanted to make you aware of the fact that Iran's missile
program made specific requests for items manufactured by these
German firms.

-- We also want to reiterate that SHIG often conducts its
business through front companies and middlemen posing as end
users.

-- Given SHIG's interest in this equipment and the previous
Iranian efforts to acquire Rohde & Schwarz and HBM equipment,
we wanted to share this latest information with you, and urge
you to continue your work to prevent these firms from acting,
even unwittingly, as suppliers to SHIG and other Iranian
entities of proliferation concern.

-- We look forward to continuing our excellent cooperation on
nonproliferation matters and to hearing of any updates related
to this case.

¶5. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann (Phone:
202-647-1430). Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR, EUR/CE, and EUR/PRA.

¶6. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at
www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON


/tag/IR_2.html


09UNVIEVIENNA540     2009-12-02 17:05     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     UNVIE

VZCZCXRO5630
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHUNV #0540/01 3361717
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 021717Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0355
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 UNVIE VIENNA 000540

SIPDIS

FOR P, T, H, ISN, S/SANAC, IO, NEA, SCA, EAP
H PLS PASS STAFFDEL AS APPROPRIATE
DOE FOR S2 AND NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, RYU, TALWAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: PREL KNNP AORC IR SY KN IN
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER EXAMINES IRAN, SYRIA, AND
MULTILATERAL VIENNA'S FRUSTRATING NAM DYNAMIC

REF: EMBASSY VIENNA 1450

Classified By: Mark Scheland, Counselor for nuclear Policy; reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: HFAC staffers Richard Kessler and David Fite
received from IAEA Secretariat November 10 information on the
Iran case that tracked with the tone of the subsequent
Director General's reporting on Iran to the Board of
Governors. The STAFFDEL heard that contact with Iran over
"possible military dimensions" of the nuclear program was at
an "absolute stalemate." According to Safeguards regional
division director Herman Nackaerts, IAEA inspectors' first
visit to the enrichment facility under construction near Qom
had run predictably but without extraordinary responsiveness
on Iran's part; the Secretariat was still trying to
understand the motivation to build the plant as now designed.
Nackaerts described the frustrating limitations of Iran's
cooperation with the Agency, and the STAFFDEL deduced that
Iranian officials held back because they were uncertain about
what lines of inquiry the IAEA was best equipped to exploit.
Questioning then-DG ElBaradei's remark to media that the
Agency had found "nothing to worry about" in Qom, STAFFDEL
asked if the Secretariat would report on how it judged the
plant did or did not fit into Iran's publicly explained
nuclear program. Nackaerts expressed appreciation for the
precision and usefulness of U.S.-supplied information in the
Qom case and generally.

¶2. (C) Summary contd.: On Syria, Nackaerts said the
Secretariat had told Damascus its first explanation for the
presence of anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron
Source Reactor was not credible. Further, the Secretariat
still could not yet present the case for how what was being
built at Dair Alzour fit in as "part of a Syrian program or
part of someone else's program." On DPRK, IAEA/EXPO's Tariq
Rauf said the IAEA, when it could, would ultimately have to
"go back to the early 1990s" to reconstruct accountancy of
plutonium and could not accept a "political" compromise
setting material "off to the side." To get to a finding of
"no diversion" would take several years and extensive
resources and forensics.

¶3. (SBU) Contd.: Treating Technical Cooperation, the
STAFFDEL received the same briefing on the Safeguards
Department's project review process and internal database
that was provided to a GAO review team in 2008. IAEA
External Relations Director Rauf asserted, "We are not a
denial organization." STAFFDEL related how segments of the
GAO report had reduced Congressional confidence in the
efficiency of TC. U.S. national labs were afforded too
little time to review projects for our national
decision-making on their merit and proliferation risk.
Secretariat also described hindrances it faces in having UN
and national development officials recognize and integrate
nuclear applications.

¶4. (SBU) Contd.: The STAFFDEL also engaged P5-plus-1 heads
of mission over lunch on the means to draw or impel Iran to
open up on its nuclear program and on dynamics in Vienna
between blocs of Member States. End Summary.

Fordow/Qom and Iran PMD: Frustration,
but Good Support from the U.S.
-------------------------------------

¶5. (U) House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Majority Staff
Director Richard Kessler and Professional Staff Member David
Fite (STAFFDEL) spent ninety minutes with IAEA staff on
November 10. Principal issues were safeguards verification
in Iran and Syria, the screening of IAEA Technical
Cooperation (TC) projects for proliferation risk, and TC
Department efforts to improve project design and integration
into national and UN development activities. STAFFDEL
affirmed to Secretariat officials that the HFAC under
Chairman Berman: was strongly supportive of the IAEA; put
emphasis on counter-proliferation issues in countries of
concern (indeed, was weighing legislation to impose further
U.S. sanctions on Iran); had advocated an increase in NADR
funding for extrabudgetary contributions to the IAEA,
including for the Safeguards Analytical laboratory; and,
supported "getting the U.S. up to date" on payment of its
assessments to the IAEA's regular budget. Following the
meeting at the IAEA, STAFFDEL consulted Ambassador and
Mission staff and had a working lunch with P5-plus-1 heads of
mission focused on Iran and the dynamics of multilateral

UNVIE VIEN 00000540 002 OF 005


diplomacy in Vienna. STAFFDEL's UNVIE program followed a day
of consultations with Austrian officials (reftel).

¶6. (SBU) IAEA Safeguards Department Operations B (AOR
Mideast, South Asia, parts of Europe, the Americas, and all
nuclear weapons states) Director Herman Nackaerts briefed
STAFFDEL on the inspection he had led a few weeks before to
the recently disclosed Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom
in Iran. Nackaerts said Iranian officials had been open to
allowing inspectors access. The Secretariat was still trying
to understand, he said, why Iran would build this facility,
scaled as it was for 3000 centrifuges in contrast to the much
large Natanz facility. It was positive, Nackaerts pointed
out, that Fordow was now under safeguards. He noted that the
IAEA had "at least two" safeguards inspectors at work in Iran
"every day of the year" and would henceforth plan to visit
Fordow regularly. Asked how "complete" the plant was or when
it would be operational, Nackaerts said, "The information we
got from Member States proved to be very precise" on this
point. Asked about permission to take samples at Fordow,
Nackaerts replied that Iranian officials had permitted the
inspectors to perform the same safeguards procedures they
typically undertook at Natanz.

¶7. (S) STAFFDEL asked if the Agency enjoyed full access to
the Arak IR-40 plant. Nackaerts related there had been no
access for a 12-month period but normal access in August and
October 2009. However, the Iranians "claim they cannot go
back on the decision of their parliament, and hence grant the
IAEA a "visit" but do not call it Design Information
Verification. On possible military dimensions (PMD),
Nackaerts said the Secretariat's approach was to follow lines
of inquiry that could involve use of nuclear material, for
example, the documents treating uranium metal or green salt.
The Iranians, he said in a tone conveying his skepticism,
asserted the uranium metal document was "mistakenly" included
in a packet of information they received from the AQ Khan
network but was nothing Iran had asked for or used. The
"green salt" documentation Iran dismissed as a forgery.
Indeed, Nackaerts went on, Iran replied basically on the form
of documents, not on their substance. The Secretariat had
not been "impressed" by the 117-page rejoinder Iran had
provided to the initial presentation of PMD documentation.
It had told Iran the information hung together too much for
it all to have bee fabricated and asked that, if some of the
documentation were "doctored," Iranian officials should show
the Secretariat "where the truth ends." Since August 2008,
(when Ahmadinejad personally shut off Nackaerts's previously
approved visit to workshops indicated in the documentation),
Nackaerts concluded, there remained a high-level decision not
to cooperate. STAFFDEL member Fite took from this that the
Iranians were holding back "because they don't know where any
opening will lead." Nackaerts agreed, saying they knew that
every question they answered would bring another question.


¶8. (S) Fite alluded to then-DG ElBaradei's remarks of a few
days before in U.S. media to the effect that the inspectors
had found "nothing to worry about" in Fordow. Acknowledging
the practical meaning of this remark -- that there were no
centrifuges or nuclear material present -- Fite nevertheless
regretted the headline and asked if the DG's formal report to
Board members (Note: subsequently released as GOV/2009/74,
deresticted by the Board November 27, and available to the
public at www.iaea.org) would deal with how Qom fits or does
not fit into Iran's explained nuclear program. Nackaerts
replied, "We will identify the issues we're working." He
went on that understanding the timeline of Fordow's
development was hindered by Iran's practice never to involve
people who really know the facts or the government's
intentions in discussion with the Agency. The officials with
whom inspectors meet clearly are "steered" by unseen
observers, who send notes to the Iranian interlocutors during
meetings. Iran recorded the meetings, he added, but did not
permit the IAEA to do so. Further, the Secretariat never
received original design documents, but ones produced for the
Secretariat that were technically true to the facilities they
found upon inspection. Against this Iranian practice,
Nackaerts added, the Secretariat received very precise
information from Member States that helped inspectors decide
what to ask about. The organization of this information was
good and, while the Agency was satisfied, it had inquired if
more information could be shared with the Agency, "not
necessarily for release to Iran," he said.

Syria Stalemate

UNVIE VIEN 00000540 003 OF 005


---------------

¶9. (SBU) The Syria case, Nackaerts said, was starting to
look like Iran in that the government provided "good
cooperation" on some areas but presented a "stalemate" on
others. The Secretariat challenged Syria's proposed
explanation for the presence of uranium at Dair Alzour/Al
Kibar (i.e., that Israeli depleted uranium munitions could be
the source), but the inquiry was at a roadblock. Syrian
officials had been told their first explanation for
anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor
(MNSR) was not credible, and the Agency had inquired what
nuclear material Syria could have had that was not previously
declared. Overall, the IAEA still "did not understand"
(meaning, it could not yet present the solid case for) how
Dair Alzour fit in as part of a Syrian nuclear program "or
part of someone else's program."

Return to DPRK?
Safeguards in India?
--------------------

¶10. (SBU) Asked how quickly IAEA inspectors could resume
work in North Korea if re-admitted by the government, Tariq
Rauf of IAEA External Relations and Policy Coordination
(EXPO) observed that the last resumption had taken a week
(for technical set-up, re-activation of cameras, etc.).
Safeguards Operations A division had a program set out for
what steps to undertake "under circumstances the DPRK may let
us back in." Rauf continued that the Agency would to go back
to the early 1990s' plutonium revelation to reconstruct
material accountancy. When most recently in the DPRK, the
IAEA had been monitoring facility shutdown processes but not
implementing NPT safeguards on DPRK material. The Agency
could "not accept" political compromises that would set some
nuclear material "off to the side". Then-DG ElBaradei had
called for implementation of the Additional Protocol in DPRK,
but even if Pyongyang cooperated fully it would take several
years and much in the way of resources and forensics to be
able to get to a finding of "no diversion."

¶11. (SBU) Asked about progress toward safeguards
implementation in India, Rauf confirmed the GOI had submitted
a "formal list" of facilities that was not a document the
Agency would characterize as a formal declaration under its
safeguards agreement. India was under no mandatory timeline
to make its declaration as it was not an NPT signatory.
(Comment: Rauf's characterization was flat wrong. Mission
had learned from the Safeguards Department three weeks before
this meeting that India had officially "notified" two new
facilities (Raps 5 and 6) under its 2008 safeguards
agreement, that surveillance systems had been installed, and
the facilities were under safeguards. End Comment.)

Scrutinizing and Promoting
IAEA Technical Cooperation
--------------------------

¶12. (U) Renaud Chatelus of the Safeguards Division of
Information Management (SGIM) acquainted STAFFDEL with IAEA
screening of Technical Cooperation (TC) projects for their
potential to afford access to sensitive technologies.
Grounded in a 1979 Agency Information Circular, INFCIRC/267,
the practice is to focus on projects related to enrichment,
heavy water production, reprocessing of spent fuel, and
plutonium or mixed oxide fuel. Chatelus said SGIM reviewed
projects submitted, project approved, individual procurement
actions, and overall implementation of projects. Reviews are
conducted completely in-house, he said in reply to a
question. Using the same PowerPoint slides that were
presented to a GAO review team in 2008, Chatelus illustrated
with screen shots from the Agency's staff access-only
database the system of flagging projects for: compliance with
INFCIRC 267, compliance with INFCIRC 540 (Additional
Protocol), transfer of "sensitive items" on the nuclear
Suppliers Group or dual-use lists, general interest, or
possible relation to a safeguarded facility. In subsequent
discussion of the impact of screening and Member States'
sense of entitlement to TC, EXPO's Tariq Rauf affirmed, "We
are not a denial organization."

¶13. (U) STAFFDEL member Fite observed that segments of the
GAO report treating transfers to state sponsors of terrorism
as well as on program management had reduced Congressional
confidence about TC. Fite said he had approached
Appropriations staff about using a supplemental funding bill

UNVIE VIEN 00000540 004 OF 005


to resolve slow U.S. payment of assessments and do more for
the Agency, but was rebuffed because the GAO report on TC had
"poisoned the waters." Apart from political objections to
certain TC recipients benefitting from U.S. funding, he
added, a persisting "Achilles heel" was that U.S. national
labs were afforded too little time to review projects for our
national decision-making on their merit and proliferation
risk. TC Department representative Johannes Seybold replied
that the Agency aimed to provide Member States six weeks time
for review, but was also at the mercy of requesting states
providing the relevant project information. Just the
compendium of project titles and short descriptions became a
very thick document in each biennial cycle, Seybold went on,
and the Agency was "struggling" with some Member States'
national policies to be able to go beyond this level of
transparency.

¶14. (U) STAFFDEL's meeting with Secretariat officials
concluded in an exchange with Seybold, TC's section head for
strategy and partnerships, about the IAEA's awkward position
in development efforts coordinated by the UN or by developing
countries' national institutions. Seybold laid out the
following. The IAEA's cooperation with TC recipient states
occurs through National Liaison Officers, generally in the
atomic energy commission or government ministry responsible
for nuclear power or radiological sources. Generally,
neither the IAEA nor the corresponding national entity is a
participant in UN development team or host government
deliberations about development in the recipient country.
Two-thirds of TC projects address development issues for
which the IAEA is not the responsible lead agency in the UN
system, e.g., water quality and availability, food security,
climate. In many cases, national authorities and the UN team
responsible for these areas in a given country lack awareness
of IAEA capabilities, and/or they maintain a distance from
things "nuclear." Seybold related Agency efforts to
integrate with these authorities through the UNDAF (UN
Development Assistance Framework) process and other
partnering efforts. STAFFDEL expressed encouragement for
bringing nuclear applications to greater impact in the
development field.

P5-plus-1 Ambassadors Regret Iranian Paralysis
on TRR; Depict Grim Dynamic with G-77/NAM
--------------------------------------------- -

¶15. (C) STAFFDEL was the guests of honor at lunch hosted by
the Ambassador with his counterparts from China, Germany,
Russia, and the UK and the French Charge d'Affaires. Kessler
and Fite laid out HFAC's interest and Chairman Berman's
supportive posture toward the Agency, as they had for
Secretariat staff. Opening discussion of Iran, UK Ambassador
Simon Smith said the Iranian answer on the ElBaradei-brokered
deal on refueling the Tehran research reactor (TRR) "had to
be 'yes' or 'no,' not waffling" as it had been. German
Ambassador Ruediger Luedeking posited that the U.S.
Administration had confounded Iranian internal processes and
the latest EU3 proposal had "cornered" Iran. Agreeing that
Iran faced an imperative between "yes" and "no," Luedeking
observed, "they can't answer." HFAC Staff Director Kessler
noted the committee had tried to follow up a Larijani
approach conveyed one year before for a meeting with Chairman
Berman, but found that the Iranians backed off.

¶16. (C) Russian Ambassador Alexander Zmeyevskiy asserted
that confidentiality was a major concern for Iran. He noted
its TRR counter-proposals, either to keep its LEU on its
territory under IAEA safeguards until released in exchange
for fuel rods, or to swap outgoing LEU piecemeal for incoming
fuel assemblies. Moving beyond the TRR issue, UK Ambassador
said he was severely disappointed that Member States had been
unable to "apply consequences for the breaking of rules" of
the organization. We needed to convince some other Member
States, he continued, that tolerating rule breaking as on Qom
and Code 3.1 (of the Subsidiary Arrangement of Iran's
Safeguards Agreement) risked bringing the organization into
discredit. STAFFDEL member Fite asked if Iran's Arab
neighbors were among the problem interlocutors in Vienna; he
asserted that officials of Arabian Peninsula countries told
the Congress they see Iran as an "existential threat." While
they may seek the cover of international signals or sanctions
imposed by others, they say they do want action against Iran.

¶17. (C) Segueing from Iran to DPRK, Chinese Ambassador Hu
Xiaodi said the main difference between the cases was that
progress with DPRK had been achieved when the North Koreans

UNVIE VIEN 00000540 005 OF 005


wanted something specific, whereas he (Hu) had never heard
Iranian officials say that they wanted a settlement, or that
they wanted anything specific. Although we did not at
present know "how" to reach a deal with Iran, Hu concluded,
we were not in the worst situation, in which Iran explicitly
does want something -- nuclear weapons. Asked if he
genuinely thought the DPRK would give up its weapons program
for aid, Hu said "hope" (as opposed to "think.") Ambassador
Davies seriously questioned that Pyongyang would give up a
weapons capability in exchange for a significant material
improvement in our relations, as the government would likely
calculate it had been its possession of weapons that won the
concessions.

¶18. (SBU) Ambassador turned the discussion to the dynamic
between groups of Member States, as illustrated in the
ongoing discussion of a Technical Cooperation project to
advance IAEA use of "results based management." The German
Ambassador observed that NAM positions on many issues were
characterized by "myths" and they were clearly being dictated
by Iran and Egypt. Ambassador Davies asked if the dynamic
was further charged by states beginning to suspect that the
U.S. seriously intends to strengthen the Agency in all its
functions -- with the uncertain shifts in practice and
distribution of resources and clout that could mean.
STAFFDEL lead Kessler said the Congressional perception was
one of a "lightning change" from the last Administration to
the present one in U.S. approaches to the IAEA, to
development assistance globally, and to multilateralism.
German Ambassador agreed and said this was a complication for
NAM states that know they are the immobile ones now. Yet, TC
was a "sacred cow" and the NAM's impulse was to reject
"illegitimate intrusion" into its distribution.

¶19. (SBU) French Charge Philippe Merlin discouraged STAFFDEL
from expecting diplomatic gains, say in the NPT review,
through greater generosity on IAEA peaceful use programs.
"TC is the price we pay," he said, for developing countries'
acquiescence toward the safeguards regime, the thing we
really want. Fite asked if a reasoned discussion with
development officials in capitals about making TC deliver
more impact could translate into different instructions to
the obstreperous missions in Vienna. German Ambassador took
the view that any effort to change TC would be seen in
capitals as "per se bad." It was more advisable to advocate
to NAM states what their own interests in the safeguards
regime were. UK Ambassador agreed there were no points to be
scored by asking NAM capitals about TC effectiveness; he
added that the UK Government "doesn't give two hoots" about
TC, given the small funding level (from the UK Energy
Ministry) in comparison to Britain's official development
assistance. TC was, also in the UK view, the price we pay
for the IAEA we want.

¶20. (U) STAFFDEL did not review this report.

DAVIES


/tag/IR_2.html


09ISTANBUL440     2009-12-04 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Consulate Istanbul

VZCZCXRO7673
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHIT #0440/01 3381236
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041236Z DEC 09
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9361
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 000440

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR MURRAY; BERLIN FOR ROSENSTOCK-STILLER; BAGHDAD
FOR POPAL AND HUBAH; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; ASHGABAT FOR
TANGBORN; DUBAI FOR IRPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2024
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON ETRD KNNP TU IR
SUBJECT: TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS: MOTIVATIONS, LIMITATIONS,
AND IMPLICATIONS

REF: (A) ANKARA 1516 (EXDIS) (B) ISTANBUL 421 (C)
ISTANBUL 290 (D) 2008 ISTANBUL 85 (E) 2008
ISTANBUL 146 (F) ISTANBUL 425 (G) ANKARA 1704

Classified By: ConGen Istanbul Deputy Principal Officer Win Dayton; Rea
son 1.5 (d).

¶1. (C) Recent discussions with Turkish and Iranian
think-tank, business, and political activist contacts on the
issue of Turkey-Iran relations reveal a broad consensus that:
(1) Turkey pursues closer relations with Iran out of desires
for regional stability and conflict avoidance, recognition of
Turkey as an indispensable East-West bridge; strengthening a
long-term energy and commercial relationship; and hope that
Turkey's approach will moderate Iranian regime behavior. (2)
Iran reciprocates because it sees Turkey as a hedge against
its diplomatic isolation, a buffer against sanctions, and a
safety valve for its population. However, (3) Turkey's
influence over Iranian decision-making it limited; Turkey has
never persuaded Iran to change course on an issue of
strategic concern to the regime. To quote one contact:
"Iran knows Turkey is not going to walk away." On the other
hand, our contacts also concluded that Iranian
decision-making responds at least tactically to multilateral
pressure, which argues that Turkey can and should play a key
role to play in supporting tougher approaches on Iran at the
UNSC and IAEA. End Summary.

Views from Contacts on Turkey-Iran Relations
---------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Over the past several weeks, in conversations before
and after President Ahmadinejad's November 8-9 visit to
Istanbul (ref B), ConGen Istanbul's NEA Iran Watcher has
solicited views from a wide range of Turkish and Iranian
contacts on the issue of warming Turkey-Iran relations, what
motivates each side, and whether Turkey's approach has led to
a moderation of Iranian regime behavior. Contacts with whom
we spoke included Turkish academic experts, Turkish
businessmen who deal with Iran, Istanbul-based journalists
who cover Iran, several Iranian political activists now
seeking refugee status in Turkey for fear of persecution in
Iran, and several Tehran-based Iranian contacts who follow
Iran's foreign policy. Our conversations revealed an unusual
confluence of views.

Turkey's Motivations
--------------------
¶3. (C) According to a number of Turkish academic and
think-tank contacts, Turkey is pursuing closer relations with
Iran for several mutually-reinforcing reasons. First, the
underlying principle: According to a Turkish university
professor who informally advises FM Davutoglu on Middle East
issues (ref C), Turkey's pursuit of close relations with Iran
is a direct reflection of Davutoglu's academic philosophy and
influential 2000 book, "Strategic Depth," in which he first
articulated a policy of "zero problems" with Turkey's
neighbors. Another Istanbul-based professor told us that
Turkey's Iran policy represents "a triumph of real-politik,"
with Turkey's national and regional interests trumping any
discomfort that Turkey, as a multi-ethnic, pluralistic
democracy, might feel about the Iranian regime's harsh
domestic authoritarianism. This contact described Davutoglu
as "Turkey's Kissinger."

¶4. (C) Regional Stability and Conflict Avoidance: Turkish
contacts, and indeed even MFA interlocutors, have
acknowledged in the recent past that Turkey sees a military
attack against Iran's nuclear facilities as the worst
possible outcome on the Iran issue. Iran's acquisition of a
nuclear weapons capability would only be the second worst
outcome. This hints at the depth of Turkey's anxiety about
the dangers to regional stability, including Turkey's, of the
unintended consequences of any further military action in the
region, and explains Turkey's commitment at almost any cost
to continued western diplomatic engagement with Iran. As one
contact explained, "After the traumatic violence in Iraq, and
fearful that some countries still think military action is an
option with Iran, Turkey will do anything to prevent armed
conflict." The GoT's approach on this score enjoys some
public support: Turkish public opinion also considers an
attack against Iran as more dangerous to Turkey than Iran
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Indeed, almost a
third of Turks polled do not consider a nuclear-armed Iran to
be a threat, believing that Iran would never attack a fellow
Muslim country.

¶5. (C) Recognition of Turkey as Moderate Regional Leader and
Indispensable East-West Bridge: According to an Ankara-based

ISTANBUL 00000440 002 OF 004


international relations professor with ties to PM Erdogan's
office, Turkey is also deepening ties to Iran because the
region otherwise faces a "power vacuum." No other regional
state (e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq) has the military and
economic power to serve as an effective counterweight to
Iran. Turkey fills this role with the support of regional
states who otherwise fear a dominant Iran, including the Gulf
States and to some degree Iran's own client, Syria.
Moreover, he described Turkey's engagement with Iran as part
of a wider effort to stake out a regional leadership position
that puts Turkey "at the fulcrum" and makes it an
indispensable partner for the west -- whether or not Turkey
eventually joins the EU -- in dealing with the Middle East
and Central Asia. This contact acknowledged that this
sometimes requires Turkey to tactically distance itself from
the USG on several key issues, including Iran's "right" to
enrichment and the regime's dismal human rights record. But
our contact underscored that "this is classic triangulation."
Turkey's intention, he claims, is not a strategic distancing
from the US.
¶6. (C) Strengthening a long-term energy and commercial
relationship: Turkey does not hide the fact that its own
growing energy security needs compel it to look to all
available sources, including Iran, for energy. In response,
we have underscored that the USG supports the diversification
of Turkish gas supplies, while cautioning that Iran has
proven to be an unreliable partner in the past and
reaffirming USG concern over new energy deals with Iran.
Turkey is also actively seeking to expand trade ties with
Iran: Both Turkish and Iranian officials have publicly
called for bilateral trade volume, which was $10 billion in
2008, to reach $20 billion by 2012 -- a goal most trade
experts say is wildly unrealistic. Furthermore, Turkey is
taking steps to protect and expand financial ties with Iran,
for example by continuing to allow Iran's Bank Mellat
(sanctioned by the USG under E.O. 13382) to operate branches
in Istanbul and Ankara, and agreeing to conduct bilateral
trade in Turkish Lira or Iranian Rials rather than dollars
and Euros to avoid having to clear the payments through US or
European banks.
¶7. (C) Tying Iran into regional organizations: As long as
Davutoglu controls Turkish foreign policy, our Turkish
contacts predict that Ankara will seek multiple avenues for
bilateral and multilateral engagement with Iran, deepening
bilateral cultural and economic ties, and working with
regional organizations like the D-8 (ref D), the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ref E) and the OIC to maximize
engagement. Indeed, Davutoglu's MFA sees regional IOs like
these as much more useful tools for engaging Iran, and thus
committing Iran incrementally to pursue regionally
cooperative policies, than previous FMs did, according to
contacts.

Iran's Motivations
------------------
¶8. (C) According to our Turkish and Iranian contacts, Iran
is happy to reciprocate Turkey's interest in closer ties
because it sees Turkey as a hedge against its diplomatic
isolation, a buffer against sanctions, and a safety valve for
its population. Turkey's value to Iran is felt most strongly
in these six areas:
--Economic: Iran recognizes Turkey's emergence as a regional
economic powerhouse, wants to deepen Turkey's dependence on
its natural gas, and sees Turkish markets and bilateral
commerce as a hedge against isolation and sanctions;
-- Diplomatic: Iran knows that Turkey's seats on the UNSC
and IAEA Board give it outsized influence, and Iran benefits
from the occasional inclination of Turkish leaders to give
Iran's nuclear intentions, at least in public, the benefit of
the doubt;
-- Political: Turkey's refusal to publicly criticize the
regime over the conduct of June elections or its crackdown on
peaceful protesters, as well as PM Edogan's quick recognition
of Ahmadinejad's contested election victory, helped bolster
Iranian regime legitimacy at a critical period when the
regime needed it most;
-- Cultural: A quarter of Iran's population is ethnically
Azeri and Turkish-speaking; Turkish TV programs and are among
the most popular in Iran; and one million Iranians flock
annually visa-free to Turkey as a touristic "safety valve";
-- Turkey's strategic importance to the U.S: Iran closely
watched the spring 2009 visits to Turkey by Secretary Clinton
and then President Obama. One direct result of those visits,
according to an Iranian journalist based in Istanbul, was a
decision by the regime to try to use Turkey's enhanced
influence with the USG to "soften" Washington's approach to
Iran.


ISTANBUL 00000440 003 OF 004


The Limits of Turkish Influence On Iran
---------------------------
¶9. (C) Turkey's influence with Iran runs broadly, but does
not appear to run deep. None of our contacts had seen
concrete evidence that Turkey has swayed Iranian leaders to
change course on any issue of strategic interest to the
regime where Iran had not already calculated it was in its
interests to do so.

¶10. (C) An Istanbul-based professor who informally advises
Davutoglu, and joined him in his September and October bilats
(in Tehran and Kuala Lumpur) with Iranian FM Mottaki, claimed
that Davutoglu's interventions helped persuade the regime to
agree to participate in the October 1 Geneva meeting with the
P5 1. However, all other contacts dismissed that claim,
noting that Iranian regime statements and press reports prior
to Davutoglu's bilats already indicated that Iran would go to
Geneva.

¶11. (C) Several weeks of intense, personal diplomacy by FM
Davutoglu, supported by interventions form President Gul and
PM Erdogan, have been unable to persuade Iranian
decision-makers to agree to a compromise deal with Turkey
that would keep alive the IAEA's Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR) fuel swap proposal, a key test of the P5 1's efforts to
engage Iran.

¶12. (C) Our contact who advises Davutoglu also asserted that
Turkey played a key role in persuading Iran to release
several detainees including Greek-British journalist Iason
Athanasiadis (jailed in Iran on June 17 and released on July
6). But Athanasiadis (please protect) told us that while
Turkey offered to intervene with Iran on his case, to his
knowledge it never did, and indeed Athanasiadis told us he
believed it was the Ecumenical Patriarch's personal request
to Khamenei (via letter) that probably convinced Iran to
release him.

¶13. (C) Even on issues of lesser strategic importance to
Iran, high-level Turkish intervention does not reveal a
record of successfully moderating Iranian policies.
According to a Turkish businessman who deals with Iran (Ref
F), several interventions from Turkey's Trade and Foreign
Ministers, and even a plea from PM Erdogan in Tehran on
October 27, have been unable to persuade Iran to lower its
customs duties on Turkish imports, currently 45% for finished
products. As our business contact explained, even though Iran
depends on Turkish diplomatic support and benefits from
Turkish gas purchases and other trade, Iran realizes it does
not have to sacrifice any critical policy priorities in
return, including its customs income, because "Iran knows
Turkey is not going to walk away."

Does Turkey Really Understand Iran Better?
---------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Underlying Turkey's pursuit of warmer relations with
Iran is an assumption on the part of Turkish decision-makers
and diplomats that Turkey has correctly judged that the
current Iranian regime will be its long-term interlocutor.
But Turkey's belief that it understands Iranian political
developments better than most western countries is an
assumption strongly challenged by our Iranian contacts.
These contacts suggest that Turkey draws its assessment of
Iran's internal dynamics through a subjective filter, which
values regime stability foremost, and thus Turkey's
assessments artificially inflate evidence suggestive of
regime stability.

¶15. (C) According to two separate "Green Movement" activists
now seeking refugee status in Turkey -- one a Mousavi
campaign official, one the communications director of a
reformist party that supported Mousavi -- Turkey missed an
historic opportunity by quickly recognizing Ahmadinejad's
victory and dismissing the Green Movement's political
significance, either as a meaningful opposition movement or
as the possible vanguard of a more democratic Iranian
government. Most Green Movement activists now see Turkey as
fully committed to the Iranian regime's survival in the name
of regional stability, and predict that Turkey will be "on
the wrong side of history" if and when Iran's fractured
regime faces systemic change at the hands of Iran's
population. "When the system falls and a more democratic,
moderate, outward-looking government comes to power, we will
all remember where Turkey stood on 22 Khordad (June 12) and
after."
¶16. (C) Turkey, like the USG, almost certainly recognizes
that within the Iranian regime there are at least several
factions and key players jockeying intensely for influence.

ISTANBUL 00000440 004 OF 004


The fact that Turkish President Gul agreed to meet former
Iranian presidential candidate Mohsen Rezai, a Rafsanjani
ally, in Ankara in October (despite the INTERPOL Red Notice
issued against Rezai), and the relative frequency with which
Turkish officials including PM Erdogan have met influential
Majles speaker Larijani, an Ahmadinejad rival, in the past
six months, suggest that Turkey -- like others in the west --
wants to hedge its bets on who will emerge as the strongest
of Iran's decision-makers, especially if Supreme Leader
Khamenei faces future leadership challenges. (In a telling
anecdote related to us indirectly, when Erdogan met Khamenei
in Tehran on October 28, Khamenei seemed to be "in a time
capsule", asking uninformed or unrealistic questions about
Turkish foreign policy, and passively uninterested in
discussing the nuclear issue.) Despite its belief that it
knows its neighbor Iran better than most other countries do,
according to our contacts, Turkey is just as uncertain as the
USG and other western countries as to what exactly is
happening behind the regime's closed doors.

Implications
----------
¶17. (C) If the consensus views of our contacts are accurate,
it suggests our efforts to persuade PM Erdogan to adopt a
tougher public stance against Iran will be a tough sell.
Even if Erdogan were to hew closer to P5-plus-one criticism
of Iran, Tehran would likely pay him little heed. On the
other hand, our contacts point out that Iran's regime has a
clear recent history of making tactical concessions in the
face of concerted international pressure, especially pressure
from the UNSC and IAEA. If this holds true, we can and
should encourage Turkey to play a supportive role at the UNSC
and IAEA as the USG and partners consider raising pressure on
Iran in those fora. As noted Ref G, however, any USG effort
to try press Turkey to sign up to tougher international
measures on Iran, especially on issues that might impact the
Turkish economy, will have costly domestic political
consequences for the GoT. The key to securing Turkish
acquiescence at the UNSC and IAEA, a Turkish professor
explained, is to keep the engagement track on the table and
even further sweetened (especially with trade incentives from
which Turkey might also benefit), even as tougher measures
are being pursued.
WIENER


/tag/IR_2.html


09UNVIEVIENNA553     2009-12-09 13:01     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     UNVIE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000553

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2023
TAGS: PREL IR AU AORC KNNP
SUBJECT: AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN DESCRIBES ELECTIONS AS
DRIVING TEHRAN ENVIRONMENT

REF: UNVIE 544

Classified By: DCM Geoff Pyatt for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)

¶1. (C) Summary. On December 3, former Austrian Ambassador
to Tehran Michael Postl (please protect) debriefed MsnOff on
his final calls on Iranian officials as he left post. He
noted that former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani both had
extracted themselves from the normal political scene and were
focused on tangential issues where their weight could still
be felt. Nevertheless, Rafsanjani suggested that it would be
helpful if the West spoke out against the election fraud and
human rights violations that followed.

¶2. (C) Postl said that President Ahmadinejad's chief of
cabinet, Mashaie, made clear to him prior to the Geneva talks
that Iran was planning to approach the talks with a spirit of
compromise and that Postl would be "surprised" by Iran's
attitude. Postl explained the lack of follow-through in the
wake of the talks as a probable decision by Supreme Leader
Khamenei that the West was not trustworthy or that Iran could
get more from the P5 plus 1 than the six offered in Geneva.
Majles Speaker Larijani's outspoken disapproval of the Tehran
Research Reactor deal advocated by Ahmadinejad could have
been an exercise of Larijani's first opportunity to undermine
Ahmadinejad after he was pressured to disavow himself of
knowledge that Iranian prisoners were being raped in jail,
which lost him credibility with the Iranian public. Finally,
Postl argued that the U.S. should focus its outreach to Iran
on formats that Iranians perceive are less biased, such as
BBC Persian's version of Hardtalk or Press TV. End Summary.

¶3. (C) On December 3, former Austrian Ambassador to Tehran
Michael Postl gave MsnOff a readout of the state of domestic
political wranglings in Tehran prior to his departure from
post in October. Now posted in Vienna, Postl noted that he
still advises the Austrian government on Iran issues and that
he was recently asked to see if his contacts in Iran would
meet with him even though he had departed post. Many said
that they would, so he may be asked by the Austrian Foreign
Ministry to return to Iran periodically to make use of the
excellent contacts he was afforded given his Farsi skills and
native Iranian wife.

¶4. (C) Postl recounted his final calls on contacts in Iran
before leaving post, noting that many who had refused
meetings with him after the elections were now willing to
meet him. When he met with former President Khatami, Khatami
noted that because of the post-election environment, it did
not make sense to talk about politics. Postl suggested that
they discuss the possibility of Khatami pursuing a dialogue
of civilizations or religions that might give him an opening
to the West. Khatami noted that he did want to focus more on
that kind of dialogue and engagement and that he might come
to Austria next year in pursuit of such discussions.

-------------------------------------------
Final Calls Reveal Disillusionment with the
Possibilities for Change
-------------------------------------------

¶5. (C) Postl noted that in his final calls, he sought out
a meeting with the new health minister, Marzieh Vahid
Dastjerdi since he was interested in meeting the Islamic
Republic's first female minister. Postl described her as
"sort of a puppet" and very insecure despite her good
credentials for the job. She is a member of the Larijani
family, giving this influential clan placement in the
executive branch, in addition to the leverage they hold
through the key posts of Ali Larijani as Majles Speaker and
Javad Larijani as head of the Judiciary. In their meeting,
Dastjerdi and Postl discussed possible cooperation between
Iran and Austria in hospitals, training, and person-to-person
contacts in the medical field.

¶6. (C) Postl also called on the powerful new chief of
President Ahmadinejad's cabinet, Mashaie. Postl said that
many believed that Mashaie's rejection for a vice
presidential post showed that there were disagreements
between Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, but the fact that
he was given the slot as head of the cabinet means that
Khamenei must not be fundamentally opposed to him. Postl was
candid with Mashaie, noting that although the Iranian
elections were an internal matter, the treatment of civilians
in the aftermath of the elections was wrong by any
calculation. Postl assessed that using Farsi instead of
English made a difference in the reaction he received to this
candor, and Mashaie said that he would be pleased to meet
with Postl again if he were in Iran.


UNVIE VIEN 00000553 002 OF 004


¶7. (C) In what Postl believes was the first meeting former
President Rafsanjani had granted to a Westerner -- and
perhaps the first meeting with a foreigner -- since the
elections, the two discussed economic cooperation, which
Rafsanjani said was his primary focus. They avoided the
topics of the election and the nuclear issue, especially
given the presence of 10 to 15 "watchers" from different
veins of the Iranian government. Rafsanjani was very
interested in non-nuclear energy cooperation and asked very
detailed questions about wind energy, which Postl said
Austria would be able to help with. Rafsanjani also
discussed his sense of how the Iranian government could
evolve, arguing that change must come from within Iran and
that interference from foreigners was not welcome in most
circumstances. Nevertheless, Rafsanjani believed that the
best help possible from foreigners would be to say that the
elections were not fair and to note the human rights
violations in the aftermath, though he was not specific about
what he thought the influence of such statements would be.
Postl noted that recent months clearly had been hard on
Rafsanjani; he looked pale and had lost a lot of weight, but
his eyes were still "active," according to Postl.

¶8. (C) Postl described the positions of presidential
candidates Karrubi and Musavi as children of the revolution
and argued that neither of them wants systemic change.
Rather, they hoped to give Iran a "human face." Since the
"population of Iran," according to Postl, opposes the Islamic
system, the people are not very strongly behind either of
these candidates. In closing out his comments on his final
meetings in Tehran, Postl noted that after he departed post,
his contacts were questioned thoroughly and aggressively,
which Postl described as a reality of life in Iran and
contact with a Westerner.

--------------------------------
Infighting and Confusion Driving
the nuclear Issue
--------------------------------

¶9. (C) In his discussions at the end of September with
Mashaie, Postl encouraged him to ensure that Iran did not
"miss the opportunity" presented by the talks in Geneva.
Mashaie responded that Iran would be "sure to take" advantage
of this opportunity and told Postl that Postl would be
surprised at Iran's approach, that Iran would come with
seriousness and an attitude of compromise. Postl's
assessment is that Iran decided that this was the right time
to show flexibility in order to get an agreement, especially
since Ahmadinejad wants to claim responsibility for an
agreement with the West. Postl believes that nuclear
Negotiator Jalili came to Geneva with this spirit of
compromise and was following direction, presumably from
Ahmadinejad. Iran's failure to follow through on these
agreements may have been due to a decision by Khamenei either
that the West was not trustworthy despite Iran's supposed
good intentions or that Iran could get more from the West or
P5 plus 1 than was offered in Geneva. Despite the fact that
people close to the President say he wants "more," the system
gets in the way as do Ahmadinejad's bad advisers. Postl's
interlocutors say that if Ahmadinejad alone were to decide
about engagement with the West, "things would move more
quickly." Postl noted that Khamenei is still respected in
Iran and, in his personal opinion, there is no essential
divergence between the Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad. On
issues where the Supreme Leader's opinions were clear, Postl
argued that other influential Iranians would not "touch on
issues," even to undercut Ahmadinejad. The only way to
challenge these leaders was to focus on "unjust" or
un-Islamic behavior.

¶10. (C) Postl said that Majles Speaker Larijani probably
was not in favor of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) deal,
but when MsnOff questioned whether he really opposed the deal
or was responding to the fact that Ahmadinejad came out in
favor of the deal, Postl recounted another possibility tied
to the post-election environment. Postl noted that he had
asked someone close to Larijani whether he was aware of the
rapes of election-related prisoners. The interlocutors said
that not only was Larijani aware, but all officials were
aware of what was going on inside the prison. Nevertheless,
when Larijani spoke publicly about the issue, he stated
clearly that the rapes are not occurring and thus lost some
credibility with the Iranian public. To have not given a
more ambiguous response, such as that he would look into the
situation, Larijani must have been under strong pressure from
above, in Postl's estimation. Given the clarity that what
Ahmadinejad had done after the election was wrong and
Larijani's distaste for Ahmadinejad, the TRR proposal may
have been Larijani's first opportunity to strike back at

UNVIE VIEN 00000553 003 OF 004


Ahmadinejad.

¶11. (C) Postl also noted that Iran probably has whiplash
from the international community's response to the Fordow
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), which will complicate our
efforts to press Iran into compliance with its obligations.
Although IAEA Director General ElBaradei said after the first
inspection of the FFEP that it was nothing more than "a hole
in a mountain," the IAEA Board of Governors passed a
resolution against Iran, citing the FFEP as one of its main
points (ref A). Postl argued that this probably leads Iran to
believe that the international community is not serious about
the issue, and that, rather, this is "a game."

¶12. (C) One of Postl's contacts close to the Supreme
Leader pointed him to a Kayhan article from December 1,
written by editor Shariatmadari, which espouses the views of
Khamenei on the nuclear issue. The article argues that Iran
has gotten nothing from cooperation and should withdraw from
the NPT immediately. Since Khamenei has said that he is not
opposed to an opening with the U.S., it becomes about
Washington presenting the right arguments at the right time.
However, Postl said that bringing up the issue of the
detained Americans at Geneva probably fell flat with the
Iranians. Iranian officials told Postl that they were
surprised that American officials raised this issue at those
talks. This was the wrong time to bring up this issue, Postl
argued, since these issues are not connected in the minds of
the Iranians. (We will explain to the Austrians why this
issue is so important and resonates so much to the U.S.)
Postl suggested that the UK model was better: when their
sailors were captured, UK officials said that this issue had
nothing to do with the political problems between the two
countries. The dissociation of the issues worked in favor of
getting the sailors released. Pressed on when might be such
a right time to address the U.S. detainees, Postl suggested
that one such way might have been to capitalize on the
October 1 Geneva talks by following up quickly with a call
from Under Secretary Burns to Jalili "in the spirit of
Geneva." During that phone call, Burns could engage Jalili
on the detainee issue as an aside. Postl also noted that
some of his Iranian government contacts had noted with
pleasure the appointment of Ambassador Limbert to deal with
the Iranian file given his understanding of Iran.

----------------------------
Postl's Tehran Retrospective
----------------------------

¶13. (C) Looking back on his tenure as Ambassador to Iran,
Postl noted that the biggest "game changer" had been this
past summer's presidential elections. The events were
causing backlash from much of the population. Parents and
grandparents were saying, according to Postl, that they do
not want their children to be forced to experience the same
Iran that they, themselves, have been living under for the
last 30 years. For the first time, one can see "kill
Khamenei" and "death to Khamenei" scrawled on walls in
Tehran. These direct challenges to Khamenei's authority are
new and significant. Additionally, Postl expects that the
population was disillusioned by the overwhelming fraud in the
elections and many will not vote in the future.

¶14. (C) On engagement, Postl suggested that some ways
forward for the U.S. and Iran might be to look into using a
route from Chah Bahar, on Iran's southern coast, to get U.S.
supplies into Afghanistan and using the assumption of office
by new IAEA Director General Amano to press for "a new start"
on the Additional Protocol and additional transparency
measures discussions.

¶15. (C) Postl reiterated his message that Iranian citizens
see the Voice of America (VOA) as biased and asked that we
not underestimate their frustration. If they see a pervasive
media outlet as biased, this presents the U.S. in a negative
light and works against U.S. messaging. He said that Iranians
currently are faced with two biased choices: VOA and Iranian
Broadcasting (IRIB). In response to a MsnOff question about
how BBC Persian is perceived, he noted that it is seen as
more neutral, but has the stigma of being associated with the
UK. Postl floated the idea of U.S. support to Euro News to
start broadcasting in Farsi. He also suggested that doing
Hardtalk in Persian might be one of the best outlets for U.S.
arguments since the format of pitting opposing viewpoints
against one another would counteract the perception of bias,
but suggested that if our arguments to the Iranian people are
not convincing, this quickly would become clear. Finally,
Postl noted that the U.S. should not shy away from interviews
with Iranian media outlets, suggesting Press TV because it is
in English and it is watched in Tehran. A program built

UNVIE VIEN 00000553 004 OF 004


around broadcasting the differing opinions of the U.S., India
(because its opinion is well-respected given its influence as
a leader in the Nonaligned Movement), and Iran might be a
useful way to get our messages across while counteracting
perceptions of bias.
DAVIES


/tag/IR_2.html


09BERLIN1577     2009-12-14 07:07     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Berlin

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP ETTC EFIN IR GM
SUBJECT: NOW FOR THE HARD PART: MERKEL,S TEAM EXAMINES NEXT
STEPS IN IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Philip D. Murphy for reasons 1.4 b/d.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Chancellor Merkel set the German agenda on
Iran with her early November statement before the U.S.
Congress on "zero tolerance" for a nuclear armed Iran and the
need for tougher sanctions should engagement not work.
During a private roundtable hosted by Ambassador Murphy,
however, members of Germany's Iran "brain-trust" from the
German Parliament, MFA, Ministry of Economics and top
government funded think tank welcomed the President's
engagement policy, recommended broadening the dialogue to
areas of cooperation (drugs, Afghanistan, diplomatic
relations), betrayed little beyond a superficial knowledge of
the nuclear program, argued that Germany took the largest
economic hit from recent sanctions, and expressed doubts as
to the efficacy of sanctions, giving us a window into the
difficult task Chancellor Merkel will have in keeping her
government on her page. In the end, we assess that Merkel
will have her way. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) The November 24 event at the Embassy included members
of Parliament from the four main German political parties:
FDP Elke Hoff, CDU Andreas Schockenhoff, Greens Kerstin
Mueller, and SPD Rolf Muetzenich. From the MFA, Policy
Planner Markus Ederer, DG for Economics Ruediger von Fritsch,
DG for Disarmament and Nonproliferation Amb. Peter Gottwald,
and Iran Task Force Director Andreas Krueger attended.
Ministry of Economics DG for External Economic Policy
Karl-Ernst Brauner and the Director of the German government
funded research institute Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft und
Politik (SWP, or Institute for Science and Politics) Volker
Perthes also attended.

-----------------------------------------
MFA: TRR Not Dead Yet; But Not Well Either
-----------------------------------------

¶3. (C) The Ambassador opened the discussion by thanking the
German government for its excellent cooperation on Iran and
asked his guests to share their thoughts on the Iranian
internal situation, especially given recent reports of the
expanded role of the IRGC in the cultural/educational spheres
of life, and how that might affect Iran's external policy.
MFA DG for Disarmament Gottwald stated that if we were
correct in assessing the Iranian regime's primary goal to be
survival, then we still had a chance with a negotiated
solution. He said that while the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR) deal was not "well," Germany wasn't ready to pronounce
it "dead" quite yet. He concluded with a strong statement
saying that a nuclear armed Iran would be a nightmare in and
of itself and a disastrous blow to the NPT regime which was
why Germany would be a strong partner in support of further
sanctions.

¶4. (C) MFA Policy Planer Ederer said he thought Iran was
confused about what it wants and that the West might be even
more confused about how to get what we want. He said we want
Iranian behavior change, but we don't agree yet what will get
us there. He said UN sponsored sanctions would isolate Iran
and limit its capacity, but questioned whether they would
change Tehran's behavior. He said he realized sanctions
remained a good alternative to military action, but
questioned whether they were really capable of anything other
than just buying time.

------------------------------------------
More Carrots before we Reach for the Sticks
------------------------------------------

¶5. (C) SWP's Perthes argued Iranian Supreme Leader
Khamenei's primary interest was to maintain the security of
the system and prevent regime change. Perthes said Khamenei
feared a velvet revolution over all else, though regional
instability was a close second. He noted Iran remained
besieged by problems of drug smuggling, piracy, and
instability in Pakistan. He recommended more emphasis be
placed on trying to find an incentive for the regime to
cooperate on the regional track, which had already shown some
progress. He said the April 2009, 300 million dollar Iranian
pledge at the Pakistan donor's conference was an important
symbol of the value the regime placed on regional security.
He suggested the West "broaden" relations with Iran to areas
where cooperation could be had: drugs, Afghanistan, and
diplomatic (especially Consular) ties. POL M/C noted this
was fine, but ignored the fact that time was not on our side.
Rather, Iran was installing new centrifuges each week. If
Iran wanted to build confidence or "broaden" relations, it
could modulate that pace, but time was not a luxury we had.
Gottwald agreed emphatically.

BERLIN 00001577 002 OF 003



¶6. (C) Changing course, Perthes said that if "sticks" had to
be used, he suggested more focus on "export-control" and less
on sanctions. He noted evidence suggested export control
regimes had already worked in slowing down centrifuge
progress. He concluded by saying that if sanctions must be
used, we should avoid all use of the word "crippling" and
instead focus on "targeted" sanctions in order not to turn
the Iranian masses against us and right back into
Ahmadinejad's hands. He also suggested that "unofficial"
sanctions such as Russia's decision not to sell the S300s
were more effective than most formal sanctions. If formal
sanctions had to be pursued he said only global sanctions
would be effective, and therefore advocated UNSC action.
Perthes said he saw readiness in the German business
community to accept financial loss if sanctions were truly
global, but they don't want to see business opportunities
being lost to China or India.

--------------------------------------------- ----
Green Party : Too Late to Prevent, Need To Contain
--------------------------------------------- ----

¶7. (C) From the opposition, Green Party Foreign Policy
Spokesperson Kerstin Mueller said she was glad that the new
U.S. administration no longer talked about a threat of a
military option. But she also said she was skeptical that
Iran can be prevented from obtaining a nuclear capability
without a military option, and that it might even be too late
for a military option to be effective. She said she didn't
see compromise within the interests of the regime and thought
the West should focus more attention on how to "control" a
nuclear-armed Iran.

-------------------------------------------
FDP: Rank and File Grudging Partner on Iran?
--------------------------------------------

¶8. (C) FDP Spokeswoman on Defense Policy, Elke Hoff opened
her remarks with a grudging acknowledgment of the coalition
agreement in which her party agreed that if engagement with
Iran on the nuclear dossier failed, sanctions would be
implemented. She added that she remained personally
skeptical as to their efficacy. She said additional
sanctions would serve the unintended consequence of rallying
the masses around Ahmadinejad.

¶9. (C) Hoff said she often hears from constituents in the
business community that German companies are getting
pressured from their American counterparts not to do business
in Iran, and yet they see plenty of U.S. products for sale in
Iran. Econ M/C intervened and stressed that the U.S. was
ready to prosecute any U.S. businesses in violation of U.S.
sanctions and had already done so. Hoff also suggested
offering German businesses financial compensation should new
sanctions come into play. In response to a criticism from
Hoff on whether the U.S. deadline created for engagement on
Iran reflected Obama's domestic political agenda, the
Ambassador emphasized the deep commitment of the
administration to engagement.

----------------------------
Germany is the Largest Loser
----------------------------

¶10. (C) MFA DG for Economics Von Fritsch agreed with
Perthes' suggestion to focus more on the carrots and not the
sticks. He noted that no single country has (recently)
sacrificed as much financially as Germany has, not just in
existing trade, but also in long term future contracts. Econ
M/C noted that U.S. business had also suffered enormous trade
and investment losses after 1979. Von Fritsch said if
sanctions were inevitable, German business preferred global
and clear sanctions as opposed to vague wording that can be
left open to differing interpretations. On correspondent
banking relations, Von Fritsch said the German government was
still examining the issue but that a complete severance of
correspondent banking relations including with Iran's central
bank would not be possible since it would amount to a total
trade embargo.

¶11. (C) Ministry of Economics DG for External Policy Brauner
referenced the inclusion in German law of the presumptive
right to trade, and said that he was concerned that what the
German Customs and BAFA (export control agency under the
Ministry of Economics) were doing to encourage "Nullbescheid"
(pre-certification that specific trade with Iran is not
illicit) might actually be illegal, as German business had
complained. He said one important consideration for Germany

BERLIN 00001577 003 OF 003


was that a further crackdown on trade with Iran could
endanger repayment of the 4.5 billion Euros in outstanding
credits that Iran owed Germany. Germany had agreed not to
issue any new credit under its Hermes (OPIC-like) program,
but expected to be able to collect on outstanding credits.
Nonetheless, both Brauner and Von Fritsch emphasized that in
the event of no progress in negotiations with Iran, Germany
was ready to enter a new round of stronger sanctions, and
that we should look to Chancellor Merkel's statements in the
U.S. Congress and FM Westerwelle's reiterations of her strong
policy as the final say on which direction Germany would go
on Iran.

¶12. (C) CONCLUSION. The majority of the guests at the table
distinctly deferred to Perthes for guidance on where the Iran
issue might be headed or should be headed. This was striking
amongst such a high ranking group of people operationally
involved with the Iran issue. Also illuminating was the
variety of talking points employed by the participants to
define hurdles for sanction until debunked one at a time by
Embassy officers. The candor with which even some MFA and
Ministry of Economics officials expressed their skepticism on
the efficacy of pursuing tougher sanctions on Iran may mean
that Merkel will have to press hard within her own government
to deliver on her promise of implementing tougher sanctions
should engagement with Iran fail. None of our interlocutors,
however, questioned whether Merkel would, at the end of the
day, be able to "deliver" on her promises. If and when we
decide to go forward on the pressure track on Iran, the USG
may wish to reinforce Merkel's position by showing
appreciation for Germany's strong continuing support. END
CONCLUSION.
MURPHY


/tag/IR_2.html


09MOSCOW3010     2009-12-14 15:03     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5471
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #3010/01 3481520
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141520Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5655
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0540

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003010

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP IAEA RS IR
SUBJECT: MOSCOW'S INCREASING FRUSTRATION WITH TEHRAN

Classified By: Acting Political M/C David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Official GOR reports and media have
pronounced the Russian-Iranian relationship healthy and
Minister of Energy's Shmatko's recent visit to Tehran as a
success. Privately, GOR officials and Russian analysts agree
that there are serious tensions in the bilateral relationship
such as the S-300s issue, the Bushehr project and the
possibility of Russia's support of sanctions. They downplay
Moscow's ability to influence Iran, noting competing
interests within Russia that complicate Russian policy
decisions. Iran policy remains a sensitive domestic
question. End Summary

---------------------------
Signaling Iran on Sanctions
---------------------------

¶2. (C) Italian Embassy interlocutors in Moscow reported
that, during his recent visit to Rome, President Medvedev
confided to PM Berlusconi that dealing with Iran lately had
been "frustrating." Medvedev said he was bothered by Iran's
refusal to accept the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) proposal
and that Iran's reaction showed a lack of trust for Russia.
While Russia did not necessarily agree that sanctions would
be effective, he said, the threat of sanctions could signal
Iran that it was time to change course. Medvedev admitted
that he did not know who was making decisions in Tehran now,
but he was nevertheless optimistic that there was still some
room for negotiation on the TRR proposal.

¶3. (C) Ali Mustafabeily, Deputy for Iran and Afghanistan in
the MFA's Second Asia Department who accompanied Shmatko to
Iran, told us that it was time to pressure Iran. The TRR
proposal was a fair offer, but there was also a deadline that
Iran had missed. Commenting that the Iranians were "sly" and
knew how to negotiate, he said that just last week Saeed
Jalili, Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Supreme
National Security Council, had informed the Russian
Ambassador in Tehran of Iran's new thinking on the TRR
proposal. If the West, including Russia, did not agree to a
plan in which the IAEA would take "possession" of the low
enriched uranium (LEU) while it remained on Iranian soil, it
meant the West did not trust the IAEA. Mustafabeily seemed
exasperated by this thinking. He also reported that Iran had
conferred with (unnamed) other countries and determined that
the enrichment proposed in the TRR proposal could be
completed in five months rather than one year. Mustafabeily
said that Russia could not accomplish this process in five
months, but said it was possible that others could.

¶4. (C) Mustafabeily also remarked that he had met many
members of the Iranian diaspora living in France. Most were
involved in business and kept one foot in France and the
other in Iran. While uniformly critical of the current
Iranian regime, they also unanimously opposed sanctions as a
way to influence Iran. They believed sanctions would only
harm average Iranians, not the elites. Mustafabeily reported
his own private conversations with businessmen in Tehran that
confirmed this opinion.

---------------------------------------
S-300s: Still Yellow Light on Transfer
---------------------------------------

¶5. (C) On the issue of the S-300s, Mustafabeily reported
that the Iranians had strongly criticized delays in the sale.
Specifically, the Iranian Ministers of Trade and Economic
Development summoned Shmatko to discuss the S-300s and
threatened legal action against the GOR to resolve the issue.
According to Mustafabeily, the Iranians reminded Shmatko
that they had already paid a considerable amount towards
delivery of the system and they expected fulfillment of the
contract. While Moscow was not considering a refund, GOR
officials recognized the gravity of the issue and that Tehran
was likely waiting for Russia's decision on sanctions before
carrying out its threat of legal action. Baranov said the
decision on the Russian side would be made at the
Presidential level, implying that the MFA was not involved in
the discussions. He did note that some in the GOR believed
transferring the S-300s to Iran would increase stability in
the region because Iran would feel more secure without
developing nuclear weapons.

-----------------------
Anti-Russian Mood Grows
-----------------------


MOSCOW 00003010 002 OF 003


¶6. (C) Interestingly, Mustafabeily noticed an anti-Russian
feeling in Iran, even to include unorchestrated
demonstrations in front of their embassy in Tehran. He
commented that Russia was being criticized by the government
and the elites for being too close to the West and for voting
with Western countries in the IAEA. Simultaneously, the
Iranian opposition was also condemning Russia for working
with the Iranian government. Mustafabeily complained that
the propaganda machine was working at full-speed in Iran.

¶7. (C) Maxim Baranov, Director of the MFA's Iran Desk, said
that Minister of Energy Shmatko's visit to Tehran was a
chance to calm Iran's concerns about delays at the Bushehr
facility and reduce rising tensions in the relationship. He
said that Russia planned to open the Bushehr reactor as soon
as technical tests were completed and that confusion over
dates had led to misstatements in the press. Baranov claimed
that Russia was continuing with technical testing and did not
truly have an expected opening date. Baranov acknowledged
that Shmatko's visit came at a difficult time in the
bilateral relationship, given Russia's recent vote at the
IAEA. He noted that, although Iran was upset about Russia's
decision, Iranians would not directly "criticize a guest in
their home." As could be expected, Iranian officials instead
expressed their disappointment through the media. Baranov
explained Russia's IAEA vote as an effort to signal Iran that
Russia would no longer remain its unconditional supporter.
He indicated that Moscow felt deceived by the Qom site.
Baranov also took the opportunity to call for the U.S. to
consult more closely with Russia on Iran and not limit
discussions to like-minded countries.

¶8. (C) Baranov claimed there was no clear signal coming from
Tehran about if or when Iran would negotiate and who was in
charge. According to Baranov, Russia wanted Iran to
understand that, while IAEA Director El Baradei had always
tried to remain objective, there was no guarantee that the
incoming director would follow this path. El Baradei's
proposal was a favorable deal that might not be available
after he leaves his position. Therefore, Russia was urging
Iran to begin cooperation with the IAEA now on the TRR
proposal. When asked about Prime Minister Putin's recent
statement that Russia had no information about a military
dimension to Iran's nuclear program, Baranov seemed caught
off guard. He confided that backing up such a comment would
be "complicated work."

--------------------------------------
Iran's Goal--Capability or Production?
--------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Russian Academy of Sciences Vladimir Yevseyev claimed
that Russia's red line with Iran would be if/when Iran
withdrew from the IAEA because this would demonstrate that
Iran's intention was to build a nuclear weapon. He believed
that, because Iran was hoping to keep the LEU on its
territory and needed an excuse to back away from the IAEA,
its reaction to the vote was calculated and exaggerated.
Nina Mamedova of the Oriental Studies Institute and Zhigun
Yefim of the Middle East Institute agreed that Iran's
reaction was overly emotional. Mamedova claimed that Iran's
reaction and subsequent announcement of plans to build 10
enrichment sites was meant to leave room for bargaining in
the world community. Iran was well known, according to
Mamedova, for adopting harsh positions so there would be room
for retreat. She recalled that six years ago Iran reacted in
the same way to an unfavorable IAEA resolution and threatened
to build 20 nuclear power plants. Then, when Iran realized
that the isolation this decision produced was not helpful, it
renewed cooperation. She predicted that Iran would likely
return to negotiations by early next year but did not know
when exactly.

¶10. (C) Vladimir Sazhin of the Oriental Studies Institute
and commentator for the Voice of Russia claimed that Tehran's
overall goal was completion of the fuel cycle and
infrastructure to produce a nuclear weapon when they needed
it. He did not believe Tehran intended to assemble a weapon.
Merely having the capacity would be enough to satisfy its
need for security and self-aggrandizement. Conversely, both
Mamedova and Yefim believed Iran's goal was to build a
nuclear weapon rather than just develop the capability. They
believed Iran would not feel secure until it had a small
number of nuclear weapons to defend itself against the
"threat" from Israel.

-----------------
Influencing Iran
-----------------

MOSCOW 00003010 003 OF 003



¶11. (C) Although Russia had long considered Iran as a key
element of regional stability, most Russian officials and
analysts agreed that its ability to influence Iran was
minimal and quickly decreasing. Yevseyev pointed out that
Italy and Germany had far greater trade turnover with Iran
than Russia did. Similarly, Mamedova lamented that the
bilateral economic relationship was small, even speculating
that rumors circulating about Iran's readiness to start joint
new exploration efforts with Gazprom of possible gas fields
were more likely empty promises meant to convince Russia to
defend Iran's position in the international community.

¶12. (C) A carrot/stick approach was recommended by some
observers. Vladimir Sazhin said that any use of military
force against Iran would cause catastrophe in the region or
even globally. He advocated balanced measures which included
financial support to the oil and gas sector, a treaty between
the P5 1 and Iran on security guarantees, and recognition of
Iran's prominent role in the region. If these failed to
produce positive results, he believed sanctions against the
banking and oil and gas sectors might be effective. Yevseyev
said the international community should remain flexible and
strive for Iran's integration in to the global economic and
political system when Iran demonstrates behaviors that are
more positive. Mamedova said it was critical that sanctions
avoid inflicting suffering on average Iranians because this
would only increase support for Iran's current behavior.

¶13. (C) Comment: The varying perspectives within the Russian
foreign policy establishment reflect competing interests.
From a purely mercantilist standpoint, sanctions against
Iran, particularly its energy sector, would likely translate
into a bump in world oil prices, which would boost annual
revenues for Russia's state-connected energy companies and
the state budget by billions of dollars annually. If
sanctions harm Iran's burgeoning economic relationship with
China, some in Russia might also regard that as a plus. On
the other hand, sanctions could damage Russia's own trade
with Iran, which is modest (Russia currently has a bilateral
trade surplus of about USD 3 billion) but concentrated in the
politically-influential defense and atomic-energy sectors.
Since many high-ranking officials in these agencies also
favor a more adversarial policy towards the West, an
anti-sanctions posture serves them both economically and
ideologically. The status quo is preferable for Russia and
as the decision point approaches Moscow will probably search
for an outcome that changes as little as possible. Given the
stakes for Russia's economy and its relations with the U.S.,
Israel and the EU, this decision will be made by both
Medvedev and Putin, with implications for the domestic and
foreign influence each exerts. End Comment.

Beyrle


/tag/IR_2.html


09ABUDHABI1151     2009-12-17 13:01     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Abu Dhabi

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAD #1151/01 3511307
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 171307Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0042
INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001151

NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP
ENERGY FOR S1, S2, O???CONNOR AND SANDOLOW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/17
TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM ENRG IR YM AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE WARNS DOE DEPSEC PONEMAN ABOUT IRAN

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard G. Olson, Ambassador, State, US Embassy Abu
Dhabi, UAE; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: During a December 9 meeting in Abu Dhabi (other
meetings reported septel), Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel
Poneman told Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) that
the USG shared many energy policy priorities with the UAE,
including renewable energy development and the importance of
critical energy infrastructure protection. Poneman briefed MbZ on
the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR) proposal and Vienna talks. MbZ
said he would be surprised if Iran accepted the P5+1/IAEA proposal
and warned that Iran was already acting like a nuclear power.
Further, and more dangerously, Iran is establishing "emirates"
across the Muslim world, including South Lebanon and Gaza, sleeper
"emirates" in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi
Arabia, the mother of all "emirates" in Southern Iraq, and now
Saada in Yemen. MbZ suggested that the U.S. is misreading the
situation in Yemen and failing to recognize strong evidence of
Iranian support. End Summary.



POTENTIAL COOPERATION:

RENEWABLES, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

-------------------------------------



¶2. (SBU) The Crown Prince asked DepSec Poneman several questions
about U.S. energy development plans, including the outlook for the
next 25 years. Poneman explained President Obama and Secretary Chu
have a strategic vision of a new energy economy with a low carbon
profile. In the short term, Poneman said DOE is investing Recovery
Act funds to improve efficiency and support new technologies, but
that the USG seeks to facilitate energy development through a
portfolio approach, not dictate what the market should pursue. On
nuclear, MbZ specifically asked what progress could be expected
within the next three years. Poneman said there are a number of
active deals under development, and strong public support for
nuclear power, but that capital costs continue to be a challenge.
(Comment: MbZ pressed hard on US plans for a nuclear renaissance,
suggesting to us that he is worried we may compete with his program
in the hunt for nuclear engineering and technical talent. End
Comment.) Turning to renewable energy and efficiency, the DepSec
noted that USG goals are very much in line with Abu Dhabi's own
Masdar (Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company) and that he looked forward
to greater DOE-Masdar cooperation (septel).



¶3. (SBU) Poneman also told MbZ that the USG is interested in
supporting Abu Dhabi's critical energy infrastructure protection
(CEIP) plans and said a DOE team was discussing cooperation
potential with the Critical National Infrastructure Authority
(CNIA, reported septel). Learning from Hurricane Katrina, DOE was
focused on survivability of assets, resiliency and recovery. MbZ
said he was personally very interested in greater cooperation with
the U.S. on CEIP, through DOE, other USG entities and/or the
private sector. He stressed that citizens' confidence in their
government was very important, noting "We're doing our best to make
them feel secure." MbZ added that while UAE is a small country, it
has the resources to protect itself, and is willing to invest in
top-quality infrastructure protection.



IRAN

----



¶4. (S/NF) DepSec Poneman briefed MbZ on the international proposal
for Iran to ship 1,200 kg of Low Enriched Uranium produced at
Natanz to a location outside Iran and where it would be enriched to
20 percent for use to produce medical radioisotopes at the Tehran
Research Reactor. Poneman stressed that the IAEA, the Russians,
and the U.S. had all taken every possible step to address stated
Iranian concerns, including a first-ever official USG statement of
support for the proposal. He stressed that the offer would not
remain open indefinitely; as DG El Baradei had said, this is a
"fleeting" opportunity. He also explained that the extra effort
had strengthened international cooperation, with Russia and China
supportive of the recent IAEA Board of Governors resolution.


Poneman stressed that the deal was not offered out of naivete, but
rather out of the view that if Iran agreed it would remove a
significant amount of LEU from Natanz and if Iran refused it would
help build international support - beginning with Russia and China
- for tougher sanctions.

¶5. (S/NF) The Crown Prince said he would be "very surprised" if a
deal was possible, as Iran's nuclear program is not an issue of
internal conflict but rather one of national pride for the vast
majority of Iranians. He stressed that Iran is not North Korea,
because 1) it is looking to reestablish a Persian empire in the
21st century, 2) Iran has resources and lacks neighbors, including
the UAE, who can pressure it, 3) the leadership has not changed (it
is the same people who seized Embassy Tehran in 1979) , and 4) Iran
believes itself to be a superpower. Poneman said the USG does not
disagree with MbZ's analysis, but believes pride makes the Iranian
leadership more susceptible to the pressure of the world community
uniting against them, whereas North Korea revels in its own
isolation. MbZ agreed, and emphasized the strategic importance of
creating a Palestinian State (i.e., resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict) as the way to create genuine Middle
Eastern unity on the question of Iran's nuclear program and
regional ambitions.



YEMEN

-----



¶6. (S/NF) MbZ said Iran already acts like a superpower and
explained that, while the UAE is a federation of emirates, Iran's
"emirates" have a larger army and budget that the UAE. In addition
to Iran's established emirates in South Lebanon and Gaza, sleeper
emirates in Kuwait, Bahrain, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia,
and the mother of all emirates in Southern Iraq. Now Iran has an
emirate in Saada. MbZ told Poneman, "We believe you don't want us
to believe" the mounting evidence of Iranian involvement in Yemen.
He stressed that he doesn't believe Ali Abdullah Saleh either, but
this is "not like cracking the enigma code" (in World War II),
there are Iranian ships unloading weapons for the Houthis, and "you
have the capability to track this." He warned, "We know your
priority is Al-Qaeda, but don't forget Iran. Al-Qaeda is not going
to get a nuclear bomb; Iran is a matter of time."



¶7. (SBU) DepSec Poneman has cleared this cable.
OLSON


/tag/IR_2.html


09TELAVIV2757     2009-12-22 09:09     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Tel Aviv

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #2757/01 3560922
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 220922Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4677
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7022
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 5131
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2106
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0162
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9552

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 002757

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP EG IR
SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER'S DECEMBER 1-2 VISIT TO ISRAEL

Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

¶1. (S) Summary: Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security Ellen Tauscher visited Israel December
1-2. U/S Tauscher focused her visit on setting the stage for
a successful nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference (RevCon) in May 2010. She consulted with GOI
interlocutors on potential strategy in addressing Egyptian
insistence on pushing for the establishment of a nuclear
weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, as a way to
divert attention from Iran to Israel. U/S Tauscher
reiterated that the United States will not take any action to
compromise Israel's security and would consult closely with
Israel -- which GOI officials greatly appreciated.
Nevertheless, U/S Tauscher said the United States is
interested in exploring possible small steps involving Israel
to address some of Egypt's NWFZ concerns regarding the lack
of implementation of the 1995 resolution. GOI officials for
the most part were critical of these tactics, questioning why
Israel should be portrayed as part of the problem. They
recommended a more direct approach to President Mubarak --
thereby circumventing the Egyptian MFA -- in which Egypt is
reminded that Iran is the regional nuclear threat. Other
topics discussed include President Obama's arms control and
nonproliferation agenda, the P5 1 process and Iran's nuclear
program, the FMCT and CTBT, Jordan's plans for a nuclear
reactor, and Israel's qualitative military edge (QME). End
summary.

¶2. (SBU) U/S Tauscher met with National Security Advisor Uzi
Arad on December 1. Arad was accompanied by NSC Senior
Advisor and nuclear Security Summit Sherpa Gil Reich. In a
separate meeting on December 1, U/S Tauscher met with MFA
Director General Yossi Gal, Deputy Director General for North
America Baruch Bina, and Deputy Director General for
Strategic Affairs Alon Bar. U.S. participants for the Arad
and Gal meetings included Political Counselor Marc Sievers, T
Senior Advisor James Timbie, NSC's Adam Scheinman, and
political military officer Jason Grubb. U/S Tauscher met for
dinner with Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and MFA
senior officials on December 1, including IAEC Director
General Saul Chorev, Deputy Director General David Danieli,
and Director for Policy and Arms Control Merav Zefary-Odiz,
as well as MFA DDG Bar and Director for Arms Control Rodica
Radian-Gordon. On December 2, U/S Tauscher met for breakfast
with MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad; U.S. attendees
included Charge D'Affaires Luis Moreno, Timbie, Scheinman,
and Grubb.

Arms Control/Nonproliferation Agenda
------------------------------------

¶3. (S) In various meetings with GOI interlocutors, U/S
Tauscher outlined an ambitious arms control and
nonproliferation agenda, beginning with the President's
Prague speech, and including other priorities such as a
follow-on to START, CTBT ratification, the upcoming NPT
Review Conference, and negotiating the FMCT. She noted that
negotiations with Moscow on START were slow to develop in
part due to delayed confirmations and Russian wariness. But
U/S Tauscher expected a START follow-on -- including a strong
verification regime -- soon.

¶4. (S) National Security Advisor Arad described President
Obama's arms control and nonproliferation agenda as "daunting
and challenging." He reaffirmed that the GOI will
participate in the April 2010 nuclear Security summit in
Washington, noting that PM Netanyahu planned to attend the
summit as discussed between President Obama and PM Netanyahu
during their recent one-on-one meeting in Washington. GOI
nuclear Summit Sherpa Gil Reich noted, however, that the
Holocaust memorial day in Israel might be a potential
scheduling conflict with the summit. Arad expressed
appreciation for the summit, noting that if the initiative
had been pursued ten years previously, perhaps proliferation
cases such as AQ Khan might have been prevented or at least
controlled. He wished the United States success negotiating
with the Russians on START.

¶5. (S) Due to the U.S. administration's prioritization of
arms control and nonproliferation, Arad also noted that the
GOI had recently reconvened a high level committee on these
issues comprised of GOI officials and experts from outside
the government. He noted that the committee had been formed
during President George Herbert Walker Bush's administration
to analyze treaties such as the CWC and CTBT, but stopped
meeting in 2007. U/S Tauscher expressed interest in meeting
with the group during her next visit to Israel; Arad took the
request on board.

Egypt and the NPT
-----------------

¶6. (S) On the NPT, U/S Tauscher reiterated the importance of
a successful Review Conference -- including hopefully a
consensus resolution. She raised U.S. concerns over
potential Egyptian actions at the RevCon, based on previous
decades of behavior and "10-15 year-old talking points." U/S
Tauscher said the United States is not "naive" with respect
to Egypt; nevertheless, the United States must make a
sincere, good faith effort to create the conditions for a
positive RevCon -- this might include small steps with Israel
to address some of Egypt's desire to demonstrate progress in
implementation of the 1995 resolution on a region free of
weapons of mass destruction.

¶7. (S) That said, U/S Tauscher reiterated that the United
States would consult and coordinate with Israel, and would
take no action that might compromise Israel's security. She
noted that the United States would like to elevate the NPT
RevCon issue to President Mubarak at an appropriate time, and
expressed interest in developing an alternate communication
track to Mubarak to circumvent the MFA, potentially through
Egyptian Intelligence Minister LTG Suleiman. U/S Tauscher
said her message to Cairo will be "very tough," and that
Egyptian obstructionist behavior linking Israel to Iran's
nuclear program is not helping Egypt.

¶8. (S) Arad said relations with Egypt were "relatively good,"
describing continued dialogue between PM Netanyahu and
President Mubarak, and strong channels of communication at
other levels. In many respects, he said Israel's relations
with Egypt are almost as good as during PM Rabin's time.
Arad said Egypt and Israel do not see "eye-to-eye" on some
issues such as Gaza and the Palestinian Authority, but
otherwise relations are strong.

¶9. (S) Arad described the Egyptian MFA, however, as a
"nagging problem" in the relationship, particularly regarding
the Middle East NWFZ issue, and noted Cairo's refusal to talk
to FM Lieberman. Other GOI officials expressed exasperation
over Egyptian motivations on the NWFZ; Reich raised Egyptian
behavior at the latest IAEA General Conference, as well as
Cairo's negative reaction to the IAEA Board of Governor's
recent statement on Iran. Arad said Israel has supported a
regional NWFZ as far back as 1992, provided Israel enjoyed
peaceful relations with its neighbors. He said the GOI has
spoken frankly with Cairo, noting that such behavior is not
helpful, and is misdirecting focus away from Iran.

¶10. (S) MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad said Egypt
understands that Iran is the real threat to the region,
noting that a nuclear weapon-armed Iran is a redline for
Cairo. He averred that Egypt does not accept that Iran will
become a superpower, but remains afraid of its own domestic
political situation post-Mubarak. Gilad expressed succession
concerns, noting that Mubarak is "approaching the past more
quickly than the future." He added that Mubarak does not
have confidence in Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit.

¶11. (S) MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
Alon Bar outlined repeated attempts by the GOI to engage with
the Egyptian MFA, but to no avail. He described Egyptian
actions linking Israel to Iran's nuclear program in the IAEA
as "not encouraging," and questioned how to convince Egypt to
drop this "obsession" over the NWFZ. Israel Atomic Energy
Commission (IAEC) Director General Saul Chorev and Arms
Control Director Merav Zefary-Odiz speculated that Egypt
feels challenged by Iranian attempts to acquire nuclear
weapons, and includes Israel in any public attack on Tehran
in order to give Cairo coverage from regional criticism. Bar
argued that the Egyptian MFA raises Israel's nuclear program
as a "wedge issue" in order to prevent better relations
between Israel and others in the region. IAEC Deputy
Director General David Danieli concurred, noting that Egypt
can use the nuclear issue to put Israel "in a corner" while
benefiting from positive relations between the two countries.


¶12. (S) Zefary-Odiz also reviewed her participation in an
International Commission on nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament conference in September 2009 in Cairo. She
described the conference as "very confrontational," and that
it was clear Israel was targeted by Egyptian interlocutors.
Zefary-Odiz acknowledged that the GOI had anticipated such
behavior, and contemplated skipping the conference. She
noted that Egyptian officials also lambasted Iranian
participants, but were always careful to include Israel and
Iran in the same sentence.

¶13. (S) Arad said the GOI will take their cue from U.S.
"heavy-lifting": if there is a small step -- "not a
concession," he stressed -- that Israel could take to help
facilitate, then the GOI would consider it. He noted that
the GOI wanted to see a "reversal of trends" from Egypt
regarding Iran's nuclear program -- after all, it is in
Egypt's interest to do so. He said Israel continues to have
reservations regarding the NPT -- following nuclear pursuits
by Libya, Syria, and Iran, it is clear to the GOI that the
NPT is not sufficient and must be strengthened. The goal of
the NPT, he stressed, should not be to "prevent the next
Iran, but to stop Iran in order to prevent the next Iran"
from occurring.

¶14. (S) Chorev speculated that Egypt will aim to ruin the
RevCon. Bar said the Egyptians have not been held
accountable for past bad behavior at the NPT RevCon -- "they
have never paid the price." He noted that Cairo knows the
importance the United States attaches to a successful RevCon,
and therefore will try to leverage a "high price" in order
not to ruin it. He noted similar tactics with regard to
Egypt's counter-smuggling efforts along the border with Gaza.


¶15. (S) Timbie outlined several small steps that might
address Egyptian concerns and demonstrate progress in
implementation of the 1995 resolution and the Middle East
NWFZ: an IAEA forum on the experience of other regional
NWFZs; a special coordinator or rappateur on 1995 resolution
implementation; a statement from the United States, United
Kingdom and Russia reiterating the importance of the 1995
resolution; and exploring text with Israel and Egypt on
universality and compliance.

¶16. (S) Gilad questioned these steps from a
"tactical/strategic" context, and suggested this was not a
tactical matter. He argued against creating the impression
that Israel was the problem. Instead, Gilad recommended a
strategic, traditional approach -- concessions will only be
used by Egypt as leverage. He suggested the United States
remind Egypt of its special relationship based on U.S.
support, and reaffirm that Iran is the "bad guy." Gilad said
Egypt should also be reminded that most countries in the
region agree with the NWFZ concept in principle; the Egyptian
MFA's insistence on an immediate NWFZ neither fits the
current political reality nor makes sense as it diverts focus
from Iranian intransigence. He noted that Egypt listens to
the United States; it is therefore important to speak clearly
and directly when taking the issue to Mubarak.

¶17. (S) Chorev and Zefary-Odiz argued these steps had been
tried in the past -- and had failed. Danieli questioned why
Israel should take any steps at all. Based on experience at
the IAEA and the UN First Committee on Disarmament and
International Security, he said "nothing satisfies Egypt" as
Cairo "pockets every concession" and demands more -- "it's a
slippery slope." Danieli said Israel will not "play by
Egypt's rules." Bar concurred, noting that Egypt will "raise
the bar," and begin negotiations with these small steps as
the baseline -- he was skeptical such steps would prove
helpful.

¶18. (S) Arad characterized these steps as "talking endlessly"
-- that is "not progress," he said. He was uncomfortable
discussing Israel NPT compliance, especially as Israel is not
a party to the treaty. He also raised concerns regarding the
definition of the Middle East NWFZ -- did it also include
Pakistan, India and Iran, for example? Arad said such
questions should be posed to Cairo -- if Egypt is willing to
include Pakistan in its definition of a Middle East NWFZ,
then we can take that as a signal that Cairo is ready for a
serious conversation on the matter.

¶19. (S) Zefary-Odiz argued that the NPT as a "global
solution" is not appropriate in the current political
realities of the Middle East. Due to the region's prior
track record of NPT non-compliance, she said a gradual,
step-by-step process employing confidence building measures
be used to improve relations between neighbors. NPT partner
obligations should be enhanced, not reduced, she said.
Zefary-Odiz noted that only after peaceful relations are
established can arms control measures be pursued, starting
with conventional weapons and later focusing on
chemical/biological/nuclear arms. She said that Egypt and
other Arab states de-link comprehensive peace from arms
control measures -- Israel views these elements as
inseparable and sequential.

¶20. (S) On a related note, Chorev asked if Israel should
attend the RevCon as an observer. U/S Tauscher and Timbie
replied that the decision was ultimately the GOI's to make,
but offered to raise the issue in Washington . Chorev noted
that Israel would be careful not to "make any noise," and
could play a positive, consultative role. On the other hand,
Danieli acknowledged the argument that as a non-party,
perhaps it was not appropriate for Israel to attend.

Iran
----

¶21. (S) U/S Tauscher said the United States was very
concerned about the recently announced Iranian plans to build
ten additional uranium enrichment facilities. She reiterated
the two track strategy of persuasion and pressure, and noted
that the time for persuasion is "waning." U/S Tauscher said
the United States has "created the coalition" it had hoped
for, and was happy to see the recent IAEA BOG's resolution
transferred to the UNSC.

¶22. (S) U/S Tauscher noted that the United States was working
hard through the P5 1 process to encourage Russian and
Chinese cooperation to counter continued Iranian
intransigence and inflammatory rhetoric -- Russia and China
are "lynch pins," she said. She noted that Russia had worked
closely with the United States on the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR) proposal, which Moscow considered an "elegant
solution," -- but Iran had not agreed. Keeping Russia
engaged, U/S Tauscher explained, also means Chinese
cooperation.

¶23. (S) MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad described
recent Russian cooperation on Iran as encouraging, but
expressed reservations that Russia would join in any
sanctions against Iran. He explained that Moscow has raised
the provision of sophisticated Israeli unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) technology in exchange for canceling the S-300
sale to Tehran. Gilad said that Russian interlocutors had
acknowledged development gaps in their UAV platform, and is
prepared to pay USD one billion for Israeli UAV technology.
He reiterated that Israel will not provide its latest UAV
technology, arguing that such technology would likely end up
in the hands of the Chinese.

¶24. (S) Arad said the GOI appreciated the United States'
efforts regarding Iran, noting how hard the United States has
worked to build an alliance. He pointed to the recent IAEA
Board of Governor's resolution as a successful example of
U.S. efforts. Regarding the Qom facility, Arad said the GOI
was not surprised by Tehran's "chutzpah." He described a
high degree of alertness in Israel, and added that the GOI
studies daily Iranian posturing and boastful announcements in
an attempt to discern Iranian intentions. Arad commented
that the trends are bad, as Iran continues to accumulate low
enriched uranium.

¶25. (S) MFA DG Gal said there was not much difference in the
national intelligence estimations (U.S., UK, France, and
Russia) regarding Iran. He said the GOI takes "very
seriously" Iranian plans for ten new enrichment facilities --
"time is of the essence," and "now is the time to implement
crippling sanctions," he added. Gal likened the case for
enhanced sanctions to prescribed antibiotics from a doctor --
one must take the full course of antibiotics for the
prescribed period of time, or they will not work.

¶26. (S) Turning to his crystal ball, Gilad was not sure
Tehran had decided it wants a nuclear weapon -- but is
"determined" to obtain the option to build one. He
acknowledged that the engagement strategy is a good idea --
"as long as you understand that it will not work." Gilad
said it should be clear by February 2010 that engagement as a
option has failed -- the imposition of "crippling sanctions"
for the February/March/April timeframe is crucial. He said
Russian cooperation will be the key, and the current Russian
cooperative mind-set cannot necessarily be counted on in
several weeks time. By June of next year, Gilad said it
should be clear whether sanctions have worked. However,
given Tehran's clandestine nuclear program (e.g., Qom), he
said it will not be clear when Iran has reached the "point of
no return" -- he doubted Iran will choose to let it overtly
known that it has produced a nuclear weapon.

FMCT and CTBT
-------------

¶27. (S) IAEC DG Chorev raised the FMCT's future in the
Conference on Disarmament. U/S Tauscher acknowledged
frustration with Pakistan, and noted that while Washington
places a high priority on the FMCT, other efforts like a
START follow-on and the CTBT will come first. Timbie added
that it will take some time to negotiate an FMCT.

¶28. (S) Chorev asked about the current prospects for CTBT
ratification in the Senate. U/S Tauscher noted that the
START follow-on was a higher priority, and said the Senate
will likely focus on the Law of the Sea treaty before turning
its attention to the CTBT. She pointed to mid-term
Congressional elections in 2010, and explained that focusing
on the CTBT in 2011 might be more prudent given the
controversy associated with the treaty. U/S Tauscher
explained the necessity of making the case for the CTBT, and
hoped to build political momentum in favor of the treaty
through the release of the nuclear Posture Review, a new
national intelligence estimate, and the handover on the
stockpile stewardship program.

¶29. (S) Chorev asked that the United States consult with the
GOI on the CTBT, where he said Israel could be "more flexible
than the FMCT." U/S Tauscher asked if the GOI might be
willing to make affirmative statements in support of the
CTBT; Chorev made no promises, but suspected such a statement
might be possible -- especially if it would help with Senate
ratification.

¶30. (S) Chorev described the FMCT as "very difficult" for
Israel. Scheinman confirmed that negotiations would be based
on the 2006 draft FMCT text, with an added verification
regime that is being worked on -- he described the
verification regime's definitions as "critical" in that
regard. Danieli questioned the FMCT's added value, arguing
that it would have little impact. He asked who was the
FMCT's real target -- India, Pakistan or even Israel?

Jordanian nuclear Reactor
-------------------------

¶31. (S) IAEC DG Chorev raised Jordanian plans to build a
nuclear reactor. He said the GOI has decided not to oppose
the reactor, and have offered the Jordanians Israeli
expertise on where best to build it. Chorev said the IAEC
formed a steering committee with its Jordanian counterpart
comprised of three working groups focusing on safety,
geological surveys, and water issues. Chorev said the
steering committee first met in Amman in June 2009, and is
waiting to convene again. Danieli stressed that the GOI does
not want to hamper the Jordanian nuclear plans, but added
that Israel has concerns about border issues and security
associated with the reactor. Timbie said the United States
is pushing Jordan to sign a 123 Agreement along the same
lines as the recent agreement signed with UAE, only stronger.
Zefary-Odiz noted that Egypt is putting tremendous pressure
on Jordan not to accept a 123 Agreement.

QME
---

¶32. (S) U/S Tauscher reiterated the United States' strong
commitment to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), and
expressed appreciation for the GOI's willingness to work with
us through the newly created QME working groups. Both MOD
Pol-Mil Chief Gilad and MFA DDG Bar commended the newly
created QME working groups, and asked they be scheduled to
convene as soon as possible.

¶33. (U) T has cleared this cable.

CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_2.html


09TELAVIV2777     2009-12-23 10:10     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Tel Aviv

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002777

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP MASS SY TU FR KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: CODEL SKELTON'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
NETANYAHU

Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. CODEL Skelton met with Prime Minister
Netanyahu November 16 at the Prime Minister's office in
Jerusalem. Their discussion covered Netanyahu's meeting with
President Obama the previous week, Netanyahu's interest in
resuming negotiations with the Palestinians, the Iranian
nuclear program and options for tougher sanctions, possible
negotiations with Syria, U.S.-Israeli cooperation on missile
defense, and Israel's objections to the Goldstone Report.
Netanyahu said his meeting with the President was the best
meeting that they have had. He stressed that he had told the
President that he is ready to negotiate with Abu Mazen now,
and contrasted Israel's position with the PA's setting of
preconditions for negotiations. Netanyahu listed steps the
GOI has taken to support Abu Mazen, noting that the PA is
"doing a good job" on security. A nuclear Iran, however,
would "wash away" all progress as well as undermining
Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. Netanyahu
said that Iran is vulnerable to sanctions and urged the U.S.
to increase the pressure on Iran, with likeminded countries
if Russia and China will not support new sanctions in the
Security Council. Netanyahu commented that there is broader
Arab and European support for tough sanctions than in the
past, although the Arabs may not say so publicly. Netanyahu
praised President Obama's commitment to missile defense, and
commented that U.S.-Israeli cooperation on missile defense
sends a strong signal to Israel's enemies. He thanked the
CODEL for the Congress' support. Netanyahu said Israel faces
three main threats: Iran's nuclear program, the build-up of
rockets and missiles in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, and the
Goldstone Report, which condemned Israel for defending its
civilian population from years of rocket attacks. Netanyahu
said Israel will need to ensure that a future Palestinian
state cannot launch rockets at Israel's international airport
or critical facilities. End Summary.

Let's Get on with Negotiations
------------------------------

¶2. (U) CODEL Skelton, consisting of House Armed Services
Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D, MO) and Mrs. Skelton,
Representative Steve Israel (D-NY), Representative Tim Murphy
(R, PA), Congressional Staff members Phil McNaughton, Michael
Casey, and John Wason, Military aides Colonel Jeff Koch and
PolCouns met with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu November
¶16. Netanyahu was joined by Deputy National Security Adviser
Rear Admiral (reserve) Avriel Bar Josef, media adviser Mark
Regev, policy adviser Ari Harrow, and a Congressional liaison
officer from the Israeli Embassy in Washington.

¶3. (C) Netanyahu began the meeting by noting his
appreciation for his meeting with President Obama at the
White House the previous week. Netanyahu described his
conversation with the President as "the best we've had so
far." He said that regarding negotiations with the
Palestinians, he told the President, "let's get on with it."
Netanyahu stated that his government had removed hundreds of
obstacles and roadblocks in the West Bank, helping the West
Bank economy achieve a seven percent growth rate, adding "and
we can kick it up to ten percent growth." Netanyahu said his
Bar Ilan address last June had been difficult for him, but it
had united Israelis in support of accepting a demilitarized
Palestinian state. The current GOI had also restrainted
construction in settlements more than its past several
predecessors.

¶4. (C) Netanyahu then contrasted his efforts with the PA,
which he said is maintaining a "political and economic
boycott" of Israel, setting preconditions for negotiations,
supporting the Goldstone Report in the UN, and is now talking
about a unilateral declaration of independence. Israel wants
to engage, but the Palestinians do not. Netanyahu quoted a
Palestinian official as saying that the PA had "exhausted the
negotiating process," then noted that the Palestinians have
not even started to talk to his government. The real
difference, he pointed out, is that Abu Mazen is facing
elections, while Israel has already conducted its elections.
Netanyahu also commented that the Palestinians had initially
expected the U.S. to "deliver Israel" on all of their
demands, but are now realizing that this will not happen.
President Obama understands, he stated, that Israel is ready
to move forward. The alternatives to negotiations are bad
for everyone. Netanyahu said that if Abu Mazen would engage,
they would confront all the issues. The process would not be
easy, but it has to get started.

¶5. (C) Netanyahu said the West Bank had remained quiet
during Operation Cast Lead because the Palestinians do not

TEL AVIV 00002777 002 OF 003


want to live under Hamas' rule. He asserted that according
to recent polls, Abu Mazen and Fatah would easily win an
election, even in Gaza. Netanyahu stressed that he was not
pushing for the Palestinians to hold elections, but was
instead focused on promoting the expansion of the West Bank
economy by removing both physical and bureaucratic obstacles.
He acknowledged that the PA is "doing a good job" on
security, though he added that PA leaders are not aware of
everything Israel is doing to support the PA's security. If
we could add a political process to the cooperation that
currently exists, we could get security, economic
development, and peace. Netanyahu warned, however, that if
Iran gets a nuclear bomb, the peace process would be "washed
away." Even Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan
would come under enormous pressure.

Iran Sanctions
--------------

¶6. (C) Chairman Skelton noted that his Committee is
following Iran closely. Netanyahu said he had advised the
President to stick to the deadline on the TRR offer, adding
that it is also important to ask Iran to stop its enrichment
activities. Netanyahu commented that there is a new mood in
the major European capitals in support of sanctions. The
U.S. does not need to depend on the Security Council, but can
work with likeminded countries. Sanctions should focus on
Iran's importation of gasoline, while also focusing on
opening up the information networks. The U.S. should lead
the world toward tougher sanctions, or more of the Arab
states will start appeasing Iran, as Qatar is doing.
Netanyahu summed up his advice as: "stick to the deadline,
be firm on the terms, and apply sanctions" if Iran does not
comply. He thought Russia may be more inclined than in the
past, but it would be best not to count on the Security
Council. Having set a deadline, the P5 1 should stick to it.
The Western powers at least will go along. We should close
the gap between understanding the problem and acting on it,
he said. Netanyahu said Israel's problems with Iran are not
limited to its nuclear program. Even without a nuclear
umbrella, Iran is sending hundreds of tons of weapons to
Syria, Hamas and Hizballah. The ship seized November 3 by
the Israeli Navy had on board two thirds of the amount of
rockets fired at Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War.

¶7. (C) Representative Israel asked Netanyahu about the
timetable for Iran to achieve a nuclear weapon. Netanyahu
responded that Iran has the capability now to make one bomb
or they could wait and make several bombs in a year or two.
It is important to bear in mind that the Iranian regime was
exposed as a fraud during their presidential elections. The
Iranian people detest the regime and have shown great courage
in the streets. The exposure of the Qom facility also helped
convince doubters in the international community that Iran
has a weapons program. Iran has a weak economy and a
fractured political system, so it is vulnerable to sanctions.
The time to act diplomatically is now, Netanyahu said,
adding that we still have a year or two to stop the Iranian
program. Netanyahu said he thought President Obama
understands Iran perfectly. The Arab leaders hope Iran will
be stopped, there is broad Arab and European support for
"vigorous steps." Chairman Skelton asked whether the Arabs
would state their support publicly. Netanyahu replied they
might not, but it would not make a large difference since the
Arab "street" will not rise up in support of the Iranian
regime.

Ready to Talk to Syria
----------------------

¶8. (C) Regarding Syria, Netanyahu urged the U.S. to press
Damascus to stop supplying arms to Hizballah. Noting that he
had stopped in Paris to meet President Sarkozy on his way
back to Israel from Washington, Netanyahu confirmed media
reports that Sarkozy had offered to mediate between Israel
and Syria. Netanyahu said he would prefer direct
negotiations with the Syrians, but added that he would accept
France as a mediator. President Asad, however, still wants
Turkey as the mediator. Noting that Turkish PM Erdogan had
recently stated that he would prefer to meet with Sudanese
President Omar Bashir than with Netanyahu, Netanyahu asked
how the Turks could be fair mediators.

Working Together on Missile Defense
-----------------------------------

¶9. (C) Netanyahu said that in addition to peace with the
Palestinians and Iran, he and the President had discussed
joint U.S.-Israeli efforts on missile defense. Netanyahu

TEL AVIV 00002777 003 OF 003


commented that he had personally visited the Juniper Cobra
joint military exercise. The program has reached a phase at
which it is possible to monitor incoming missiles with a good
lead-time, but it is still very expensive to intercept "crude
rockets" such as those fired from Gaza. The information
shield is moving ahead nicely, but the physical shield is
lagging behind. Netanyahu observed that it is very important
for the U.S. and its allies to be able to defend themselves
against missile attack. Chairman Skelton noted that U.S.
personnel who briefed the CODEL were very optimistic about
the program. Netanyahu said only the U.S. and Israel are
currently working on missile defense. This cooperation sends
a powerful message to Israel's enemies he noted, and thanked
the CODEL and the Congress for their support.

Goldstone Report a Key Threat
-----------------------------

¶10. (C) Netanyahu commented that Israel currently faces
three principal threats: Iran's nuclear program, missile
proliferation and the Goldstone Report. Goldstone gave
terrorists immunity to attack Israel if they fire from
populated areas. During Cast Lead the IDF send thousands and
flyers, text messages and phone calls to civilians, warning
them to get out of the way, yet Israel was accused of war
crimes. Hamas and other terrorists fired 12.000 rockets into
Israel from Gaza, Netanyahu said, noting that Israel is the
only country in the world faced with threats to annihilate
it. Netanyahu asked the CODEL to imagine a situation in
which Israeli Air Force pilots must consult with lawyers
before they can travel abroad. Former PM Olmert, former
FonMin Livni and DefMin Barak could be hauled before the
International Criminal Court. Netanyahu said he could not
accept that IDF soldiers could be charged with war crimes for
protecting their country from constant attack. The deaths of
several hundred civilians in Gaza was "tragic," Netanyahu
said, but there was no deliberate targeting of civilians by
Israel. Deliberate targeting of civilians is a war crime,
but what should Israel do when terrorists deliberately target
Israeli civilians and then hide within their civilian
population?

¶11. (U) CODEL Skelton did not clear this cable.
CUNNINGHAM


/tag/IR_2.html


09BERLIN1626     2009-12-29 07:07     2010-11-28 18:06     UNCLASSIFIED     Embassy Berlin

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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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STATE FOR INR/R/MR, EUR/PAPD, EUR/PPA, EUR/CE, INR/EUC, INR/P,
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/DSAA, DIA FOR DC-4A

VIENNA FOR CSBM, CSCE, PAA

"PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE"

SIPDIS

E.0. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KGHG US IR CH US
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: TERRORISM, IRAN, CHINA, U.S.;BERLIN

¶1. Lead Stories Summary
¶2. (U.S.) Failed Terrorist Attack
¶3. (Iran) New Protestsn4
¶4. (China) Reaction to Jailing of Liu Xiabo
¶5. (U.S.) Healthcare Reform


¶1. Lead Stories Summary

The majority of dailies opened with reports on the failed terror
attack on a Delta Airlines jet, while Sueddeutsche headlined:
"Protests Intensify - Riots in Iran" and FAZ led with the headline:

"People Killed in Demonstrations in Iran." Editorials focused on
the
failed terror attack in the U.S., with the unrest in Iran and with
the
state of the coalition government in Berlin. ZDF-TV's early evening

newscast heute and ARD-TV's early evening newscast Tagesschau opened

with a report on violent clashes between the Iranian regime and
opponents.

¶2. (U.S.) Failed Terrorist Attack

All papers carry extensive reports the failed terrorist attack on a

Delta Airlines airliners and reported that travelers flying to the
United States must expect heightened security measures and tougher
restrictions on their flights to the United States. Die Welt
headlined: "Terror Attempt Stirring up fear of Terror," while
Financial Times headlined: "Fear of Terror is Back."

In a front-page editorial, Die Welt (12/28) judged: "The fact that
the
would-be attacker was able to board a plane with his dangerous
material reveals gaps in the control system. With metal detectors
alone chemical explosives cannot be discovered."

Under the headline: "Flight 253," Frankfurter Allgemeine (12/28)
opined: "If someone really had believed that we have transnational
terror under control, and that we can give an all-clear signal with

respect to security, then those people have now been taught better.

Irrespective of whether the attacker acted on his own or on the
instructions of al-Qaida, the danger is not over and that is why
travelers, not only to the Untied States, must accept new
inconveniences which are hopefully useful."

"Following the terror attempt in Detroit, the usual security debate

will now begin," Frankfurter Rundschau (12/28) noted, and added:
"controls will be heightened, and agencies are trying to get us to
do
everything possible to prevent another attack. This failed terror
attempt shows how unpredictable people can be who stop at nothing.

For the time being, there is only one lesson we can learn from the
events on Flight 253: It is the courageous effort of Jasper
Schuringa
who prevented even worse events. The unexpected resolve of
individuals can be the right answer to the threat that comes out of

the blue."

In the view of Stuttgarter Zeitung (12/28), "Abdulmutallab was miles


BERLIN 00001626 002 OF 005


away from the organizational level of the 9/11 attackers. But the
Nigerian national succeeded in one thing: he totally unnerved the
western world, and the terror fighting machinery of the United
States
in particular. Even though the U.S. government knew about the
danger
of the young man, he was able to fly around the world without
difficulty. Almost without any problems, he was able to smuggle
dangerous substances aboard an aircraft. But what if he really had

the order from al-Qaida in Yemen to blow up the plane? How does
this
view then fit the U.S. focus on Afghanistan? Is Yemen, too, a front

in the anti-terror war? Many question, but only a few answers."

Regional daily Nrnberger Nachrichten (12/28) and regional daily
Trierischer Volksfreund (12/28) judged: "How was it possible for a
young man to get aboard with a one-way ticket and an Arabic sounding

name, whose contacts with Islamic extremists were known and whose
father even warned the U.S. embassy? The lists of passengers
travelling to the United States are transferred in advance to the
U.S.
Homeland Security Department with all its data bases. But again we

see a big hole in the net that is supposed to capture potential
terrorists. Of course, one hundred percent security will never
exist,
but these gaps are dramatic and should be an alarm call which
politicians should not ignore."

Mannheimer Morgen (12/28) warned against hysteria and judged: "Each

day terror investigators receive hundreds of tips and indications.

How is it then possible to follow a vague suspicion? We should not

exaggerate security measures for flights. The fact that in the
United
States no one is allowed to go to the bathroom one hour before
landing
is ridiculous. The same is true for the ban on liquids in Europe.

Here there is a clear disproportion between cost and benefit."
MQrkische Allgemeine of Potsdam (12/28) opined: "If airlines, as a
reaction to the failed attempt, force their passengers to remain
seated one hour before landing, then this is no more than a gesture
of
helplessness. The second much more important aspect may be
dissatisfying at the moment, but there is no way around it: Muslims

must preach again and again in their own ranks that terror is not
the
culmination of piety but a crime. Any incident like this should
stress to the Muslim world how urgent this message is."

Regional daily Westdeutsche Zeitung of Dsseldorf (12/28) observed:

"Hectic measure such as barring passengers from getting up should
not
prevail in the long run. In the future, there will be no way around

finding the right balance between possible improvements of our
security standards compared to the trouble caused by
them."SchwarzwQlder Bote (12/28) noted: "Everything we have learned

about this attack does not strengthen our confidence in
international

BERLIN 00001626 003 OF 005


security measures. It is certainly right that there cannot be
absolute security from mean terrorist attacks but this does not the

least excuse the gaps in anti-terror measures.

¶3. (Iran) New Protests

All papers carry extensive coverage of the new clashes between the
regime and opposition forces in Iran. Sueddeutsche headlined:
"Protests Intensify - Riots in Iran" and FAZ led with the headline:

"People Killed in Demonstrations in Iran." Frankfurter Rundschau
reported on its front page: "The protests are directed against
Iranian
President Ahmadinejad." The paper also reported that "according to

reports from Tehran, police officers partly disobeyed orders to use

their guns against the protesters. The Internet page "Jaras," which

is critical of the government, reported that 'some [police officers]

tried to fire their guns in the air when their superiors put
pressure
on them.'"

Sueddeutsche Zeitung (12/28) said in an editorial under the
headline:
"There is Growing Unrest among the People" that "if the information

fragments from Tehran on the demonstrations during the Ashura
holidays
allow one conclusion, then this one: the rank and file of the
protests
are now overtaking their leaders. Posters of religious leader Ali
Khamenei and the chorus of demonstrators who want to see the
dictator
dead do not correspond with the slogans of the two opposition
leaders
Moussawi and Charrubi. They are now faced with a dilemma: If they

stick to their view that they, in principle, recognize the
institutions of the Islamic republic and want to use the courts to
make their political opposition heard, then it could be that their
followers will leave them because many want something else: regime
change."

Regional daily Suedwest Presse of Ulm (12/28) editorialized: "The
regime is using all its might to extinguish the massive protests.
The
few Internet reports in any case show the brutality of the leading
clique around President Ahmadinejad. In the meantime, the regime
has
its back to the wall. The protests are no longer confined to Tehran

but are spreading to other cities.... The government can no longer

afford the good deeds with which it bought the loyalty of Iranians.

All this is really worrying for the international community of
nations."

Ostsee Zeitung of Rostock (12/28) argued: "Despite jammed cellular
phone networks and despite blocked access to the Internet, the
unrest
in Iran hardly seems to be stoppable. The resistance is still
limited
to a well-educated cosmopolitan, young, urban middle class. Large
sectors of the population, however, seem to keep quiet or seem to

BERLIN 00001626 004 OF 005


support the regime. But the cyber revolt in Tehran has demonstrated

that the mullahs no longer enjoy a monolithic power."

Regional daily Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten (12/28) opined: "Since
the
allegedly manipulated re-election of President Ahmadinejad, a state
of
emergency has dominated in Iran. But this is not only the struggle
of
a limited political protest movement against the president and the
ayatollahs behind him. The country is now facing an endurance test.

At issue is whether the country wants to become a fundamental
religious state or an Islamic republic. The pictures from Iran are

shocking. It is the violence on both sides that makes us fear the
worst."

¶4. (China) Reaction to Jailing of Liu Xiabo

Frankfurter Allgemeine (12/28) editorialized under the headline:
"Co-
Responsibility," that foreign countries must also be blamed that a
man
like Liu Xiabo is jailed with such an absurdly high prison term.
The
foreign countries have treated China for economic considerations
with
political kid gloves for years. We can't blame China under these
circumstances because we think that it is unassailable? A positive

reaction to any criticism of the verdict cannot be expected."

Sueddeutsche Zeitung (12/28) said in an editorial: "A subtle but
clearly visible trend is getting hold in China. Civil disobedience

among the rank and file is spreading. It is an irony that this tend

has become visible in the tough verdict against Liu Xiabo. In front

of the court in which China's leadership organized the show trial,
we
could not only see international reporters and diplomats, but
Chinese
supporters of Liu shouted slogans and unrolled posters thus
deliberately risking their arrest. Only a few courageous people
went
to the court, but they showed that intimidation no longer works as
successfully as in the past. This new trend is not only confined to

the traditional political protest. Courageous lawyers of the
Weiquan
civil rights movement are defending victims of the arbitrariness of

state agencies and they defend each other, too. And the number of
peaceful and violent civil protests is on the rise. But the Chinese

Communist Party fails miserably when it comes to channeling
communication with its critics into a constructive direction. The
verdict against Liu Xiabo is one more example. It will only
partially
obtain the desired effect but not intimidate the people. At the
same
time, new embitterment, new disobedience is growing. With each show

trial, the party is now doing of what it is accusing Liu: it
undermines the state's authority."


BERLIN 00001626 005 OF 005


¶5. (U.S.) Healthcare Reform

Under the headline: "Reform Blues," Sueddeutsche Zeitung (12/28) had

this to say: "There is no doubt that the healthcare reform bill that

has now been adopted in the Senate is a great work...and
trailblazing.
But enthusiasm about the success is limited. One reason is that the

legislative process is so tiresome; but there is an even more
important reason: disappointment and doubts are spreading. The
advocates of the reform have been brought down to earth again
because
they were able to implement only a few of their demands. Thus far,

the Democrats have lost the fight for public opinion. They will
have
to do quite a lot in the election campaign in 2010 to avoid being
punished for a reasonable reform."

Die Welt (12/28) argued: "The Democrats will now have difficulty
explaining to their irritated voters why it is historic progress
that
31 million compatriots who have no coverage today will get health
insurance, and that health insurance companies can no longer reject

sick Americans or demand astronomically high premiums. This reform
is
supposed to carry itself and not burden the budget. But the
opponents
to the bill do not believe a word, arguing that the nation will go
bankrupt. This is a highly imperfect, weakened bill and, at the
same
time, a giant step forward into an American future in which job loss

no longer means the end of insurance protection for a former
employee
and their whole family."

DELAWIE


/tag/IR_2.html


10DAMASCUS8     2010-01-04 09:09     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Damascus

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 DAMASCUS 000008

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR NOBLES
LONDON FOR LORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2029
TAGS: PREL IR LE IZ SY
SUBJECT: CODEL GREGG'S DECEMBER 30 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
ASAD

Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter for reasons 1.4 b and d.

¶1. (S) Summary: In a frank one-hour meeting with Syrian
President Bashar al-Asad, Senators Gregg, Bayh, Specter,
Enzi, Cornyn, and Klobuchar affirmed Washington's interest in
better U.S.-Syrian relations and pushed Asad to take positive
steps as well. The senators urged Syria to move forward on
security cooperation with the U.S. on Iraq, facilitating the
release of three detained Americans in Iran, and re-opening
the Damascus Community School. Asad welcomed the prospect of
more Congressional visits and candid exchanges, saying
diplomacy had failed to solve the region's problems during
the last two decades.

-- On comprehensive peace, Asad reiterated Syria's strong
desire to return to Turkish-facilitated indirect talks with
Israel as a means to establish agreed terms of reference for
direct negotiations. Syria's relations with Iran should not
be linked to Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. Syria's ties
to Hamas, Hizballah, and other groups could be satisfactorily
resolved only after the achievement of a comprehensive
regional peace, Asad maintained.

-- The U.S. and Syria should use the next several months to
improve bilateral relations so that both sides could overcome
mutual distrust that would hinder U.S. credibility as an
honest broker, Asad told the senators. Later in the
discussion, FM Muallim argued the onus for taking the next
positive step lay with the U.S. Syria could not move on
issues such as the American school or the Cultural Center
unless Washington lifted its ban on the sale of new
commercial aircraft to Syria.

-- Calling Iran the region's most important country, Asad
said the West could improve the prospects for peace by
acknowledging Iran's NPT-protected right to enrich uranium
under IAEA monitoring. Asad argued the West should accept
Iran's "reasonable" counter-offer to ship several batches of
low-enriched uranium (LEU) abroad for enrichment by other
countries, instead of insisting Iran ship all of its LEU at
once. Asad said he believed Iran was not interested in
pursuing a nuclear weapon, but warned that an Israeli
military strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure would fail
to disable the program and would only increase Iran's
determination. End Summary.

--------------------------------------------- --
Doctor Asad: Treat, Don't Condemn, the Illness
--------------------------------------------- --

¶2. (S) A confident President Asad greeted the six visiting
senators and accompanying staff of CODEL Gregg on December 30
with a call for frank discussion of "the facts" rather than
an exchange of opinions. Only the facts, he said, would
enable both sides to focus on the critical issues of common
interest and lead to a process of identifying solutions to
shared challenges. The international community had failed
for two decades to solve the region's problems. Now, there
were new challenges on top of these that required direct, not
diplomatic, solutions. He welcomed the delegation, saying he
hoped for more meetings with Congressional groups.

¶3. (S) Senator Specter expressed the delegation's
condolences after the death of the President's younger
brother Majd and recalled his numerous meetings with
President Asad since their first meeting in 2000 at the
funeral of former Syrian President Hafez al-Asad. Senator
Specter referred to his earlier discussions with Syrian
officials about Israeli-Syrian peace talks and suggested

DAMASCUS 00000008 002 OF 006


Israel would benefit from peace with Syria. The U.S.
recognized Syria's deep and long-standing ties to Iran, but
it also saw dangers if Iran acquired nuclear weapons.
Stipulating that the Israeli government would have to make
its own decisions on how to proceed in peace talks with Syria
without U.S. pressure, Specter suggested the U.S. would
positively view Syrian efforts to use its influence to alter
Iranian policies. Iranian policies currently opposed the
achievement of peace between Syria and Israel, even as Syria
recognized such a development would have a positive impact on
defusing other regional tensions.

¶4. (S) Asad asserted he wanted peace with Israel, but the
issues were complex and required an organized frame of
reference. Both sides might agree on the shared objective of
peace, but they differed on preferred approaches. Calling
for a fact-based approach to identifying the obstacles to
peace, Asad likened the process to how a doctor should treat
cancer. Condemnations and mutual recriminations might be
self-satisfying, but the cancer still grows unless the doctor
is able to treat the root illness. Syria, Asad continued,
had begun indirect peace talks with Israel in May 2008 under
Turkish auspices. In roughly eight months, these talks had
achieved more than several years of direct negotiations with
Israel in the 1990s. The U.S. and Europeans needed to
support the Turkish track, argued Asad. They also should
convince Israel that only peace will protect Israel.
Israel's military superiority would not secure it from attack
against missiles and other technologies. President Obama's
tenure might represent the last opportunity for peace, Asad
told the senators.

-----------------------------------------
Asad on Necessity of Indirect Peace Talks
-----------------------------------------

¶5. (S) Senator Gregg asked why Syria insisted on pursuing
indirect peace talks via the Turks. Why couldn't Syria and
Israel move to direct talks brokered by the U.S., while Syria
helped on issues important to the U.S., such as Hizballah,
Hamas, and relations with Iran? Asad replied Hamas and
Hizballah should be a part of the peace, but not organizing
principles for conducting peace discussions. Syria, as
demonstrated by then-lead negotiator Muallim's efforts in the
1990s, had no problems with direct negotiations. But those
negotiations failed; failing again might foreclose future
opportunities. U.S. ambitions to push the peace process
forward only resulted in spoiling the process because of the
lack of "rules of negotiation." Indirect talks represent the
best way to establish terms of reference similar to those
reached by Secretary Baker during his intense shuttle
diplomacy in 1991. While no one called these talks indirect
negotiations, they functioned comparably to Syria's indirect
talks under Turkish auspices.

¶6. (S) Syria, Asad continued, saw the indirect talks as a
way to institutionalize the process and reach agreed terms of
reference on which to base direct negotiations. This basis
was absent in the 1990s and explained why the direct
negotiations ultimately failed. Referring to the "elephant
in the room," Gregg asked whether it would be possible to
reach peace with Israel without first resolving the Iranian
nuclear issue. Asad cautioned against linking Iran's nuclear
program to an Israeli-Syrian peace deal, arguing such a link
would only complicate both sets of issues. "Too many cooks
spoil the meal," he said. Later in the conversation, however
(in the context of a request for Syrian intervention with
Iran to free detained American hikers), Asad noted every
person and nation was key in bilateral and regional dynamics.

DAMASCUS 00000008 003 OF 006


Syria had cut relations with the U.S. after the 1967
Arab-Israeli conflict, but bilateral relations had improved
markedly after President Nixon visited Syria in 1974 to
discuss peace with Israel. "That's our issue," he stressed,
noting that the Golan track had been active under President
Carter but then dormant through most of the 1980s and the
early part of the current decade.

--------------------------------------------- ---------
Iraq: Political Cooperation, Then Security Cooperation
--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶7. (S) Senator Bayh observed that many things in Syria had
changed for the better since his 2002 visit. Now, there were
positive indicators that bilateral relations might be on the
upswing as well. One area, however, in which relations had
not improved was intelligence cooperation. The U.S. and
Syria appeared to have common interests in seeing a stable
Iraq, not dominated by Iran. Yet, foreign extremists
continued to travel through Syria into Iraq. The U.S. had
provided information regarding four named individuals to the
Syrian government, but nothing had happened. Perhaps now was
a propitious moment to consider re-establishing intelligence
ties, Bayh suggested. Asad concurred with the idea of
overlapping U.S.-Syrian interests in Iraq. He noted,
however, that the main obstacle to increased U.S.-Syrian
security cooperation stemmed from the absence of political
cooperation. The U.S. possessed a "huge information
apparatus" but lacked the ability to analyze this information
successfully, maintained Asad. "You're failing in the fight
against extremism. While we lack your intelligence
capabilities, we succeed in fighting extremists because we
have better analysts," he claimed, attributing the superior
analysis to living in and understanding the region.

¶8. (S) Syria, Asad explained, had refused to cooperate with
President Bush because it did not trust him and because the
Bush Administration had wrongfully accused Syria of
supporting foreign fighters. When President Obama assumed
office, Syria tried to be positive. Asad he had proposed to
Special Envoy Mitchell the idea of a border security
cooperation initiative with Iraq as a first step. (Post
Comment: Asad's recollection is both selective and
inaccurate. U.S. officials first proposed a border security
cooperation initiative to a reluctant FM Muallim in May 2009.
President Asad agreed to participate after meeting S/E
Mitchell in late July 2009.) "This was a small step for me,
but big for you," Asad argued. Citing the U.S. inability to
control its long border with Mexico, Asad said the border was
not the major challenge. Syria's close intelligence
cooperation with Turkey enabled both countries to prevent
terrorists from crossing their 860-kilometer border without
relying on a huge border security presence. This
intelligence cooperation enabled Syria to "suffocate"
logistical networks critical to the movement of terrorists.
"In the U.S., you like to shoot (terrorists). Suffocating
their networks is far more effective," said Asad.

¶9. (S) Asad said Syria required a positive first step prior
to resuming intelligence cooperation, a position that Senator
Mitchell had accepted. Syria had succeeded in convincing
Iraqi PM Maliki on August 18 to reverse its opposition to the
trilateral border security initiative and was ready to
participate. After the August 19 bombings and Iraqi
accusations against Syria for facilitating the terrorist
attacks, Syria remained willing to participate in the border
assessments. It was the U.S., Asad insisted, that had backed
away. Syria had no interest in supporting extremists, who
weren't killing Americans but rather Iraqi civilians. "That

DAMASCUS 00000008 004 OF 006


hurts us," Asad claimed. U.S. "mistakes in Iraq" had cost
Syria and the region a great deal. Syria had out of
self-interest sought to deter terrorists who popped up.
Still, despite a shared interest with the U.S. in ensuring
Iraqi stability, Syria would not immediately jump to
intelligence cooperation without ensuring its own interests
would be respected. "I won't give it (intelligence
cooperation) to you for free," he said. Senator Bayh replied
that the U.S. was working to normalize relations and
considering positive steps to take along the way. Syria,
Asad commented, had been clear on how to start rebuilding
relations. "We didn't say no," he said, "but we have to
build from an absence of trust."

----------------------------------------
Asad: Door Open to Iranian nuclear Deal
----------------------------------------

¶10. (S) Senator Cornyn commented the most dire threat to
regional peace stemmed from Iran's nuclear aspirations.
Syrian interests could well suffer if there were a conflict
between Israel and Iran and possibly others. Asad replied no
one could predict the course of a conflict; therefore, it was
better to avoid one. The Bush Administration took a
political approach to Iran instead of dealing with the
nuclear issue in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Under the NPT, Iran enjoys the right to enrich uranium,
provided there is IAEA monitoring. Instead of trying to stop
Iran's program, the international emphasis should shift to
ensuring proper monitoring. Iran had accepted the principle
of enriching uranium outside of its borders. Now the
challenge was how to meet Iran's concern that shipping all of
its LEU at once would risk not receiving any in return. Asad
claimed Iran sought only to enrich its uranium to 20 percent,
well bellow the 95 percent threshold necessary for
weapons-grade material. If the international community
agreed to divide Iran's shipments into four or five parts,
Iran would be flexible, Asad argued. In the meantime, Israel
had to forget about attacking Iran. Such a move would only
encourage Iran to follow the path of India, Pakistan, and
others in seeking a nuclear weapon. Syria opposed this
outcome, but viewed the only solution was to recognize Iran's
rights and demonstrate flexibility in foreign enrichment,
Asad said.

¶11. (S) Later in the conversation, Senator Specter argued
Iran appeared to be blocking a deal. Asad claimed Iranian
diplomacy was now more flexible because the government was
stronger and more confident after the 2009 elections. Noting
he had shared this assessment with French President Sarkozy,
Asad said he judged Iran to be looking for cooperative signs.
Iran represented the most important country in the region,
Asad assessed, ranking Turkey second and Syria third. The
U.S. had troops in Afghanistan and needed better relations
with Iran. Specter agreed the enrichment issue could be
solved; Russia had offered to enrich Iranian uranium several
years ago, subject to international monitoring. Iran had
answered yes, replied Asad, but the issue was how to proceed.
Iran's desire to divide the uranium shipments represented
the only difference: if the West agreed, the issue would be
solved. There was an open door; if the nuclear issue could
be solved, the peace process would proceed more easily. But
if conflict erupted, the regional context would become
extremely complicated.

------------------------------------
Discussion of Detained Amcits in Iran
-------------------------------------


DAMASCUS 00000008 005 OF 006


¶12. (S) Senator Klobuchar commented that she had supported
Barak Obama because of his promise to advance a new approach
to international relations. While there were no easy
solutions in the region, the U.S. and Syria appeared to have
overlapping interests in avoiding war and in ensuring a
strong and stable Iraq. From the U.S. perspective, Syria
might demonstrate as a goodwill gesture its interest in
better relations by helping obtain the release of three
American citizens -- Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer and Sarah
Shourd -- who apparrently crossed into Iran while hiking in
northeastern Iraq. Swiss officials had visited them, but
they were isolated and the U.S. lacked information on their
whereabouts and any pending charges.

¶13. (S) Asad replied he was unfamiliar with their case and
requested that the Embassy send more information. Senator
Specter interjected later in the conversation that the
Embassy had delivered a letter to the MFA that week from the
Secretary. Specter added he had personally raised the matter
in Washington with Syrian Ambassador Imad Mustafa. The U.S.
would view positively Syrian efforts to secure the three
Americans' release, Specter said, comparing the case to the
Iranian detention of UK sailors whom Syria helped to free.
"We'll try our best," replied Asad, saying it would be
necessary to ask about the legal aspects of the case.
Specter clarified there had been no charges filed. It had
started as a trespassing case, but U.S.-Iranian relations
were so poor it was impossible to resolve.

--------------------------------------------- ---
Re-Opening DCS: Syria Awaiting U.S. Steps First
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶13. (S) Senator Klobuchar and Senator Enzi argued Syria
might demonstrate good will by re-opening the Damascus
Community School (DCS), whose closure had hurt not just
American students, but also many foreigners and Syrians.
Senator Enzi said his committee's purview on education
created a personal interest in seeing the DCS re-opened; the
school's closure represented a step away from moving towards
positive relations. Asad replied he wanted to open Syria to
the rest of the world. In September 2008, for example, the
French Embassy opened a new international school. Asad
explained he had ordered DCS's closure after a U.S. military
attack on Syrian soil had killed seven innocent civilians in
late October 2008. "We had to respond," he argued, saying
the school's closure "was the only step we could take" in
response to the Bush Administration. President Carter, Asad
continued, had urged the reopening of DCS during his December
2008 visit. "I told Carter that we are ready," said Asad,
who noted the Syrian government wanted to send positive
signals to the Obama administration and had done so by
re-opening the American Cultural Center (ACC).

¶14. (S) FM Muallim noted that only part of the American
Language Center portion of ACC had been allowed to re-open.
He argued that he and other Syrian officials had told State
Department officials that steps by Syria to improve relations
first required U.S. steps. "We can't move without a waiver
for Syrian Airlines," he argued, citing the threat to Syrian
civilians posed a U.S. ban on the sale of civilian aircraft
and spare parts. Asad noted that a good friend who ran a
medical laboratory was similarly unable to import U.S. lab
technology. The bigger issue, Asad said, was about bilateral
relations. Syria's intent was to re-open the DCS. Asad said
he trusted President Carter and supported President Obama.
"We know he has other problems and priorities, but there must
be U.S. steps," Asad insisted.


DAMASCUS 00000008 006 OF 006


¶15. (C) U.S. Participants:

CDA Charles Hunter
Senator Judd Gregg
Senator Evan Bayh
Senator Arlen Specter
Senator Michael Enzi
Senator John Cornyn
Senator Amy Klobuchar
Mr. Paul Grove, Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee
Mr. Christopher Gahan, Staff Member, Senator Gregg's Office
Mr. Michael Pevzner, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence
Mr. Tom Sullivan, Staff Member, Senate Judiciary Committee
Mr. Christopher Bradish, Staff Member, Senator Specter's
Office

¶16. (C) Syrian Participants:

President Bashar al-Asad
Foreign Minister Walid Muallim
Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad
Presidential Advisor for Media and Policy Affairs Bouthaina
Shaaban
MFA America's Desk Director Dr. Muhammad Khafif

¶17. (SBU) Mr. Paul Grove of CODEL Gregg cleared on this
cable.
HUNTER


/tag/IR_2.html


10RPODUBAI13     2010-01-12 14:02     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN     Iran RPO Dubai

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/12
TAGS: PGOV IR PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN'S GREEN PARTY OPPOSITION: ITS BIRTH AND EVOLUTION (1/3)

CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Iran's Green Path Opposition (GPO) came into being
as a result of the fixed June 12 Presidential election. What
started as a movement to annul the election now gives shelter both
to those seeking the full set of rights guaranteed them by Islamic
Iran's Constitution and others seeking a new system altogether.
Although the numbers of those publicly willing to march under its
banner have decreased in the face of regime brutality, its current
core group, mostly college-age urban youth, have shown no sign of
giving up the fight. But like the regime that seeks to crush it,
the GPO is not monolithic and there is a clear gulf between the
opposition's elite leadership and the popular movement protesting
in the streets. Remaining outside the umbrella of the GPO is an
array of unsatisfied groups whose willingness to join the GPO is
unclear. These groups clearly oppose President Ahmadinejad but do
not yet seek, as do many GPO elements, to overturn the entire
system. END SUMMARY.



¶2. (C) NOTE: This is the first in a series of three cables
examining the Iranian Opposition since the June 12 Presidential
election, what might happen in the short-term, and what the most
effective levers of US policy have been so far and what combination
may have the most impact in the coming months.



¶I. BIRTH OF THE GPO

---------------------------



¶3. (C) ELECTION BUILD-UP AND ORIGINS OF THE Green Path OPPOSITION:
Iran's current unrest began in June 2009, when Iran's lackluster
Presidential campaign became energized by a (first-time) series of
televised debates among the four Presidential candidates: former
Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi (reformist), former Speaker
Mehdi Karrubi (reformist), Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen
Rezai (moderate conservative) and President Ahmadinejad (hard-line
conservative). President Ahmadinejad's accusations that former
Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami were 'plotting' against his
government and, along with Mousavi and other reformists, sought to
undermine the Revolution and to enrich themselves, galvanized
ordinary Iranians. Incivility and accusations at odds with
obligatory Persian politesse left many observers with the
impression (discomforting for some, energizing for others) that the
elections might actually be more of a true contest than past
elections, and that Ahmadinejad might actually be vulnerable to an
upset.



¶4. (C) These Presidential debates sparked popular interest in the
election, and in the last week or so before the June 12 vote
reformist candidate Mousavi, with active and behind-the-scenes
support from Khatami and Rafsanjani, increasingly gained momentum,
with his supporters for the first time beginning to speak publicly
of a 'Green Movement.' Part of his support were young, first-time
voters; part were revitalized older 'Second of Khordad' reformists
who had turned out in record number to support Khatami in 1997 and
2001, but who had subsequently sourced on politics due to Khatami's
inability to effect change. Another large group of first-time
voters were from the ranks of the "Khamoush" ('silent') - ie,
Iranians who had never voted but who were inspired by prospects for
positive change and had hope that this election would be genuine.
Mousavi may have even drawn some support for older and more
conservative voters who remembered his steady stewardship of Iran's
economy during his stint as Prime Minister during the 1980's
Iran-Iraq War.



¶5. (C) ELECTION DAY: IRIG elections have never been 'free and
fair,' but until June 2009 most electoral machinations consisted
primarily of the conservative Guardian Council screening out
ideologically undesirable candidates, plus vote manipulation at
relatively low levels, including using the Basij to 'get out the
vote.' Conventional wisdom going into June 12 was that a high
turnout -- representing energized young and urban voters -- would
favor Mousavi, who would need a few million vote 'cushion' in order

DUBAI 00000013 002 OF 006


to either win outright or to get into a subsequent two-man runoff
with Ahmadinejad. While we don't know nor might not ever know the
real June 12 vote count, it is clear that the turnout was at record
high levels and that there was systematic vote count fraud (if in
fact the votes were even counted) to ensure that Ahmadinejad 'won
big' in the first round.



¶6. (C) Why the fix? In retrospect, many of the reasons seem clear.
Part of the answer could relate to SLK's desire to have unified
control over the three branches of government to strengthen Iran's
hand, and his hand personally, in expected upcoming negotiations
with the West and the US over nuclear issues. More certainly, part
of the answer is that after the 1997-2005 Khatami Presidency,
Supreme Leader Khamenei (SLK) was determined to prevent any
reformist, especially his former political opponent Mousavi, from
heading the Executive Branch. SLK considers Rafsanjani his most
serious rival, and is also intimidated by Khatami's popularity.
Therefore, that both Rafsanjani and Khatami supported Mousavi may
have led SLK to conclude that a Mousavi victory would consolidate
power in the hands of those bitter rivals and leave him
unacceptably vulnerable to marginalization. And part of the answer
relates to the increasingly powerful IRGC hardline faction that had
supported Ahmadinejad (AN) in 2005, whose support AN strengthened
over the subsequent four years by using government funds and
patronage to increase this faction's power and wealth. As such,
this hardline IRGC faction, composed mostly of high-level officers
with a shared intelligence-security background, wanted 'four more
years,' despite mixed support for AN from within the IRGC ranks.
Anecdotal information indicates that this hardline faction had
convinced SLK that the election could be fixed with minimal
backlash.



¶7. (C) They were wrong, as shown by the unprecedented sight of
millions of ordinary Iranians pouring into the streets chanting
'where is my vote.' On June 19, SLK abandoned his carefully
cultivated pretense of non-partisanship and took the first steps
down the long road of post-election suppression when he lauded the
'epic' June 12 vote and told those disputing the results to stop
protesting and fall in line or face the consequences. In response,
what started as the pre-election 'Green Movement' slowly began
changing into the 'Green Path of Hope' Opposition (GPO), as
reformist leaders Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami signaled that they
would not stand down.



¶8. (C) REGIME RESPONSE: Regime reaction to ongoing post-election
GPO activity was swift, conducted at both the popular and elite
level:



- At the elite level the regime began a widespread intimidation
campaign to include Stalinesque show trials, rounding up not only
'all the usual suspects' (i.e. first-tier reformists, primarily
those associated with Khatami's 'Second of Khordad' movement), but
also their family members, in addition to second-tier reformists,
political and human rights activists, and reporters. Many if not
most of these detained, to include those arrests that garnered the
most publicity in the West, played no significant role in either
promoting Mousavi's candidacy or in engendering post-election
protests. However anecdotal evidence indicates there have been
extensive arrests of younger, lesser-known activists more active in
the GPO. Within the regime, SLK acted quickly to bring into line
as many key power brokers as possible, including traditional
conservatives like Majlis Speaker Larijani, former IRGC commander
(and defeated Presidential candidate) Mohsen Rezai, and Tehran
Mayor Qalibaf - all of whom oppose Ahmadinejad and would have been
happy to see him go, but whose loyalty to the System and to the
Leader trumped concerns they may have had about the extent of the
voting fraud.



- At the popular level the regime increasingly resorted to force on
those public holidays when GPO supporters took to the streets. The
following were the key dates on which the GPO took to the streets:

DUBAI 00000013 003 OF 006


-- 20 June 2009: The day after SLK's gauntlet-throwing Friday
Prayer speech saw several hundred thousand Iranians march in Tehran
to protest, and also witnessed the first significant use of regime
force against protestors. The killing of one young marcher, Neda
Agha Soltani, captured on video, focused global attention on the
protests and gave the GPO a tragic but iconic image of martyrdom to
wield against the regime.



-- June 28, 2009 (7th of Tir): The first time the GPO used the
cover of an officially sanctioned ceremony to rally against the
government. GPO supporters, led by a key Mousavi aide, caught
security forces off guard by taking over an annual ceremony to mark
the 1981 bombing that killed several leaders of the Revolution.



-- July 17, 2009: The first and only time since June 12 when
former President Rafsanjani, in many ways the main target of
hardline regime animus, was allowed to give the Tehran Friday
Prayer sermon. Rafsanjani's much anticipated speech, in which he
did not acquiesce to the official election results, energized
opposition supporters and led to street clashes.



-- September 18, 2009 (Ghods Day): The government-orchestrated
event to demonstrate solidarity with Palestinians was co-opted by
hundreds of thousands of GPO supporters flaunting green and
chanting anti-government slogans. Ghods Day was the zenith of the
GPO's ability to bring significant number to the streets, and the
last time when security forces by and large eschewed violence;



-- November 4, 2009 (US Embassy Takeover Anniversary): The GPO
hoped to replicate Ghods Day during the first large-scale protest
since university campuses reopened. Increasingly ominous warnings
from the security forces and revelations of detainee abuse resulted
in smaller GPO turnout, and more violent clashes than previously;



-- December 27, 2009 (Ashura and 7th Mourning Day for Grand
Ayatollah Montazeri): Ashura witnessed the most violent clashes
since June 20, with at least nine killed. Violent clashes also
took place in major cities outside of Tehran.



II. WHERE WE ARE NOW

----------------------------------



¶9. (C) WHAT IS THE OPPOSITION: Up to now the GPO's most significant
tool of resistance is popular turnout in the form of peaceful
marching and civil disobedience on those holidays when the regime
cannot prevent people taking to the streets. However, ongoing
regime violence against protesters has decreased GPO turnout, from
the millions of June 15 to a smaller committed core of (at most)
hundreds of thousands. Much if not most of them are young,
college-age Iranians, and understandably the vast majority of
opposition turnout appears to have been in Tehran, although other
major urban centers have also seen sporadic unrest. Although the
number of GPO'ers willing to take to the streets has decreased from
the days immediately following the June election, those remaining
on the streets seem to have radicalized, with at least some
opposition animus from AN to SLK: the new emblematic chant is no
longer 'where is my vote' but 'death to the dictator (i.e. SLK).'
At the elite level, not only are Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami the
focus on hardline regime pressure, but former President Rafsanjani
is under ongoing attack by these same forces.

DUBAI 00000013 004 OF 006


¶10. (C) The GPO has a strong 'brand' - green, freedom, peace signs,
silent marches, stolen election and martyrs like Neda Agha Soltani.
But like the regime that seeks to crush it, the GPO is not
monolithic. To characterize the GPO's active core as now primarily
(but not exclusively) university students and university-age youth
in a country so demographically young (for example, approximately
one quarter of the population is in its twenties) is not to
belittle its potential. Outside of the active GPO core group there
is a larger, relatively passive group, whose support now mostly
manifests in the anonymous shouts of 'God is Great' from night-time
North Tehran rooftops or who scrawl or stamp anti-regime slogans on
ten thousand Toman currency notes. Presumably many of them have
fled the field due to fear of regime reprisal but might be drawn
back into the fray if the prospects of a GPO victory, however
defined, became more real to them than the prospect of blows from a
Basiji baton.



¶11. (C) OTHER OPPOSITIONS: Stepping back, it is wrong to assume
that the GPO is the logical equivalent of 'the Iranian opposition,'
and indeed it is more accurate to speak of many different Iranian
oppositions, each with different constituents and goals, to include
the following:



- BUREAUCRACY: AN has effected vast bureaucratic top-down Executive
branch personnel changes, ignoring the technocratic cadre that was
the recruitment pool for the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies.
Given his preference for ideology over expertise ('mota'hed' versus
'motakhasses'), he has staffed his government largely from within
the current and former IRGC ranks. Many of these former ministers,
deputy ministers, office heads and other senior bureaucrats have
not been pleased with their professional fates. At lower
government levels, there is anecdotal evidence of widespread
disgruntlement with if not opposition to AN.



-MILITARY/INTELLIGENCE: AN and his hardline IRGC backers have
extensively purged the Intelligence Ministry on the grounds of
partisan loyalty, creating a significant cadre of disgruntled
former Intelligence Ministry officials. Similarly, there is
evidence of at least some IRGC opposition, both within the rank and
file and also the upper ranks, at SLK's handling of the election
and post-election events.



- INDUSTRIALISTS: AN's massive economic mismanagement and the
ongoing economic power grab of 'IRGC Incorporated' has engendered
much ill will among Iran's affluent and influential industrial
leaders.



- RAFSANJANI/CLERGY: Rafsanjani's institutional power is minimal,
but as part of his strategy he seeks to retain/expand his support
within Iran's clerical class, although this class itself is
increasingly impotent and dependent on government favor . As one
element of the regime's efforts to limit the pro-GPO clergy's
influence, it has taken steps in recent weeks to challenge the
religious titles and credentials of at least one top-level
reformist cleric ("Grand Ayatollah"). This move will not likely
endear the regime to many if not most Iranian traditional
seminarians who take matters of religious credentials, learning,
and hierarchy very seriously, especially given SLK's own lack of
qualifications for his religious title.



- 'MODERATE' PRINCIPLISTS: Within the ruling conservative
'Principlist' ('Osulgarayan') grouping there is a significant
faction opposing AN, though still quite loyal to SLK and the
concept of 'Supreme Jurisconsulate.' One of this faction's leaders
is Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, with the Majlis as a whole in an
ongoing battle with AN's increasingly 'imperial' Executive Branch.
Other major Principlist opponents are Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher
Qalibaf and Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai.

DUBAI 00000013 005 OF 006


GPO LEADERSHIP- STREET

---------------------------------



¶12. (C) The GPO has promulgated a new mode of oppositionist
organization for Iran. Anecdotal evidence indicates that GPO
leaders, especially Mousavi, have from the start favored a
horizontal, diffuse, decentralized GPO structure as opposed to a
more hierarchical one. Indeed, part of the GPO's resilience stems
from this defuse and decentralized nature, frustrating a regime
that has come to rely on the two-step of identifying and
decapitating leadership as its main tool for extinguishing dissent.
In this regard communication technologies such as the Internet and
SMS technology have been a significant 'force multiplier,' with
virtual space in many ways playing the same 'information-center'
role now that the networks of mosques played in the 1979
Revolution. GPO leaders Karrubi, Mousavi and Khatami play a role
both symbolic and also operational, with anecdotal evidence
indicating that they are playing at least a limited role in
coordinating with if not leading the GPO masses. Additionally,
for the first time since the Revolution elements of the Iranian
Diaspora seem to be playing a role within events in Iran,
coordinating with GPO leadership elements inside the country.



¶13. (C) Distance between the titular GPO leadership and the street
may yield tactical advantages, though it also reflects a gulf
between the leadership and the popular opposition. Mousavi,
Karrubi, and Khatami are longstanding fixtures of the Islamic
Republic, making them ill suited to lead a radicalizing movement
calling for the overthrow of that system. Certainly they retain
support from the broader opposition, but many, and particularly the
more radicalized elements, do not look to Mousavi et al for
leadership. In particular, IRPO contacts in their 20s and 30s
discount the notion that anyone previously associated with 'the
Nezam' ('the System') could accurately represent their interests
and aspirations. The regime, however, has proved particularly
effective at neutralizing emerging leaders from the post-Revolution
generations.



¶14. (C) Within the GPO there is no consensus on its goals. What
started as a movement merely to annul the election results now
gives shelter both to those seeking the full set of rights
guaranteed them by Islamic Iran's Constitution and others seeking a
new system of governance altogether. Much like the ambiguity in
its leadership, the unspecified nature of its goals allow it to
have a 'bigger tent.' Mousavi's recent five point declaration
calling for restoring press freedom, creating a fair and
transparent election law, freeing all political prisoners, and
recognizing the peoples' right to gather and to form political
associations and parties, was however an attempt by the GPO
leaderships to to begin to delimit the scope of their ambitions.



¶15. (C) Heretofore the GPO has yet to adopt any sort of an economic
agenda or set of grievances as part of a core opposition message,
and perhaps the absence of one partially underscores the relative
'bourgeois' leanings of the GPO. Anecdotal information indicates
that unemployment and a potential spike in inflation (expected with
the recent decision to end subsidies) increasingly concern a large
number of Iranians. IRPO contacts and Iranian press reporting also
indicate another spike in labor unrest, due to the parlous state of
Iran's factories and their inability to pay their workers on time.
One would think that a message that capitalizes on these economic
concerns juxtaposed against President Ahmadinejad's (and by
extension the Revolution's) economic mismanagement and continued
corruption would attract a wide spectrum of socio-economic groups
to a more broad-based GPO. However, for whatever reason, in
contemporary Iran it has been political and not economic themes
that have been more effective in mobilizing the Iranian people, and
economic concerns on their own have rarely drawn large protests in
Iran's thirty-year post-revolutionary history.

DUBAI 00000013 006 OF 006


¶16. (U) COMMENT: The June 12 election and its subsequent
protests/crackdown was a tectonic shift in Iranian domestic
politics. At the elite level it destroyed Khamenei's non-partisan
veneer, placing him securely in the center of a no holds-barred
political fray. It also redefined the sets of insider ('khodi')
and outsider ('qeyr-e khodi') so that not only were Second of
Khordad Reformists on the outs, but so was former President Hashemi
Rafsanjani and those aligned with him. In this regard, at the
elite level the central dynamic in many ways can be seen as Supreme
Leader Khamenei, AN and the hard-line intelligence-security IRGC
faction on one side and former President Rafsanjani on the other,
with all of Iran's political elite being pressured to openly take
sides (NOTE: there is a substantial economic element to this
dynamic, as in many ways Ahmadinejad's ascension to power coincides
with attempts by a new cohort elite, largely composed of hardline
IRGC 'intelligence-security' elements, to secure positions of
wealth and influence formerly occupied by Rafsanjani loyalists).
Certainly many hardline regime elements see Rafsanjani and his
eldest son Mehdi as the 'head' to the GPO 'body,' and assume that
if Rafsanjani were neutralized then the GPO's threat potential
would be far less.



¶17. (C) COMMENT (CONT): According to IRPO contacts close to the
Rafsanjani circle, Rafsanjani is still unsuccessfully seeking to
persuade Supreme Leader Khamenei that AN and his crowd are a far
greater threat to the Islamic Republic than any threat that
Khamenei might feel from Rafsanjani, and that SLK should withdraw
his support for them. For their part, the regime continues to
pressure Rafsanjani through (inter alia) judicial and other
pressure on his family, such that his eldest son Mehdi has fled
abroad and cannot return. A weakened Rafsanjani has minimal
institutional power, given that the Expediency Council is
subordinate to Khamenei and that the clerics in the Experts Council
are too cowed or beholden to the government to oppose them. As
such, Rafsanjani keeps a low public profile while at the same time
trying to rally elite support, to include moderate conservatives
and influential IRGC commanders. The regime is unlikely to more
directly target Rafsanjani unless and until Rafsanjani were to
become more confrontational.



¶18. (C) COMMENT (CONT): At the popular level, June 12 has revived a
popular reformist movement largely quiescent after the eight
Khatami years while also bringing large parts of Iran's youngest
generation into the fray. This opposition, however, is not
unified. The GPO now is a bifurcated movement, coupling a largely
student-dominated mass following with a titular, elite leadership,
and the two parts are not a cohesive whole. This rather diffuse
organization may be a key to its staying power and simultaneously
an impediment to building an opposition movement that could
challenge the viability of the current government. Beyond the GPO
is an array of unsatisfied groups whose willingness to join the GPO
is unclear. These groups clearly oppose President Ahmadinejad but
do not yet seek, as do many GPO elements, to overturn the entire
system. END COMMENT.
EYRE


/tag/IR_2.html


10RPODUBAI15     2010-01-13 13:01     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN     Iran RPO Dubai

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TAGS: PGOV IR PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN DOMESTIC POLITICS: 'FROM CRISIS TO STALEMATE' (2/3)

CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At this point the Green Path Opposition (GPO) is
more of a persistent problem for the regime than an existential
threat, and it is unrealistic to assume that the GPO will be able
to effect any 'regime change' in the short-term. Iran's ruling
regime is likely to continue seeing increased violence and
suppression as its most effective tool, including in the build-up
to mid- February anniversary of the Revolution and the opposition's
next planned protests. However it is unlikely be able to
eliminate the GPO, which will continue trying to co-opt public
holidays to stage anti-regime protests and also try to increase
divisions among regime elite. Although subsets of the GPO are
radicalizing, there is no reason to assume that GPO elements
seeking to fundamentally change the system represent most Iranians.
The GPO does not mirror the widespread an varied opposition that
overturned the Shah thirty years ago, and the standoff now is
increasingly becoming a stalemate that (inter alia) imperils the
IRIG's ability to engage with the West. Until a new homeostasis is
reached in Iran's political ruling class, progress on issues of
bilateral importance will be even more difficult than usual. END
SUMMARY.



¶2. (U) NOTE: This is the second in a series of cables examining
the Iranian opposition since the June 12 Presidential election,
what might happen in the short-term, and what the most effective
levers of US policy have been so far and what combination may have
the most impact in the coming months.



ON THIS SIDE: REGIME

-----------------------------



¶3. (C) Iran's current leadership sees the GPO with its periodic
street demonstrations more as a persistent problem than as an
existential threat. Ideology and personal experience have taught
regime hard-liners to equate compromise under pressure with
weakness. Supreme Leader Khamenei (SLK) himself is said to believe
that the Shah's fatal mistake, and the reason the Revolution
succeeded, was because the Shah 'retreated,' in addition to
believing that the USSR's fall was due to the same reasons. As
such, the regime can be expected to remain committed to using force
and repression against the GPO as necessary to both incapacitate
its first- and second-tier leadership (primarily through detention)
and its rank and file (through detention and violence, to include
deadly force).



¶4. (C) Opposition activists have told IRPO that at least part of
the regime strategy is a pre-emptive 'rolling round-up' of not just
active GPO elements but also sympathizers. Thus in addition to
those it identifies as participating in GPO activities, the regime
goes after reformist reporters, feminists, human rights advocates,
labor organizers, ageing 'National Front' sympathizers, 'Second of
Khordad' Khatami-era reformists who are not active in the GPO
movement. According to some foreign-based GPO leaders, informed
estimates indicate approximately 2,000 people have been thus far
detained.



¶5. (C) Indications are that the regime is laying the groundwork for
using even more violence, to include the broader use of lethal
force at the popular level if necessary. This could include
executions of those found guilty of 'warring against God,' a term
which the regime is prone to define somewhat expansively. And while
there is certainly a limit to the regime's willingness to use
violence against its own people, there are no indications that it
is anywhere near it. One former IRGC officer told an Iranwatcher
that the IRGC wants to avoid killing more than a 'few dozen'
protestors in any one location on any one day, partially to avoid
associations with 'Black Friday' -September 8, 1978 - when mass
fatalities in a demonstration turned many against the Shah). The
Ashura-day murder of Mousavi's nephew, in addition to the January 7
incident where security officials seemed to have coordinated shots
being fired at a car carrying Karrubi indicate a regime intent to

DUBAI 00000015 002 OF 006


calibrate its level of violence to intimidate the opposition and
its leadership.



¶6. (C) The media press environment is also expected to become far
more restrictive, with one prominent reformist newsman telling IRPO
that he expects all reformist papers to be shut down in the
short-term. The regime continues to block 'subversive' websites,
while also stepping up it jamming of satellite broadcasts from both
VOA and BBC.



¶7. (C) In addition to its familiar tools of force and repression,
the regime also occasionally feints toward reconciliation, issuing
statements counseling moderation and offering up an occasional
scapegoat, such as the recent Majlis report blaming former Tehran
Prosecutor General Mortazavi for the detainee deaths at the
Kahrizak detention center. In the public thrust and parry over
post-June 12 events one regime voice conspicuous by its absence has
been that of President Ahmadinejad, who has largely kept silent.
This strategy has drawn criticism by some fellow hard-liners, who
fault him for his unwillingness to publicly endorse harsh measures
against the GPO.



¶8. (C) According to GPO expatriate leaders and other sources, the
ruling regime can be seen as composed of three groups, with
Khamenei still exercising control:



- relative moderates, such as Ali Larijani and Ahmad Tavakolli in
the Majlis, and Asghar Hejazi, former Foreign Minister Velayati and
former Majlis Speaker Nateq-Nuri all in the Supreme Leader's
office. This group seeks to have SLK cease his active support of
Ahmadinejad so that he can be removed by the Majlis;



-hardliners, such as IRGC Intelligence Head Hossein Taeb,
Khameneni's son Mojtaba, Basij Commander BG Mohammad Reza Naqdi,
Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, and Ahmadinejad and his own crowd. This
group seeks increased use of force, to include lethal force, on the
GPO and its leaders;



- a middle way 'swing' group, composed of SLK himself, his two
sons Mostafa and Maysam, and some intelligence officials. This
group seeks a middle course between the two above, favoring
imprisoning, beating but not mass killing of protestors, and house
arrest and intimidation but not arrest and/or execution of GPO
leaders.



ON THIS SIDE: GPO

-------------------------



¶9. (C) Going forward, the GPO seems committed to using public
holidays as a show of strength and support, with the next big GPO
planned demonstration being the anniversary of the Revolution's
victory on February 11 (22 Bahman). According to at least one
prominent GPO activist based abroad, the GPO leadership has a
three-part strategy:



- (1) Maintaining GPO unity while also 'growing' and training its
numbers, expanding both geographically and in its constituent
class/demographic/ethnic elements. Public street gatherings on key
dates are one way of showing solidarity, as are slogans from
rooftops, work slowdowns, and other non-violent 'political
actions.' It will also seek to expand its use of 'blitz'
demonstrations, i.e. rapid assembly and dispersal of protestors, in

DUBAI 00000015 003 OF 006


addition to university demonstrations and other forms of protest.
In this regard it seeks to strengthen links with Iran's labor
force, many of whom have a tradition of striking over non-payment
of wages. (NOTE: The GPO's diffuse structure, and constant regime
pressure, will make implementing better organization and training
difficult in the short-term).



- (2) Creating divisions within the ruling elite, by 'peeling off'
the moderates around Khamenei. Mousavi's recent statement in which
he tacitly accepted the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad government
was a step in this direction. Second of Khordad 'theoretician' Said
Hajjarian used to speak of the tactic of 'pressure from below,
negotiations from above' as the reformist strategy, and at least
some GPO strategists hope that elite pressure from moderate
conservatives dismayed at ongoing popular protests will seek to
convince SLK to cease his active support of Ahmadinejad, at which
point he will be subject to possibly politically fatal attacks from
the Majlis due to (inter alia) his financial mismanagement. These
GPO strategists, who curiously also see regime compromise as a sign
of weakness, see Supreme Leader Khamenei's 'throwing Ahmadinejad
under the bus' as the first step to ultimately bringing down
Supreme Leader Khamenei himself



- (3) Continuing non-violent efforts to 'paralyze' the government,
largely through boycotts of IRGC affiliated companies, through work
slowdowns, and ultimately through strikes. Some within the GPO see
the December 27 Ashura demonstrations as equivalent to the 17
Shahrivar demonstrations during the Revolution, after which the
people slowly 'lost their fear' of the Shah's machinery of
repression. However, even the most optimistic GPO leaders
acknowledge the movement needs significantly more organization and
training before it is able to engage in larger anti-regime
activities (NOTE: Another advantage of a non-violent strategy is
that such non-violent protests are technically authorized by
Article 27 of the Constitution. As such, any move to anti-regime
violence would represent not just an escalation in the likely
overall level of violence, but a move from inter-Constitutional to
extra-Constitutional opposition).



¶10. (C) This 3-part strategy, as articulated by a GPO leader based
abroad, in many respects depends on the willingness of the mass
movement of the GPO for support; whether it has been embraced by
the popular elements of the GPO opposition is unclear.
Furthermore, the increasing radicalization of popular elements
within the GPO potentially undermines this strategy and at the very
least makes near-term predictions less reliable. An opposition
that increasingly responds to regime violence with its own violence
gives the regime greater license to increase repression even
further, creating an unpredictable cycle of violence coupled with
greater disillusionment with the regime.



¶11. (C) MEDIA AND CYBERSPACE: The regime and GPO clash not just in
the streets but also in cyberspace, and the GPO can be expected to
expand its efforts to create a virtual space in which it can
disseminate information to Iranians inside Iran. It continues to
spend significant energies on circumventing Iranian attempts to
monitor, control and block Internet access in Iran, and is
exploring the possibility of providing satellite high-speed
internet access, although funding is the main barrier. In
conventional media, expatriate GPO activists have told IRPO that
while in the short-term GPO is forced to rely on satellite TV such
as VOA and BBC to get oppositionist news into Iran, it is seeking
to create its own news fora, to include its own satellite
television broadcast.



NO 2ND REVOLUTION

-----------------------------

DUBAI 00000015 004 OF 006


¶12. (C) No one knows or can know what will happen next. While
Iran is not North Korea, since June 12 and the subsequent crackdown
it has become harder to follow significant events there, both at
the popular and elite level. Foreign media presence has been
severely curtailed and domestic media is increasingly censored. And
Iran's hardline intelligence-security cabal's 'soft overthrow'
fixation has reduced the number and type of Iranians willing to
talk frankly to the press (and to Iranwatchers) about domestic
events.



¶13. (C) Against that backdrop one must note the 'selective
perception' bias that tends to over-emphasize the GPO's potency.
Some pro-GPO bias stems from their being the (relative) 'good guys'
in this drama, to the extent that their agenda encompasses
principles dear to Western democracies. Additionally, Western
media's Iran contacts tend to be pro-reformist, with Western press
quoting pro-GPO activists and analysts almost exclusively. Also USG
officials' interactions with Iranians tend to be largely limited to
Iranians willing and able to talk with us, with a disproportionate
number of them being those seeking USG assistance in helping fight
the regime. Finally and in many ways most importantly 'if it bleeds
it leads,' so there are no 'Youtube' uploads on demonstration days
of the millions of ordinary Iranians who are going about their
business.



¶14. (C) In this regard, many IRPO interlocutors comment that for
most in Tehran, life is going on as normal, with no sensation of
living in 'a police state' (except on the key dates targeted by the
GPO, and only then for people in specific areas where clashes
occur). In other words, it seems that the vast majority of
Iranians, though more critical of the government to greater or
lesser degrees, are continuing to live their lives as normal.
There is no reason to assume that those 'radical' GPO elements
seeking to fundamentally change the system represent most Iranians.
At most, it appears that many and possibly most Iranians want a
peaceful reform of the system as opposed to another revolution with
an uncertain outcome.



¶15. (C) Having stipulated that no one can assert with confidence
what will happen in Iran's domestic situation over the next year,
it does seem that, as expatriate Iranian oppositionist Ibrahim
Nabavi has written, Iran is moving 'from crisis to stalemate.' The
clash between Iran's government hardliners and the GPO is unlikely
to end decisively to the benefit of either side within the
short-term, and it is quite improbable that in the short-term the
GPO will in some decisive way 'defeat' the Khamenei regime and
change Iran's theocracy into a secular republic.



¶16. (C) In terms of the significant metrics by which can judge the
course of future events, some of the ones significant both in
1977-79 and now include the following:



- Numbers: The numbers of protestors willing to take to the streets
now is an order of magnitude smaller than in 78-79.



- Classes: the GPO as currently constituted doesn't seem to have a
significant ethnic or labor component, and doesn't seem to have
'broken out' of Tehran in a significant way to other major urban
centers, though we recognize that our awareness of developments
outside of Tehran is likely to be more limited.



- Anti-Gov't Activities: Unlike 1979, there have been no paralyzing
strikes, bazaar closings, military defections, or signs of the
government ceasing to function. Whereas the bazaar merchants in
1979 had the inclination and money to fund striking workers
deprived of pay, the there seems to be no such GPO 'deep pockets.'
Indeed both elements of the 'bazaar-mosque' alliance that were in

DUBAI 00000015 005 OF 006


many ways the backbone of the 1979 Revolution are singularly absent
in today's opposition, as each has been largely co-opted by the
government. There have been no indications that Rafsanjani and the
Servants of Construction or Qalibaf's Tehran Municipality are
currently a significant GPO funding source. On a far more limited
scale, expatriate 'Second of Khordad' Reformist elements within the
Iranian Diaspora are leading efforts to create a fund for the
support of detainee families.



- Elite Defection/Emigration: Those hardliners who constitute and
support the regime are very likely to remain committed to the fight
against the GPO, since they know they would have no role in any new
order and would also have nowhere else to go. However for the GPO,
many reformists and oppositionists dissatisfied with Iran's plight
would rather quit then fight, as shown by the ongoing brain drain,
to include increased exodus of political activists. Anecdotal
information shows that many of larger numbers of affluent and
educated Iranians who can be presumed to be oppose the hardliners
are taking their families and fortunes abroad.



¶17. (C) Although much GPO animus has transferred from Ahmadinejad
to SLK, it can be assumed that at least part of the movement's
support would fade were Ahmadinejad to be replaced by someone less
controversial and better equipped to successfully govern. Although
SLK has shown that he prefers suppression to compromise, at some
point pressure at the elite level might persuade him to abandon or
marginalize Ahmadinejad. Granted, the subsequent Presidential
election could provide another spark for future protests, but the
point here is that at both at the popular and elite level, at least
some oppositionist fervor is still fixated on Ahmadinejad, and
would presumably dissipate with his dismissal.



STALEMATE TO CONTINUE

----------------------------------



¶18. (C) The IRIG's decision-making process, multi-polar and messy
even before this turmoil, has been further strained by the battle
between the regime and the GPO as well as by the animosity toward
Ahmadinejad from within the regime. For example, domestic
political opposition torpedoed Khamenei and Ahmadinejad's ability
to sell the IAEA's Tehran Research Reactor agreement. Subsidy
reform, the most important piece of domestic legislation in years,
was passed only after a protracted political cage fight between
Ahmadinejad and the Majlis. Amid the IRIG-GPO stalemate and the
accompanying factionalization in the conservative 'Principalist'
camp, Iran will be hard pressed achieve consensus and move forward
on issues relevant to the USG.



¶19. (C) As one US-based IRPO contact noted, only one thing is
certain, namely uncertainty over how the contest will play out. It
is clear neither regime leaders nor opposition figures are
convinced of the path ahead and they are constantly recalibrating
and shifting positions. Moreover, he added, there is hesitancy on
the part of all actors to move decisively. He noted that this was
visible in the regime's unwillingness to use the full force of its
repressive capabilities to crack down on the opposition once and
for all.



¶20. (C) COMMENT: The GPO is not Poland's Solidarity, and Tehran
2010 isn't Tehran 1978. In other words, it is quite unlikely that
the current Iranian system of government will significantly change
in the short-term, and if there were any significant change, it is
more likely to be towards a more authoritarian regime than to be
towards a more democratic one. However, having posited why the
GPO is unlikely to effect fundamental short-term changes in Iran's
ruling system, it is equally true to say that it is unlikely to go
away. What makes the preceding important for the USG is the fact
that Iran's current domestic strife is a political 'black hole'

DUBAI 00000015 006 OF 006


that swallows all other issues, both domestic and foreign, such
that until a new homeostasis is reached in Iran's political ruling
class, progress on issues of bilateral importance will be even more
difficult than usual. END COMMENT.
EYRE


/tag/IR_2.html


10ROME87     2010-01-22 15:03     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Rome

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RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 4216
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000087

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2020
TAGS: PREL ENRG KNNP PARM IR PGOV
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH MFA, ENI, PD

REF: ROME 00035

ROME 00000087 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
-------


¶1. (C) Staff Director of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee (HCFA) Dr. Richard Kessler and HCFA staff members
probed senior MFA and energy and gas parastatal Eni officials
on Italy's intentions concerning Iran sanctions and prospects
for effective multilateral action to curb Iran's nuclear
program. Opposition Democratic Party (PD) officials
discussed Iran, Italy's role in Afghanistan, the MEPP, Iraq,
and nonproliferation with the Staffdel. End Summary.


IRAN DOMINATES MFA TALKS
------------------------

¶2. (C) A January 8 roundtable discussion with Dr. Kessler
and three HCFA staff members at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) included MFA Director General for Multilateral
Political Cooperation Stefano Ronca, Ronca's Deputy Filippo
Formica, and Deputy DG for Economic Cooperation Claudio
Spinedi. Office Directors Massimo Marotti
(Political-Military Security and NATO Affairs); Diego
Brasioli (G8 Issues and Global Challenges); and Giovanni
Pugliese (Arms Control and Nonproliferation) also
participated. After the roundtable the Staffdel had a meeting
with MFA Deputy SecGen and Political Director Sandro De
Bernardin. Post was represented by the Charge, Pol-Mil
Counselor and Poloff (notetaker).

¶3. (C) Ronca believes the deteriorating situation in Iran
will soon come to a head and that the UNSC should convey to
Iran that delay tactics will not work and support this
position by readiness to adopt further pressure. Ronca and
Spinedi told the Staffdel Italy is ready to explore, with its
EU colleagues, the possibility of further sanctions, which,
however, must conform to EU regulations, and not affect the
legal rights of European companies. Ronca suggested that the
Iranian financial, oil and gas, and insurance sectors (but
not the Central Bank) could be targeted and that the list
sensitive products on the export ban list could be expanded.

¶4. (C) Spinedi, who (with Formica) attended the October 7
Washington meeting of "Likeminded States on Iran," started by
briefly alluding to Italy's longstanding complaint of
exclusion from P5 1. Spinedi pointed out we needed to
determine what kind of sanctions would be acceptable to China
and Russia, adding that even at the beginning of January,
China's UN ambassador said that China "needed more time,"
which, Spinedi noted, was not a total rejection of tougher
sanctions. Spinedi advocated strengthening what already
exists and deciding where we are willing to exert additional
pressure (especially in the oil and gas sector). It would be
important to determine which technologies others (e.g., China
and India) are willing to provide and embargo those which
they cannot. Spinedi acknowledged that Italy had not yet
imposed legally binding sanctions, but that the GOI had
successfully used "moral suasion."

¶5. (C) Spinedi noted that sanctions proposed by the U.S. at
the October 7 Likeminded meeting included targeting the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Command (IRGC), but did not
include an embargo of refined oil and gas products. Spinedi
echoed Ronca in saying that in the coming months Italy will
need to see how the rest of the Europe will approach new
sanctions.

¶6. (C) MFA Deputy SecGen Sandro De Bernardin told the
Staffdel that Italy was well aware of the danger posed by
Iran and supported a "firm line." De Bernardin noted Eni's
considerable investments in Iran and characterized Italy's
"moral suasion" efforts to wean Iran away from its nuclear
ambitions as a "significant success." On sanctions, De
Bernardin stated that Italy was prepared to assume its "share
of responsibility," but that sanctions are a means of
pressure, not a goal; effective ones must be found. In De
Bernardin's view, U.S.domestic legislation should not
negatively affect other countries and the presidential waiver
has been useful in the past; he hoped it will still figure in
the future.

¶7. (C) Kessler encouraged Italy to continue and reinforce

ROME 00000087 002.2 OF 003


their past efforts. De Bernardin agreed that if Iran gets
the bomb, then others will seek to acquire nuclear weapons
too and that the Iranian regime must realize there is a heavy
price to be paid for persisting in non-compliance. " De
Bernardin reiterated Italy's support for openess to dialogue
in addition to pressure, or the dual-track approach, and that
"putting Iran in a corner" is not the same as "cutting it
off" and characterized Italy as a "crucial player," essential
to catalyzing consensus in Europe. He added that, given
Iran's critical domestic situation, the regime was not in a
position to decide anything.


KEY TO SUCCESS IN AFGHANISTAN
-----------------------------

¶8. (C) With regard to the critical situation in
Afghanistan, Ronca acknowledged that we must strengthen the
military aspect of the campaign, but that institution
building and engaging President Karzai on fighting corruption
must not be neglected. On the security side, Ronca said that
Italy will increase its force by 1000 men during the first
half of 2010 and that its Afghan National Police (ANP)
training program is a first priority. As for civilian
engagement, Italy has committed 465 million euros in various
civilian sectors, including health, education, and justice.
Ronca and Marotti stressed the need for better coordination
of civilian and military activities as an issue that should
be on the agenda of the January 28 London NATO conference.
Ronca noted that reaching out to insurgents was a task that
should also be pursued. The Italians stressed the need for a
long-term development strategy based on Afghan priorities,
but which would also include private sector involvement and
the development of good governance.


CENTER LEFT PD AIRS FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS
--------------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Head of the opposition Partito Democratico's (PD)
Foreign Policy Department Piero Fassino told the Staffdel the
PD supports President Obama's initiative to dialogue and
build bridges with the Islamic world, but is very concerned
about the blocked MEPP and the "new wave of terror" in
Afghanistan. As for Iran, the PD supports pursuing a
negotiated solution, but Fassino questioned whether the
current leadership is in a position to negotiate credibly.
He suggested it could be useful to change the order of
priorities in Iran; that is, be more flexible on the nuclear
issue, but harder on human rights. According to Fassino, the
greatest risk with nuclear proliferation is that
irresponsible governments like the one in Iran could gain
access to nuclear arms, adding that the PD assessed that
there was little to fear with nations such as India, Britain,
and France having nuclear weapons. He asked whether a
democratic government in Iran might not have a different
position on the nuclear program.

¶10. (C) Fassino said the PD supports the GOI's increased
(military) support for Afghanistan, but stressed that
strengthening civil and governmental institutions and
economic development are equally important. On the MEPP,
Fassino characterized Netanyahu's proposed 10-month
settlement freeze "a little window of opportunity," but
questioned whether it was enough, given the Israelis' refusal
to discuss (the status of) Jerusalem. As for Iraq, Fassino
said the stabilization process must be supported; there was
no alternative.


ENI JUSTIFIES IRAN ACTIVITIES
-----------------------------

¶11. ( C ) Energy and gas parastatal Eni (Ente Nazionale
Idrocarburi) officials told the Congressional delegation that
it is cooperating to address USG concerns over the company,s
Iran activities, but insisted that it will continue to
fulfill its contractual obligations there. The company
officials said that Eni has understood the USG message to
reduce its presence in Iran, and as a result it has already
decreased its Iran activities to a minimum level. The Eni
officials provided the Staffdel with a copy of the November
16, 2009 CEO Scaroni letter to Ambassador Thorne that states
the company,s position (A copy of Eni's letter was provided
to EEB in November). Referencing this letter, the officials
pointed out that Eni will not undertake new activities in
Iran, including no new activities by its subsidiaries, Saipem

ROME 00000087 003.2 OF 003


and Polimeri Europa. They added that following Scaroni,s
September 16 meetings in Washington the company also gave up
plans for an MOU with Iran for development of the phase III
of the Darquain oil field. The officials stated that while EU
law prevents the Eni from responding to official requests for
information on its Iran operations, it has been transparent
in informing the USG on a voluntary basis.

¶12. ( C ) The Eni officials stated, however, that Eni
intends to carry out exploration and development activities
in Iran that fall under its contractual obligations there.
The officials acknowledged that this is a &gray area8 due
to the differences of opinion between the company and the USG
over what is &new8 activity and what is &old.8 The
company officials said that they hope to clarify this issue
with Washington during separate meetings in January with
senior officials from the State Department and Department of
Treasury. Pressed for details over the company,s existing
obligations, the officials said that it is under contract to
meet certain targets of (oil) production in order to
guarantee defined levels of production within a given time
frame. They added that Eni must keep a certain threshold of
production in order to recover its investments in Iran. They
also explained that Eni receives periodic (possibly
scheduled) payments by Iran in oil equivalent amounts that
correspond to the attained target levels of production.

¶13. ( C ) The Eni officials admitted the frustrating
difficulties of operating in Iran, but stated that Eni's
priority is to recover its investments there while meeting EU
laws. The officials estimated Eni's total Iran investments at
around $3 billion dollars, of which they said Eni has already
recovered already about 60 percent (or about $1.7 billion
according to one Eni representative). The company officials
said Eni still needs to recover about $1.4 billion from its
Iran operations. They added that &if all goes as planned8
Eni will recover this remainder of its investments by the end
of 2013 or early in 2014. They further explained that Eni's
Iran contracts provide the possibility of extensions if the
company is not able to recover its investments within the
stipulated time frame. The Eni officials cautioned that the
company may face EU sanctions if it withdraws from Iran due
to pressure from USG unilateral sanctions.

¶14. (U) Staffdel Kessler has not cleared this cable.
THORNE


/tag/IR_2.html


10ANKARA126     2010-01-26 11:11     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Embassy Ankara

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SIPDIS

FOR BACKGROUND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR TU AF PK IR IZ IS AM
SUBJECT: SECRETARY GATES' TURKEY BILATERAL VISIT:
SCENESETTER

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (a,b,d)

¶1. (S) PM Erdogan welcomed President Obama's reiteration of
support to the fight against the PKK during the December 7
meeting in the Oval Office, but the Secretary should expect
questions about how we will operationalize that commitment as
plans to withdraw from Iraq move forward. A key issue will
be how to reduce the gap between the time when the U.S. is no
longer able to provide ISR support and when we will be able
to help Turkey acquire its own capability. On missile
defense, we will look for the Secretary's help in advancing
our work with Turkey to persuade the Turks to allow a key
radar system to be based here. The Turks are struggling to
define what they will need in terms of NATO political cover
to lessen the high cost - both in terms of domestic politics
and in relations with Iran - that Erdogan's government
believes it will have to pay should they agree.

¶2. (S) Although our agenda with Turkey is broad and complex,
the following issues are likely to come up during the
Secretary's trip:

"Need To Raise"
----------------

- Our commitment to continue sharing real-time intelligence
to support Turkey's counter-PKK fight, but caution that the
process for Turkey to acquire an armed UAV system from the
U.S. will be long and complex. (para 3-5, 14)

- The need for a NATO BMD system with Turkey's participation
and the Iranian threat against NATO interests. (para 6-9)

- Appreciation for Turkey's efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan,
particularly for its new commitments to training security
forces. (para 10-11)

- Appreciation for support to OIF/OEF through Turkey's
territory, including the Incirlik Cargo Hub; easing transit
of non-lethal mil cargo shipments from Iraq to Afghanistan.
(para 12)

- Our advocacy support for Raytheon and Sikorsky on sales of
air defense systems and utility helicopters (para 13).

"Be Ready To Respond On"
------------------------

- Pressure for direct U.S. milops against the PKK (paras 5)

- Turkish requests for 24/7 Predator coverage of the
Turkey-Iraq border to counter PKK operations and activities
(para 5).

- Turkish requests for immediate delivery of AH-1W
helicopters (para 15)

Counter - PKK Operations: Still Turkey's Top Priority
--------------------------------------------- --------

¶3. (C) Turkey's counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK
have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond
military action alone. Although the government's renamed
National Unity Project (initially called the "Kurdish
Opening") was not fully developed when launched and appears
to be moving slowly, the government has increased social and
economic support to ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey,
dramatically broadened the rights of Kurds to use their own
language, and increased educational opportunities as well.
It is post's view that the military success against the PKK,
supported by our intelligence-sharing operation, has given
the civilians the political space to explore this opening and
to deal directly with Masoud Barzani and other Iraqi Kurds.
Turkish military operations against the PKK continue,
however, and on October 6, 2009 Parliament extended the
government's mandate to conduct cross-border operations
against the PKK in Iraq for another year. Turkey's leaders
have learned from us and from their own experience that only

a whole-of-government approach will succeed against the PKK
insurgency.

¶4. (C) Our November 2007 decision to share operational
intelligence was a turning point for the bilateral
relationship, and President Obama's declaration before the
Turkish Parliament in April 2009 and during his oval office
meeting with Erdogan in December 2009 of our continuing
commitment to support Turkey's fight against the PKK were
warmly welcomed. Our cooperation has helped to improve the
bilateral relationship across the board, particularly by
making it difficult for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq
as a safe haven. We can never reiterate enough our
continuing committment, as President Obama did effectively
with PM Erdogan in December.

¶5. (C) Nevertheless, Turkish causalities are still occurring.
Turkey still looks for more support, and will press us for
more concrete action before the U.S. completes its withdrawal
from Iraq. CHOD Basbug will likely repeat the GOT's request
for laser-designation of targets and/or direct U.S.
operations against the PKK. In December, PM Erdogan also
asked POTUS for 24-hour Predator coverage. At present we
provide approximately 12-hour coverage, with an occasional
surge to 24 hours to support specific Turkish operations,
such as against High Value Targets. A move to 24-hour
coverage is not easy due to resources requirements elsewhere;
however, we may be able to provide a few weeks of 24-hour
coverage during crucial spring months, and are working with
TGS to determine exactly where and when it would be most
useful to do so, and what assets the Turkish military would
employ if additional UAV support is made available.

Missile Defense
----------------

¶6. (S) The Turks asked us to postpone a return visit from
Ellen Tauscher, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, as they are still considering how
best to respond to our request to base an AN/TPY-2 and
(potentially) other MD assets in Turkey. While some of the
Turks' technical questions remain unanswered, the key
questions are now political. During his meeting with
President Obama, PM Erdogan said that such a system must be
implemented in a NATO context to diminish the political cost
that his government will likely bear, both in terms of
domestic politics and in Turkey's relations with Iran. The
ball is now in the court of the civilian leaders here to
determine just "how much NATO" will be enough for them
politically; NATOs inability to fund an "interim capability"
makes it harder for us to show parallel development of a NATO
BMD system with PAA. Erdogan is concerned that Turkey's
participation might later give Israel protection from an
Iranian counter-strike.

¶7. (S) We have made the point to the Turks that a decision to
not base the AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey is essentially a
decision to opt out of missile defense coverage for Turkey;
this would not be a political consequence, but just a fact
based on physics and geometry. It is important to make this
point again (gently) with PM Erdogan, but also underscore
that we value Turkey's participation and will try to
"NATOize" the system, if Turkey will tell us how much NATO
would be enough.

¶8. (S) Behind all this, we fear, is a manifestation of both
the Turkish government's, and to some degree the Turkish
public's, growing distancing from the Atlanticist world view
now that most dangers for Turkey are gone. While Turks are
not naive about Iran (see below), MD places them in a pickle,
forcing them to choose between the U.S./West and a Middle
East "vocation" - which, while not necessarily includes
coddling Iran, requires palpable space between Turkey and
"the West."

Iran
----

¶9. (S) Turkey understands and partially shares U.S. and
international concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but is
hesitant to use harsh language in public statements, in part
due to its dependence on Iran as an energy supplier and as a
trade route to Central Asian markets. It has worked quietly
with us to prevent some proliferation-sensitive shipments to
and from Iran. Turkey's top civilian and military officials
may have come to the conclusion that a military strike
against Iran would be more harmful for Turkey's interests
than Iran gaining a nuclear weapons capability; they believe
international pressure against Iran only helps to strengthen
Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners. PM Erdogan himself is a
particularly vocal skeptic of the U.S. position. However,
Turkey did press Iran (albeit quietly) to accept the P5 plus
1 Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) offer and FM Davutoglu had
been personally engaged in trying to rescue the TRR deal,
which would have removed a significant portion of Iran's
lowly-enriched uranium stockpile. As a current member of the
UNSC, the Turks would be very hesitant to support sanctions
against Iran. We need nevertheless to encourage PM Erdogan
to support UN actions if Iran does not comply with Iran's
international obligations while underscoring that we view
Iran's program as a serious threat to NATO interests in
Europe and would like to see a non-military solution
(including Turkish participation in NATO BMD).

Afghanistan/Pakistan
----------------------

¶10. (SBU) Turkey has been a dedicated partner in Afghanistan.
It has commanded ISAF twice since its inception and again
took command of RC-Capital in November. Turkey leads PRT
Wardak and plans to open a second PRT in Jawzjan (also
covering Sar-e-Pol) in mid-2010. Turkey has sponsored the
"Ankara Process" dialogue, one of several efforts to
encourage constructive communications between Kabul and
Islamabad, and is a leading participant in the Friends of
Democratic Pakistan. It hosted a trilateral summit on
January 25 and a Afghanistan Regional Summit (including all
of Afghanistan's immediate neighbors as well as select other
countries including the U.S.) on January 26, just prior to
the January 28 London Conference on Afghanistan.

¶11. (C) Turkey pledged significant aid to both countries:
USD 200 million to Afghanistan and USD 100 million to
Pakistan, as well as USD 1.5 million to the ANA. There are
1750 Turkish troops in Afghanistan, and Turkey has four OMLTs
currently in Kabul and, since December, pledged two more
OMLTs and one POMLT. Because of its culture, history and
religious orientation, as well as Foreign Minister
Davutoglu's strategic ambition, Turkey is well disposed to
act as an agent of the international community's goals in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2010, Turkey has pledged to
offer 6-8 week trainings for up to a brigade's worth of
Afghan military and police personnel in Turkey and will
establish a training center in Kabul capable of training up
to 600 ANSA personnel at a time.

Retrograde through Turkey
-------------------------

¶12. (S) Turkey's agreement to allow us to use its territory,
facilities and airspace has been essential to our ability to
support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We now look to
expand current capabilities to transit materiel from Iraq to
join up with the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to
Afghanistan. CENTCOM logisticians, working with us and our
EUCOM Office of Defense Cooperation, seek to take advantage
of improved commercial ties between Turkey and Iraq to move
non-lethal equipment across Turkey to join the NDN. We are
working to expand our current retrograde agreements to
minimize the time and bureaucracy involved, and to expand
permissions to allow non-lethal military equipment, including
armored transport vehicles.

Advocacy for U.S. Defense Industry
----------------------------------

¶13. (C) We much appreciate SecDef's help in advocating for
U.S. firms competing for key projects in Turkey, and hope he
can raise both Sikorsky's and Raytheon's cases in person.
Sikorsky's "International Blackhawk" proposal holds
remarkable benefits. This deal represents a new level of
industrial partnership; Sikorsky guarantees that it would
build in Turkey - for sale outside of Turkey - one Blackhawk
for each one the GOT builds and buys for itself; this is a
boon of hundreds of millions of dollars for the Turkish
economy. On Air Defense, Raytheon's PAC-3 is competing in a
tender for Turkey's air defense. Raytheon also seeks to take
advantage of Turkish industry's ability to co-produce complex
systems with us and would produce systems for sale in the UAE
and elsewhere. The benefit to Turkey's economy from such
co-production would likely exceed USD 1 billion. Technically
and operationally, there is no system which can compete with
the PAC-3, but Turkey's Defense Ministry seeks to broaden
competition to include lower-cost options from Russia and
even from European producers. Raytheon often asks us to
remind the Turks that a decision on requests for support on
Missile Defense should not necessarily affect a decision on
PAC-3.

UAV's, Attack Helicopters, and Intel Surge
------------------------------------------

¶14. (C) Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own
ISR capability to replace the US assets currently being used
in anti-PKK operations. President Obama told PM Erdogan in
December that we support Turkey's request to acquire armed
Reaper UAVs. Nevertheless, approval for armed Reapers is
complicated due to Hill concerns. We have explained this to
the Turks. However, even if those could be overcome, the
delivery pipeline for these systems is long, and Turkey's
leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull our
intelligence support until they can replace it. While we are
working to enhance Turkey's ISR capabilities, we have not
made this commitment to date.

¶15. (C) Bad GOT procurement decisions led Turkey to a severe
shortage of dual engine, high altitude attack helicopters,
which it desperately needs to fight the PKK. PM Erdogan
raised this issue with the President in December 2009; SecDef
should expect this issue to be a top priority in meetings
with Minister Gonul and with GEN Basbug. The Turks took
SecDef's May 2009 letter to provide up to four AH-1W
helicopters each in 2011, 2012 and 2013 as a firm commitment,
and now have asked us to advance that date to 2010. They do
not accept our explanation that these aircraft are simply not
available from our inventory, as they believe they have --
just like the U.S. -- "troops in contact" and need the close
tactical support. While SecDef should make no commitment, we
should also explore whether we can persuade Taiwan to sell or
lease some of its own AH-1W aircraft now that Taiwan is
taking delivery of Apaches.

Support For The US-Turkey-Iraq "Tripartite Security Dialogue"
--------------------------------------------- ----------------

¶16. (S) SecDef's visit will take place just as USFI's GEN
Odierno will have left. We expect that GEN Odierno's visit
will give a political boost to the U.S.-Turkey-Iraq
Tripartite Security talks. Turkey's civilian leaders are
taking heat from their domestic political opposition for
pressing the "Kurdish Opening" while casualties from PKK
attacks continue. They hope to use GEN Odierno's visit to
show that their whole-of-government approach against PKK
insurgency is producing results and that it has the support
of senior USG officials in Iraq.

¶17. (S) Trilateral meetings continue regularly and a new
Tripartite operational office in Erbil, established to share
counter-PKK intelligence was established over the summer.
The most recent tri-lat meeting took place in Baghdad in
December, followed by a joint Turkey-Iraq visit in Erbil.
The Turks remain frustrated that, in their view, the KRG is
not doing enough to combat the PKK. The Turks remain shy in
sharing intelligence data; they are not convinced that they

can trust Iraqi/Kurdish individuals to keep information
concerning operations secret. Turkish officials have become
more strident in their calls for KRG officials to take action
against the PKK. The cooperation that does exist is a step in
the right direction; however, it will need to improve
significantly prior to the U.S. pullout of Iraq. CHOD Basbug
and PM Ergodan want the U.S. to put more pressure on the
Iraqis - and particularly Masoud Barzani - to take actions to
cut PKK supply and logistics lines in northern Iraq. We
should stress the need for more trust and collaboration
between Turkey and Iraq, eventually on Turkish CBOs. Absent
greater cooperation, we could see significant bilateral
problems post-2011, to include Iraqi claims of Turkey's
violation of its sovereign territory.

Northern Iraq
--------------

¶18. (C) Turkey will not consider any alternative to the
political unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, but has
become more flexible on how it engages "the local authorities
of northern Iraq" (how Turkey refers officially to the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)). Turkey's policy remains
focused on the government in Baghdad, but its outreach to the
KRG is expanding. This outreach is reinforced by the
continued dominance of Turkish products and investments in
the KRG's healthy economy.

Armenia
-------

¶19. (S) The signing of the Protocols to reestablish
Turkish-Armenian relations and open the common border in
Zurich on October 10 was a landmark for the region. However,
neither Turkey nor Armenia have taken steps toward
ratification; the GOT argues that progress toward withdrawal
of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani provinces surrounding
Nagorno-Karabakh is a pre-condition. (Note: This was
not/not part of the agreement, and not a position the U.S.
supports. End note.) Future relations will nevertheless
still be heavily linked to the 1915 "Armenian genocide"
issue. Any U.S. determination of the events of 1915 as
"genocide" would set off a political firestorm in Turkey, and
the effect on our bilateral relationship -- including
political, military, and commercial aspects -- would be
devastating.

Israel
------

¶20. (C) While the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General
Staff agree with us that a strong Turkey-Israel relationship
is essential for regional stability, PM Erdogan has sought to
shore up his domestic right flank through continued populist
rhetoric against Israel and its December 2008 Gaza operation.
His outburst at Davos and the last-minute cancellation of
Israel's participation in the Fall 2009 Anatolian Eagle
Exercise (a multilateral Air Force exercise which had US,
Turkey, Italy, and Israel as planned participants) were the
most noticeable examples of this rhetoric, which we and his
staff have sought to contain. The latest incident, a snub in
early January of the Turkish Ambassador by Israeli Deputy
Foreign Minster Danny Ayalon, almost caused the GOT to both
recall its Ambassador and cancel the visit of Israeli Defense
Minister Ehud Barak. However, the very public row was
resolved with an Israeli apology and Barak's visit on January
17 helped to stem the downward spiral for now. Nevertheless,
we assess that Erdogan is likely to continue anti-Israel
remarks and the issues will continue to cast a shadow on the
TU-IS bilateral relationship.

Political Environment
---------------------

¶21. (C) PM Erdogan's Islamist-leaning Justice and Development
(AK) Party remains Turkey's strongest political party, but
its poll numbers are slumping, and it continues to fear an
erosion of its political base from more conservative/Islamist

parties. Civilian-military relations remain complex. Chief
of Staff General Basbug has worked out a modus vivendi with
PM Erdogan, but the long-running struggle between Turkey's
secularists (with the Army as its champion) and Islamists
(represented by the government) naturally puts them at odds.
Erdogan has the clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug
has seemingly learned to live. Alleged past military
involvement in coup contingency planning or even deliberate
generation of internal chaos remains political theme number
one and preoccupies both Erdogan and Basbug and their
respective underlings. Public trust in the military is
starting to decline, the result of several very public
on-going investigations into the alleged planning against the
government.
Jeffrey

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"


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10RIYADH118     2010-01-26 17:05     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Riyadh

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C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000118

SIPDIS

LONDON PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY
NEA FOR ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020
TAGS: PREL MNUC PTER PGOV KGHG SENV ETRD SA IR
SUBJECT: SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESSING CHINA TO STOP
IRANIAN PROLIFERATION, CONCERNED ABOUT TSA REGULATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith, reasons 1.4 (b and d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Saudi Foreign Ministry officials told
visiting NEA A/S Feltman that they are convinced Iran intends
to develop a nuclear weapon, and that the Saudi Foreign
Minister pressed his counterpart hard for greater Chinese
engagement on this threat during the Chinese FM's visit
earlier in January. While no explicit deal was discussed,
Saudi Arabia made it clear it was willing to address Chinese
concerns on energy security and trade in exchange for
effective Chinese support to prevent Iranian proliferation.
Saudi Arabia is also concerned about Iran's unhelpful role in
Yemen. While generally very pleased with the state of
bilateral relations, Saudi officials strenuously - and under
instruction - complained about the continued negative effect
of the recent Transportation Safety Administration (TSA)
regulations that call for extra security screening for Saudi
Arabia. The Saudi Foreign Minister will raise these concerns
with the Secretary in London on January 27. They noted that
the Saudi public is increasingly upset by this, and does not
understand why they were put in the same group with Cuba,
which has prompted some Saudis to question how special their
relationship with the United States really is. A/S Feltman
urged Saudi Arabia to associate itself with the Copenhagen
Accord by January 31. The MFA reported that Saudi Arabia
donated $50 million for Haitian relief efforts on January 25.
End Summary.

Iranian nuclear Ambitions:
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶2. (C) Visiting NEA A/S Feltman discussed a wide range of
issues with Deputy Saudi Foreign Minister Dr. Prince Torki
Al-Saud Al-Kabir on January 26. Prince Torki said Saudi
Arabia is convinced that Iran intends to develop nuclear
weapons, and reported that Saudi Foreign Minister Saud
Al-Faisal pressed the Chinese Foreign Minister on this issue
on his January 17 visit. Saud Al-Faisal told the Chinese
that, for Saudi Arabia, this is a critical security issue.
Iran,s getting nuclear weapons will open the door to the
rest of the Middle East pursuing nuclear weapons. Saudi
Arabia would prefer that the Middle East remain a nuclear
free zone. When the Chinese Foreign Minister replied that
China will not accept Iran's development of nuclear weapons,
Saud Al-Faisal told him that China will have to work more
closely with the rest of the world and the UN Security
Council to prevent this from happening.

¶3. (C) Prince Torki agreed that it was not helpful that the
Chinese sent a low-level delegation to the most recent 5 1
talks. He also agreed it was unfortunate the delegation did
not agree it was time now to increase pressure on Iran.
Al-Kabir also noted that time was not in the UN Security
Council's favor, but in Iran's. Prince Torki said that Saudi
Arabia was convinced the time was ripe to push China on this
issue. It would be important to demonstrate that the
assurances FM Al-Faisal got were not just from the Foreign
Minister, but represented the thinking of the whole
government. He said that Saudi Arabia repeated these points
to the Chinese Middle East special envoy, who visited a week
later. Saudi Arabia has also raised these concerns with
Russia, "which is closer to the U.S. and Saudi positions,"
and with the Deputy French Foreign Minister three weeks ago.
Prince Torki also agreed to work with Lebanon's UN Mission,
now on the Security Council, where it is sure to confront the
issue of Iranian proliferation.

¶4. (C) Prince Torki said that China never directly raised the
issue of its concerns about securing sufficient oil supplies,
particularly in the event of a cutoff of Iranian supplies.
However, Saudi Arabia fully understands China's concerns, and
in that context, is pleased that the Chinese Foreign Minister
had &successful8 talks with Saudi Aramco and trade
officials about specific commercial and energy issues.
Prince Torki noted that Saudi Arabia has become one of
China's largest energy suppliers, and has invested billions
of dollars in refineries in China. Trade has grown from $140
million a decade ago to $75 billion now, with prospects for
further increases. Prince Torki concluded by noting that
Saudi Arabia knows what concerns China, and is willing to
take actions to address those concerns, but must have Chinese
cooperation in stopping Iran,s development of nuclear
weapons as a quid pro quo. Saudi Arabia is encouraging other

Gulf countries to meet with China to explore similar
cooperation, although it expects these countries will seek
the same exchange.

Yemen:
- - - -

¶5. (C) Prince Torki explained that Saudi Arabia also believes
that Iran is playing an unhelpful role in Yemen. Dismissing
the need for specific evidence, he said it was hard to
explain how the Houthis, as a poor tribal group, managed to
get so much money so quickly to obtain the heavy armaments
that they have been using absent the help of some outside
group. It is also hard, he argued, to explain the striking
similarities with techniques that have been used by
pro-Iranian groups in Iraq. Saudi Arabia is convinced that
Iran is providing money for poor tribesmen to fight, as well
as payments to their families, and is facilitating contact
with Somalia and Al Qaeda. Prince Torki said the Saudi
Defense Forces have been impressed how well the Houthis have
fought, displaying advanced training. (Note: in a separate
meeting, Ministry of Interior officials echoed many of these
assessments in greater detail, septel. End Note).

¶6. (C) Prince Torki was unequivocal in stating that Saudi
Arabia has no intention of becoming part of the current
conflict between the central government and the Houthis.
Saudi Arabia felt it had to respond, however, after Houthi
forces crossed its border. He said that it made little sense
for the Houthis to have attacked Saudi Arabia, especially
since the SAG had warned them previously not to. He
concluded that Iran was trying to test Saudi reactions.
Yemen does not need U.S. troops, but does need equipment,
training and information, as well as assistance to meet its
long-term development challenges. He also said that Saudi
Arabia is very concerned about Al Qaeda's continued presence
in Yemen, as it will exploit any opportunity to attack Saudi
Arabia and the United States.

Bilateral Relations:
- - - - - - - - - - -

¶7. (C). Prince Torki agreed that our bilateral relations are
quite strong in general. He singled out counter-terrorism as
an example of the strength of cooperation, noting that Saudi
Arabia enjoys a unique level of cooperation on security with
the United States. Prince Torki confirmed that Saudi Arabia
had contributed $50 million to the Haiti relief effort on
January 25, which is the largest contribution to date of any
Middle Eastern country. He also welcomed greater U.S.
engagement in multilateral and international organizations.

Climate Change:
- - - - - - - -

8.(SBU) A/S Feltman noted the importance that the President
places on Climate Change, and the Copenhagen Accord. Given
that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi was involved in crafting
the final agreement, A/S Feltman noted the United States is
counting on Saudi Arabia to associate itself with the accord
by January 31. Prince Torki said that Saudi Arabia was very
pleased the United States was more actively engaged in this
issue, and said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports
trying to address this issue. He noted that the MFA will
have to consult with other involved ministries, such as the
Ministry of Petroleum, and promised to respond before January
¶31.

Concern over TSA Regulations:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶9. (SBU) Prince Torki noted he had been instructed to raise
Saudi Arabia's significant concern about the TSA regulations
which had included Saudi Arabia in a limited group of
countries for additional airport screening. Prince Torki
said that this issue had caused a lot of difficulties and
embarrassment for Saudi Arabia, to the degree that Foreign
Minister Saud Al-Faisal will raise this with the Secretary in
London on January 27. Prince Torki said that Saudi Arabia
was not upset about the regulation itself, as it recognized
the U.S. right and obligation to protect its citizens. The
issue, rather, was inclusion on the list with the likes of
Cuba, which causes Saudi Arabia's friends and enemies to

question how strong its bilateral relationship with the
United States really is. Prince Torki said it is very hard
to explain to the Saudi public why they are included on this
list, despite not being the origin of the December 25 flight,
while other countries that have had recent terrorist
incidents on planes, like the UK, Egypt and Turkey, are not.
Prince Torki said that Saudi Arabia had been shocked to be
included on the list. He noted that Saudi Arabia had been
told these provisions would only be temporary, and said Saudi
Arabia would like to know how and when they will be amended,
implying that the longer they remained in effect without any
public explanation from the USG, the more it was likely to
prompt the Saudi Government to re-evaluate areas of
cooperation, including counter-terrorism cooperation. A/S
Feltman promised to convey the spirit and strength of the
message, and invited any specific Saudi suggestions to
address the security gap regarding nonmetallic explosives
exploited in the December 25 incident.

Middle East Peace:
- - - - - - - - -

¶10. (C) In response to a question, A/S Feltman explained that
the United States believes that we need to get the Israelis
and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table, which
will be the best way to compel Israel to follow through on
its public statements and to overcome Palestinian skepticism.
A/S Feltman noted that the United States had referred to the
1967 lines with swaps as a way of helping encourage the
Palestinians to return to the table. Prince Torki welcomed
this overview.

(U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Feltman.

SMITH


/tag/IR_2.html


10RIYADH123     2010-01-27 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Riyadh

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000123

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD CH KWBG IR SA
SUBJECT: CHINESE FM YANG VISITS RIYADH

REF: A. BEIJING 69
¶B. 09 RIYADH 895
¶C. RIYADH 118

RIYADH 00000123 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

SUMMARY:
----------

¶1. (C) Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with King
Abdullah and FM Prince Saud Al-Faisal on January 13, during
the last stop of a five nation Africa and Middle East tour.
During the visit, FM Yang discussed deepening Saudi-Chinese
ties in a variety of fields, emphasizing trade, in
particular, with his Saudi counterparts. Responding to
statements made by FM Saud, Yang also briefly discussed
Chinese support for Iraq, concern about Iranian nuclear
ambitions, and hopes for the Middle East Peace Process. FM
Yang's foray into regional political commentary appears to
have been a result of FM Saud's prodding, both publicly and
behind closed doors, and is a reflection of the developing
Saudi-Chinese relationship.
END SUMMARY.


TRADE TAKES PRECEDENCE
----------------------

¶2. (U) FM Yang arrived in Riyadh on January 13, the first
high-level visit since Chinese President Hu Jintao's February
2009 "Trip of Friendship and Cooperation." FM Yang's visit
coincided with the 20th anniversary of Saudi-Chinese
diplomatic relations, and followed three days after Chinese
Trade Minister Chen Deming co-chaired the 4th session of the
Saudi-Chinese Joint Commission in Riyadh.

¶3. (U) The Chinese Foreign Minister has traditionally made
his first overseas trip of the new year to Africa, visiting
with African leaders and expressing Chinese goodwill and
improvements in trade relations. This year, FM Yang extended
his visit to include not only major trading partners like
Nigeria, Kenya and Morocco, but also Saudi Arabia. In a
January 13 statement to the press, FM Yang stressed the
importance of strengthening cooperation in "energy,
infrastructure, finance and science and
technology." He said that both sides should carry out
cultural and education exchanges to deepen the bilateral
relationship and pressed the need for closer relations
between China and the GCC.

¶4. (U) These statements echoed similar announcements from
Chinese Trade Minister Chen who, in a January 10 press
conference, called for finalizing the Chinese-GCC free trade
agreement and increasing bilateral trade by 50%, from a total
annual value of $40 billion to $60 billion, over the next
five years (ref A). During the Joint Commission meeting,
Saudi Minister of Finance Ibrahim Al-Assaf reportedly urged
the Chinese to participate in more joint ventures, noting
that while bilateral trade increased 25 times over the past
ten years, the two countries only have 19 joint projects.
Al-Assaf also welcomed China's 44 billion riyal ($11.7
billion) worth of infrastructure projects in the Kingdom.


DUMPING CAUSES A BUMP
---------------------

¶5. (C) This call to increase Sino-Saudi trade comes on the
heels of a December 24 announcement that China would impose
anti-dumping tariffs of up to 13.6 percent on Saudi and
Taiwan-produced butanediol. Beijing began a dumping probe on
methanol and butanediol (BDO) from Saudi Arabia in July,
which caused an unusually public trade spat between the two
countries (ref B). Methanol and butanediol make up 10 to 15
percent of Saudi Arabia's $2 billion in annual non-oil
exports to China. A Ministry of Commerce and Industry
official told Econoffs on January 13 that Saudi Arabia was
able to convince the Chinese not to impose tariffs on
methanol, but said the BDO case was still pending. The
Ministry recently appointed a new Deputy Minister for
Technical Affairs, Dr. Hamad Al-Awfy, who will handle all
anti-dumping issues, he said. Al-Awfy previously complained
to EconCouns that the SAG was increasingly frustrated by the
growing number of Saudi companies complaining about Chinese
dumping in Saudi Arabia. Other senior SAG officials have
caustically complained about the low quality of Chinese
construction and the "short-term, extractive" approach of
Chinese companies to investments in Saudi Arabia.


RIYADH 00000123 002.2 OF 003



A MATURING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP?
---------------------------------

¶6. (C) China recently surpassed the U.S. as the largest
importer of Saudi oil. Saudi Arabia's investments in China
have increased significantly over the last few years,
including a $3.5 billion refinery in Fujian and a $2.86
billion joint-venture petrochemical complex in Tianjin.
Additionaly, President Hu Jintao commemorated the opening of
a cement plant when he visited Saudi Arabia in February 2009.
Saudi Arabia,s more forward-leaning approach, including
large-scale investments in China, indicates a maturing of the
bilateral relations and assumes a more pro-active, rather
than reactive, role towards economic engagement. (Note:
China is now the SAG's number two trade partner after the
U.S. Saudi-Chinese bilateral trade was estimated at $40
billion in 2008, while Saudi-U.S. trade was estimated at $67
billion during the same time period. End note.)


FM SAUD PRODS, FM YANG RESPONDS
-------------------------------

¶7. (U) While trade issues dominated FM Yang's agenda, both he
and FM Prince Saud-Al Faisal commented on the regional
political landscape in a press conference that followed their
bilateral meeting. FM Saud spoke out against Israeli
defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and called on
China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to
"deal with world disputes in accordance to international
legitimacy...as stipulated in the Arab Peace Initiative."
The meetings with FM Yang were "part of a framework of
coordination and consultation," FM Saud continued, that
included not only the Palestinian cause but also Iran's
nuclear file, Iraq and Yemen. In particular, he emphasized
China's role as a member of the P5 plus 1 group and their
responsibility "to solve the (Iranian nuclear) crisis through
dialogue and peaceful means. "Our two nations are keen that
the Middle East and the Gulf should be free of all weapons of
mass destruction, including nuclear weapons," he stressed.

¶8. (U) In response to FM Saud's comments, FM Yang said China
called for serious negotiations between Israel and Palestine
that would carry out the peace process and establish the
State of Palestine. "China is ready for cooperation with the
world community to work for stability in the Middle East," he
added. In regard to Iraq, he said that China extended
assistance by reducing Iraqi debt obligations to China and
forging trade agreements between Iraqi and Chinese companies.
With respect to Iran, FM Yang said the Iranian file should
be solved through "political diplomatic channels which help
stabilize the situation in the region."


FM SAUD: CHINA NEEDS TO MORE ACTIVELY COUNTER
IRANIAN NUKES
---------------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Prince Torki told visiting
NEA A/S Feltman on January 26 (ref C) that FM Saud had
pressed the Chinese Foreign Minister hard on the need to be
more active in working with the rest of the international
community and the UN Security Council to counter the threat
of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. FM Saud told FM Yang
that Saudi Arabia was convinced Iran intended to develop a
nuclear weapon, despite its assurances, and that only
concerted international action could stop that. While no
explicit bargain was discussed, Dep FM Torki explained that
Saudi Arabia understood China was concerned about having
access to energy supplies, which could be cut off by Iran,
and wanted to attract more trade and investment. Saudi
Arabia was willing to provide assurances on those scores to
China, but only in exchange for tangible Chinese actions to
restrain Iran,s drive for nuclear weapons.


COMMENT:
--------

¶9. (C) Since King Abdullah's historic visit to Beijing in
January 2006, the Saudi-Chinese relationship has focused
predominantly on energy and trade. However, the relationship
may be showing signs of political evolution. While the
Chinese would likely prefer to stay away from political
controversy, their economic power and permanent seat on the
UN Security Council has made it more and more difficult for
them to avoid politics altogether.

¶10. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The incentives for the Saudis to

RIYADH 00000123 003.2 OF 003


try and leverage their economic relationship with China for
political gain with respect to sensitive regional issues,
such as Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are
significant and growing. After patiently focusing on
building the economic relationsip since 2006, FM Saud,s
public and private prodding of FM Yang indicates the Saudis
are ready to try and cash in some political chips. End
comment.
SMITH


/tag/IR_2.html


10STATE9124     2010-01-29 03:03     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Secretary of State

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INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 009124

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2030
TAGS: PARM PREL IR UNSC
SUBJECT: MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE IRAN'S
ENGAGEMENT ON ITS nuclear PROGRAM

Classified by NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey D. Feltman
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

REF A: STATE 120288

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see
paragraphs 2-5.

SUMMARY
-------

¶2. (C) The United States, along with its partners, has
made an unprecedented effort to engage Iran in an effort
to diplomatically resolve the international community's
concerns with Iran's nuclear program. Iran's lack of
constructive response so far, and its continued
reluctance to cooperate with international efforts to
build confidence and transparency in its nuclear
program, demand a response. Department requests posts
to draw on the attached narrative to explain our
rationale for why sharpening the choice that Iran
faces, by increasing pressure, is necessary at this
point, and to secure the cooperation of host governments
in these efforts. End Summary.


OBJECTIVES
----------

¶3. (C) FOR ALL POSTS (except Moscow, Paris, Beijing,
London and Berlin): Please draw on narrative beginning
in paragraph 11 to:

-- Highlight U.S. efforts to mobilize diplomatic
engagement with Iran in 2009;

-- Underscore the lack of a meaningful Iranian response
to those efforts, especially since the P5+1 political
directors meeting with Iran in Geneva on October 1,
2009;

-- Outline U.S. view of next steps, including increasing
pressure on Iran; and

-- Seek enhanced bilateral cooperation to increase
pressure.

¶4. (C) FOR MOSCOW, PARIS, BEIJING, LONDON, AND BERLIN:
Posts may share the general tenor of our message but do
not need to deploy the points themselves with host
governments.

¶5. (C) Points should be deployed by Ambassadors to most
appropriate senior counterparts. Posts may not leave
any part of this message in writing with host
governments.

DEADLINE
--------

¶6. (U) Posts should report any substantive response to
their efforts by February 3. Elisa Catalano (NEA/FO,
catalanoe@state.sgov.gov, 647-9533) and Richard Nephew
(ISN/RA, nephewrm@state.sgov.gov, 647-7680) are the
Department's POCs.

BACKGROUND
----------

¶7. (SBU) With its P5+1 partners, the U.S. has been
pursuing a policy towards Iran that includes engagement

STATE 00009124 002 OF 006


and incentives, as well as pressure. Since the 1
October 2009 meeting of the P5+1 Political Directors and
representatives from Iran, the United States has been
working closely with its partners to engage with Iran to
build international confidence in the peaceful nature of
its nuclear program. Based on the agreement in
principle reached with Iran in Geneva, we have focused
on supporting the IAEA's proposal for refueling the
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), facilitating the IAEA's
investigation of the previously clandestine uranium
enrichment plant at Qom, and pressing for a follow-on
meeting between P5+1 Political Directors and Iranian
representatives explicitly on Iran's nuclear program.

¶8. (C) The results since October 1 have been
disappointing. Iran has not accepted the IAEA's TRR
proposal; instead, Iran has rejected a series of updated
and more flexible proposals from the IAEA and our
partners on some terms of the proposal (REF A), and has
offered a substantially different counterproposal which
fails to address the concerns about its nuclear program,
does not fulfill the objective of building confidence in
Iran's nuclear intentions, and, as EU High
Representative Lady Ashton described, in effect rejects
the IAEA's proposal. Iran has also announced its intent
to expand its nuclear program, including its intention
to start enriching uranium to higher levels to make its
own TRR fuel if its terms are not accepted on the fuel
deal. Although Iran granted IAEA access to the facility
at Qom, its cooperation was limited and there remain
serious questions about Iran's intentions for the
facility, which is in open defiance of five UN Security
Council resolutions. Finally, Iran to date has gone
back on its earlier commitment to meet again with the
P5+1 to discuss its nuclear program.

¶9. (SBU) Former IAEA Director General El-Baradei
released his latest report on Iran on November 16, 2009,
and the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) adopted a
resolution on Iran on November 27, 2009. The resolution
notes the Board of Governors' serious concern that Iran
continues to defy the requirements and obligations
contained in UNSC resolutions and IAEA resolutions. The
Board of Governors also expressed its serious concern
that contrary to the request of the Board of Governors
and requirements of the UN Security Council, Iran has
neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor provided
the access necessary for the IAEA to provide assurance
as to the absence of additional undeclared nuclear
activities.

¶10. (U) President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and other
P5+1 leaders identified the end of 2009 as a key period
for assessing Iran's responsiveness. While the offer of
engagement remains on the table, we have begun to work
with partners to prepare new measures to increase
pressure on Iran.

DIPLOMATIC POLICY NARRATIVE
---------------------------

¶11. (U) Begin talking points:

Overview: Where We've Been, and Where We Are
--------------------------------------------

-- The President made clear his readiness to open a new
page in our relations with Iran, based on mutual
respect. This new approach featured our offer to engage
Iran directly, as well as our readiness to become a full
and active participant in the P5+1's efforts to resolve
international concerns about Iran's nuclear program
through negotiations.

-- We stated clearly our support for Iran's right to the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided Iran meets its

STATE 00009124 003 OF 006


international obligations and carries out its
responsibilities within the NPT framework.

-- When we met with the Iranian delegation in Geneva on
October 1, along with our P5+1 partners, we sought
Iran's commitment to three concrete actions, which would
demonstrate its intentions for its nuclear program:

-- support the IAEA's proposal for refueling the
Tehran Research Reactor;

-- facilitate the IAEA's full investigation of the
previously clandestine uranium enrichment plant at
Qom;

-- agree to a follow-on meeting between P5+1
Political Directors and Iranian representatives by
the end of October, explicitly focused on nuclear
issues but also open to discussion of any issues
raised by any party.
-- Each of these agreed actions presented Iran with an
important opportunity to begin to assure the
international community about its intentions for its
nuclear program and to pursue together a diplomatic
resolution to our differences.

-- Iran has not followed through on any of these three
commitments.

-- President Obama also stated last year that we would
continually assess Iran's responsiveness to these
offers, and that the end of the year would present a key
period of assessment.

-- It is increasingly clear that Iran has not taken
advantage of the opportunities we have offered.

-- A year into the Obama administration, Iran has not
taken practical, concrete steps that would begin to
create confidence in its nuclear intentions. Iran:

-- Continues to enrich uranium despite UNSC
requirements that it suspend such operations;

-- Revealed it had been building a secret uranium
enrichment facility at a military base near Qom, in
violation of its safeguards agreement and UN
Security Council resolutions;

-- Continues to refuse cooperation with the IAEA
in addressing the full range of IAEA questions
about the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program;

-- Has not accepted the IAEA proposal to refuel
the TRR, which was a response to an Iranian
request, despite U.S. and our partners' significant
efforts to be flexible and address Iranian concerns
with the deal; and

-- Since meeting with representatives of the five
permanent members of the Security Council and
Germany in Geneva on October 1, has refused all
subsequent efforts to schedule another meeting to
discuss its nuclear program.

-- Iran has not been able to say "yes" to a balanced
IAEA proposal that would provide fuel for its Tehran
Research Reactor and begin to build mutual trust and
confidence, notably by transferring 1,200kgs of its low
enriched uranium abroad as an indication of Iran's
peaceful nuclear intent.

-- Underscoring the significance of the IAEA's TRR
proposal, in November 2009, former IAEA DG ElBaradei
said that the proposal had "extensive built-in
guarantees...the Russians are guaranteeing implementation.

STATE 00009124 004 OF 006


The Americans are ready for the first time to guarantee
the implementation. The [IAEA] will take custody of
Iran's material so the international community as a
whole will guarantee" implementation.

-- On Iran's desire to retain possession of its nuclear
material under delivery of the fuel (which is the basis
of Iran's counterproposal), Dr. ElBaradei rejected this
approach, saying publicly in November after Iran first
raised this idea that this would "defeat the whole
purpose of the IAEA's agreement...this is not a
solution.";

-- While it allowed IAEA inspectors to visit its newly
revealed enrichment site near Qom, it did not provide
the IAEA with the full access the organization
requested, notably by agreeing to the IAEA's request for
access to specific Iranian nuclear officials and
answering IAEA questions regarding the history and
purpose of the facility. The clandestine construction
of this facility was inconsistent with Iran's IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, and is in open defiance of UN
Security Council resolutions.

-- As the IAEA reported in November 2009, Iran
continues to develop its nuclear program regardless of
international concerns and IAEA, NPT, and UNSC
requirements - most starkly in its construction of a
secret uranium enrichment facility at a military base
near Qom. As former Director General El-Baradei's
report on November 16 outlines, this facility and the
circumstances surrounding it raises the persistent
question of additional such undeclared facilities.

-- The IAEA report makes clear that Iran has failed to
cooperate fully and transparently with the IAEA,
answering questions about the use of this facility and
the possibility of other facilities.

-- Iran has failed to take advantage of the creative
TRR proposal, engage with us constructively on other
elements of its nuclear program, and cooperate fully
with the IAEA. It also still defies UNSC requirements
that it suspend its enrichment program, instead
announcing an expansion of its nuclear program. Even
more, it is threatening to begin enriching its LEU to
higher levels of enrichment if the international
community does not accept a TRR deal on its terms, terms
that would not build confidence as they would reduce and
delay transfers of LEU from Iran.

-- Iran's continued nuclear activities and its refusal
to engage meaningfully with the international community
risks a possible arms race in the region and undermines
the global international nonproliferation regime as a
whole.

-- As you know, Israel has stated that an Iran with
nuclear weapons poses a great threat to its security and
that it reserves the right to defend itself. We believe
Iran's continued non-compliance with its international
obligations regarding its nuclear program poses serious
threats to stability in the region. Presenting Iran
with a united global front is the best avenue to resolve
the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means.

-- In addition to its disregard of its nuclear-related
obligations, Iran continues to support terrorist
organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, and militant
groups in Iraq. It also provides some support to the
Taliban to facilitate attacks against ISAF forces in
Afghanistan.

-- Also of deep concern to the international community
is the dramatic uptick in repression inside Iran. As
Secretary Clinton said recently, we are deeply disturbed

STATE 00009124 005 OF 006


by the ruthless repression that Iran is exercising
against its citizens who seek to exercise their
universal right to free expression and assembly.

The Pressure Aspect of the Strategy: Making the Case
--------------------------------------------- -------

-- The two elements of the P5+1 strategy -
engagement/incentives and pressure -- were always
intended to run in parallel, because without a credible
threat of consequences, it is unlikely that Iran will
make a strategic or even tactical change in direction.

-- For that reason, we have always recognized the
possibility that we would need to increase pressure to
sharpen the choice that Iran faces in order to persuade
Iran that the international community is serious.

-- Still, our emphasis over the course of this year has
been on outreach and engagement rather than pressure.
Unfortunately, to date, Iran has failed to respond
constructively.

-- Pressure is not an end in itself; it is a means to
encourage Iran to recalculate costs and benefits, and to
return to a course of constructive engagement at the
negotiating table. But without unmistakable and
meaningful consequences, there seems little prospect for
such a return.

-- The international community has already imposed
strict measures on Iran via various multilateral fora to
demonstrate that Iran cannot ignore its responsibilities
without cost. We believe a more aggressive enforcement
of this existing and robust international framework,
along with the application of significant additional
pressure, will illustrate to Iran the sharp choices it
faces should it continue to rebuff efforts to resolve
our differences diplomatically.

-- Unity among members of the international community
is absolutely essential to demonstrate to Iran that
there are serious consequences for its continued refusal
to engage constructively with the international
community over its nuclear program. Such unity was
clear when the IAEA Board of Governors adopted its Iran
resolution in November. It was also clear in the
European Council's declaration on Iran issued in
December. Both were useful and immediate opportunities
to increase pressure on Iran.

-- We believe Iran's continued non-compliance regarding
its nuclear program deserves the full and urgent
attention of the international community.

Next Steps
----------

-- We stand behind our offer to engage with Iran, but we
are rapidly approaching the moment when we will have to
give full meaning to all elements of our strategy. We,
along with our partners, believe that the time has come
to increase pressure on Iran. Such pressure is
necessary to uphold the integrity of the UNSC and IAEA,
and demonstrate that continued non-compliance has
consequences.

-- The U.S. believes that multilateral pressure would be
best achieved through new UN Security Council action and
swift implementation of that action.

-- However, UN action alone may not be sufficient to
persuade Iran to change course. There is much more that
can and should be done immediately to implement measures
already required under the existing international
sanctions framework. We therefore ask our partners to

STATE 00009124 006 OF 006


ensure that we are collectively enforcing all those
measures that are already in place as comprehensively as
possible.

-- We regret that Iran has missed repeated opportunities
for meaningful engagement. Our intent is not to
escalate a conflict, but to press for a diplomatic
resolution. Inaction is what the Iranians are hoping
for, as they draw closer to achieving a nuclear weapons
capability.

-- On January 16, we and our P5+1 partners met to take
stock and discuss next steps regarding Iran. As the
Chair's statement reflects, we agreed that Iran has
failed to follow up on the key understandings reached in
our meeting with the Iranian delegation on October 1,
¶2009. We are united and remain committed to our
approach - while we will continue to seek a negotiated
diplomatic solution, we believe it is time for
consideration of appropriate further measures.

-- We are here today to intensify our consultations with
you, as one of our partners in the international
community, on next appropriate steps aimed to persuade
Iran to bring its nuclear program into full compliance
with its international obligations.

-- We urge these steps with steady determination that we
must do everything we can, including applying greater
pressure, to encourage Iran to return to a constructive
course of engagement.

FOR EU MEMBER STATES, USEU, AND TOKYO ONLY:

-- As we move ahead with and beyond the UN process, we
also will want to work with you to agree on additional
actions we could take on a coordinated, national basis
to magnify the impact of a new Security Council
Resolution and demonstrate to Iran our seriousness of
purpose.
CLINTON


/tag/IR_2.html


10KUWAIT88     2010-02-01 11:11     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Kuwait

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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000088

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM PGOV UNSC IR KU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAISES IRANIAN nuclear CONCERNS WITH
KUWAIT

REF: A. STATE 9124
¶B. 09 KUWAIT 1112
¶C. KUWAIT 61

Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and
d

¶1. (C) Ambassador, during a January 31 luncheon in honor of
Tony Blair at the residence of Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser
Al Sabah, pulled aside Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed
Al Sabah and raised ref A points concerning Iran's nuclear
program, continuing USG concerns, and our efforts to address
Tehran's intransigence, which now require greater application
of international pressure. Ambassador also noted Washington
interest in Kuwait's recent high-level diplomatic engagement
with Iran (PM's visit in November -- ref B), Iranian
Parliamentary Speaker Larijani's visit in January (Ref C and
septel), and reports of a possible Amiri visit later this
Spring, as well as efforts to expand commercial ties,
including oil/gas deals on the continental shelf (septel) --
and said that enhanced bilateral cooperation to align our
strategies would be welcome. The FM took the points on
board, but declined to be drawn out further on Kuwait's
strategy for dealing with Iran.

¶2. (C) Earlier at the same event, Ambassador raised reftel
points with the FM's Office Director, Shaykh Dr. Ahmad Naser
Al Sabah (Note: also the Prime Minister's son. End Note),
who asked whether the Iranian side had committed "in writing"
to the Tehran reactor fuel swap, the Qom facility inspection
and the follow-on meeting of P5 1. Shaykh Dr. Ahmed
suggested that the two critical issues are whether Iran's
nuclear program is now so widespread as to be for practical
purposes unstoppable -- and whether Tehran has or is close to
having the actual wherewithal to construct a nuclear device.
Ambassador replied that we are aware of at least three
reactors, but said the issue of capability was more difficult
to judge -- technical know-how had to be combined with all
the various necessary physical components, and there would
need to be a political decision to proceed. She emphasized
that the President's hand is still outstretched to Iran, but
at some point Iran will have to face the consequences of its
recalcitrance; moreover, the President was walking a
carefully considered fine line in dealing with others who
wished to take actions we hoped to avoid.

¶3. (C) Dr. Ahmad took Ambassador's point and noted that a
year or two ago, many in Kuwait hoped a silent, targeted
strike would take out the troublesome reactor and leave the
region more relaxed. He suggested that now, however, Iran
might have multiple reactors and was so intent on achieving
its nuclear goal that no matter what the West did, Iran would
get the bomb, and any attempt to disrupt it militarily or
through tough sanctions would go badly for the West. He
offered his analysis that "Iran is very different from Iraq;
if the "Murshid" orders his people to do something (like
revenge attacks across the Gulf, striking
American interests as well as Arab), they will do it, to a
person."

¶4. (C) Polcounselor separately alluded to USG concerns raised
reftel during a January 31 meeting with MFA Asia Department
Counselor Rashid Al-Hajri during a January read-out on
Iranian Speaker Ali Larijani's visit last week to Kuwait (Ref
C and septel). Al-Hajri, in response, delivered the GoK's
standard (and not particularly convincing) talking points on
this issue, emphasizing the GOK's "clear and unchanging
position" that Iran must abide by UN and IAEA safeguards on
its nuclear program and opposes any military options in the
Gulf. Al-Hajri said GOK officials invariably stress these
points in meetings with Iranian counterparts; at the same
time, Kuwait is obliged to conduct bilateral relations on a
variety of issues with its larger neighbor.

¶5. (C) Comment: Kuwaitis at all levels are deeply worried
about the nuclear ambitions of their much larger neighbor,
but are unsure how to respond. They worry that an Iran
emboldened by a nuclear arsenal would assert greater regional
hegemony at the expense of Kuwaiti interests, and would be
more inclined to meddle in Kuwaiti internal affairs given the
thirty percent of the nation that is Shi'a. However,
Kuwaitis are equally concerned about military pre-emption,
which they believe would not prove decisive and would lead
Iran to lash out at US interests in the Gulf (including US
military facilities in Kuwait), and against those states in
the region seen as allied with the US. Kuwait's current
limited engagement with Iran appears to be motivated by a
desire to try to lower regional tensions (particularly
between Iran and Saudi Arabia), with Kuwait able to distance

itself from the message by emphasizing that it is speaking on
behalf of the GCC in its capacity as GCC chair for 2010.

¶6. (U) Comment continued: At the same time, Kuwait more
parochially is seeking a way forward to secure Iranian
agreement to tap gas reserves in the disputed continental
shelf (Kuwait needs the gas, which it has little of
domestically, to fuel more and cleaner power plants to meet
growing electricity demand). The careful balancing act
Kuwait is playing was perhaps best exemplified during the
visit last week of Iranian parliamentary Speaker Larijani --
his warning that GCC states should not allow their territory
to be used by the US to launch attacks against Iran was
carried in most local papers on the front page, above the
fold, with prominent coverage given below the fold to
comprehensive coverage (including photos) of the US-Kuwait
military exercise "Eager Mace." Kuwait's nuanced approach
requires careful footwork, but PM Nasser Mohammed Al Sabah,
former dean of Tehran's diplomatic corps and self-described
Iran expert, apparently feels confident he is up to the task
-- and doesn't need much help from the US with the
choreography. End Comment.

********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
JONES


/tag/IR_2.html


10STATE9939     2010-02-01 16:04     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Secretary of State

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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7036

S E C R E T STATE 009939

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2035
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA IR CH
SUBJECT: (S) ALERTING CHINA TO POSSIBLE MISSILE-RELATED
EXPORT TO IRAN

Classified By: (U) CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS DAVID B. SHEAR,
REASON: 1.4 (C).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please
see paragraph 3.

¶2. (S) Background/Objective: The U.S. has information
indicating that in December 2009, the Chinese company Hong
Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. offered to sell gyroscopes
produced by a Russian company to Iran's Isfahan Optics
Industries. Our information indicates that these gyroscopes
could be delivered to Iran in early February 2010 and that
Isfahan Optics Industries was coordinating this transaction
through an intermediary named Iran Business (IBco). Because
key missile development organizations in Iran previously have
attempted to procure similar gyroscopes, we are concerned
this equipment potentially could be diverted to
missile-related end-users. We therefore want to alert
Chinese officials to this information and ask that they
investigate this activity with a view to preventing Hong Kong
4 Star Electronics Ltd. from facilitating missile-related
exports to Iran.

¶3. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Beijing approach
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.

¶4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL CHINA)

--We would like to alert you to information of proliferation
concern and request your government's assistance in
investigating this activity.

--The U.S. has information indicating that in December 2009,
Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd., a Chinese company based in
Futian, China, had offered to sell Iran's Isfahan Optics
Industries gyroscopes produced by a Russian company.

--Our information indicates that these gyroscopes could be
delivered to Iran in early February 2010 and that Isfahan
Optics Industries was coordinating this transaction through
an intermediary named Iran Business (IBco).

--We are bringing this matter to your attention to support
your export control efforts as we are concerned this
equipment potentially could be diverted to missile-related
end-users in Iran.

--We understand that the Aerospace Industries Organization
(AIO), which is responsible for overseeing all of Iran's
missile programs, has previously attempted to procure similar
gyroscopes.

--We hope you will use this information to investigate this
activity and take all appropriate measures to ensure that
Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. is not facilitating
unauthorized exports of missile technology to Iran.

--We believe taking such action would be consistent with
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1803,
which require countries to prevent transfers of items to and
from Iran that could contribute to the development of nuclear
weapons delivery systems.

--We look forward to continued cooperation on missile
nonproliferation issues and to hearing of any actions your
government takes in response to this information.

End talking points/non-paper

¶5. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone:
202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR and EAP/CM.

¶6. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at
www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON


/tag/IR_2.html


10MUSCAT71     2010-02-02 14:02     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Muscat

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1190
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
RHMFISS/COMUSAFCENT SHAW AFB SC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000071

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/02
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IR MU
SUBJECT: OMANI GOVERNMENT REACTS STRONGLY TO SUGGESTION OF PATRIOT
OFFER

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Schmierer, Ambassador, Department of State,
Embassy Muscat; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D)

¶1. (C) Summary: A recent New York Time's (NYT) article describing
Patriot missile deployment to countries in the Gulf in order to
counter Iran, assuage Israel, and reassure our Gulf partners has
been disquieting to the Omani Government. There has never been an
official USG offer of Patriots to Oman, due in large part to the
GoO's rejection of any undertaking that might include or would
imply the presence of Patriot missiles here. Oman's close
partnership with the USG, particularly through the Base Access
Agreement (BAA), is contingent on maintaining an extremely low
profile and continuing the Sultanate's foreign policy objective of
carefully balancing public perception of its relationships with the
U.S. and Iran. Press of this sort, however unintended, makes it
extremely difficult for Oman to maintain that balance. End
Summary.



Press Articles on Missile Defense in the Gulf

--------------------------------------------- ----------

¶2. (U) A NYT article appeared on January 30 titled "U.S. Speeding
Up Missile Defenses in Persian Gulf," which quoted General Petraeus
as saying that Patriot missile batteries would be located in four
gulf countries, and noted that Saudi Arabia already has Patriots.
An unnamed military official named the countries as Qatar, the UAE,
Bahrain and Kuwait. The version of this article syndicated by the
NYT news service includes the sentence "Oman, which has always been
sensitive about perceptions that it is doing U.S. bidding, has also
been approached, but there is no deployment of Patriots there,
according to U.S. officials." (Note: That sentence does not/not
appear in the version currently available via the NYT website, and
it is unclear to post if it appeared in the print edition on
January 31; the syndicated version of the article is otherwise not
substantially different from the NYT original. End Note). The
item was picked up by regional press on January 31, quoting the NYT
article and specifically noting that "Oman has declined the offer."
On February 2, the private English daily "Times of Oman" carried a
front page article titled "Missile Shield: Oman denies receiving
any offer from US." In it, Sayyid Badr al Busaidi, Secretary
General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), is quoted as
saying, "the Sultanate's position on such matters is firm and that
it does not ... enter into alliances or axis (sic) against any
state." He stressed that Oman "does not allow its territory to be
used to carry out any military operations against any country in
the region."



Oman is not Interested

------------------------------

¶3. (C) The Embassy has no record of a formal offer of Patriot
missiles made to Oman by the USG. However, a number of discussions
have occurred in which USG intent was to gauge Omani interest in
collective missile defense capability. Oman has consistently shown
a lack of interest and has politely declined to engage in
substantive discussions on "shared early warning" systems,
"integrated air defense," or "collective defense." (Note: This
is likely due to its assessment that Iran does not pose an imminent
threat, its desire to not needlessly antagonize Iran, and its
distrust of fellow GCC members, making it unwilling to share data
within that group. End Note.) Further, in official
correspondence, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) rejected an offer for
a "Missile and Air Defence Working Group" on February 6, 2009;
rejected further offers for an "Air and Missile Defense Shared
Early Warning (SEW) System" on March 30, 2009, citing Oman's
"unwillingness to commit itself to a SEW"; and on July 22, 2009
again rejected any participation in the "Air Defense Missiles
Advanced Warning System" project.



Direct Omani Reaction

-----------------------------

¶4. (C) The Omani Royal Office made contact with the Embassy on
February 2 to express strong concern about the article and its
repercussions, as that office had just received a pointed inquiry
from the Sultan on this matter. In a follow-up discussion embassy
officer provided the history of discussions on the issue, of which
the Royal Office was previously unaware, due to what was described


as a "lack of lateral coordination within the GoO."



¶5. (C) Comment: The strength of Oman's immediate reaction, and the
level at which it transpired, is reflective of the tremendous
seriousness with which this matter is viewed by the GoO. It is
likely that one of the goals of Badr's media statement was to
protect the U.S./Omani relationship, as any belief that the U.S.
would attempt to utilize Omani territory in this way could
potentially cause a public backlash that would jeopardize other
aspects of our relationship. The deployment of Patriots to Oman,
especially with the goal of countering the Iran threat, would run
completely counter to Oman's publicly-stated foreign-policy
objectives. Although they do not find the threat imminent, Iran is
Oman's number one strategic threat; however, the GoO fundamentally
believes the threat can be mitigated through careful management of
the relationship. Therefore, the GoO works very deliberately to
create a public perception of balance in its relationships with
the U.S. and Iran. Oman's security strategy of keeping a low
public profile in general has been threatened by the attention
brought by the NYT article, and the GoO is working to manage the
message for the public. End Comment.
Schmierer


/tag/IR_2.html


10STATE10900     2010-02-03 15:03     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Secretary of State

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INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 010900

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2035
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA IR CH MY
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHINA ON THE
MALAYSIA-BASED COMPANY ELECTRONICS COMPONENT LIMITED

REF: A. 09 STATE 130917
¶B. 09 BEIJING 003476

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM, REASON: 1.4 (C).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please
see paragraph 4.

¶2. (S) Background/Objective: In December 2009, the United
States shared with China information regarding attempts by
the Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component Limited (ECL)
to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm VibTel
Industrial Co. Inc. (Ref A). These gyroscopes, which are
controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
and China's missile-related export controls, would be
suitable for use in the guidance systems of ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. We
requested China investigate this information because ECL is
associated with a network of Iranian-controlled front
companies that procure sensitive goods on behalf of a number
of Iranian entities of proliferation concern.

¶3. (S) Chinese officials agreed to investigate this
information, but asked for additional details on ECL's
relationships with firms in Iran (Ref B). To support their
efforts in this case, we would like to inform them that ECL
is part of a network of Iranian-controlled front companies
that includes the Iranian firm Shahin Sefid Esta and the
Malaysia-based front company Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd. This
network procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number of
Iranian entities of proliferation concern, including the
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1737-designated entities Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
(SHIG) and Ya Mahdi Industries. We want to provide this
information to Chinese officials and emphasize that we
believe the transfer of this controlled equipment to a
company linked to UNSCR-designated entities would be
prohibited pursuant to UNSCR 1737.

¶4. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Beijing approach
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.

¶5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL CHINA)

--In December 2009, we shared with you information regarding
attempts by the Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component
Limited (ECL) to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm
VibTel Industrial Co. Inc.

--TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled by the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and China's missile-related export
controls, and can be used in the guidance systems of
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial
vehicles.

--We also noted that ECL is associated with a network of
Iranian-controlled front companies that procure sensitive
goods on behalf of a number of Iranian entities of
proliferation concern.

--In response to this information, you agreed to look into
this matter, but asked if the United States could provide
additional details on ECL's relationships with firms in Iran.

--We now want to provide you with additional information
indicating that ECL is part of a network of
Iranian-controlled front companies that includes the Iranian
firm Shahin Sefid Esta and the Malaysia-based front company
Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd.

--This network procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number
of Iranian entities of proliferation concern, including the
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), which is Iran's
primary developer of liquid propellant ballistic missiles,
and Heavy Metal Industries, a front company for the tactical
missile developer Ya Mahdi Industries.

--Both SHIG and Ya Mahdi Industries are sanctioned under
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737.

--Additionally, the TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled items
that would be prohibited from being exported to Iran under
UNSCR 1737.

--We hope this information is useful in supporting your
efforts in this case and assists your ability to prevent the
transfer of these gyroscopes by VibTel Industrial Co. to ECL.

--We look forward to future cooperation on nonproliferation
issues and to hearing the results of your investigation into
this activity at the earliest possible time.

End talking points/non-paper

¶6. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann (Phone:
202-647-1430). Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR and EAP/CM.

¶7. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at
www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON


/tag/IR_2.html


10BERLIN164     2010-02-05 15:03     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Berlin

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RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0690

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000164

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020
TAGS: OTRA MARR NATO PARM PINS PREL PGOV GM AF IR
SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES

Classified By: Classified by Political M-C George Glass for reasons 1.4
(b,d).

¶1. (C) German FM Westerwelle told Amb February 5 that it was
important to refocus Afghanistan efforts on civilian
reconstruction; that we needed to avoid suggesting German
troops engaged in less risk than other countries; that he did
not invite Iranian FM Mottaki to Germany or seek a meeting
with him; that any discussion of non-strategic nuclear
weapons needed to be conducted at 28 at NATO; and that he
could not influence any decision by the European Parliament
on the SWIFT agreement. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) The Ambassador asked about Westerwelle's first 100
days in office. Though in an ebullient mood, Westerwelle
said things were very difficult (FDP slipped another
percentage point in the polls hours before the meeting). He
said he had been in France February 4 for a joint cabinet
meeting, but that nothing substantive came of it. He
observed that one never really knew what was going to happen
with Sarkozy involved.

--------------
AFGHANISTAN
-------------

¶3. (C) The Ambassador reviewed his own recent trip to
Afghanistan. He shared his impression that the Germans were
doing a superb job at all levels from the RC-North commander
on down. He learned how critical mentoring and partnering
with Afghan security forces had become. He noted that the
U.S. was sending substantial forces to RC-North, where they
would conduct training and be under German command.
Westerwelle responded that this was important for Germany and
for international cooperation. The Ambassador added that the
U.S. was sending substantial helicopter support as well. He
said that Germans could be proud of their troops in
Afghanistan. Westerwelle responded that this was good news.
He said that the London Conference bore an excellent
conclusion, and was particularly useful for its focus on
civilian progress. He emphasized the importance of
underscoring civilian reconstruction.
¶4. (C) With a request for confidentiality, Westerwelle
referred to the January 20 "Bild Zeitung" interview with
General McChrystal, in which the general is quoted as urging
the Germans to take more risks. Westerwelle recounted that
he himself had had to answer questions about this article for
ten days, explaining that the Germans were not "peace
soldiers" while other countries provided the combat troops.
He said it was important that German troops not be
"relativized" and cast as second-class troops. He observed
that Germany had originally deployed 3,500 troops, increased
that mandate to 4,500, and was now planning an increase of
another 500 plus a reserve. He emphasized that this was a
major contribution compared with other European countries.
¶5. (C) The Ambassador noted that he had gained the
impression in Afghanistan that police training was more
challenging than he had originally understood. Troops were
usually required to provide force protection. But German
police training was the best.
¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked how the prospective February 26
Bundestag debate to extend the Bundeswehr mandate in
Afghanistan would play out. Westerwelle said the question
was how large a majority would approve the new mandate. He
said that SPD caucus chief Steinmeier displayed good will on
this issue. However, SPD chairman Gabriel wanted to
politicize the issue for domestic political gain.
Nevertheless, he thought some in the SPD would support the
new mandate. However, Westerwelle expected no support from
the Greens. Westerwelle noted that the May NRW state
elections were also affecting the issue in a negative way.
That said, he said he could not see Steinmeier opposing the
larger mandate. He hoped the Ambassador would speak with
Steinmeier.

------
IRAN
------

¶7. (C) Asked about the February 5 visit of Iranian FM
Mottaki to the Munich Security Conference, Westerwelle
emphasized that he (Westerwelle) had not invited Mottaki to
come to Germany, and Westerwelle had also not requested a
meeting with Mottaki. Rather, it was Mottaki who was asking
to see Westerwelle. Westerwelle said he had still not
decided whether he would talk to Mottaki or not. He
reflected concern that Tehran might try to exploit Mottaki's
visit to Germany as a distraction, and continue executing
people during the visit. In any case, Westerwelle said his
position was exactly the same as the U.S. on Iran, and he
would share the results of any meeting with Mottaki, if it
took place.

BERLIN 00000164 002 OF 002


¶8. (C) Westerwelle said he would meet Russian FM Lavrov and
(separately) Chinese FM Yang February 5. He suggested that
Moscow had been changing course on Iran sanctions since the
Qom revelations. The Russians now saw Iran as playing games
on the nuclear issue. However, he observed that China was
"hesitant," or even in opposition to sanctions. Reflecting
on his recent visit to China, Westerwelle said he had not
perceived any "good will" there at present. He said he would
ask Yang again about Iran and then share the results with the
U.S. Westerwelle opined that it was important also to focus
on Brazil as an opinion leader in the Third World. He noted
that President Lula had received Ahmadinejad warmly several
months ago. He added that he was uncertain what the Saudis
thought, but that the other Persian Gulf countries seemed to
be in an existential panic about the Iranian nuclear program.

-----------
TAC NUKES
-----------

¶9. (C) Touching briefly on arms control, Westerwelle stated
unequivocally that tactical nuclear weapons was an issue for
NATO. He said that when he had received Kissinger, Schulz,
Perry and Nunn on February 3 to talk about their global zero
proposal, tactical nuclear weapons was not discussed. He
said that the four statesmen were very supportive of
President Obama.

----------
TFTP
---------

¶10. (C) The Ambassador raised the challenge of getting the
European Parliament to approve an agreement to share data
with the U.S. on tracking terrorist finance. The Ambassador
noted the extensive efforts of the Treasury Department and
other U.S. agencies to explain the importance of the program
to our common security. He asked how one could get better
support for the program. Westerwelle replied that the German
government had been able to come up with a solution for
itself a few months ago when the issue first surfaced.
(Comment: In fact, German Interior Minister de Maziere's vote
to abstain in the EU Council vote on TFTP on November 30
reflected the complete deadlock within the Coalition
Government between TFTP advocates in the CDU-controlled
Interior Ministry and TFTP opponents in the FDP-controlled
Justice Ministery. End Comment.) However, Westerwelle said
that now that the issue was in the European Parliament, he
had no ability to influence it. He said that he was very,
very aware of the Secretary's interest in this issue.
Nevertheless, he had a sense that almost all groups in the
European Parliament had concerns with the proposed agreement.
He emphasized that this was not an issue that only concerned
his party, the FDP, but rather many others as well.
¶11. (C) Westerwelle shared that he had not yet appointed a
new Coordinator for German-American cooperation.

----------
COMMENT
---------

¶12. (C) Westerwelle (who spoke with ease in English) was in
a buoyant mood and more confident on his issues than we have
seen him so far. He seemed ready to defend any intimation
that he was less than supportive of a troop surge (Defense
Minister zu Guttenberg told the Ambassador two days ago that
Westerwelle had worked for no increase of German troops for
Afghanistan, see Berlin 157) with invocations of the
importance of civilian reconstruction. On Iran, he leapt at
the chance to tell us he had not invited Mottaki. His dodges
on both tactical nuclear weapons and terrorist finance were
all but practiced. His comment that he was unable to affect
the vote in the EU Parliament on TFTP was a bit disingenuous;
on February 4, an MFA official acknowledged to visiting
Treasury officials in Berlin that German MEPs were in fact
leading the charge against TFTP in the EU Parliament with the
tacit support of the FDP, if not of specialists in the
Justice Ministry and MFA themselves. Westerwelle still cuts a
good image in meetings and in the press here, even though his
party continues a bout of free fall in the polls. His
ministry, though, still wonders (privately to us) where he
gets his policy direction from. END COMMENT.
¶13. (U) The Ambassador did not have the chance to clear this
cable before departing Berlin.



Murphy


/tag/IR_2.html


10RIYADH178     2010-02-11 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Riyadh

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 RIYADH 000178

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR SECRETARY CLINTON FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV PTER SA YM IR ECON
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S FEB 15-16
VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES SMITH
REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)

INTRODUCTION
------------

¶1. (C) Madam Secretary, Mission Saudi Arabia warmly welcomes
your visit to the Kingdom, a country which, by virtue of its
energy resources, financial power, counterterrorism efforts,
and leadership of the Muslim world, plays a critical role in
many global and regional issues of importance to us. Your
visit comes at a time of emerging opportunities for
engagement to advance the goals that you and the President
have laid out in your speeches in the region.

¶2. (C) Our alliance with Saudi Arabia, while complicated and
subject to occasional disjunctions, has proven durable.
Taking stock of where we stand, we see a mixed picture. The
good news is that the Saudi leadership still sees the United
States as its most important strategic partner and guarantor
of its stability. We also share many global and regional
objectives, including the need for global financial and
energy stability, a common view of threats posed by terrorism
and extremism, the dangers posed by Iran and destabilization
in Pakistan, and the linkage that progress toward Middle East
peace has to virtually all other regional issues. Finally,
Saudi Arabia has become one of our most important allies in
the fight against Al-Qaida and terror financing.

¶3. (C) The bad news is that we differ on tactics in some key
objectives, and we are often frustrated by Saudi
unresponsiveness and a dearth of interlocutors among an aging
collective leadership. The status of women, religious
freedom, and human rights are ongoing concerns. On the Saudi
side, King Abdullah believes we are not always reliable,
consistent, or willing to heed his advice on important issues
such as Iraq. Saud Al-Faisal and others have openly been
critical of U.S. policies they describe as having shifted the
regional balance of power in favor of arch-rival Iran.
Differences of opinion on some of these issues can be
exacerbated by our differing cultures and value systems,
which can introduce a degree of skepticism and hesitancy in
the relationship.

¶4. (C) Despite the problems, a negative assessment of the
bilateral relationship would miss a critical point relevant
to U.S. goals in the region: Saudi Arabia is a country in
transition, and the changes underway present opportunities
for engagement that can advance U.S. interests and national
security. Saudi Arabia faces transitions on multiple levels,
from the geopolitical, where its trade and energy relations
are shifting from west to east, to economic, where greater
integration in the world economy is steadily exposing Saudis
to international best practices. Domestically, greater
access to internet and cell phones is unleashing new forms of
social activism, something demonstrated by an outpouring of
Saudi spontaneous voluntary assistance in the aftermath of
the Jeddah floods.

EDUCATION & DIVERSIFICATION TO COMBAT EXTREMISM
--------------------------------------------- --

¶5. (C) Having faced down what amounted to an insurgency by
Al-Qaida from 2003 to 2006, Saudi Arabia's leadership
acknowledged the pressing need for systemic reforms to combat
extremist ideology and provide for a rapidly expanding
population (the annual growth rate is about 2 percent). King
Abdullah's strategy is two-pronged: he has attacked the
roots of the extremism that fed Al-Qaida through education
and judicial reforms to weaken the influence of the most
reactionary elements of Saudi Arabia's religious
establishment. He is also promoting economic
diversification. The King is keenly aware of the urgent need
to make Saudi education more relevant to today's workplace
and increase the role of women in the economy, goals which
remain controversial in this deeply conservative,
inward-looking desert Kingdom. Guided by a vision that
dovetails with some key elements of the President's Cairo
speech, King Abdullah has begun to implement an ambitious
plan to transform Saudi Arabia's economy away from excessive

RIYADH 00000178 002 OF 005


reliance on hydrocarbons and towards a knowledge-based
economy that can provide sustainable development for the
long-term. Achieving these goals will require nothing short
of a revolution in the education system and significant
changes in most aspects of Saudi society, especially the
status of women.

¶6. (U) Seen from the outside, the pace of political reform
seems glacial (a notable exception is that changes introduced
after the WTO negotiations have been very fast for any
country; regulatory agencies are also standing up quickly).
Yet for certain elements of Saudi society, the changes are
coming too fast. Whatever the pace, however, the reality is
that serious reforms are gradually but irrevocably changing
Saudi society. Recently implemented reform measures include
re-shuffling the Ministry of Education's leadership last
February (bringing in the King's pro-reform son-in-law as the
new minister); a top-to-bottom restructuring of the country's
courts to introduce, among other things, review of judicial
decisions and more professional training for Shari'a judges;
the creation of a new investment promotion agency to overhaul
the once-convoluted process of starting a business here; the
creation of a regulatory body for capital markets; the
construction of the King Abdullah University for Science and
Technology (the country's new flagship and
controversially-coed institution for advanced scientific
research); and a substantial budgetary investment in
educating the workforce for future jobs. The Saudi government
is also encouraging the development of non-hydrocarbon
sectors in which the Kingdom has a comparative advantage,
including mining, solar energy, and religious tourism. The
Kingdom's 2010 budget reflects these priorities -- about 25
percent is devoted to education alone -- and amounts to a
significant economic stimulus package.

U.S. PARTNERSHIPS TO SUPPORT
REFORM & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
-----------------------------

¶7. (SBU) Saudi officials have been candid in stressing the
importance they place on strong ties with the United States
to help them meet reform challenges, both through increased
engagement at the government level, including educational
exchanges and more FDI, particularly in energy, high tech,
and manufacturing. The past year has seen several large
investments by prominent U.S. firms in advanced technology
areas, and we are working to raise the profile of our trade
and investment relations, including through a major Saudi
exposition in Chicago at the end of April. The Mission has
also steadily expanded USG engagement in education, public
health, science & technology, entrepreneurship, and civil
society. There are now more than 22,000 Saudi students
studying in the US, exceeding pre-9/11 levels. Public health
engagement has included breast cancer awareness and CDC
cooperation to set up an advanced epidemic screening network
that protected this year,s 3 million Hajj pilgrims. Our
Science & Technology umbrella agreement is already expanding
cooperation, including new projects with NASA. Our MEPI
programs include a first-time ever exchange visit by a group
of Saudi judges, leadership development for women, prevention
of violence against women and children, and youth exchange
and study. One female participant in our Social
Entrepreneurship Forum was a finalist in the 2009 Global
Student Entrepreneur Awards. She and seven other Saudi
entrepreneurs will attend the President's April summit.
Mission elements have also provided training to help the SAG
implement a new law to combat trafficking in persons.
Intensive engagement with the SAG on IPR is another success
story. You will want to congratulate Saudi officials for the
significant progress Saudi Arabia has made over the last
several years in improving IPR protection, which resulted in
the Special 301 Committee deciding to remove Saudi Arabia
from the Watch List.


SAUDI STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS
----------------------------

¶8. (C) TURNING EAST: Saudi Arabia is trying to come to terms
with the shift in global energy and trade ties towards Asia,

RIYADH 00000178 003 OF 005


which has both political and economic consequences.
Bilateral trade with China has more than tripled, and China
will soon be Saudi Arabia,s largest importer. Saudi Arabia
has also committed significant investments in China,
including the $8 billion Fujian refinery. Increased trade
has also brought increased friction, including anti-dumping
complaints from both sides. Saudi Arabia is thinking through
how best to take a leaf from the Chinese playbook and use
these expanded trade ties to achieve important political
goals. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has told the Chinese
that it is willing to effectively trade a guaranteed oil
supply in return for Chinese pressure on Iran not to develop
nuclear weapons.

¶9. (S/NF) COUNTERING IRAN: We expect that Saudi Arabia will
continue to develop its ties with China, in part to
counterbalance relations with the West. While the King's
preference is to cooperate with the U.S., he has concluded
that he needs to proceed with his own strategy to counter
Iranian influence in the region, which includes rebuilding
Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus coordination, supporting Palestinian
reconciliation, supporting the Yemeni government, and
expanding relations with non-traditional partners such as
Russia, China, and India to create diplomatic and economic
pressure on Iran that do not directly depend on U.S. help.
The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in
developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do
the same, including Saudi Arabia.

¶10. (S/NF) The King is convinced that current U.S. engagement
efforts with Tehran will not succeed; he is likely to feel
grimly vindicated in his view by Ahmadinejad's February 11
boast that having successfully enriched uranium to a level of
20 percent, Iran "is now a nuclear nation." The King told
General Jones that Iranian internal turmoil presented an
opportunity to weaken the regime -- which he encouraged --
but he also urged that this be done covertly and stressed
that public statements in support of the reformers were
counterproductive. The King assesses that sanctions could
help weaken the government, but only if they are strong and
sustained. The King will want you to elaborate on the
President's statement that the time for sanctions has come.
He will also want to hear our plans for bolstering Gulf
defenses vis a vis Iran. (The King has invited General
Petraeus to his desert camp for discussion on this topic on
Tuesday.)

¶11. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE: Your visit offers an important
opportunity to head off a serious clash over climate change.
Saudi officials are very concerned that a climate change
treaty would significantly reduce their income just as they
face significant costs to diversify their economy. We want
to get beyond the obstructionism that Saudi negotiators have
often shown during the negotiations and persuade senior
leaders to work with us in a partnership to meet their
strategic concerns, including by cooperating on developing
solar and biomass energy. The King is particularly sensitive
to avoid Saudi Arabia being singled out as the bad actor,
particularly on environmental issues. Your conveying the
importance the President places on working as partners with
Saudi Arabia on the Copenhagen process will be very important
in making this dialogue more constructive. Secretary Chu
intends to explore specific areas of collaboration during his
February 21-23 visit.

SAUDI REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
--------------------------------

¶12. (S) PREVENTING A COLLAPSE OF YEMEN: Saudi participation
in international diplomatic efforts to stabilize Yemen
reflect Saudi fears that instability on its southern border
is a clear and present danger. The King will tell you that
Yemen's strategic location makes an Al-Qaida presence there
more threatening than in Afghanistan; he will stress the need
to support Yemeni unity, despite his mistrust of Ali Abdullah
Saleh. With respect to Saudi involvement in the war against
the Houthis, the King will stress that the SAG's motivation
was self-defense. As Al-Qaida infiltrators from Yemen
multiplied, the SAG concluded that the Houthi rebellion had
distracted Saleh's government to the detriment of Saudi

RIYADH 00000178 004 OF 005


security. The military intervention was triggered by a
Houthi incursion into Saudi territory, but it presented a
long-sought excuse to fortify the porous Saudi-Yemeni border.
On February 7, Prince Khalid also informed Ambassador Smith
the fighting is wrapping up, and that a ceasefire arrangement
could be in place by mid-February.

¶13. (C) GESTURES AFTER ALL?: The King appreciates the
President's commitment to Middle East peace but is skeptical
the U.S. can bring sufficient and sustained pressure to bear
on Israel, especially regarding settlements. The King told
General Jones that progress on Middle East peace was only
possible if President Obama was willing to pressure Israel,
and Saudi officials have rebuffed U.S. requests for
confidence-building gestures to help restart negotiations.
Despite their adamant rhetoric, however, several members of a
private Jeddah-based think tank run by a retired Saudi
general have very quietly been participating in Track Two
discussions, apparently with SAG knowledge, and even put
forward a proposal on Gaza. In a more dramatic public
encounter that has provoked commotion in the region, former
Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Turki Al-Faisal shook
hands with Israeli Deputy FM Ayalon to settle a dispute over
joint seating at a Munich conference. Both sides have since
insisted the gesture did not signal changes in policy, with a
"senior Saudi diplomat" issuing a statement emphatically
denying that the incident constituted any form of recognition
for Israel.

¶14. (S/NF) AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN: King Abdullah firmly
believes that Asif Zardari is the primary obstacle to the
government's ability to move unequivocally to end terrorist
safe havens there ("when the head is rotten, it affects the
whole body"). The King told General Jones that U.S.
development assistance would rebuild trust with the Army,
which he asserted was staying out of politics in deference to
U.S. wishes, rather than doing what it "should." On
Afghanistan, the King has expressed support for the new U.S.
strategy, saying that spending on roads, schools, hospitals
and mosques would dissipate popular mistrust and help rebuild
the country. The King has not yet acknowledged the Saudi
role in Taliban mediation in conversations with USG
officials; GIP Director Prince Muqrin has explained to
several recent USG visitors that the SAG prefers to keep such
discussions in intelligence channels until any agreement is
reached. Perhaps reflecting this, the Saudi media downplayed
President Karzai's recent visit and the Afghan Ambassador
reported that the meeting with the King lasted only ten
minutes.

A NOTE ABOUT THE KING
---------------------

¶15. (C) The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques will offer you
a traditional Saudi welcome at the desert "encampment"
outside Riyadh, where he likes to spend his winter vacations.
You will find in 86-year old King Abdullah a wry and
forthright interlocutor. Having struggled with a speech
impediment throughout his life, he tends to express himself
tersely. Reflecting his Bedouin roots, he judges his
counterparts on the basis of character, honesty, and trust.
He expects commitments to be respected and sees actions, not
words, as the true test of commitment; and he expects
good-faith consultations, not surprises. Once the King has
lost trust in a counterpart, as has been the case with Nouri
Al-Maliki or Asif Zardari, his personal antipathy can become
a serious obstacle to bilateral relations. On the other
hand, as with President Obama, the King's esteem will help
navigate differences and at times change policies. The King
is undoubtedly looking forward to his discussions with you,
and Mission Saudi Arabia enthusiastically looks forward to
supporting your visit.

MISSION STAFFING
----------------

¶16. (U) The U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia includes Embassy
Riyadh, and Consulate Generals Dhahran and Jeddah. The
entire Mission, representing ten agencies, consists of 605
staff (212 U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) and 393 Locally Engaged

RIYADH 00000178 005 OF 005


(LE) staff).
SMITH


/tag/IR_2.html


10PARIS170     2010-02-12 13:01     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Paris

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000170

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12598 DECL: 02/12/20
TAGS: PREL MOPS MAR FR IR AF NATO
SUBJECT: SECDEF GATES'S MEETING WITH FRENCH MINISTER OF DEFENSE HERVE
MORIN, FEBRUARY 8, 2010.

PARIS 00000170 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Alexander Vershbow, ASD/ISA. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Ref: USNATO 56

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (SecDef) was
hosted by French Minister of Defense Herve Morin for a working lunch
during an official bilateral visit to Paris on February 8, 2010.
SecDef and Morin agreed on the basic themes to be included in NATO's
revised Strategic Concept. On Missile Defense, SecDef refuted Morin's
contention that a European Missile Defense system is both unwise and
unnecessary but pledged to give France and other Allies better
information on the costs and command and control structure of the U.S.
proposal. Both Morin and Gates agreed that Iran's rejection of an
engagement track meant that the time for pressure had arrived, but both
noted concern over China's opposition to a new UN Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR). On Afghanistan, SecDef praised French
contributions and highlighted ongoing trainer shortfalls. SecDef
raised U.S. concerns over the sale of a Mistral-class helicopter
carrier to Russia as sending a mixed signal to both Russia and our
Central and East European Allies. Morin refuted this idea, arguing
that the sale was a way to send a message of partnership to Russia at a
critical time. Morin requested that the upcoming U.S. Air Force
Request for Proposal (RFP) for a new in-flight refueling tanker
aircraft be unbiased. SecDef told Morin that he had full confidence
that the RFP would be as fair as possible. END SUMMARY.

----------------------
NATO Strategic Concept
----------------------

¶2. (S/NF) Morin welcomed SecDef to France and asked about U.S positions
regarding the revised NATO Strategic Concept. Morin noted France's
interest in a document that would inject new ideas, be adopted with
great momentum, and define NATO's roles and missions. It should not
just be a restatement of the conventional wisdom.

¶3. (S/NF) SecDef told Morin he favored a short document that was
perhaps three to five pages in length. The Strategic Concept should
move NATO from a traditional defensive alliance to a security alliance
that can address a wide range of global threats. SecDef said that the
Strategic Concept must better align resources with NATO's level of
ambition; it must lay out a comprehensive approach to civil-military
cooperation and enhance partnerships with the EU, UN and other
international organizations. SecDef concluded that, above all,
financial and broader structural reform must be pursued -- either as
part of the Strategic Concept or in parallel.

¶4. (S/NF) Morin agreed on length and the need for NATO to take on new
missions, but he wondered what types of missions members had in mind.
Cyber attacks? Terrorism? Proliferation? Missile Defense? Morin
also stated his belief that NATO needed to bring some clarity to its
area of operation so that NATO did not end up extending to the Pacific.
He added that, in his view, extending the Alliance to Georgia would
weaken Article 5. SecDef stated his preference for NATO to focus its
efforts in the Euro-Atlantic area, perhaps extending into the
Mediterranean. He concurred with Morin that a bigger Alliance posed
challenges.

¶5. (S//NF) Morin told SecDef that the UK MoD had proposed drafting a
joint French-UK proposal on NATO reform to then present to the U.S.
Noting that the objective was to overcome blockages from those
countries that had underwhelming General Staffs, Morin asked whether
SecDef thought it would be better for Europe to build consensus at home
and work its own ideas, or for Europe and the United States to develop
joint proposals. SecDef replied that he thought it best not to have
two proposals, but that he would consult with SecState. He also said
he hoped that the Senior Officials Group would come up with some
concrete and viable ideas for reform.

---------------
Missile Defense
---------------

¶6. (S/NF) Morin, having expressed strong reservations to new U.S. and
NATO missile defense (MD) plans at the NATO ministerial in Istanbul
(reftel), said he wanted to explain how France sees MD and raise some
questions. First, he believes that the shift from Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) to defense of populations and territory will give publics
a false sense of security, since the sword was ultimately stronger than
the shield. For France, security came from strong defense and
deterrence. Second, Morin asked what threat the system aims to
counter. nuclear states or rogue states? Third, Morin asked about
funding and how European countries would participate in command and
control (C2) decisions. Morin summarized his own personal opposition
to MD by asserting that the U.S. and Europe have differing mentalities
on defense spending. He said the U.S. has true resiliency with

PARIS 00000170 002.2 OF 004


"infinite" means, while in Europe defense spending has collapsed in
every country but the UK and France. As a result, any development
needing common funding will dilute the already weak European defenses.
Morin concluded by stating that it was folly to assume that MD would
give us added security.

¶7. (S/NF) SecDef refuted Morin's arguments, pointing out that MD
contributes to deterrence. SecDef explained to Morin that the system
was aimed at nations with a handful of nuclear weapons and a limited
but growing missile capability to launch them. Noting Iran fits that
profile, SecDef said that MD provides a good deterrent against limited
attacks.

¶8. (S/NF) SecDef agreed with MoD Morin that the U.S. owed NATO answers
on C2, costs, and the role of common funding. He pledged to provide
more details on these issues, as well as on how ALTBMD and the U.S.
Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) fit together. However, SecDef said it
was important to move ahead with the MD study that was endorsed at the
2009 NATO summit, since it would provide some of the answers France was
seeking. SecDef reminded Morin that POTUS will want to obtain a
decision affirming the Alliance role in MD at the Lisbon summit in late
¶2010.

¶9. (S/NF) Responding to SecDef's discussion of MD, Morin asked why
there was a need to shift from theater to population defense. SecDef
said the systems the U.S. was deploying have broader applications. For
example the THAAD system, which the U.S. had deployed to Hawaii as a
measure against North Korean threat, protects both the theater and the
population. Gates offered the Aegis ship-borne SM-3, which was used to
shoot down a defunct satellite, as a second example of a system that
could also have broader applications and deter Iran from holding us
hostage by threatening missile launches.

¶10. (S/NF) Recalling that Russian Prime Minister Putin once told him
Iran was Russia's greatest threat, SecDef noted that Russia could plug
into the new system. SecDef highlighted two Russian objections to the
former system: first, the radar in the Czech Republic would have been
so powerful that it could see into Russia; second, Russia believed that
the three-stage Ground-Based Interceptor could have been converted
easily to an offensive weapon. The SM-3 missiles in the new approach
can only be defensive in nature, however. For these reasons, the U.S.
believed partnering with Russia is once again potentially possible.
(NOTE: Following the meetings, Morin's critical comments on Missile
Defense were disavowed by senior officials at the MoD and the MFA, who
said that his views were his own and that the U.S. should essentially
"erase" what he had just said. END NOTE.)

-----
Iran
-----

¶11. (S/NF) Shifting from Missile Defense to Iran, SecDef noted that
Russia is now of a different mind on Iran because of Tehran's
persistent rejection of international proposals for negotiated
solutions and its concealment of the Qom facility. SecDef believed
Russia would be supportive of a new UNSCR, although it may have
different views on the severity of sanctions, but he expressed concern
about China. SecDef said that Russia could perhaps help on China, but
that securing the support of other non-permanent Security Council
members was also an issue. In this regard, SecDef told Morin he had
been blunt with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, telling him that if
Iran developed nuclear weapons, we were facing two scenarios: nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East or a regional war (or perhaps both).

¶12. (S/NF) Morin asked SecDef if he believed Israel had the capability
to strike Iran without U.S. support. SecDef responded that he didn't
know if they would be successful, but that Israel could carry out the
operation. SecDef told Morin that he believed a conventional strike by
any nation would only delay Iranian plans by one to three years, while
unifying the Iranian people to be forever embittered against the
attacker.

¶13. (S/NF) MoD Morin agreed that China could be problematic on the
UNSCR and queried SecDef how the U.S. believed we could ensure their
vote, especially in light of the upcoming Dalai Lama visit and the U.S.
weapons sale to Taiwan. SecDef told Morin that because of
Congressionally mandated rules, the U.S. was required to provide
defensive weapons for Taiwan. He observed that every time the U.S.
makes the sales to Taiwan, the Chinese suspend military-to-military
relations, but only for the short term.

--------
Pakistan
--------

¶14. (S/NF) Morin expressed doubt about the willingness of the Pakistani

PARIS 00000170 003 OF 004


government to fight extremists at home. He noted that Karzai had told
the French that if the Pakistan-Afghanistan border were closed, it
would largely solve issues in Afghanistan. SecDef replied that he had
told the Pakistani government two weeks earlier that Al Qaeda was
helping the Pakistan Taliban to destabilize Pakistan. SecDef
highlighted the dramatic changes in Pakistan over the past 18 months,
especially in Swat and Bajaur provinces, which offered some hope of
progress. SecDef said that there was increasing coordination between
U.S. and Pakistani forces across the border.

-----------
Afghanistan
-----------

¶15. (S/NF) Turning to Afghanistan, MoD Morin began by stating that
although he had announced an additional 80 trainers, France had also
sent a non-official contribution as well. (NOTE: Morin was referring
to a classified deployment of French Special Forces that have a limited
mission to find two kidnapped French journalists. END NOTE.) France
had also sent an additional deployment of engineers to work exclusively
on the Counter-IED mission. Morin underscored that France had
significantly increased its contributions in Afghanistan in the past 18
months from 2700 troops to nearly 4000.

¶16. (S/NF) SecDef said the U.S. understood the domestic situation and
that he would not have pressed France publicly for more forces until
after the March elections. However SecDef requested that France
strongly consider substantially increasing military and police
trainers. SecDef said that while he would publicly praise French
troops, which U.S. troops consider terrific fighters, he was fine with
keeping these discussions close hold.

¶17. (S/NF) Shifting topics, Morin questioned the decision to
specifically name mid-2011 as the start of a withdrawal, which Morin
thought would simply make the Taliban wait it out. SecDef noted that
whether to set a date for transition had led to one of the most
protracted debates in Washington in recent months. SecDef had come to
the conclusion, however, that the Afghans needed to be put on notice
that they would need to take responsibility for their own security. He
pointed out that there is no end date for U.S. involvement; July 2011
is just the beginning of a process. POTUS was very clear that the
transition would be conditions-based. Morin agreed with this and urged
that clear benchmarks be set that could reassure public opinion.
SecDef concurred and observed that the U.S. public will not tolerate a
prolonged stalemate.

--------------
Russia/Mistral
--------------

¶18. (S/NF) SecDef expressed U.S. concerns about the Mistral sale to
Russia. He told Morin that because of Sarkozy's involvement in
brokering a ceasefire in Georgia, which Russia was not fully honoring,
the sale would send the wrong message to Russia and to our Allies in
Central and East Europe.

¶19. (S/NF) Morin told SecDef pointedly that he had pushed hard for the
sale. He conceded that it was indeed a warship for power projection.
But Morin asked rhetorically how we can tell Russia we desire
partnership but then not trust them. Morin told SecDef that he
understood the U.S. position on considering Central and East European
Allies' concerns about the perceived threat from Russia. Morin argued,
however, that this single ship would not make any difference with
respect to Russian capabilities, as Russia's naval production ability
was severely degraded.

¶20. (S/NF) SecDef replied that U.S. concerns were not about military
capacity but about messaging. Some allies, because of their past
experiences, are still very concerned with Russia and are not sure how
much to trust the West. SecDef observed that Russian democracy has
disappeared and the government was an oligarchy run by the security
services. President Medvedev has a more pragmatic vision for Russia
than PM Putin, but there has been little real change.

--------------
KC-X Tanker RFP
--------------

¶21. (S/NF) Morin told SecDef he had one final, but major, topic to
raise, the U.S. contract tender for a new tanker plane. He asked that
the RFP be issued so that competition was equal for both companies and
there was no bias. Morin stressed that it was important for our market
economy to be a two-way street. He told SecDef that if the terms of
competition are unequal, EADS would not submit a bid.

¶22. (S/NF) SecDef stated his belief that the RFP would be fair. He

PARIS 00000170 004 OF 004


told Morin that the Air Force had established the requirements. He
noted that since the previous competition, he had fired both the
civilian and military leaders of the Air Force and that there was a new
person in charge of the Pentagon's acquisition policy. SecDef said
that it would be disappointing if EADS did not submit a proposal.

¶23. (U) SecDef has cleared this cable. Drafted by OSD Staff.


RIVKIN


/tag/IR_2.html


10KUWAIT142     2010-02-17 14:02     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Kuwait

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000142

SIPDIS
NOFORN

NEA/ARP, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR YM KU
SUBJECT: KUWAIT INTERIOR MINISTER SOUNDS ALARM ON IRAN;
OFFERS ASSURANCES ON GTMO RETURNEES AND SECURITY

REF: KUWAIT 137

Classified By: DCM Tom Williams for reasons 1.4 b and d

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Interior Minister Jaber Al-Khaled Al
Sabah told Ambassador February 16 that he is deeply concerned
about Iranian actions, particularly in Yemen with the
Houthis. A security hard-liner whose views do not always
reflect those of the rest of the GoK, Shaykh Jaber suggested
Iran is intent upon exporting its revolution and can only be
deterred by force from achieving its nuclear ambitions; he
characterized Iran as the "beating heart" of Islamic
extremism, adding that even Palestinians now aspire to be
Shi'a because they have bought Iranian "stories" about Shi'a
being more prepared to "fight to the end" and stand up to
Israel. Now Iran is trying to infiltrate Egypt, exploiting
poverty there. Ambassador emphasized USG effort to pursue a
"pressure track" with Iran; on Yemen she suggested many of
Yemen's problems were home-grown and required economic and
social solutions at least as much as military ones. Shaykh
Jaber concurred, calling President Saleh "a leader with an
NCO mentality who thinks he can buy loyalty" when what is
needed is strong, honest government and firmer security
measures. Ambassador sought GoK assurances on legality and
intent to ensure monitoring and withholding of travel
documents for any future GTMO returnees, noting that without
those firm commitments the cases of the remaining two
Kuwaitis in GTMO may prove difficult to resolve. The
Minister promised a more formal response but offered his
personal assurances that travel documents would not be
issued, and said monitoring of the last two returnees was
constant and ongoing. Ambassador also raised the need for
GoK outreach to the Parliament to prioritize passage of
pending legislation to criminalize terror financing; Shaykh
Jaber said politics was hindering progress on this issue and
on many other important bills, including one to criminalize
cyber crimes, but said his Ministry was committed to pursuing
radical extremists and ensuring the safety of Americans in
Kuwait, with or without new laws. End Summary.

Iran on my mind
----------------

¶2. (S/NF) The blunt and outspoken Minister of Interior,
Shaykh Jaber Al-Khaled Al Sabah, told Ambassador and DCM
February 16 that Iran is his major concern. Iran is intent
upon exporting its revolution and Shi'ism, has a gameplan,
and will only be deterred from achieving its objectives -
including a nuclear weapons capability - by force. The U.S.
will not be able to avoid a military conflict with Iran, if
it is serious in its intention to prevent Tehran from
achieving a nuclear weapons capability. In Yemen, the
Houthis have shown remarkable resilience - where is their
power coming from? Yemeni extremists are making money from
the drug trade, moving narcotics into Saudi Arabia. The GoK
has been able to block some of the flow of these drugs from
Saudi into Kuwait, but remains very concerned about this.
Iran is involved, clearly, as a producer of drugs and a
facilitator of transit along the
Afghanistan-Iran-Somalia-Yemen pipeline. Now Iran is trying
to expand its influence in Egypt, seeking to exploit poverty
there and infiltrate the security services.

Iranian Mythology Resonates
----------------------------

¶3. (S/NF) Shaykh Jaber said that the Sunni-Shi'a balance in
the region is at risk and chaos could ensue. Iran is
"calling the shots" in Iraq, and has so convinced the region
of its stories - that Shi'a and Iran will "fight to the end"
where others will not, that only the Shi'a and Iran really
stand up to Israel - that now many Palestinians want to
convert to Shi'ism. As a consequence, Iran has become "the
beating heart of Islamic extremism." The Minister apologized
for speaking so frankly, but said he wanted to clearly convey
what is of greatest concern to the GoK.

¶4. (S/NF) Note: The Interior Minister's concern about Iran
may have been informed by a couple of recent incidents
briefed February 17 to the US Navy LNO at the Kuwait Navy
Base (see IIR septel for details). In one incident, on
February 6, IRGC Navy speedboats harassed Kuwaiti fishermen;
in a more serious incident on February 15 and again on
February 16, three IRGC Navy speedboats approached a joint
Kuwait/Saudi oil terminal in international waters (located in
the Al-Hout field off Mina Az-Zour), approached as close as
fifty meters and lingered for forty-five minutes on the first
occasion, but only fifteen minutes the second time (perhaps

KUWAIT 00000142 002 OF 003


as a result of the presence of the Kuwaiti patrol boat
Istiqlal that was dispatched to the terminal to hold station
after the first incident). End Note.

Pressure Track and Yemen Clarification
---------------------------------------

¶5. (S/NF) Ambassador took issue with the Minister's
characterization of Iran's role in Iraq and then moved to
review U.S. efforts along the "pressure track" with Iran. In
Yemen, Iran may no doubt try to exploit the situation with
the Houthis, but the causes of the conflict were largely
internal and would require Yemeni President Saleh to pursue a
political and social effort as well as a military campaign -
as was noted in the recent London conference, many of Yemen's
challenges are ones of governance. Shaykh Jaber agreed,
characterizing Saleh as having "an NCO's mentality that you
can win everything with money" when what is needed is less
corruption and a more proactive security posture. The
Minister noted that Kuwaiti Salafists are sympathetic to the
cause of the southern secessionists in Yemen and are being
watched by the GoK; he stated, however, that no Kuwaitis are
actively involved in the fighting. Ambassador noted that
some in the U.S. intelligence community believe that a
considerable number of Kuwaitis are involved with Al-Qaeda,
particularly in the AFPAK theater; Shaykh Jaber said Kuwaitis
tend more to be sympathizers than practitioners, but said
they all were being watched closely.

GTMO Assurances/Clarifications Needed
---------------------------------------

¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador raised the issue of the remaining
two Kuwaiti GTMO detainees, and sought the Minister's
confirmation that the commitments outlined in the latest
draft diplomatic note on oversight of returnees -
particularly with reference to constant monitoring and
withholding of passports - were both legal and accurately
reflected GoK intent. Clarification of the pending
assurances would likely be necessary given the greater
seriousness of the cases against the remaining two. The
Minister promised a more formal response later, and made
clear that he could not interfere with the activities of the
judiciary, but said he was sure the two most recent returnees
did not have passports, and characterized their level of
monitoring by the security service as "so close they can
smell us and feel our breath on the back of their necks."

Need for Passage of AML law
---------------------------

¶7. (S/NF) The Ambassador - as she had earlier with the
Foreign Minister (reftel) - noted that Kuwait is now the only
country on the Arabian Peninsula not to have criminalized
terror financing. A pending law is before parliament, but
Speaker Jassem Al-Khorafi had commented privately to the
Ambassador that the government had not made its passage a
priority for the current legislative session. Shaykh Jaber
responded that politics was getting in the way of much needed
legislation, not just TF, but also a bill to define cyber
crime. The Minister offered his assurances that the GoK is
very serious on the matter of terror financing and
facilitation, with or without the law, and was committed to
this and to protecting Americans in Kuwait. At the close of
the meeting, the Ambassador provided Shaykh Jaber with drop
copies of two previous requests for information on alleged
anti-American plotters in Kuwait, acknowledging that these
could be "poison pen" cases, but requesting a formal response
from the Ministry to ensure appropriate due diligence had
been done.

Comment
--------

¶8. (S/NF) Shaykh Jaber survived a no-confidence vote in
Parliament late last Fall, but the GoK expended only enough
effort to ensure his victory by a relatively narrow margin.
The reported cost of that governmental support (arranged by a
Prime Minister from whom Shaykh Jaber is estranged) was
Shaykh Jaber's acceptance that KSS Chief 'Athbi Al-Fahad Al
Sabah would report directly to the PM, not to the Interior
Minister as has traditionally been the case. The Interior
Minister's tough and candid talk on Iran, consequently, while
it offers useful insight into the private worries likely
shared by many of Kuwait's seniormost leadership, should not
necessarily be seen as an articulation likely to result in
any meaningful GoK policy initiatives.


KUWAIT 00000142 003 OF 003


********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
JONES


/tag/IR_2.html


10MOSCOW392     2010-02-22 11:11     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Moscow

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000392

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS IR
SUBJECT: IRAN DOMINATES NETANYAHU'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Eric Green for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In a two-day visit to Moscow, PM Netanyahu
pressed his case on Iran while the GOR was more focused on
trade than the MEPP. The Israeli PM downplayed disagreements
over Hamas and welcomed government initiatives to help
crisis-depleted economic relations. Netanyahu came away
pleasantly surprised with Moscow's tougher attitude towards
Tehran and the GOR's willingness to countenance sanctions,
even though disagreement remains on their content. Israeli
contacts are confident Russia will not deliver the S-300s to
Iran anytime soon. End Summary.

----------------------
A Special Relationship
----------------------

¶2. (C) In his first official visit to Russia, PM Netanyahu
met with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin as well
as leaders from Russia's Jewish community. Both sides
described this as a productive visit with "frank but positive
discussions."

¶3. (C) Israeli DCM Roi Rosenblit said Netanyahu's visit
emphasized the "special relationship" between Israel and
Russia. He indicated that this the connection between the
two countries has flourished in the past year. Thanks to
visa free travel, 400,000 Russian tourists travelled to
Israel in 2009.

--------------------------------------------- --
Bilateral Economic and Cultural Ties Increasing
--------------------------------------------- --

¶4. (C) According to Dmitri Lebedov, Second Secretary in the
MFA's Israel and Palestine Department, there was some
discussion of economic issues, including cooperation in
nanotechnology, agriculture, tourism and banking. The
Russian-Israeli Bilateral Economic and Trade Commission last
met in November 2009. The commission is planning another
meeting in 2010 in Jersusalem although a date has not yet
been selected. Lebedev noted that Putin has agreed to visit
Israel in 2010.

¶5. (C) Rosenblit said both sides blamed the economic crisis
for the decrease in bilateral trade in 2009 which affected
Israeli imports of both raw diamonds and petrochemicals.
Both sides are looking for ways to diversify trade to include
more agricultural products. Rosenblit noted that Russia was
very interested in attracting Israeli investment, citing a
bilateral agreement on industrial research and development
which gives both governments the ability to finance joint
start-ups.

¶6. (C) Elaborating on economics issues, Rosenblit said that
Netanyahu and Putin discussed energy issues. Rosenblit said
that Israel had discussed with Russia and Turkey the
possibility of extending to Israel a gas pipeline but this
proposal became unnecessary after Israel found offshore gas
reserves in Haifa. Although Gazprom is still interested in
building facilities in Haifa and aiding in distribution,
Rosenblit said this was now a question for the private
sector. Rosenblit also claimed that an agreement was
reached to launch a bilateral agricultural business forum in
Moscow, possibly in March 2010. This would also be a private
effort, but under governmental auspices. He also said that
there was some discussion about future outer space
cooperation for peaceful purposes.

¶7. (C) Rosenblit claimed that the 65th anniversary of World
War II and Holocaust remembrance were high on the agenda. He
said that both the GOI and the GOR are unhappy with recent
attempts to revise the history of these events. He noted
that a Holocaust Museum will be built in Russia and a
commemorative site recognizing the Red Army's role in WWII
will be constructed in Israel. Rosenblit also said that PM
Putin invited President Peres to the May 9 Victory Day
ceremonies in Moscow later this year. Medevedev also
reportedly green lighted the idea of a cultural program
including a "Year of Russia in Israel" and "Year of Israel in
Russia" exchange.

-------------------------------------------
Middle East Peace Not High on Either Agenda
-------------------------------------------

¶8. (C) According to Rosenblit, MEPP was not thoroughly
discussed and he "doubted that the Moscow Conference
specifically was mentioned." Rosenblit also downplayed the

MOSCOW 00000392 002 OF 003


recent visits of Abbas and Meshaal and the importance
attached to them by the Russians. He said that he believed
Georgia was of greater importance to Russia than Syria,
Lebanon or Palestine.

¶9. (C) Rosenblit said that Netanyahu emphasized his openness
to talks between the GOR and the Palestinians because he
welcomed any way to bring them back to negotiations. "We
wanted everyone to tell Abbas to return to negotiations
because we can't give him a deal until he sits down." He
noted that Israel prefers direct contacts but supports any
kind of negotiations. Rosenblit said that Israel still
insists on talks without preconditions and no interim
agreements: "Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."
Rosenblit said that Israel supported Russia's efforts to
achieve comprehensive negotiations including Syria and
Lebanon.

¶10. (C) Referring to the recent visit to Moscow of Khaled
Meshaal, Netanyahu told his interlocutors that Hamas should
not be legitimized by other countries. Although Meshaal had
only a 15 minute meeting with Lavrov, it received significant
coverage in the media. Rosenblit said Medvedev asked what
Russia could do to help with Hamas. Netanyahu repeated that
Israel does not see Hamas as a legitimate partner but would
use the Russia-Hamas channel to discuss humanitarian issues
such as the proposed prisoner swap for IDF soldier Gilad
Shalit.

------------------------
Closer than Ever on Iran
------------------------

¶11. (C) Lebedov sought to downplay discussions of Iran saying
that, while it was discussed, other bilateral issues took up
most of the discussions.

¶12. (C) Rosenblit, however, claimed that Iran was clearly at
the top of Israel's agenda for this visit. He said Netanyahu
was "keen to form a group of like-minded parties" who
recognized the danger of Iran's program and would cooperate
to stop its "militant nuclearlization." Netanyahu emphasized
that Israel believes that once Iran has nuclear capabilities,
other regional powers will immediately seek their own nuclear
weapons. Because of this danger, and the threat from Tehran
itself, Netanyahu urged Russia to cooperate on tougher
sanctions against Iran.

¶13. (C) The Israeli side, according to Rosenblit, was
pleasantly surprised at Russia's harsh tone on Iran which had
changed dramatically even since FM Lieberman's visit in
November. "We heard words from them that we've never heard
before," Rosenblit claimed, "and we aren't hearing the same
old arguments." Rosenblit credited this change to the
Iranians themselves, saying that their rejection of the TRR
proposal and their decision to enrich to 20 percent had
toughened Russia's stance on Iran. He remarked that just a
few months ago, there was concern in Israel that Iran would
divide the international community, but Iran's actions have
only served as a unifying factor. "Russia's understanding of
the Iranian nuclear issue is closer to ours than it was a few
months ago."

--------------------------
Ready to Discuss Sanctions
--------------------------

¶14. (C) On the issue of sanctions, Netanyahu reportedly
handed the GOR a list of areas where Israel felt sanctions
could affect change in Iran's behavior. The list included
restrictions on Iranian exports of energy products; Iranian
imports of refined petroleum products; the financial and
banking sectors; and, shipping and aerospace companies. He
noted that, while Russia was ready to discuss sanctions, the
two did not necessarily see eye to eye on the specifics.
Both sides did agree, however, that the UNSC had to agree on
sanctions. Rosenblit said that Russian officials do not
believe that unilateral sanctions will have the desired
effect. They believe that the international community has to
maintain united and either agree to impose or not impose
sanctions.

¶15. (C) Netanyahu encouraged Russia to be an example for
China regarding sanctions. Rosenblit said both Israel and
Russia had been working bilaterally with China to convince
them that it was time for a serious discussion on sanctions.
--------------------------------------------- --
S-300s: No Quid Pro Quo, but We Trust Medevedev
--------------------------------------------- --


MOSCOW 00000392 003 OF 003


¶16. (C) When asked about media reports citing Netanyahu
himself which suggested that Israel had agreed not to restart
arms deals with Georgia in exchange for Russia's continued
inaction on the S-300s contract with Iran, Lebedov noted
that, in spite of this statement, there had been no change in
the GOR's policy. He claimed that fulfillment of the S-300s
contract remained a political decision. He remarked that the
S-300 system was itself defensive in nature and could not be
used against another party, such as Israel.

¶17. (C) Rosenblit also would not acknowledge that a deal had
been made. Instead, he said that Netanyahu had reiterated
his trust in Medvedev regarding the S-300s. According to
Rosenblit, Netanyahu believes that Russia has taken "all
aspects of regional stability" into account when taking
decisions on the S-300s. Rosenblit did note that the S-300s
issue offered a window onto the different vectors in Russian
foreign policy, with the contradictory statements that their
delivery was imminent, and the delay being caused by
technical and political issues, coming just days before
Netanyahu's visit.

¶18. (C) Rosenblit said that neither Russia nor Israel was
linking the S-300 issue with arms sales to Georgia. Israel,
he claimed, as a Russian partner, was "listening attentively"
to Russia's concerns about weapons supplies to Georgia and
the effects this could have in the region. Israel has
friendly relations with Georgia but the Russian relationship
was also very important, he said. He indicated that both
sides were trying to come to an "understanding."

¶19. (C) Comment: The Russian media built up the Prime
Minster's visit as the final stage of Russia's
Abbas-Meshaal-Netanyahu trifecta of Middle East callers.
While both sides paid lip-service to MEPP issues, Iran was
the main agenda item. This reflects Netanyahu's priorities
and the GOR's belief that it is Washington's job, not
Moscow's, to pressure the Israelis on MEPP issues. Israel
came away pleased with Russia's changed posture on Iran, but
disappointed that its list of sanctions was too ambitious for
the GOR. Separately, the widely reported "quid-pro-quo" on a
mutual freeze of the Russian S-300 delivery for Iran and
Israeli military sales to Georgia could be a convenient
Israeli invention. While Israeli contacts say there is no
formal deal, Netanyahu's statements to the media created
enough speculation to put Russia in a corner. Should Moscow
eventually deliver the system to Iran, Israel has a pretext
to step up arms sales to Georgia.
Beyrle


/tag/IR_2.html


10ABUDHABI97     2010-02-22 12:12     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Abu Dhabi

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NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/22
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC UNSC IR AE
SUBJECT: CODEL LOWEY WITH UAE FOREIGN MINISTER ON IRAN

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. In a February 17 meeting, UAE Foreign Minister
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ) discussed Iran with a
four-member Congressional delegation led by Chairwoman Nita Lowey
of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.
AbZ told the Codel the nuclear issue is only one aspect of the Iran
problem, and that Iran's regional meddling was a serious concern.
He pledged the UAE's backing as the US rallies support for new
sanctions but questioned whether they would achieve the desired
effect. AbZ noted the UAE's growing concern that Gulf allies were
being shut out of Iran sanctions planning. End Summary.



IRAN'S REACTORS AND REACH

-------------------------



¶2. (S/NF) AbZ began by expressing pride in the US-UAE 123 agreement
and the bilateral relationship generally. According to AbZ, the
123 is a powerful example for the region and provides a transparent
alternative to Iran's nuclear model. The UAE views Iran as a huge
problem that goes far beyond nuclear capabilities. Iranian support
for terrorism is broader than just Hamas and Hizballah. Iran has
influence in Afghanistan, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, the Eastern
Province of KSA, and Africa (AbZ mentioned Nigeria specifically).
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez have close, cooperative ties. If Iran acquires nuclear
weapons, the expeditionary aspect of its foreign policy will become
ever more challenging for neighboring states.



POSSIBILITY AND FUTILITY OF SANCTIONS

-------------------------------------



¶3. (S/NF) Lowey asked what AbZ thought about tougher sanctions
against Iran and how the UAE can help with China. AbZ said the US
and its allies "have to decide how to stop Iran" and that the UAE
was surprised at the Chinese attitude. AbZ noted the Emiratis and
the Saudis have spoken to the Chinese, and the UAE expressed a
willingness to expand its energy ties (Note: AbZ seemed to be
indicating that this was intended as a carrot, but he acknowledged
the difficulty of supplanting an Iran-China trade relationship that
reached $50 billion last year. End Note.)

¶4. (S/NF) AbZ urged quick action on tough new sanctions. The UAE
is conscientious in its efforts to enforce existing UNSC sanctions
but the Iranians have been able to find other routes, bypassing UAE
ports, to import what they need. AbZ predicted that smart and
swift implementation of new sanctions could still be ineffective
but said that we must try.



GULF NEIGHBORS FEELING LEFT OUT

-------------------------------



¶5. (S/NF) AbZ highlighted a growing belief the UAE and the GCC are
being left out of our Iran sanctions consultations. AbZ told
Chairwoman Lowey that the P5+1 negotiations with Iran should be
expanded to included the GCC. AbZ said there is a "trust barrier"
to full GCC support for US policy, as there is a deep suspicion
that the US is proceeding without consulting Gulf allies.

¶6. (S/NF) AbZ raised (as he likes to do regularly) the 2005 EU
package offer to Iran that was briefed to the UAE by the Iranians,
not the US or another ally. Things have improved since then, but
"we still need some serious trust building between the US, the EU,
and the GCC" on this issue. The DCM reminded AbZ (and the Codel)
that there are extensive and privileged communications between the
UAE and the USG on policy towards Iran and on sanctions planning.
AbZ acknowledged there was trust from the UAE, but the rest of the
GCC had continuing concerns. "Your problem today is to fix your
relations with the GCC, quickly. A few countries in the region are
already dealing with Iran as if they had the bomb."

¶7. (S/NF) AbZ said GCC states are left wondering what will happen
to them in any deal the US and Iran reach through back channel
conversations. He compared the current multilateral conversations
over Iran's nuclear program with negotiations over North Korea's
nuclear program, asking why North Korea's neighbors are part of the
Six Party negotiations, but the GCC is not equally involved in
similar conversations about and with Iran.



"WHAT IF?" SCENARIOS

--------------------



¶8. (S/NF) In response to questions from members of Congress, AbZ
said that if Iran goes nuclear others in the region will move
forward on the same track and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty
will completely break down. He said a crisis or confrontation in
the region would create oil supply problems worldwide. 14 million
barrels a day pass through the Strait of Hormuz. That said, he
noted that the US and UAE militaries have plans to keep Hormuz
clear.

¶9. (S) AbZ concluded the meeting with a soliloquy on the importance
of a successful peace process between Israel and its neighbors as
perhaps the most effective way of reducing Iran's regional
influence.

¶10. (SBU) Members of Congress in attendance: Congresswoman Nita
Lowey, Congressman Tom Cole, Congresswoman Barbara Lee,
Congresswoman Donna Edwards.
OLSON


/tag/IR_2.html


10STATE15856     2010-02-22 15:03     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Secretary of State

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S E C R E T STATE 015856

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2035
TAGS: ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER MASS TU IR
SUBJECT: (S) TURKISH FIRMS ENGAGED IN MILITARY
MATERIEL-RELATED DEALS WITH IRAN

Classified By: EUR/PRA Director Stephanie Miley

¶1. (U) This is an action request to Embassy Ankara. Please
see paragraph 7.

----------
BACKGROUND
----------

¶2. (S) The U.S. has information about several transactions
involving Turkish firms planning to export and import from
Iran arms and related material controlled by the Wassenaar
Arrangement. Specifically, Iran is interested in procuring
Full Metal Jacket (FMJ) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40
mm automatic grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines
(for M16 assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm
composite magazines from Turkey. In addition, we understand
that a Turkish firm may also be pursuing a deal to import
plastic explosives and nitrocellulose from Iran.

¶3. (S) The U.S. wants to provide this information to Turkish
officials, request that they investigate this activity and
use all available means to prevent these firms from exporting
and importing such arms to and from Iran. In addition to any
domestic Turkish authorities that may apply, these activities
may also be in violation of both United Nations Security
Resolution (UNSCR) 1747 and U.S. domestic authorities.

¶4. (S) UNSCR 1747: UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran
from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory
any "arms or related materiel." It also requires all states
to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether
or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran.
The procurement of plastic explosives from Iran would violate
UNSCR 1747.

¶5. (S) The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act
(INKSNA): INKSNA authorizes sanctions against any foreign
person that transfers to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria
goods, services, or technology controlled by multilateral
control lists (e.g., nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile
Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, or Wassenaar
Arrangement); of the same kind as those on multilateral
control lists, but falling below the control list parameters,
when it is determined that such goods, services, and
technologies have the potential to make a material
contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic missile systems;
on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that
are not on multilateral lists; or with the potential of
making a material contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic
missile systems. Accordingly, the U.S. is concerned that if
the Turkish firms proceed with transferring the grenade
launchers, bullets, and ammunition magazines, we would be
required to report this to the U.S. Congress and the Turkish
firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions.

¶6. (S) The U.S. is also concerned about the potential exports
to Iran because one of the items may be of U.S. origin.
According to Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm grenade launchers
from the United States in 1995. However, we do not know
definitively if any of these are among the 40 mm grenade
launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran. We note,
however, that if any U.S.-origin defense equipment (including
technical data) is re-transferred to Iran, that would violate
Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). As a
consequence, Turkey could lose its country eligibility under
the AECA to purchase or lease defense articles, including
Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or
to receive credits or guarantees relating to any purchase or
lease.

-------------------------
ACTION REQUEST/OBJECTIVES
-------------------------

¶7. (S) Post is requested to approach GOT officials to pursue
the following objectives and to deliver the talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 8 below as appropriate:

-- Thank Turkish officials for Turkey's continued cooperation
and support in preventing the transfer of arms or related
material to and from Iran;

-- Inform the GOT that we are very concerned that Turkish
firms may be exporting to and importing from Iran arms and
related material;

-- Note that the export of Wassenaar Arrangement controlled
items to Iran could require a report to the U.S. Congress
under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act
(INKSNA) and may result in sanctions being imposed on the
entities and individuals involved;

-- Point out that the import of arms or related material from
Iran would violate UNSCR 1747, which prohibits Iran from
supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any
"arms or related materiel" and requires all states to
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals;

-- Emphasize this is not the time for business as usual with
Iran;

-- Remind the GOT that both the DIO and Parchin were
designated for an asset freeze under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747,
respectively, and were sanctioned by the U.S. under Executive
Order (E.O.) 13382;

-- Strongly urge the GOT to use available legal authorities,
including appropriate domestic laws and authorities related
to implementing UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, to immediately
terminate these deals and freeze any assets of DIO;

-- Note that Iran has a long history of providing arms and
other military equipment to terrorist groups and that these
items could easily end up in the hands of al-Qaida, Hamas,
Hizballah, and the Taliban;

--------------
TALKING POINTS
--------------

¶8. (S//REL TURKEY) Begin talking points:

-- We appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued
cooperation and support in preventing the transfer of
military equipment and related materiel to and from Iran.

-- In the spirit of this cooperation, we want to share with
you some additional information about Turkish firms involved
in dealings concerning arms and related materiel with Iran.

---------------
EXPORTS TO IRAN
---------------

-- We have information that the Turkish firms Mercan Tanitim
Dis Ticaret ve Muhendislik Ltd. and Makina ve Kimya
Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) may sign a contract to export
military material to Iran.

-- The items covered by the contract include: FMJ (Full Metal
Jacket) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40 mm automatic
grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines (for M16
assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm composite
magazines, all of which are specified on the Wassenaar
Arrangement Munitions List.

-- In addition, according to the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm
grenade launchers from the United States in 1995. We do not
know, definitively, if any of these were among the 40 mm
grenade launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran.

-- We should note, however, that if any U.S.-origin defense
equipment (including technical data) is re-transferred to
Iran, that transfer would violate Section 3 of the U.S. Arms
Export Control Act (AECA). As a consequence, Turkey could
lose its country eligibility under the AECA to purchase or
lease defense articles. This could potentially include
Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or
the ability to receive credits or guarantees relating to any
purchase or lease.

-----------------
IMPORTS FROM IRAN
-----------------

-- In addition to our information related to the export of
arms material to Iran, we also understand some of the same
Turkish firms involved in the exports are interested in
procuring arms material from Iran.

-- Specifically, we understand that in September 2009, Mercan
Tanitim was pursuing a deal with MKEK to import 2,000 kg of
Composition A-4 military plastic explosives produced by
Parchin Chemical Industries, an Iranian government military
company and an element of the Defense Industries Organization

(DIO).

-- We further understand that in September 2009, the Turkish
companies Kolorkim Kimya San and Mercan Tanitim were
considering a deal to import nitrocellulose (NC) from Iran.
NC is a dual-use material that serves as a major component in
smokeless gunpowder.

-- As a subordinate of DIO, Parchin acts on behalf of DIO,
importing and exporting chemical goods throughout the world.
In April 2007, Parchin Chemical Industries was identified as
the final recipient of sodium perchlorate monohydrate, a
chemical precursor for solid propellant oxidizer, possibly to
be used for ballistic missiles.

-- As you know, DIO is one of seven Iranian nuclear-related
entities designated for an asset freeze in the Annex to UNSCR
¶1737. In addition to being listed in the Annex for UNSCR
1737, DIO was sanctioned previously by the United States for
WMD- or missile-related activities under the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (ISNA), the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA), Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, and the Export
Administration Act.

-- We would further note that Parchin Chemical Industries has
been designated for an asset freeze under UNSCR 1747 and U.S.
E.O. 13382 in July 2008 as a consequence of its work on
behalf of Iran's ballistic missile program. We, therefore,
urge you, per UNSCR 1747, to freeze any assets of Parchin
Chemical Industries that may come under Turkish jurisdiction.

-- We would like to inform you that Turkish firms engaged in
business with entities designated under E.O. 13382 are
eligible for sanctions if such activities are not halted.

-- Given the UN Security Council's grave concern over Iran's
nuclear and ballistic missile program activities, we urge you
to encourage all Turkish firms to avoid any affiliation with
this company.

-- Iran, a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism, has a
long history of providing arms and other military equipment
to terrorist groups and other non-state actors, including in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. We are concerned that the
materials being negotiated for transfer by the Turkish
companies in question could be diverted by Iran to such
groups.

-- Iran has long supplied non-state actors, including
terrorist groups such as Hizballah, with arms and other
military equipment. The terrorist applications of small arms
and light weapons (SA/LW) are obvious, but Iran has also
supplied terrorists with larger weapons systems that threaten
regional security and stability.

-- Failure to prevent these sales could result in the
re-transfer of military material and explosives by Iran to
groups like al-Qaida, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Taliban.
This would harm the Turkish government's reputation as a NATO
ally and demonstrated opponent of terrorism, and would
reflect badly on the Turkish business community.

-- These transactions could also be damaging to our bilateral
relationship as these items can be used to kill and severely
injure Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere
in the region.

-- Turkey is also required to prevent the transfers from Iran
as noted in UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, which prohibits Iran
from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory
any "arms or related materiel." All states are required to
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether
or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran.

-- We believe the arms and explosives acquisitions being
pursued by Mercan Tanitim and MKEK with Iranian entities
would clearly violate this provision of UNSCR 1747, and that
the Kolorkim and Mercan Tanitim deal involving the transfer
of nitrocellulose may as well.

-- Action to prevent such transfers would clearly demonstrate
Turkey's commitment to the full and effective implementation
of UNSCR 1747. Such action would also remove the possibility
that these firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions under the
Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).

-- We strongly urge you to investigate this information and
prevent any transfers being contemplated by the entities
involved by using authorities available under Turkish
domestic law.

-- Please share with us the results of your investigation at
your earliest convenience.

END POINTS

---------------------
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
---------------------

¶9. (U) Post is requested to please report results of its
efforts as soon as possible.

-----------------
POINTS OF CONTACT
-----------------

¶10. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are
Margaret T. Mitchell and Michael Rolleri of ISN/CATR, and
Matthew Hardiman, EUR/PRA.
CLINTON


/tag/IR_2.html


10DOHA70     2010-02-23 10:10     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Doha

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2020
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL IR QA
SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY'S MEETING WITH QATAR'S AMIR

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------

-- The Amir of Qatar urged the U.S. in his February 14
meeting with Senator John Kerry (D-MA) to do everything in
its power to find a lasting solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Amir said the best way to
begin is by moving first on the Syrian track.

-- In Qatar's view, now is the time to reach out to
Damascus. The Syrian Government can help Arab extremists
make tough choices, but only if the U.S., whose involvement
is essential, demonstrates to Syria early on a willingness to
address the return of the Golan Heights and supports Turkey's
mediation efforts between Israel and Syria.

-- According to the Amir, Hamas will accept the 1967 border
with Israel, but will not say it publicly so as to lose
popular Palestinian support.

-- The Egyptians' goal, according to the Amir, is to stay in
the game and maintain their relationship with the U.S., which
is built around brokering regional peace, for as long as
possible.

-- The Amir recommended that the U.S. and Qatar establish a
small bilateral committee to discuss how to advance regional
peace. Qatar can help move Hamas, because Qatar does not
"play in their internal politics." That does not mean Qatar
shares Hamas' ideology, stressed the Amir.

-- On Iran, the Amir said President Ahmadinejad is strong
because he is uncorrupted. The Amir also advised the U.S. to
continue ts efforts to open a dialogue with the Iranian
ladership.

End Key Points.

¶1. (C) Senator Joh Kerry (D-MA), the Chairman of the Senate
Foreig Relations Committee(SFRC), joined by Ambassador,P/E
Chief, and SFRC staff member Dr. Jonah Blank met February 14
with the Amir of Qatar, Hamad bn Khalifa Al Thani. The
meeting took place at Waba Palace, the residence of the
Amir, and the Amir began the meeting by pointing out that the
comfortable chairs on which the U.S. party was seated were
made in Syria.

------------------------------
IMPORTANCE OF THE SYRIAN TRACK
------------------------------

¶2. (C) This opening led Senator Kerry to remark that he had
held great discussions with Syria's President, Bashar
Al-Asad, when he met him in Damascus some months ago. The
Amir said President Asad is committed to "big change," but
Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri's death and complications
resulting from Syria's alleged involvement in it had brought
about "complications" for Asad. The Amir added that "Bashar
is still young and can grow."

¶3. (C) Senator Kerry said he took away from his visit to
Damascus that Asad wants change. The Amir added that the
Syrian President also wants peace with Israel and that the
arrival of a U.S. Ambassador in Damascus would help in this
regard. Senator Kerry said he had wanted a U.S. Ambassador
in Syria a year ago, but agreed that the naming of an
Ambassador is a positive development.

¶4. (C) The Amir cautioned that the Syrians will not accept
everything the U.S. proposes, stressing that the Israeli
occupation of the Golan Heights continues and that the return
of this land to Syria is paramount for Damascus. The Amir
observed that the "Syrians have lost confidence in the U.S.
and that the Israelis now have the upper hand in the region
because of the support of the United States." The Israeli
leaders need to represent the people of Israel, who
themselves do not trust Arabs. The Amir said this is
understandable and "we can't blame them" because the Israelis
have been "under threat" for a long time.

¶5. (C) What has changed, continued the Amir, is that Arabs
"for sure" now want two states -- Israel and Palestine. When
you consider that many in the region perceive that Hizballah
drove Israel out of Lebanon and Hamas kicked them (at least
initially) out "of the small piece of land called Gaza," it
is actually surprising that the Israelis still want peace.
The region, however, is still "far away" from peace,
concluded the Amir.

¶6. (C) Senator Kerry responded that in his long experience
with the region, it was not unusual for people to take
positions adverse to their own interests. Yasser Arafat went
from living as a terrorist in Tunisia to signing an agreement
with Israel on the White House lawn. The transformation of
Arafat is an example of how actors in the region need to take
risks if we are to move forward in advancing regional peace.
Turning the conversation back to Syria, Chairman Kerry
pointed out that Syria's facilitation of arms to Hizballah
and its turning a blind eye to missile upgrades in Lebanon do
not represent risk-taking in the promotion of peace.

¶7. (C) The Amir pointed out that any progress toward regional
peace had come about due to American involvement. He implied
that it would take U.S. intervention on the Syrian-Israeli
track to address these issues and asked Senator Kerry what he
would have Damascus do.

¶8. (C) The Chairman responded that President Asad needs to
make a bolder move and take risks. He observed that if the
Syrian President wants peace and economic development for his
country, he needs to be more statesman-like, which would in
turn help Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu engage him.

¶9. (C) The Amir agreed with Senator Kerry's assessment of
Asad's aims and said he is ready for peace, but asked if the
Israelis are ready. Would Israel accept to resume Turkey's
mediation between Syria and Israel? Would the U.S. play a
role in advancing the Syria track?

¶10. (C) If we can get Abu Mazen back to the negotiating
table, we can engage on border issues -- including Israel's
borders with Syria, advised Senator Kerry. Abu Mazen right
now is not strong enough, though, to make necessary
compromises with Israel because the Palestinian people have
wanted him to stick to his guns on a settlement freeze and
the Goldstone Report. The Chairman added that Netanyahu also
needs to compromise and work the return of the Golan Heights
into a formula for peace.

¶11. (C) The Amir encouraged the U.S. to work the Golan
Heights issue first. He stressed that Syrians are very
different from Iranians in "mentality," and said the Syrians
turned to Iran for support only because they had nowhere else
to go. Now is the time, the Amir told Senator Kerry, to
reach out to Damascus.

-------------------------
PARAMETERS FOR DISCUSSION
-------------------------

¶12. (C) Senator Kerry responded that the U.S. is prepared to
play a strong role in bringing about peace in the region.
President Obama, said the Chairman, understands that he
personally must engage and do so strongly. The Senator told
the Amir that in his speech to the U.S.-Islamic Forum the
previous evening, the Senator had focused on former President
Clinton's parameters for peace and the 2002 Arab League peace
initiative. Now, said the Senator, is the time to put those
back on the table and resume talking, with the U.S. acting as
a legitimate agent of peace. Chairman Kerry told the Amir he
is convinced that we can see great progress in the coming
year by moving swiftly from proximity talks, to direct talks
between the parties and ending with final status discussions.


¶13. (C) To be successful, continued Senator Kerry, we must
begin by agreeing at the outset the amount of land each side
(Israelis and Palestinians) will obtain in the end and use
that understanding to draw the borders. If both sides make
good compromises, we can address the settlement issues in the
context of giving something up so that the borders, when
drawn, contain the agreed-upon amounts of land for both
sides. The Amir agreed with the Senator's assessment and
complimented President Obama for being the first U.S.
President to take on the Middle East conflict in the first
year of his term.

¶14. (C) Continuing the presentation of his ideas on the
parameters of peace between Israel and the Palestinians,
Senator Kerry noted that one of the biggest problems for
Israel is the potential return of 5-6 million Palestinian
refugees. The parties broached the return issue in
discussions at Taba and agreed that the right of Palestinian
return would be subject to later negotiation, pointed out the
Chairman. If we can proceed from that point on the right of
return, the Senator believes there is an "artful way" to
frame the negotiations on borders, land swaps, and Jerusalem
as a shared capital.
¶15. (C) Any negotiation has its limits, added Senator Kerry,
and we know for the Palestinians that control of Al-Aqsa
mosque and the establishment of some kind of capital for the
Palestinians in East Jerusalem are not negotiable. For the
Israelis, the Senator continued, Israel's character as a
Jewish state is not open for negotiation. The
non-militarization of an eventual Palestinian state and its
borders can nonetheless be resolved through negotiation.

¶16. (C) The Amir underscored that Abu Mazen needs Arab
support to make the above happen. Hamas "for sure," he said,
will accept the 1967 border but will not say it publicly so
as to lose popular Palestinian support.

---------------------------
DEALING WITH THE EXTREMISTS
---------------------------

¶17. (C) Senator Kerry told the Amir he knew Qatar could help
the U.S. but asked how we deal with those who advocate
violence. The Amir said the short answer is to work the
Syrian track, which means pushing for Israel's return of the
Golan Heights to Syria. The Amir said return of the Golan is
important not just to Syria but also to Hizballah and Iran.
The U.S. must bear in mind that Misha'al, a leader of Hamas
based in Damascus, has drawn the conclusion that the Oslo
accords were bad for Arafat. He lost the support of his own
people and died living under Israeli siege. The Syrians can
help Misha'al and others make tough choices, but only if the
U.S. demonstrates to Syria early on a willingness to address
the Golan. Senator Kerry responded that the U.S. would
accept a legitimate discussion of the Golan Heights.

¶18. (C) What is more, said the Amir, the U.S. needs to
support Turkey's mediation between Israel and Syria. It is
important that the U.S. encourage Israel to understand that
that resolving the status of the Golan Heights is very
important to the United States.

¶19. (C) Senator Kerry asked the Amir if Hamas is under
pressure given the circumstances in Gaza. The Amir answered
by saying that Hamas needs Iranian support. He added that
the biggest misconception in the region is that the Syrians,
who host Hamas leaders in Damascus, go to Iran because they
like the Iranians. This is wrong. Syria goes to those who
will not shun them.

-------------
ROLE OF EGYPT
-------------

¶20. (C) Returning to the pressure Hamas is facing, Senator
Kerry observed that economic development in the West Bank is
taking place, but not in Gaza. The Palestinian
reconciliation that would make possible developmental
assistance in Gaza has not happened. The Egyptians have not
delivered, said Senator Kerry.

¶21. (C) The Amir said the Egyptians' goal is to stay in the
game and maintain their relationship with the U.S., which is
built around brokering Middle East peace, for as long as
possible. According to the Amir, Fatah and Hamas agreed on a
memorandum of understanding, but the Egyptians wanted it
changed. The Amir remarked that he has a feeling he knows
which capital (Cairo) is the source of reports that Gaza is
under pressure. He said the economic pressure in Gaza on
families is not what it was. He offered as an example that
Qatar Charity recently offered a family in Gaza 500 USD, but
the family declined the gift saying its members had enough to
get by and suggested another family that was in more dire
need of assistance. The Amir said the notion that a family
would turn down money is new.

¶22. (C) The Amir told Senator Kerry that everyone knows
"Egypt has a problem with the Muslim Brotherhood. Okay, we
understand. But Egypt should not expect the world to take
external actions that would help it internally."

¶23. (C) Asked his advice for President Obama, the Amir
recommended the establishment of a small U.S.-Qatar committee
to discuss how to proceed. Qatar is close to Hamas,
emphasized the Amir, because "we don't play in their internal
politics." That does not mean we share their ideology or do
not disagree with them. "I can remember many arguments with
them (Hamas) on the 1967 border with Israel." The Amir noted
that he had mediated with Hamas previously at the U.S.
request, namely when he urged Hamas at the previous
Administration's request to participate in Palestinian
elections.

¶24. (C) Returning to the leadership of Hamas, Senator Kerry
asked the Amir for his insights into how the leadership, with
leaders sitting in both Gaza and Syria, makes decisions. The
Amir said the impression that Misha'al sits in Damascus and
others take orders from him is wrong. Several key players
within Hamas are involved in decisions. They have
differences over policy, but "the bottom line is that they
all want the Palestinians to take their rights from Israel."

----
IRAN
----

¶25. (C) Senator Kerry observed that the international
community is moving toward imposing additional economic
sanctions on Iran. Understanding and respecting that Qatar
needs to balance its relationships with regional powers,
including Iran, the Chairman asked the Amir for his
perspective on where we are going on Iran.

¶26. (C) The Amir answered by affirming that his first
obligation is to defend the interests of Qatar. Due to the
natural gas field Iran shares with Qatar, Qatar will not
"provoke a fight" with Iran. He added that in the history of
the two countries, "Iran has not bothered us." That said,
the Amir noted that Iran is an important country in the
Middle East. He faulted the U.S. for "making the mistake of
speaking up for protesters" after the disputed Iranian
presidential elections.

¶27. (C) The Iranian regime is strong, continued the Amir,
because President Ahmadinejad is uncorrupted. "That is the
secret to his success." Khatami is also not corrupted, but
as a reformer he is in a weak position. Rafsanjani, on the
other hand, is corrupt.

¶28. (C) Senator Kerry lamented that every communication the
current Administration has attempted to the Government of
Iran has gone back channel and been met with no response.
There have been non-U.S. initiatives, too. Again, no
success. The Chairman observed that the Iranians are scared
to talk. The Supreme Ayatollah had met with Russian President
Putin, but seems not inclined to meet with other political
leaders. Our instinct is that we need to find a way to talk
to him.

¶29. (C) Your instinct is right, replied the Amir. The U.S.
needs to talk directly with senior Iranian officials. The
Amir then asked, "What if I talk to the Iranian President.
What would you have me say?"

¶30. (C) Senator Kerry responded, "The U.S. seeks serious
discussion and sought to create a new foundation for a
relationship based on Iran's non-confrontational compliance
with IAEA requirements and other mutual interests." Those
interests include dealing with drug-running, the Taliban, and
illicit trade. The Chairman told the Amir he feared that
Iran still thinks it is dealing with the 1953 America that
tried to overthrow the Iranian government.

¶31. (C) The Amir responded that you cannot blame them for
having that attitude, and Senator Kerry agreed, adding that
the U.S. has a very different posture in the post-Cold War
world of today. Iran has ambitions; I know this from other
regional leaders, said the Senator. These are the first
words that come out of their mouths.

¶32. (C) Iran wants to be a "big power," agreed the Amir, but
what sort? He reminded Senator Kerry the U.S. should not
forget that Iranians are Persian and the U.S. needs to
approach them in that framework.

¶33. (C) Senator Kerry stressed that the U.S. "would love to
have that dialogue." The U.S. respects Iranian civilization
-- talent, art, culture, etc. It is crazy to continue on
this collision course. The region needs schools and jobs,
emphasized the Chairman, not another war. The Amir agreed
that "demographics are a big worry." Not just for the
countries in the region but for the U.S. too.

¶34. (C) Many scientific and technological transformations are
underway, noted the Senator, "but Iran misinterprets the road
to being a great power and the degree to which the
international community is concerned about Iran's acquisition
of nuclear weapons." We are at a "fork in the road," and
Iran must choose between confrontation or building
partnerships. If the latter, we can open up new
opportunities for cooperation in the sciences, technology,
education, robotics, energy and other ongoing
transformations.

¶35. (C) Going back to the speech he had delivered in Doha the
previous evening, Senator Kerry told the Amir that 17 former
U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense had come out in favor
of eliminating nuclear weapons. Every stop closer to
realizing that goal is a sign of progress, but "no one
believes Iranian nukes get us closer to that goal."

¶36. (C) Senator Kerry reported that leaders of regional Arab
countries tell me they want nuclear weapons if the Iranians
have them. The Amir responded that he did not believe they
were serious, but are saying this to put additional pressure
on Iran.

¶37. (C) The Chairman noted that the disputed Iranian
presidential elections may have derailed U.S. efforts to have
serious dialogue with Tehran. The Amir agreed, offering that
the Israelis are also using Iran's quest for nuclear weapons
as a diversion from settling matters with the Palestinians.
The historical backdrop of Arab-Persian relations does not
help, the Amir added.

--------------
FINAL THOUGHTS
--------------

¶38. (C) The Amir advised the U.S. to continue trying to open
a dialogue with the Iranian leadership. He also told Senator
Kerry the U.S. needs to tell the Israelis they are causing
the U.S. to lose the hearts and minds of Muslims. There was
a time, such as during the Suez Canal crisis, when the Arabs
loved the Americans and disliked the British and French, he
said.

¶39. (C) Senator Kerry asked the Amir how the U.S. goes about
changing its reputation. The Amir said first and foremost
the U.S. must do everything in its power to find a lasting
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the best
way to begin is by moving first on the Syrian track.

¶40. (C) The Chairman of the SFRC said he expects a genuine
effort by the President this year on an agreement and
expressed his hope that Iranian issues would not complicate
matters. The Amir agreed, adding that China likes the
distraction for the U.S. as its forces fight in Iraq and
Afghanistan.

¶41. (C) Senator Kerry concurred, noting that China is lending
the U.S. money and expanding its influence at U.S. expense.
He added that he ran against President George W. Bush saying
the war with Iraq was the wrong war in the wrong place and
time.

¶42. (C) The Amir closed the meeting by offering that based on
30 years of experience with the Iranians, they will give you
100 words. Trust only one of the 100.

¶43. (U) CODEL Kerry has cleared this message.

Lebaron


/tag/IR_2.html


10KUWAIT161     2010-02-23 13:01     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Kuwait

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C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000161

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PARM IR KU
SUBJECT: GOK QUIETLY CONCERNED ABOUT IRANIAN ENRICHMENT
PLANS

REF: A. STATE 15979
¶B. KUWAIT 137

Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and
d

¶1. PolCouns on February 23 raised ref a points regarding USG
policy on Iran's Tehran research reactor with Counselor
Rashid Al-Hajiri, MFA's desk officer for Iran. Al-Hajiri
offered no substantive response to our points, noting merely
that the GOK has been following the issue through its
representative to the IAEA. Al-Hajiri added that the GOK
shares USG concerns about the lack of transparency in Iran's
nuclear program and regularly encourages Iran to comply with
international safeguards. At the same time, Al-Hajiri said,
the GOK hopes that the international community can persuade
Iran to come into compliance through peaceful dialogue rather
than through expanded sanctions.

¶2. Comment: Al-Hajiri's tepid response to our demarche
reflects the overall GOK approach to Iran which, as noted Ref
B, consists of quietly urging Tehran to abide by IAEA
safeguards while maintaining a friendly relationship with its
much larger and more powerful neighbor. Trapped in a
difficult neighborhood, the GOK will welcome any proposals
that can move Iran off its nuclear path -- including IAEA
proposals noted ref A to ensure that Iran receives needed
medical isotopes -- but will not expose itself to Iranian ire
by getting out front to push for these. Emblematic of
Kuwait's position was the statement by Deputy PM and FM
Shaykh Dr. Mohammad Al Sabah February 22, who told the local
press that "We wish our friends (in Iran) can do their best
to reassure the international community about the Iranian
nuclear program so that there will not be an excuse for
imposing sanctions. There are wise people in Iran," he
added, continuing to call on Iran to abide by the requirments
of international legitimacy and the IAEA. End Comment.

********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
WILLIAMS


/tag/IR_2.html


10DOHA71     2010-02-24 09:09     2010-11-28 18:06     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Doha

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000071

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL IR QA
SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY'S MEETING WITH QATAR'S PRIME MINISTER

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------

-- Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ) told
Senator John Kerry February 13 that we will all lose us 4-6
months of time in pursuing the recently announced "proximity
talks" between the Israelis and Palestinians.

-- HBJ underscored that it is a mistake to ignore Hamas in
seeking a lasting agreement.

-- From Qatar's perspective, there are differences in style
and approaches between the two wings of Hamas, but in
principle both are fundamentally aligned. Hamas leaders in
Damascus and Gaza can accept recognition of Israel, but must
calibrate the timing very carefully because Hamas supporters
are not ready for this change.

-- According to HBJ, Egypt has a vested interest in dragging
out Palestinian reconciliation talks for as long as possible.
Egypt "has no end game; serving as broker of the talks is
Egypt's only business interest with the U.S."

-- The Prime Minister suggested that one or two GCC members,
Morocco, and Syria form the core membership of an Arab League
committee to address Palestinian-Israeli concerns. Giving
Syria a role would create jealousy among the Arabs, which HBJ
said would help the U.S. move talks forward.

-- HBJ said putting economic pressure on Iran by targeting
its oil revenues is the best way to get Tehran to rethink its
quest for nuclear weapons. For the sanctions to work, it
would be vital that Russia and other countries bordering Iran
implement them fully.

End Key Points.

¶1. (C) The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (SFRC), Senator John Kerry (D-MA), accompanied by
Ambassador, P/E Chief and SFRC staff Frank Lowenstein and
Fatema Sumar, met February 13 with Prime Minister (and
Foreign Minister) of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani
(HBJ). HBJ opened the meeting by observing that President
Obama's presidency had brought a lot of optimism to the
region. Senator Kerry agreed, adding that now we "need to
deliver."

---------------------------
PROXIMITY TALKS NOT HELPFUL
---------------------------

¶2. (C) HBJ expressed dissatisfaction that "everyone in the
region" seems to have a separate plan for moving ahead on the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute when only one plan was needed --
a plan that both the Israelis and Palestinians would accept
and finalize. More disconcerting to Qatar, he said, was the
announcement by Special Envoy Mitchell that both parties
would now engage in "proximity talks." Such talks "will lose
us 4-6 months of time," stated HBJ.

¶3. (C) Senator Kerry responded that we "are where we are."
He assessed that the Goldstone Report and dissatisfaction in
Fatah's ranks in the West Bank made it difficult for Abu
Mazen to "give something to Israel" that would allow direct
negotiations to begin between the parties. Add in Abu
Mazen's previous statements on the need for a full settlement
freeze, and the ingredients for the Palestinian people to
accept direct talks simply are not there.

¶4. (C) Abu Mazen is out on a limb, responded HBJ. "He
climbed a tree (drawing a line in the sand on settlements)
and can't get down." HBJ suggested that President Obama's
address to the UN General Assembly at the opening of its
current session could serve as a "roadmap" forward: two
states (Israel and Palestine) remain the goal, and the
establishment of settlements must stop while negotiations
take place. HBJ stressed again that the "proximity talks"
will cause a "lot of problems."

-----------------------------------
NEED FOR PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION
-----------------------------------

¶5. (C) HBJ told Chairman Kerry he had met recently in Doha
with an Israeli delegation and had encouraged them to work
with Palestinians of all stripes in the pursuit of peace.
HBJ underscored that it is a mistake to work with just one
partner, Fatah, and ignore Hamas. Saying this does not mean

DOHA 00000071 002 OF 004


that Qatar expresses a preference for Hamas. HBJ pointed out
that Abu Mazen had taught in Qatar for 30 years and remains a
friend of Qatar. Qatar has no differences with him or those
around him, but the Palestinian Authority (PA) cannot sign
off on an agreement on behalf of the Palestinians where open
divisions exist.

¶6. (C) HBJ noted that in conversations Qatar has held with
Hamas' leadership, it is clear that Hamas is ready to accept
Israel's right to exist. But the acceptance must come about
gradually, not in one day. Senator Kerry said he had heard
this elsewhere, but in his own conversations in Damascus --
where a many leaders of Hamas reside -- he did not get the
sense that Hamas was ready to accept Israel's existence.

¶7. (C) Qatar's PM observed that the biggest obstacle on the
Palestinian side to an eventual agreement with Israel is the
reconciliation of Hamas and Fatah. HBJ maintained that it
would have happened during the previous U.S. administration,
but President Bush told Abu Mazen not to sign off on it.
Now, said HBJ, progress is slow, and bringing the two parties
together in the spirit of reconciliation is hampered by Arab
politics. Reconciliation can happen, HBJ asserted, but only
"if bigger countries in the region allow it."

8, (C) Senator Kerry, noting that he had seen Yasser Arafat
make the transition from PLO fighter to signer of an
agreement on the White House lawn, observed that people can
come around and change their position. But was that the case
here? The Senator asked HBJ if the differences at play
between Hamas' leaders in Damascus and Gaza were too wide to
bridge.

¶9. (C) From HBJ's perspective, there are differences in style
and approaches between the two wings of Hamas, but in
principle both are fundamentally aligned. They can accept
recognition of Israel, but have to calibrate the timing very
carefully because Hamas knows that its supporters in the
Palestinian territories are not ready for this change. HBJ
said Hamas leaders in Damascus and Gaza are aligned on
wanting to open the border crossing at Rafah, for example,
but differ on tactics in reaching this goal. The leaderships
in Syria and Gaza consult each other, and no one leader in
Hamas can take a decision alone, reported HBJ.

--------------------------------------------
EGYPT INTERESTED IN THE PROCESS, NOT RESULTS
--------------------------------------------

¶10. (C) Chairman Kerry asked HBJ if Hamas is feeling
political pressure from Gazans over their current living
conditions. HBJ responded that anytime people do not have
housing, schools or public utilities, their political leaders
feel pressure. Hamas, however, has a greater sense of
urgency in reconciling with Fatah, observed HBJ, than does
the broker of the talks between the Palestinian parties.

¶11. (C) According to HBJ, Egypt -- the broker -- has a vested
interest in dragging out the talks for as long as possible.
Egypt "has no end game; serving as broker of the talks is
Egypt's only business interest with the U.S." HBJ likened
the situation to a physician who has only one patient to
treat in the hospital. If that is your only business, "the
physician is going to keep the patient alive but in the
hospital for as long as possible." HBJ emphasized that
Qatar, on the other hand, is interested only in bringing
about peace in the region -- and as quickly as possible.

¶12. (C) Short term, HBJ said Hamas wants to form with Fatah a
unity government and rebuild the Israeli-inflicted damage in
Gaza. Senator Kerry, steering the conversation toward Hamas'
long-term aims, acknowledged that Qatar's leaders speak
frequently with Hamas. The Chairman asked HBJ to explain why
Hamas does not seem "to move when we need Hamas to move."

¶13. (C) Simply put, answered HBJ, "Hamas does not trust Egypt
and the Quartet enterprise." HBJ noted that since its
inception the Quartet has been anti-Hamas and aligned with
the interests of Abu Mazen, Egypt and Jordan. These partners
of the Quartet, observed HBJ, are the very partners who have
not delivered a Palestinian-Israeli agreement.

¶14. (C) Returning to his theme that "peace brokers" act in
their own self-interest, HBJ observed that President Mubarak
of Egypt is thinking about how his son can take his place and
how to stave off the growing strength of the Muslim
Brotherhood. The Egyptian government, said HBJ, has jailed
10,000 Muslim Brotherhood members without bringing court
cases against them. The Egyptian "people blame America" now
for their plight. The shift in mood on the ground is "mostly
because of Mubarak and his close ties" to the United States.

DOHA 00000071 003 OF 004


His only utility to the U.S. is brokering peace between
Palestinians and Israelis, so he has no interest in taking
himself out of the one game he has, underscored HBJ. "Tell
your friends (in Egypt) they must help themselves."

¶15. (C) As for Qatar, "We want to help Abu Mazen and the
Palestinians," declared HBJ. The short-term needs of
Palestinians in Gaza are acute, said HBJ. We need to broker
a quick reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah and move
forward quickly on rebuilding Gaza. Senator Kerry asserted
that HBJ was preaching to the converted and told the PM he
was "shocked by what I saw in Gaza."

¶16. (C) Continuing to illustrate how Egypt had not delivered
for the U.S. on Palestinian issues, HBJ said Qatar was told
in late 2008 that Israel and the U.S. needed the Egyptians to
deal with the crisis in Gaza. Yet former Israeli PM Olmert
later complained to Qatar that Egypt is a big country and not
nimble; it could not move fast enough. Senator Kerry pointed
out he was in Cairo at the time Qatar was calling for an Arab
League Summit in December 2008/January 2009 and asked HBJ for
his perspective on the rift between Qatar and Egypt at that
time.

¶17. (C) HBJ told Senator Kerry that Mubarak refused to come
to Doha for a meeting of Arab leaders, preferring that the
meeting take place in Riyadh. The request to move the
meeting was relayed to Qatar by the Saudis, not the
Egyptians. Saudi Arabia, as a big country like Egypt, has a
vested interest in keeping Egypt afloat, said HBJ. The
Saudis agreed to host the meeting in Riyadh not because they
objected to traveling to Doha, but because the Egyptians did.
"So we argued over the meeting location" while the
Palestinians suffered, and we in Qatar "called a meeting and
said whoever comes, comes."

¶18. (C) Qatar is worried, said HBJ, about Egypt and its
people, who are increasingly impatient. Mubarak, continued
HBJ, says Al Jazeera is the source of Egypt's problems. This
is an excuse. HBJ had told Mubarak "we would stop Al Jazeera
for a year" if he agreed in that span of time to deliver a
lasting settlement for the Palestinians.
Mubarak said nothing in response, according to HBJ.

¶19. (C) Asked his advice on bringing about an agreement
between Israel and the Palestinians, HBJ said President
Clinton recognized before leaving office that Egypt was a
problem. When President Clinton sought help at the end of
his term in reaching a final deal, the Saudis and Egyptians
did not encourage him, said HBJ. "They told him to do what
he thinks right." Culturally, said HBJ, that is the way
Arabs say "you are on your own." And President Clinton was,
said HBJ.

¶20. (C) Now we are at a stage, said HBJ, where Egypt does not
want Arab League involvement in brokering a reconciliation
agreement among the Palestinians unless the talks bog down.
HBJ said he had told Abbas that climbing down from his tree
on no settlement activity so that talks can go forward will
require Arab support. But the Egyptians won't allow it.

¶21. (C) Asked if tabling a more specific plan for peace
between the Israelis and Palestinians would help, HBJ said it
would be a mistake to table a plan that is too specific. HBJ
then reiterated that the problem is more with those carrying
out the negotiations. "The good cooks (Egypt) have not given
good food to now."

¶22. (C) Senator Kerry noted that Special Envoy Mitchell had
made a lot of requests of Arabs but with little success.
Leaving Qatar aside, the Chairman asked HBJ for proposed next
steps. HBJ said he trusts the Saudis, but because they talk
openly to Egypt and do not want to create more problems for
Egypt than the Egyptian government already has, it is
essential to bring in the small countries and start there.

¶23. (C) HBJ suggested one or two GCC members, Morocco
(although the King there is hesitant) and Syria as the core
membership of an Arab League committee to address
Palestinian-Israeli concerns. HBJ told Senator Kerry the
inclusion of Syria might surprise him, but having Syria play
a role would create jealousy among the Arabs. Some jealously
and rivalry is just what the U.S. needs, opined HBJ, to get
the process moving.

----------------
IRAN AND LEBANON
----------------

¶24. (C) Turning to Iran, Senator Kerry said he understood
Qatar's need to find the right balance in dealing with bigger

DOHA 00000071 004 OF 004


neighbors, especially Iran given the natural gas field both
share. Due to the working relationship Qatar maintains with
Iran, the Chairman asked HBJ for his advice as the
international community becomes more serious about economic
sanctions against Iran.

¶25. (C) HBJ said Iran's president views the U.S. as a country
that is overstretched and in difficulty as a result of too
many commitments. Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. economy
are the three main problems President Ahmadinejad sees. HBJ
observed that a Western attack against Iran for Ahmadinejad
would be good politics, because it would allow him to take
out his opposition using the war as a pretext. Senator Kerry
asked clarification of whether Ahmadinejad had said these
things, or if HBJ inferred them from conversation.

¶26. (C) Qatar's PM said Ahmadinejad had told him, "We beat
the Americans in Iraq; the final battle will be in Iran."

¶27. (C) HBJ said putting economic pressure on Iran is the
best way to get the leadership to rethink its quest for
nuclear weapons. To be successful, he told Senator Kerry,
Russia would definitely have to be on board, as would the
Central Asian countries bordering Iran that provide food and
supplies.

¶28. (C) Asked his perception of the state of play with the
opposition, HBJ said the U.S. had done a good job of standing
back and not becoming the symbol of the opposition. Cracks
in the regime are appearing. It is highly significant that
many demonstrators ignored Khamenei when he called on them to
stop their protests. The four key pillars of Iranian power
-- the court, oil sector, imams, and Revolutionary Guards ---
all must stick with him, stressed HBJ. There are cracks in
the system, but the downfall of the regime may not be in the
cards.

¶29. (C) Asked what the sanctions should target, HBJ said the
money that Iran derives from oil. Depriving Tehran of this
revenue would force the regime to negotiate.

¶30. (C) Senator Kerry observed that Ahmadinejad was making it
easier by his actions. There is wide consensus in the
Executive and Legislative branches of Washington to press
ahead. Senator Kerry warned that Ahmadinejad "should not
equate Afghanistan and Iraq with what he faces."

¶31. (C) HBJ encouraged Chairman Kerry to bear in mind that
Iran is clever and makes its opponents dizzy in the quest for
deals. They will keep you working on a deal and then start
from scratch with a new interlocutor. HBJ stressed that Iran
will make no deal. Iran wants nuclear weapons, and HBJ said
he would not be surprised to see Iran test one to demonstrate
to the world its achievement.

¶32. (C) On Lebanon, Senator Kerry asked if Iran and Hizballah
are ratcheting up their weapons stockpiles as part of Iran's
war against Israel. HBJ affirmed that is the case.

----
IRAQ
----

¶33. (C) On Iraq, HBJ told Senator Kerry that Prime Minister
Al-Maliki wants a Shia state, even though the Sunnis (when
you count Kurds and non-Kurds) have the majority.

¶34. (U) CODEL Kerry has cleared this message.

Lebaron


/tag/IR_2.html


10STATE16932     2010-02-24 15:03     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Secretary of State

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INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 016932

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2035
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA IR CH KS
SUBJECT: (S) EFFORTS BY IRAN,S SBIG TO PROCURE CARBON
FIBER FROM A COMPANY IN CHINA

Classified By: (U) CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS DAVID SHEAR,
REASON: 1.4 (C).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please
see paragraph 3.

¶2. (S) Background/Objective: The United States has
information that in December 2009, an Iranian company was
seeking to procure five tons of carbon fiber from Yoon
Networks Shanghai Company. We understand this company is
likely seeking this material on behalf of the Shahid Bakeri
Industries Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's
solid propellant ballistic missile program and an entity
designated under United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1737. The fiber being sought by the Iranian company
may be controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and nuclear
Suppliers Group and could be used to produce rocket nozzles
or motor cases for Iran's solid propellant ballistic missile
systems. We want to share this information with Chinese
officials and request that they take measures to prevent this
material from being transferred from China to Iran's missile
program. We also want to note that we believe taking such
action would be consistent with UNSCR 1737.

¶3. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Beijing approach
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.

¶4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL CHINA)

--We would like to alert you to information of proliferation
concern and request your assistance in investigating this
activity.

--The United States has information that in December 2009, an
Iranian company was seeking to procure five tons of carbon
fiber from Yoon Networks Shanghai Company, a China-based firm
operated by a South Korean individual.

--We understand this company is likely seeking this material
on behalf of the Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG), which
is responsible for Iran's solid propellant ballistic missile
program and an entity designated under United Nations
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737.

--The fiber being sought by the Iranian company may be
controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and nuclear Suppliers
Group and could be used by Iran to produce rocket nozzles for
its solid propellant medium-range and short-range ballistic
missile systems. It also could be used by SBIG to produce
lighter motor cases that could potentially extend the range
of these systems.

--We believe that the transfer of this material to SBIG poses
a significant missile proliferation risk and is inconsistent
with UNSCR 1737.

--We therefore urge you to investigate this activity and take
measures to prevent this material from being transferred from
China to Iran's missile program.

--We look forward to continued cooperation on missile
nonproliferation issues and to hearing of any actions your
government takes in response to this information.

End talking points/non-paper

¶5. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone:
202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR and EAP/CM.

¶6. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at
www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON


/tag/IR_2.html


10STATE17263     2010-02-24 22:10     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET     Secretary of State

R 242212Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX In the Russian view, there is another serious threat that should be discussed: Pakistan. Pakistan is a nation with nuclear weapons, various delivery systems, and a domestic situation that is highly unstable. Russia assesses that Islamists are not only seeking power in Pakistan but are also trying to get their hands on nuclear materials. Russia is aware that Pakistani authorities, with help from the U.S., have created a well-structured system of security for protecting nuclear facilities, which includes physical protection. However, there are 120,000-130,000 people directly involved in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs, working in these facilities and protecting them. However, regardless of the clearance process for these people, there is no way to guarantee that all are 100% loyal and reliable.
¶63. (S) In addition to the Islamist interest in these facilities, Russia also is aware that Pakistan has had to hire people to protect nuclear facilities that have especially strict religious beliefs, and recently the general educational and cultural levels in Pakistan has been falling. Due to these facts, extremist organizations have more opportunities to recruit people working in the nuclear and missile programs. Over the last few years extremists have attacked vehicles that carry staff to and from these facilities. Some were killed and a number were abducted and there has been no trace seen of them. Also, even if places are well protected, transportation of materials is a vulnerable point. In Pakistan, it is hard to guarantee the security of these materials during transportation. For these reasons, Russia thinks Pakistan should also be a particular focus of discussion.
XXXXXXXXXXX





2007/09/07KABUL2998.html
07KABUL2998 2007-09-08 14:02 2010-12-02 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kabul
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 002998

SIPDIS

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STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
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CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-82 POLAD

EO 12958 DECL: 07/10/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, ECON, IR, AF
SUBJECT: BOUCHER AND KARZAI, SPANTA ON JIRGAS, DRUGS, ECON
COOPERATION, GOVERNANCE, IRAN
Classified By: Charge Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher’s August 27 meetings with President Karzai, Foreign Minister Spanta, Lower House Speaker Qanooni and National Security Advisor Rassoul spanned a range of key topics. Boucher, Karzai and Rassoul agreed to focus on themes of economic cooperation, intelligence- sharing, refugees, controlling illicit border traffic, and engaging the tribes during the upcoming trilateral meeting between Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte, Rassoul, and Pakistani National Security Advisor Aziz. Karzai’s vision of a UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan largely mirrors U.S. thoughts on the issue. Discussion of counternarcotics and governance led Karzai to make a pitch for the international community to give the Afghangovernment room to do governance “the Afghanway.” Boucher pressed Spanta and Qanooni to ensure that Iran’s role in Afghanistan is limited to a constructive one. End Summary.

------
JIRGAS
------

¶2. (C) Karzai seemed pleased when Boucher shared that the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan jirga had been portrayed favorably in the U.S. media. Karzai commented that six months would be an ideal time frame after which to host the next jirga in Pakistan. Both agreed that the Afghanjirga was an important confidence-building measure, but Boucher expressed his hope that the next jirga in Pakistan might produce more concrete agreements. He raised the upcoming visit of Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte as an opportunity to capitalize on the momentum of the jirga and ensure continued progress towards the next one. Boucher raised the idea of having the Afghanand Pakistani National Security Advisors meet together with Negroponte during his visit to Jalalabad near the Afghan-Pakistani border and proposed that the three work together to identify specific issues where the greatest cooperation is needed (such as economic cooperation, intelligence-sharing and controlling illicit border traffic). Boucher also pushed for a discussion of how to engage the tribes along the border, whose buy-in is essential to the staying power of any future jirga agreements. Karzai, Spanta and Rassoul were each on board with this.

¶3. (C) Karzai shared that there was a recent gathering of Pakistani tribal chiefs in Peshawar during which the chiefs expressed a desire for the same rights and freedoms as ordinary Pakistani citizens. However, Karzai noted that these same tribes had recently refused to celebrate Pakistani Independence Day. Karzai said the Pakistani government needed to pull tribal leaders into a system of formal representation, while Boucher noted that Pakistani Interior Minister Sherpao did not think a political party system within the Tribal Areas would be feasible in the near term.

¶4. (C) In a separate discussion with Boucher, National Security Advisor Rassoul said Karzai had initiated the process of finalizing the list of participants in the commission that will implement the agreements from the first jirga. Boucher seconded Sherpao’s desire to see a commission comprised of those “who can get things done.” In an encouraging sign, Rassoul acknowledged that Sherpao had been a very helpful partner in the lead-up to, execution of and follow-up to the first jirga. Rassoul stated that the first task would be to work on the continuation of dialogue with the “opposition,” including Taliban. Boucher pushed specifically for the jirga commission to identify who the opposition is and relayed Sherpao’s interest in bringing those “who are not part
KABUL 00002998 002 OF 006
of the Taliban but sympathetic to them into the jirga process.” Both agreed that Afghanistan’s official reconciliation process (commonly referred to as “PTS”) is not appropriate for high-level leaders and large groups, so the jirga commission could play a role in defining a more appropriate process for people in this category.

¶5. (C) Boucher shared his opinion that Pakistan is “making a real effort now by going after the hardest targets, including Pakistani and Arab insurgents,” which has already yielded results. Rassoul noted that his government is considering using the Provincial Communications Center model (currently used to coordinate information among the AfghanNational Security Forces at the provincial level) to set up a nexus for intelligence-sharing between the Afghanand Pakistani governments. Pakistan is concerned about Baluch rebels who are operating in and supported from Afghanistan, and Boucher stressed the importance of the Afghangovernment doing all it can to crack down on this.

¶6. (C) During the meeting with Spanta, the Foreign Minister indicated that while he had been skeptical about the jirga himself, he had considered it a major success in the end. He said that the AfghanMinistry of Foreign Affairs was sending five newly appointed diplomats to Pakistan for training -- a significant goodwill gesture following the jirga, as Afghanistan has refused educational assistance from Pakistan in the past. Spanta said Musharraf’s appearance at the end of the jirga was a real high point. Boucher emphasized that it was Karzai’s urging that changed Musharraf’s mind. Boucher clarified that Musharraf’s initial decision not to attend was not a snub to the jirga itself but a cautionary move by Musharraf, who feared the Pakistani Supreme Court would rule to allow former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to return to Pakistan. Spanta conceded that, “We know Sharif is bad news. He is the author of Islamic radicalism in our region.” Boucher agreed that Sharif could return to lead a movement that is pro-Islam, anti-Musharraf and anti- U.S.

----------------
UN SPECIAL ENVOY
----------------

¶7. (C) When Boucher asked Karzai his thoughts on the best role for a UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Karzai stated, “If it would be a UN Envoy that would bring better coordination among the international community at capitals and also cause better coordination in Afghanistan, and within the Alliance on Afghanistan, then good. But if it is someone who would set up a parallel government of internationals, then no.” At one point Karzai stated, “I do not want a stronger UN,” then clarified that “I want the UN to be a stronger coordinator of the international community, yes, but not a parallel government in Afghanistan.” (Note: The British have indicated their vision of a Special Envoy who would be based in and work primarily in Afghanistan, whereas the U.S. and Afghansides envision an envoy who would spend a great deal of time fund-raising and coordinating donor strategies in donor country capitals. End note.)

¶8. (C) During his meeting with Rassoul, Boucher commented that the French government had been considering running a Provincial Reconstruction Team and that the French Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs plan to visit Afghanistan soon. Boucher, Rassoul, and the Ambassador discussed future prospects for other donor country involvement in Afghanistan, noting that the Canadians were “iffy” and that the Dutch may leave after 2009. The British, French, Australians and U.S. will likely stay
KABUL 00002998 003 OF 006
for longer periods. Rassoul asserted the importance of “Afghanizing” the war in Kandahar both in order to reduce Canadian casualties, which might encourage the Canadians to stay longer, and to prepare the AfghanNational Army and police for Canada’s likely withdrawal. Boucher noted that after a withdrawal of maneuver troops, the Canadians may still be willing to run a Provincial Reconstruction Team focused on development, as well as the training and equipping of AfghanNational Security Forces. Boucher noted that as 2009 is an election year, it would be good to encourage donor countries to stay throughout 2009- 2010. He also expressed hope that efforts to engage Pakistan now would increase security significantly in the next year or two, perhaps encouraging other countries to stay present in Afghanistan.

------------------------------------
LOOKING AHEAD ON ERADICATION EFFORTS
------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Boucher noted that the UN Office of Drugs and Crime had released its latest assessment of drug production in Afghanistan. He highlighted the report’s findings that while the number of poppy-free provinces had increased from six to thirteen, overall production in Afghanistan had increased by 34 per cent, particularly in Helmand. Karzai reiterated his position against an aerial eradication campaign. When Boucher asked Karzai for his thinking on ground-based spray, Karzai replied, “We have not said no, but we’re not saying yes either. We would have to inform the population and do it in a way that does not create enmity.” The Ambassador noted the difficulties in relying on manual eradication and pointed out that 16 of the 135 eradicators had been killed last year. Boucher assured Karzai that the aerial spray decision was one for another year. “Another few years,” Karzai interjected. Boucher planted the idea of eventually doing aerial spray in Taliban controlled areas and manual eradication in those parts still loyal to the central government. Karzai gave no immediate reaction.

-------------------------------------------
KARZAI ON DOING GOVERNANCE “THE AFGHAN WAY”
--------------------------------------------

¶10. (C) The discussion on increased drug cultivation in Helmand sparked Karzai’s thoughts on establishing and maintaining central government authority in the provinces. According to Karzai, “The question is why do we have Taliban controlling these areas now when two years ago I had control of Helmand? When Sher Mohammad was governor there, we had girls in schools and only 160 foreign troops. The international community pushed me to remove him and now look where we are.” Referring to Sher Mohammad, Karzai retorted, “My question for you is, do you want a bad guy on your side or working for the Taliban? Where Afghans are in charge, drugs are less but where the international community is in charge, drugs are up.” The Ambassador countered that the scenario is more accurately read as the international community has invested its resources and manpower in the tougher provinces where, not coincidentally, the Taliban have stepped up their counterinsurgency and drug cultivation efforts to discredit both the Afghangovernment and international community. Karzai conceded but added that the Afghanpeople do not see it that way from the ground.

¶11. (C) Pressing the issue more firmly, Boucher asked Karzai whether it is possible to have the Afghangovernment in control using good guys, rather than the likes of Sher Mohammad as its agents. “Yes, but that is a gradual process,” said Karzai. Maintaining that
KABUL 00002998 004 OF 006
“the most important thing is bringing the tribes to our side,” he explained that the problem with the international community’s approach to date is that “You are trying to pick and choose tribal chiefs (who will expand the presence of the central government into rural areas), but that is not how the tribal system works. A tribal chiefdom is jealously guarded. It cannot be taken by force and it cannot be imposed from the outside. When we distort tribal structures, the vacuum is filled by the Taliban, and that is exactly what has happened in Helmand and Uruzgan.” He noted that Kandahar is an exception because of his outreach to all the tribal chiefs there. According to Karzai, “the people in Helmand and Uruzgan are uneducated, so you have to fight the Taliban with local ingredients,” unlike in more developed Kandahar. He added, “We cannot bring tribal chiefs on board with governors because we say to them that we want you to support the governor, but we single out particular chiefs and say we don’t want them involved in the process. Whether we like it or not, we have to work with these people.” Karzai and Rassoul both indicated that Karzai is currently focused on an outreach campaign to win backing from tribal leaders in Helmand.

--------------------------------------------- ------
ROLE OF IRAN, LOCAL OPPOSITION MUST BE CONSTRUCTIVE
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶12. (C) Boucher informed Karzai that he would meet with Lower House Speaker Qanooni later that day. Boucher told Karzai that his message to Qanooni would be: “Political opposition is okay, but it has to be constructive.” Karzai’s advice was to remind Qanooni that he would not hold his position without U.S. backing. As the conversation turned to political parties, Karzai commented, “I will not be a political party man, but I will support parties,” presumably referring to his rumored alliance with the newly formed Republican Party.

¶13. (C) During the meeting with Qanooni, Boucher emphasized that Iran and Russia should not be given inroads for influence in a way that would disrupt the system. Boucher clarified that while Iran’s investment in cultural and educational institutions was acceptable, its role in smuggling weapons into Afghanistan was not. Qanooni responded by assuring Boucher and the Ambassador that Afghanistan continues to see the U.S. as its “long-term partner.” Stressing that “We are not asking Afghans to choose sides,” Boucher expressed U.S. understanding for Afghanistan’s need to cultivate cooperative economic, business, cultural, and “normal” political relationships with Iran but reiterated that the line should be drawn at any activities that are disruptive to the establishment of a strong central government in Afghanistan. Qanooni indicated that, aside from Iran and Russia, people allied with the Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin party continue to seek more positions of influence within the Afghangovernment administration.

¶14. (C) Pointing out that, “The security problems in southern Afghanistan are spreading to the north,” Qanooni added that, “While others think the security situation will remain in control, I and other members of Parliament have some concerns.” He pointed to recent Taliban activity in Kapisa, Nuristan, and Baghlan as evidence of this. “Only Panjshir is protected,” he stated. When Boucher asked how Taliban are able to operate in the north, where Pashtuns are a minority, Qanooni insisted that the Taliban have located and begun to infiltrate the predominantly Pashtun districts which are scattered around the north.

¶15. (C) Qanooni mentioned the formation of a special committee from the Lower House that will be
KABUL 00002998 005 OF 006
investigating why decisions made by Parliament are not implemented by the executive branch. (Note: He was referring primarily to the decision of Parliament to impeach Foreign Minister Spanta and Minister of Refugees Akbar. Karzai mentioned that the Palace has also established a committee of six ministers to settle the issue with Parliament. End note.)

¶16. (C) The topic of Iran also surfaced during Boucher’s meeting with Spanta, who acknowledged, “We agree with the U.S. and U.K. that Iran is engaged in a lot of interference, but our interest in dealing with Iran is to be careful not to open a second front along the Iranian border with Afghanistan.” Spanta noted the Afghangovernment’s recent decision to reject a Memorandum of Understanding on military cooperation proposed by Iran. Spanta also shared that Karzai had raised the issue of Iran’s involvement in smuggling weapons into Afghanistan with Iranian President Ahmedinejad, who Spanta said, “denied it, of course, but the point was made.” Spanta noted that Iran was primarily invested in supporting political parties, mobilizing Shia mullahs, influencing the Afghanmedia, and providing material support to the Taliban. He added that Iran is funding the completion of a railway that will go from Iran into Afghanistan and end outside Herat City. Spanta expressed his uncertainty about the complicity of the Iranian Foreign Minister in providing material support to the Taliban, stating that “He promised me he is not involved, but said that he is involved in supporting political parties in Afghanistan.”

¶17. (C) Spanta commented that his biggest problem is that Iran continues to send back Afghanrefugees - both those who are registered and those who are not - and added that Iran does not coordinate with the Afghangovernment on the forced returns.

-----------------------------
REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
-----------------------------

¶18. (C) Spanta explained that Afghanistan continues to work with Pakistan on transit trade and updating their formal treaty from the 1960’s. They would also like to address this in the framework of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. AfghanCommerce Minister Farhang will travel to Pakistan shortly in hopes of making some progress. Spanta moved next to a request for U.S. financial assistance for the upcoming conference of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), October 16-20, 2007 in Herat, which is focused on regional economic cooperation between Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. Boucher promised to pass on the request but cautioned Spanta that the prospects were not good given how soon the conference would take place and the lack of U.S. membership in the organization.

¶19. (C) Boucher stressed to Karzai and Spanta the need to follow-up on the success of the Tajik- Afghanistan bridge opening with a trucking and transit agreement that allows Afghanand Tajik vendors and distributors to transport their goods across the border. The Ambassador pitched the idea of a truck leasing consortium project that would allow small- scale distributors, who could not afford to own trucks, to rent them when transporting their products. Both Karzai and Spanta welcomed the idea. Spanta noted that AfghanCommerce Minister Farhang will soon travel to Pakistan to discuss similar issues.

¶20. (C) Spanta also noted that the Chinese are increasingly interested in becoming a regional economic partner as well as knowing more about what the larger international community is doing to invest in Afghanistan.
KABUL 00002998 006 OF 006

¶21. (C) Note: Renewed focus on regional economic cooperation will be part of the agenda for the upcoming Afghanistan Ministerial Meeting on September 23 (co-chaired by President Karzai and Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon) that will precede the UN General Assembly. The October 3 meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board will also focus on regional economic cooperation. This will be an important follow-up to the success of the Tajik- Afghanistan bridge opening and an opportunity to capitalize on the momentum of the jirga, with economic cooperation presenting a clear win-win for all parties involved. End note.

¶22. (SBU) The Office of the Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs has cleared this cable. DELL


2007/11/07KABUL3800.html
07KABUL3800 2007-11-10 06:06 2010-12-02 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kabul

VZCZCXRO3668
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3800/01 3140600
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 100600Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1397
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4275
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3699

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003800

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR USDP EDELMAN AND DASD SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD

EO 12958 DECL: 11/08/2017
TAGS PREL, MARR, SNAR, PGOV, AF
SUBJECT: USDP EDELMAN NOV 7 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KARZAI:
IRAN, COUNTERNARCOTICS, MUSA QALA AND PAKISTAN

Classified By: Ambassador William Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In his November 7 office call on President Karzai, USDP Edelman expressed condolences for the victims of the November 6 bombing in Baghlan Province and highlighted the opportunity presented by this heinous act to reinforce Afghannational unity and action against the Taliban. Karzai welcomed FBI assistance in investigating the Baghlan bombing. Edelman urged that the IRoA act in concert with the U.S. to end Iranian lethal support to the Taliban before it reaches the same levels as in Iraq. Karzai agreed that Iran has to be confronted, adding without elaboration that we need to do so “effectively.” In response to Edelman noting intense Congressional interest in the counternarcotics situation, Karzai said Helmand Province (which produces 50 percent of Afghanistan’s opium) must be liberated before poppy production can be addressed, and he added that the people there are tired of Taliban control and want to be liberated. He did not dismiss the need for ISAF to use air power “at the risk of politically difficult civilian casualties” to get the job done. On Pakistan, Karzai expressed the hope that Musharraf,s extra-constitutional approach will work, but it was not clear to Karzai that Musharraf is ready to follow through in the short term on elections and a deal with Benizir Bhutto. Karzai welcomed the prospect of a visit by SecDef Gates before the end of the year. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) USDP Edelman, accompanied by Ambassador Wood, called on President Karzai on November 7. Karzai was accompanied by Defense Minister Wardak, National Security Advisor Rassoul, and two staff. Edelman and Wood were accompanied by DASD Shivers, Deputy Commander of the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) BG George, two OSD staffers and an Embassy notetaker.

Baghlan Bombing: FBI Assistance Welcomed
-----------------------------------------

¶3. (C) Edelman opened by expressing his deepest condolences for the victims of the November 6 bomb attack in Baghlan Province that killed six parliamentarians and up to 40 other victims, including as many as 15 children. (NOTE: An authoritative assessment of casualties was not available at the time of the meeting.) Clearly shaken by the tragedy, Karzai described it as a terrible and sad event and noted that the basic facts of the attack were still under investigation. He recalled briefly the names and his personal association with most of the six murdered parliamentarians and expressed concern for the security of a parliamentarian still hospitalized. In response to Edelman,s question, Karzai affirmed his conviction that if initial reports that this was a suicide attack are confirmed, it was definitely the work of the Taliban, which had carried out many other such attacks, e.g., in Kandahar.

¶4. (C) Later in the conversation, Karzai said he wanted the U.S. to help out with the investigation, and he welcomed Ambassador Wood,s offer to request FBI assistance with the investigation of the bombing. Karzai offered to include U.S. personnel in the IRoA delegation being dispatched to investigate the attack site, led by Interior Minister Zarar and including Parliamentary security representatives and the National Directorate for Security (NDS).

An Opportunity for National Unity and Decisive Action
--------------------------------------------- --------

¶5. (C) Edelman observed that the Baghlan bombing also presented an opportunity to stress national unity and rejection of terrorism. Wood added that this is an opportunity to bring the Afghanpeople together not only to
KABUL 00003800 002 OF 004
mourn the victims but also to affirm a confident outlook for the future. In spite of Karzai,s difficult relations with Parliamentary Speaker and political rival Qanooni, Wood pointed out that Qanooni is making unifying statements, e.g., supportive of IRoA security measures for the Parliamentary delegation visiting Baghlan; he is not using the occasion to seek to divide the nation for personal political gain. Karzai and Qanooni should join in bringing the nation together and use this as a basis for renewed, decisive action to counter the insurgency and take the hard decisions needed to advance good governance goals.

Iran
-----

¶6. (C) In this regard, Edelman noted the military situation in Farah Province and asked Karzai whether there might be an Iranian hand behind recent Taliban attacks. Edelman recalled maps of the myriad smuggling routes from Iran into Afghanistan and reports of Taliban recruits training at sites in Iran, although there was no concrete evidence of direct Iranian involvement. He added that ISAF Commander GEN McNeill will want to respond, and he will be seeking to work with Karzai on an effective military strategy.

¶7. (C) Karzai agreed that Iran is “busy.” It is seeking to undermine the U.S. in Afghanistan, and it is trying to undermine development and reconstruction in western Afghanistan. Karzai asserted that Iran is bothered that Afghanistan is becoming an important transit hub for the region, and it wants to forestall Pakistani and Indian natural gas imports from Central Asia in order to protect its own market.

¶8. (C) Edelman asked how best to deal with Iran. The explosively-formed projectile weapons (EFPs) intercepted by British troops are worrying; even small numbers, if effectively employed against a small Ally such as the Dutch, could have a strategic effect. EFPs have been a major cause of U.S. casualties in Iraq. Reports of MANPADS coming out of Iran are also of concern. Recalling his conversation with Karzai in March on Iran, Edelman said Iranian meddling is getting increasingly lethal. He appreciated this was a complicated issue and that Afghanistan wants to avoid a two-front war, but Iranian actions, if not checked, will result in a two-front war in any event. We need to work together to put the Iranians back on their heels, adding that the USG is implementing new financial sanctions on the IRCG Quds Force. Iranian lethal assistance to the Taliban must be stopped before it reaches the levels of similar assistance to insurgents in Iraq; Edelman underscored that we need to make clear that Iranian support for the Taliban is equally dangerous to Tehran and Afghanistan.

¶9. (C) Karzai agreed that Iran has to be confronted, adding without elaboration that we need to do so “effectively.” They are supporting those who are killing Afghanand U.S. personnel, so we cannot keep quiet, he said. Edelman agreed that pressure is what the Iranians understand. The British and French are with us; we need to bring the Germans along. Without going into detail, Karzai said he discussed Iran with Chancellor Merkel when she visited Afghanistan last week.

Governance and Counternarcotics
-------------------------------

¶10. (C) Edelman said the perception in Washington is that Afghanand ISAF forces have had tactical successes in disrupting the Taliban, and Congress has appropriated significant new funding to sustain the train-and-equip programs for the AfghanNational Army and AfghanNational Police. He noted that Congressional committees plan to hold hearings in the near future on Afghanistan and will be asking
KABUL 00003800 003 OF 004
what the IRoA and USG are doing to take advantage of the tactical successes to advance police training and reform, extend governance to the provincial and local levels, create economic opportunity and counter the narcotics trade. Interest in counternarcotics action will become particularly acute in the wake of the UN report on record poppy crops during the last growing season.

Musa Qala and Airpower
----------------------

¶11. (C) Karzai responded by highlighting public frustration in parts of Helmand Province with Taliban control. He recounted a recent phone call he received from a tribal chief in Helmand urging that Afghanand ISAF forces launch an attack on the Musa Qala District center. Karzai said there are 300 shops that sell opium paste and 65 heroin labs in Musa Qala. He added that the people are sick and tired of the situation and want to be liberated. Karzai said that Helmand must be liberated in order to stop poppy production. In response to Edleman,s observations about recent polling results showing significant public opinion against poppy cultivation and trafficking, Karzai said the Afghanpeople want a better, honest government, and they support the international community,s presence in Afghanistan. The point, he added, is to use this opportunity properly. The more we can bring security to the people and force the Taliban out, the better.

¶12. (C) Wood noted that GEN McNeill is developing a plan for Musa Qala, but it will likely require air power, which in the past has created political issues due to unintended civilian casualties. Karzai agreed that the plan would have to be discussed, but he reiterated that the people in Musa Qala are fed up, and we need to act.

Pakistan
--------

¶13. (C) Karzai emphasized that the issue of Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan has to be solved, noting with dismay that the Taliban flag has been raised in three districts in the FATA. He observed that while Afghanistan has a national identity and a weak state, Pakistan has a strong state with no coherent national identity. Noting that he had discussed Pakistan in his November 7 telephone call with President Bush, Karzai expressed the hope that Musharraf’s imposition of extra-constitutional rule will work; Musharraf must be sincere because he has no further room for “more games.”

¶14. (C) Edelman noted that U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group (DCG) talks were postponed to underscore U.S. dissatisfaction with the imposition of the Provisional Constitution Order; it was also not clear that our Pakistani interlocutors would be able to focus on the DCG agenda, given the current political turmoil. The USG and Afghanistan share an interest in Pakistani authorities moving against terrorist sanctuaries and the Taliban,s Quetta Shura; arresting lawyers will not help in this regard. We are urging Musharraf to focus on keeping to the election schedule, completing the deal with Bhutto, and taking off his uniform. Although there are special interests that are seeking to extend the period for martial law, it must be kept short. If not, Musharraf’s interests and those of the Pakistani Army may begin to diverge. Karzai agreed the situation is complicated. Musharraf recognizes that if/when Bhutto takes power, he will be out, and he may not be ready yet to take that step.

Possible Gates Visit
--------------------
KABUL 00003800 004 OF 004

¶15. (C) Edelman conveyed the warm regards of SecDef Gates and said the SecDef hopes to visit Afghanistan before the end of the year. Karzai welcomed the prospect of his visit. WOOD


2008/06/08USNATO208.html
08USNATO208 2008-06-18 13:01 2010-12-02 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Mission USNATO

VZCZCXRO2333
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHNO #0208/01 1701326
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181326Z JUN 08
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1978
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0371
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0097
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0391
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0107
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0378
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0177
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 3384
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 5602
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 4520
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0241
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 5501
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0698
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000208

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF PK
SUBJECT: USD(P) EDELMAN BRIEFS ON AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
AT NATO

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for reasons 1.4(B) and (D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric
Edelman used his June 5 meeting with NATO PermReps and a
separate session with NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer to brief on
his May 27-June 5 visit to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon
and to urge Allies to contribute more to Afghanpolice
training and use their political influence with Islamabad.
USDP Edelman said he found President Karzai concerned about
political turmoil in Pakistan and recent border developments.
Meanwhile, Pakistan's new political leadership
underestimates the threat from its domestic insurgency, and
its military is in need of retraining to confront it.
Regarding Lebanon, USDP Edelman was "more optimistic" than he
had expected to be. END SUMMARY.

------------------------
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
------------------------

¶2. (C) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman
told NATO PermReps on June 5 that, after his recent visit to
Kabul and Islamabad, he believes Afghanistan will require a
long-term approach that focuses efforts on improving local
governance and security. Among his findings:

- (C) AfghanNational Security Forces (ANSF) are far along
in their plans to assume leadership for security in Kabul
city this summer. ANSF are already providing "95 percent" of
Kabul's security.

- (C) In the next few months, the U.S.-led Combined Security
Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A) will be short more
than 100 district-level 12-person Police Mentoring Teams
(PMTs). European countries are well-suited for the high-end
training of police, and Germany and Italy have already
expressed interest. Focused District Development (FDD),
CSTC-A's police training program, gets the AfghanNational
Police (ANP) to about "the 80 percent level", but PMTs are
needed to mentor them and finish their training. Edelman
reported that on his visit to Kapisa province (in RC-East,
where French forces will soon deploy) the difference was
clear between towns where the ANP was trained and operating
effectively versus areas where they were not and as a result
the Taliban was active.

- (C) Local governance is key to success. USDP Edelman
encouraged Allies to support the GoA's Independent
Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). The estimated cost
to implement the overall IDLG strategy over a five-year
period is USD 296 million, of which USD 26 million is for
IDLG's recently unveiled AfghanSocial Outreach Program
(ASOP) that focuses on developing local governance in eleven
troubled provinces.

- (C) UN SRSG Kai Eide needs support, especially in New York
where Allies should help ensure he gets the financial and
staffing resources he requests.

- (C) The enemy is adaptive. Officials in Regional Command
East and Regional Command Capital have seen an uptick in
insurgent attacks in Khost, Nangarhar, Kabul, and other areas
where ISAF has been successful with its development projects.
The enemy realizes it must destroy what has been built or
risk losing the support of the people.

USNATO 00000208 002 OF 004

- (C) The Pakistani leadership, including the President,
Prime Minister, Defense Minister and new National Security
Advisor all say they are committed to fighting terrorism.
Edelman raised with them U.S. concerns about the peace
agreements in the tribal areas, noting that ISAF already sees
an increase in incidents in eastern Afghanistan attributable
to reduced pressure on militants in Pakistan.

- (C) Pakistan has two fundamental problems: the insurgency
in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which the
political class underestimates because it remains focused on
political machinations in Islamabad; and the grave economic
crisis, characterized by low growth and balance of payments
problems, which are exacerbated by political instability.
Edelman urged Allies to weigh in with Islamabad on the need
for a strong counterinsurgency effort, to visit Pakistan at
the senior level, and to consider economic development
programs in the tribal areas.

-----------------
PermRep Questions
-----------------

¶3. (C) In response to the Greek ambassador, USDP Edelman
commented that he is not overly concerned about the
possibility that Karzai might seek to manipulate local
governance and development programs for his electoral ends,
because his political base and the root of the insurgency
overlap in the Pashtun areas.

¶4. (C) In response to the UK ambassador, Edelman noted that
Pakistani CHOD Kayani has told senior U.S. officials that he
wants the Pakistani military out of politics, but he noted
that the army needs retraining and reequipping to confront
domestic extremists with a counterinsurgency strategy, since
it is currently oriented towards the Indian threat. In
Kabul, Edelman added, he found Karzai eager to divert
attention to Pakistan as a source of all of Afghanistan's
problems.

¶5. (C) In response to the Czech ambassador, USDP Edelman
commented that the U.S. wants to reinvigorate the Tripartite
Commission and has a very active mil-to-mil relationship with
Pakistan. Admiral Mullen and other senior U.S. officials
make frequent visits to Islamabad.

¶6. (C) In response to the French ambassador, Edelman said
that neither ISAF nor the Afghangovernment has been
successful on counternarcotics, and that eradication programs
focus mostly on small farmers, making some Allies uneasy.
Edelman urged greater focus on drug labs and high-value
targets, such as drug traffickers who are also insurgents.
He pointed out that U.S. Marines in Garmsir District of
Helmand Province discovered a Taliban poppy "agro-business"
had sprung up in the absence of a GoA/ISAF presence. The UK
ambassador added that going after traffickers and high-value
targets has not had a negative effect on local opinion, in
the UK's experience. Ambassador Nuland commented that doing
nothing about narcotics also damages ISAF's image with
Afghans and noted "neutrality is not an option" when dealing
with traffickers.

¶7. (C) In response to the Italian ambassador, Edelman
commented that our efforts to strengthen local governance do
not undermine the Afghancentral government because there has
never been a tradition of strong central government. The

USNATO 00000208 003 OF 004

best approach is to improve local governance and then link it
to the central government in Kabul.

¶8. (C) In response to the Norwegian ambassador, Edelman
expressed optimism regarding the transition to the ANSF of
security in Kabul, noting that the ANSF have shown
improvement. Regarding Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs), Edelman similarly urged a phased transition to allow
the Afghans to assume more and more responsibilities.
Transition will occur at different paces in different places
and should not be viewed as ISAF's exit strategy.

¶9. (C) In response to the Polish ambassador, Edelman said
that Karzai sees two fronts (Iran and Pakistan) to his
dilemmas. Edelman noted that when the U.S. Marines went into
Garmsir District recently, they learned a lot of new
information about insurgent and narcotics activities, and he
is concerned that a similar "blind spot" may exist in Nimruz
along the border with Iran.

¶10. (C) In response to the Canadian representative, Edelman
said that the notion of a unified approach to the Pashtun
problems in both Afghanistan and Pakistan was something U.S.
policy makers had considered, but it would be difficult to
implement on both sides of the border.

-------
LEBANON
-------

¶11. (C) In response to the Greek ambassador, USDP Edelman
said this was his third visit to Beirut in six months and he
said he was "more optimistic than expected." President
Suleiman is now more self-assured than he had been as CHOD
and gave an impressive inaugural speech. Still to play out
is the question of whether Hezbollah over-reached and damaged
itself by taking up arms against Lebanese in the recent
crisis. He added that he is skeptical that the recent
Syrian/Israeli dialogue will be successful given the nature
of the Damascus regime. Edelman noted that the U.S. is
developing a good mil-to-mil bilateral relationship with
Lebanon.

-----------------------
SecGen de Hoop Scheffer
-----------------------

¶12. (S//NF) In his conversation with NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer, USDP Edelman said that he had raised with Karzai
the latter's unhelpful comments in Der Spiegel ("I wish I Had
the Taliban as My Soldiers"), and that Karzai apologized and
claimed he was misquoted. SecGen commented on a similar
interview with the Indian press saying that such coverage
could lead parliaments in troop contributing nations to
question the value of sending their troops to Afghanistan.
SecGen wondered aloud which Karzai would show up for the
AfghanDonors, Conference in Paris-- the erratic Pashtun
politician or the rational national leader. Edelman observed
that Karzai seemed preoccupied with blaming Pakistan for
Afghanistan's problems. SecGen responded that this does not
bode well for efforts to reinvigorate the Tripartite
Commission.

¶13. (S//NF) SecGen reported that attempts to update the
Kosovo Operations Plan had run aground due to Turkish
"paranoia". The Turks have prevented PermReps from

USNATO 00000208 004 OF 004

discussing the updated plan because of concerns about their
relationship with the European Union. SecGen asked for U.S.
assistance in convincing the Turks to be more flexible.

¶14. (S//NF) SecGen indicated that he disagreed with the U.S.
response to Turkish complaints about the possible involvement
of Greek aircraft from a disputed island in the Aegean in
NATO exercises. He is concerned that this could lead toward
a situation in which NATO could never exercise in the Aegean.

¶15. (U) USDP Edelman has cleared this cable.
NULAND


2008/07/08KABUL1975.html
08KABUL1975 2008-07-31 06:06 2010-12-02 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kabul

O 310653Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4937
INFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001975

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS FOR WOOD
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT

EO 12958 DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINR, AF
SUBJECT: EX-TALIBAN SEEK MEDIATION ROLE

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Jeremiah Howard, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) On July 29, President Karzai gave the Ambassador a plan for negotiations with the Taliban that he had received from Taliban reconcilees (SEPTEL). In a meeting arranged by the presidency at our request the next day, prominent ex-Taliban said they are well-placed to mediate reconciliation with the insurgency, but argued they are hampered from doing so by their inclusion on U.N. List 1267. In earlier discussions, former Taliban government officials told us they reject Mullah Omar’s fanaticism, rigidity and alliance with Al Qaeda, but that they fear the Taliban are in the ascendant and becoming more extreme. They stressed they accept the current constitution in general, but do want amendments to make clear the primacy of Islam.

Presidency Wants to Exploit Ex-Taliban as Mediators
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶2. (C) On July 30, Deputy National Security Advisor Engineer Ibrahim Spinzada, who is seeking U.S. support in convincing Russia to allow removal of names from United Nations List 1267, responded to our earlier request to arrange a meeting for Political Officers with reconcilees from the former Taliban government. He convoked to the meeting ex-Foreign Minister Maulavi Ahmad Mutawakkil, the Taliban nominee for ambassador to the United Nations Abdul Hakim Mujadid (Note: The Taliban regime was never accepted as sovereign by a preponderance of the world community), ex-Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Habibullah Fawzi, and ex-Deputy Education Minister and current AfghanSenator Arsala Rahmani.

¶3. (C) The four ex-Taliban mentioned the plan for negotiations that had
been given to President Karzai, and, without referring directly to its text, emphasized several key points: -- Force alone cannot defeat the Taliban in either Afghanistan or Pakistan, but since the roots of Taliban insurgency lie in Afghanistan, resolution of conflict here would undermine Taliban rebellion in the FATA and NWFP; -- If the Taliban are reconciled, allied opposition groups, including those led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or the Haqqanis, would disappear; -- Ex-Taliban are an unused resource for President Karzai and the international community, since they alone have access to both political leaders and command levels of the insurgency, and are willing to mediate in negotiations; -- There should be no preconditions for negotiations, which could take place in the Gulf or Saudi Arabia, or in Afghanistan in the presence of international forces; -- Negotiations should be an incremental process, avoiding initially issues such as ceasefire or the prison at Guantanamo, and stressing instead the cessation of Taliban attacks on NGOs, schools or roads, government commitment to minimize civilian casualties and good-will detainee releases; -- Reconcilees represent a silent majority in the Taliban who simply want to end the war, and had publicly accepted the constitution though they would favor amendments to enhance the constitutional role of Islam; -- Negotiations, reconciliation and restoration of security can and should be followed by elections, and some ex-Taliban would like to be candidates. -- Only when key moderates are removed from the 1267 List will they have the credibility needed to convince insurgents they can guarantee agreements they broker with Karzai or the international community.

Ex-Taliban Moderates as an Inchoate Movement
--------------------------------------------

¶4. (SBU) In the weeks leading up to our July 30 meeting, we established contact with numerous senior ex-Taliban. We provide the paragraphs below to give a sense of what they are thinking about how to end the insurgency and how best to achieve democratic -- but Islamic -- governance.

¶5. (SBU) Former Foreign Ministry aide Waheed Mujda has written a book on the Taliban (“Ahmed Rashid wrote from the outside, but I wrote from inside”). In the summer of 2001, he says he went to the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad to warn that Al Qaeda planned to use “massive explosives” to attack the U.S.

¶6. (SBU) Mujda repots that immediately after 9/11, the Taliban began to fracture over the wisdom and morality of attacking civilians, over lost economic opportunities if the Taliban isolated itself from the West, and over dangers to be faced if the U.S. occupied Afghanistan. There was also concern about growing reliance on Pakistan’s ISI and deepening ties to Al Qaeda. Mujda hoped at the time that the U.S. would wait to attack the Taliban, since he predicted there would be “within the year” a definitive split between urban intellectuals led by Foreign Minister Mutawakkil, and Mullah Omar’s village-based obscurantists. After the U.S. “installed” Karzai, though, he saw moderates’ chances evaporating, while many lower-ranking Taliban with little commitment to either Mutawakkil or Mullah Omar proved opportunistic, waiting simply to see if the international community and Karzai could govern.

¶7. (SBU) Mujda lamented that Karzai named governors who harassed ex-Taliban of all ranks rather than open a dialog. Meanwhile, Mujda alleged, international forces committed atrocities, such as breaking down doors and searching women, that “even the Soviets taught soldiers to avoid.” Afraid of “death or Guatanamo,” some moderates concluded they had n alternative but to return to Mullah Omar. Wth the war ongoing, he contends, the Taliban as expanded its original commitments to “sharia, security and territorial integrity,” to enompass an international dimension including demands that the U.S. leave Saudi Arabia.

Civilian Casualties and “Hunger Suicides”
-----------------------------------------

¶8. (C) The Taliban’s Attorney General, Maulavi Jalal-u-Din Shinwari, agrees the Taliban is growing even more militant. Taliban ideologues have no serious doctrinal competition, he complained: the Karzai-allied Ulema Council is slow and inactive, meeting “only once a year, and that’s in the presidential palace.” Since moderates have limited effective intellectual or spiritual leadership, the Taliban and hardline mullahs in Pakistan have commandeered the right to define jihad, and channeled the jihadi impulse into “radical and violent forms.”

¶9. (C) Shinwari lambasted international forces for repeated civilian casualty incidents, which make the Taliban’s recruiting and ideological tasks easier. These “indiscriminate attacks” enable the Taliban to argue the U.S. does not care about Afghans or Islam, and that Karzai is in complicity with the U.S. or incapable of curbing U.S. excesses. As if this intense anger were not enough, he sputtered, there is also the despair of deepening poverty and inequality, creating for the first time “hunger suicides,” who kill and die either to collect a Taliban payment or simply to lighten the economic burden on their families by removing one more mouth to feed.

Not a Loose Cannon
------------------

¶10. (SBU) Parliamentary Deputy Mullah Abdul Salaam Rocketi, whose name derives from his deft touch with a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, warns that the U.S. has not carefully identified its enemies. If the U.S. continues to “fight everyone,” including Al Qaeda, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and both Taliban radicals and moderates, then he warns we cannot win, and that Pakistan, Iran or Russia will dominate Afghanistan.

¶11. (C) Rocketi counsels that “Karzai is lost,” a feckless ally for the U.S. whose cabinet, he argues, is driven by members’ separate and competing interests, unconcerned by the public’s needs. On the infrequent occasions when Karzai works up the courage or is forced to “fire the thieves,” Rocketi mutters, “he just replaces them with new thieves.” Karzai’s failure, he concludes, is “expanding the Taliban’s once narrow doors of entry into wide gates.” The U.S. must identify who within the Taliban is moderate or amenable to dialog, and work with them to seek peace and agree on how Afghanistan is to be governed.

Alternatives to Mullah Omar
---------------------------

¶12. (SBU) Two figures generally recognized as heading the ex-Taliban moderates are ex-Foreign Minister Mutawakkil, and ex-Ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salim Zaef, who spent four years at Guantanamo and whom some see as the stronger of the two. We talked to them separately in late July.

¶13. (C) Mutawakil said the U.S. must realize there are two kinds of reconciliation. One, which he calls the U.S. strategy, is designed to entice insurgents into supporting Karzai. The other, he distinguished, is designed to end the war and achieve an understanding between the two warring Afghansides. The war is being driven by foreign allies, he explained, but the U.S. on one side and Al Qaeda on the other have their own priorities. Mutawakil said he had advised Karzai to carry out negotiations with the insurgency, but to aim for incremental progress, concentrating first on small resolvable issues. Further, he had told Karzai, any negotiations must be conducted in private, with no interfering media coverage. The mediators, he half-joked, can be only “those whom neither the government nor Taliban want to be killed,” and who maintain impartial contact with both warring sides. To make mediation possible, Zaef and Mutawakkil agree, U.N. 1267 restrictions must be lifted.

¶14. (C) Mutawakkil and Zaef believe firmly that the international community is distancing itself irreparably from ordinary Afghans. Mutawakkil argues that, as the U.S.-led coalition intensifies military operations, it drives the Taliban to seek self-preservation by attaching itself more closely to Al Qaeda and the Pakistani ISI. Zaef warns that the U.S. lacks cultural knowledge and sensitivity necessary to run Afghanistan through Karzai, and that given the difficulty of running legitimate and credible elections, it should allow the transfer of governing authority to a Loya Jirga. He warns that to be effective and bring peace, the members of this Jirga cannot be named by Karzai or seen to be puppets of the U.S., and that they should be named by a pre-Jirga representing tribal and religious leaders from the entire country. He says there should also be a jirga commission to discuss “flaws” in the current constitution.

¶15. (C) Mutawakkil elaborated on what the Afghanconstitution should be like. Democracy, he stipulated, is a means to a better and peaceful life, and is not a means in itself. An Islamic base can be built for a better life, and the Taliban’s biggest mistake was in not understanding the need to avoid meddling in private lives. The Department for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice did not understand proportionality: it used major force and applied severe punishments for even minor violations, and in so doing lost public confidence.

¶16. (C) The constitution, Mutawakkil continued, is as it stands now “a piece of paper,” which even Karzai’s nominal allies and opponents in Parliament fail to respect. He thinks the constitution should be amended to garner wider respect. The primary article to be amended is the commitment to freedom of religion, since Islam must be acknowledged as paramount. This would not affect the country’s Hindus and Sikhs (“there are no AfghanChristians and only one Jew”), who would continue to be allowed freedom of religion. No Muslim, though, Mutawakkil continued, could be allowed to abandon Islam without punishment in the form of prison or banishment.
WOOD


2008/11/08LONDON2964.html
08LONDON2964 2008-11-28 15:03 2010-12-02 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy London

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 002964

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DEPT FOR EUR/WE AND SCA/A

EO 12958 DECL: 11/28/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, PTER, AF, UK
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: PRESIDENT KARZAI NOT CONFIDENT ON
ELECTIONS; CLAIMS FINANCIAL RESERVES “BEST IN WORLD”

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Greg Berry for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C/NF) Summary: During a November 25 meeting in Kabul, AfghanPresident Karzai told FS Miliband that it would be difficult or impossible to hold a credible Presidential election. He said that Afghanistan’s USD 13.4b of reserves, were the &best in the world.” Miliband commented to Karzai that, after seven years, it was important to offer a perspective on how all expected the conflict to end. Reconciliation, subject to strict conditions, would obviously be part of that. Karzai had had a good talk with Pakistan President Zardari November 24 and was looking forward to him paying a state visit in December. He was concerned that the failure to act quickly on police issues had undermined the trust which the Afghanpeople had in their government and in the international community. Miliband noted that the UK was determined to work with Helmand Governor Mangal, and to give him support in engaging with the tribes. He emphasized the need to maximize the advantages which the arrival of more U.S. troops would bring. End Summary

¶2. (C/NF) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Miliband saw Karzai for about an hour in Kabul on November 25, with Foreign Minister Spanta, National Security Advisor Rassoul , Chief of Staff Daudzai, and Spokesperson Hamidzada present on the Afghanside. UK Ambassador Cowper-Coles joined Miliband.

ELECTIONS
-----------------

¶3. (C/NF) Karzai told Miliband that it would be difficult or impossible to hold a credible Presidential election, not just in Helmand, but also in the provinces of Zabul, Farah, Kandahar and Ghazni. Although Zabul was small, in many ways it was as difficult as Helmand. That made a spring date proposed by the Parliament impossible. Karzai was confident that early agreement on a date would be reached.

AFGHAN/U.S. RELATIONS
----------------------------------------

¶4. (C/NF) Karzai related to Miliband that President-elect Obama had been “very supportive, very committed8 during their telephone conversation the previous week. He said Obama had promised to send a team to Afghanistan soon after the inauguration. Karzai noted that his government was preparing three papers for the U.S. and the international community on security, governance, and economic issues. The security paper had already been sent to the U.S. It covered civilian casualties, and ending house searches and arbitrary arrests of Afghans by coalition forces. Karzai instructed Rassoul to see that the paper was also sent to &NATO headquarters8.

GOVERNANCE/ECONOMY
----------------------------------------

¶5. (C/NF) Karzai told Miliband that the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) were in the course of preparing a paper which would call for an end to parallel structures. He said that Afghanistan’s USD 13.4b of reserves were the &best in the world8. The paper on economic issues would be for the Americans alone and would deal with some of the abuses to which their aid was subject. In particular, Afghanistan wanted to end the way in which the Americans sub-contracted major parts of their aid program to “doubtful contractors.” He was also concerned that many of the private security companies were little more than “criminal organizations.” The same applied to some of the transport companies used by the U.S.; it had become apparent to Karzai that the transport companies were responsible for much of the insecurity on the highways, in order to extract higher fees and insurance payments from the Americans.

RECONCILIATION
---------------------------

¶6. (C/NF) Miliband commented to Karzai that, after seven years, it was important to offer a perspective on how all expected the conflict to end. Reconciliation, subject to strict conditions, would obviously be part of that. Karzai agreed, saying that he had consulted &the whole Afghanpeople,8 and they were all in favor of reconciliation. They wanted to “bring over the good guys, while excluding the bad guys.” Karzai realizes that the U.S., Russia and Iran had doubts about reconciliation, but this was something that the Afghanpeople wanted, and which he was bound to press ahead
LONDON 00002964 002 OF 003

¶7. (C/NF) Miliband welcomed the warm relations between Karzai and Zardari, and spoke of the need to extend that relationship into other areas, and systemize it. It would be important to underpin contacts at the highest level with a clear work plan, and timeframe, for practical contacts at other levels. The Pakistanis were now fighting the Taleban, Miliband continued, and needed to be encouraged and supported in this. The UK stood ready to help in any way it could with the Af/Pak relationship. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Karzai welcomed all this. He had had a good talk with Zardari November 24 and was looking forward to him paying a state visit in December. Karzai opined that Pakistan wanted to cooperate with Afghanistan, without the Americans being involved. Spanta explained that there were three levels to Af/Pak cooperation: bilateral, trilateral and multilateral. Miliband added that Zardari seemed genuinely committed to tackling terrorism, and to working with Afghanistan, and seemed gradually to be extending his control over other parts of the Pakistani state, including the military. Karzai expressed skepticism about how far Zardari,s writ yet ran, but said that he hoped the UK would get involved energetically in supporting Af/Pak cooperation.

AFGHAN INTERNAL ISSUES
-------------------------------------------

¶8. (C/NF) Miliband welcomed Interior Minister Atmar,s appointment , and said that the UK would give him “every support, “ which Karzai welcomed, noting that he had given Atmar a &blank check8 to deal with corruption. His only advice to Atmar had been to maintain the ethnic balance in the Interior Ministry. Miliband also welcomed the dismissal, for corruption, of the Transport Minister. Karzai said that he had had no option, but it had been a “regrettable step.”

ANA/ANP
--------------

¶9. (C/NF) Miliband noted recent improvements in the ANA, and the fact that the units in Helmand had reached “Capability Milestone One,” but progress on the ANA had not been matched by progress on policing. Karzai agreed, saying that the failure to reform the AfghanPolice (ANP) had been the fault of “Afghanistan’s friends.” Karzai underlined that the international community had at last realized what needed to be done on the police, and said he was concerned that the failure to act quickly had undermined the trust which the Afghanpeople had in their government and in the international community.

POLITICAL OUTREACH
-----------------------------------

¶10. (C/NF) Karzai said that political outreach needed to start at village level, and extend through the district and provincial levels. Communities needed to be re-empowered, in the name of the war on terror. Those communities had been damaged by the Soviet invasion, and by radicalization, much of it paid for by the West. The IDLG was now trying to address this. Karzai added that he had replaced all but five or six governors. He was also busy signing new appointments of district governors. Miliband noted that the UK had agreed to support the AfghanSocial Outreach Program in three districts in Helmand. Karzai said that he was a “greedy man” in respect to Helmand; he wanted the whole province to benefit. Miliband added that the UK was determined to work with Helmand Governor Mangal, and to give him support in engaging with the tribes. He emphasized the need to maximize the advantages which the arrival of more U.S. troops would bring.

¶11. (C/NF) Karzai emphasized that more U.S. troops were not the answer. He hoped the Americans would consult the AfghanGovernment before sending more troops. Karzai said that the U.S. had failed to send the troops for which Karzai had asked in 2002, but now it might be too late. He hoped the ANA and coalition forces would cooperate more closely, and that the increase in the ANA could be delivered much sooner than 2012. The ground in the east was well covered, but there were not enough troops in other parts of the country. According to Karzai, the Afghanpopulation did not want more foreign troops at this stage.

¶12. (C/NF) Miliband ended the meeting by underlining that
LONDON 00002964 003 OF 003
the UK public needed reassuring about the “Afghanistan project.” Karzai,s own prestige in Britain meant that he was uniquely well placed to do this. Miliband hoped therefore that Karzai would consider writing an open letter to the British people. Cowper-Coles promised to follow up on this with Karzai,s spokesman.

SOUTH WITH SPANTA
----------------------------------

¶13. (C/NF) After the meeting with Karzai, Miliband and Spanta flew to Camp Bastion. During the flight Spanta emphasized to Miliband the need to address the suspicions which the Afghanpeople still had of Britain. He also lobbied for the UK to do more with ethnic groups other than Pashtuns (Comment: Spanta is a Tajik. End comment). Spanta suggested that the UK should engage with the universities in Heart and Mazar-e-Sharif, and have a much higher profile among Tajiks. Britain was suspected among many in Afghanistan of having a pro-Pashtun policy. Spanta also argued for Britain to do more to help restore the electricity supply to Kabul. Minister of Energy Ismael Khan needed USD 42m to address Kabul,s energy problems.

HELMAND
---------------

¶14. (C/NF) Miliband and Spanta carried out three engagements in Helmand: a visit to Garmsir, to review progress since its liberation from the Taleban earlier in the year; a visit to Lashkar Gah, to meet the Governor Mangal and other provincial notables; and a visit to the ANA training camp at Camp Shorabak, adjacent to Camp Bastion.

GARMSIR
---------------

¶15. (C/NF) In Garmsir, Miliband was received by the District Chief, Abdullah Jan, and gained a variety of insights into &good enough8 governance, Afghan-style. A large number of local elders turned out, at virtually no notice, and then accompanied Miliband and Spanta on a walkabout through the bazaar, during which Miliband bought locally-produced pomegranates. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, none of this would have been possible only a few months ago and is a reflection of the improving security situation. Miliband and Spanta also reviewed and met troops of the ANA, and of the Queen,s Dragoon Guards and 1 Rifles, the latter the lead unit for mentoring the ANA in Helmand.

GOVERNOR MANGAL
---------------------------------

¶16. (C/NF) In Lashkar Gah, Miliband assured Mangal of continuing UK support. Mangal spoke of his many achievements, and expressed gratitude for support from HMG. During a joint press conference, Spanta voiced strong support for Mangal, which XXXXXXXXXXXX considers a significant sign of Karzai’s personal stake in seeing Spanta succeed in Helmand.
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
TUTTLE


2008/12/08KABUL3176.html
08KABUL3176 2008-12-09 03:03 2010-12-02 21:09 SECRET Embassy Kabul

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STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG
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OSD FOR SECRETARY GATES, USDP EDELMAN AND WILKES
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD

EO 12958 DECL: 12/08/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, AFIN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DECEMBER 10-11, 2008 VISIT TO
AFGHANISTAN BY SECDEF ROBERT M. GATES

Classified By: Acting DCM Valerie C. Fowler for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

¶1. (C) Embassy Kabul warmly welcomes your visit to Afghanistan. The overall state of the security situation here is more nuanced than the negative drumbeat coming from the media. Steady advances in success by Coalition and AfghanNational Security Forces (ANSF) do not grab the headlines that a spectacular suicide attack does. Progress in development in support of a balanced COIN strategy continues below the radar screen. Those achievements, however, are hindered and ultimately threatened by poor performance on the governance front.

--------------------------------------------- -----
The Fundamental Challenge of Governance
--------------------------------------------- -----

¶2. (C) Karzai is at the center of the governance challenge. He has failed to overcome his fundamental leadership deficiencies in decisiveness and in confidence to delegate authority to competent subordinates. The result: a cycle of overwork/fatigue/indecision on the part of Karzai, and gridlock and a sense of drift among senior officials on nearly all critical policy decisions.

¶3. (C) Karzai struggles with striking the correct balance between institutional and traditional (i.e. tribal) governance. In fairness, there are no easy answers. He has given a notional nod to General McKiernan,s proposal to support formal agreements between Afghanauthorities and district-level councils. The latter would be responsible for certain governance and security functions in their districts. This proposal is aimed at ensuring freedom of travel along the Ring Road, the lack of which undermines public confidence in the Afghangovernment and in the international community’s efforts. Some questions remain on how to ensure district security arrangements do not create independent local militias.

¶4. (SBU) Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) Director Popal has earned and maintains Karzai,s backing to improve sub-national governance. Popal has launched the AfghanSocial Outreach Program (ASOP), to form local councils (separate from McKiernan,s plan) to strengthen ties between sub-national institutional government and the tribes. We will be one of the largest donors to this new and ambitious plan, providing $6 million for ASOP in three provinces.

---------
Elections
---------

¶5. (C) Next year,s presidential and provincial council elections will be the defining event for 2009. Election factors already dominate nearly everything political here. Karzai,s popularity has fallen through the floor, but the absence of a credible opponent means it is still Karzai,s election to lose. Public ill ease over personal (not national) insecurity and disgust over unconstrained corruption are Karzai,s greatest vulnerabilities. He installed Hanif Atmar as Interior Minister to turn up the heat on both problems. Atmar is talented and may turn around perceptions, but after seven years of unmet expectations Afghans will be hard to convince.

¶6. (C) Politicians and the Kabul punditry are fascinated with the political jockeying between Parliament and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) over the election date. In the end, we expect all will agree to the IEC,s proposal for an August vote, based on security and logistical reasons.

¶7. (C) More problematic is the insecurity in the south and east, which is prompting some ) including Karzai, other Pashtuns and some RC-South partners ) to raise the specter of Pashtun disenfranchisement and the possible illegitimacy of the vote. It is much too early to judge the prospects of failure. We and Karzai agree the British are not up to the task of securing Helmand, but we also think the expected arrival of additional U.S. combat brigades this spring and summer, in tandem with the constant flow of newly-minted Afghantroops to the field will provide an adequately secure environment for the election.

--------------------------
Taliban reconciliation
--------------------------

¶8. (C) Karzai’s senior-level Taliban reconciliation initiative is more about strengthening his political base and his relationship with the Saudis than anything else. “Negotiations” have been much less tangible in reality than is depicted in the press. The public is split: many welcome the promise (whether real or not) of reduced violence and instability via a possible reconciliation with the Taliban, while others (mainly non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear a Karzai backroom deal that could harm their political interests or set back hard-fought human rights advances. We have advised Karzai to negotiate from a position of strength and to restate our shared &red lines.8

-----------------------------------
Karzai and civilian casualties
-----------------------------------

¶9. (C) Karzai’s recent heated public statements about “bringing down NATO aircraft” and timelines for coalition withdrawal reflect both deep and heartfelt anger, as well as a certain amount of elections grandstanding. Civilian casualties anger him most. General McKiernan has directed substantial changes to coalition tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), but those cannot eliminate the possibility of civilian casualties, especially when the Taliban has clearly adopted “human shield” tactics. ISAF and the Embassy work increasingly more effectively with Afghancounterparts on improved post-incident response (to affected communities and the media), and investigations.

¶10. (C) Karzai hears of these efforts, but is not mollified. You can address his upset by acknowledging the problem and recognizing such mistakes hurt us all. In the months since the Shindand incident, and specifically as a response to civilian casualties, the Afghans have drafted a technical framework agreement on security measures, as a means to exert greater control over coalition operations. The Ambassador told Spanta that Washington cannot take this up until after the new Administration is in place, a point you should underscore with Karzai.

-------------------------------
Steps to Improve Security
-------------------------------

¶11. (C) The Coalition and Afghansecurity forces have increased our area of control and taken the fight to the Taliban, with increasing effectiveness. The Taliban response has been a forced shift in tactics from insurgency to terrorism to challenge the will of Afghans and the international community. Taliban acts of violence are highly visible and the immediate effect is that ordinary Afghans do feel less safe with random violence - particularly kidnappings - on the rise, and travel around the country more insecure. Atmar is countering, by looking to accelerate reform of the police. We are supporting him. The Focused District Development (FDD) program to retrain and equip the police is going well and will broaden to include the Border Police. Nonetheless, professionalizing the AfghanNational Police (ANP) and reforming the Ministry of Interior are ongoing challenges. We also are working with the IDLG, NDS, and the Ministry of Defense to engage community support for security along the highways.

¶12. (C) Our greatest success on the security side is the advances in numbers and capabilities in the Afghanarmy. The army is the most trusted governmental entity, and is currently leading more than 60 percent of joint military operations. The International Community recently agreed to support the expansion of the army force structure to 134,000 (which includes a 12,000-troop trainee, transient, patient “float”). Army expansion will help meet future security requirements and take some of the pressure off of the police to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The principal challenge for both the army and police training program is a shortage of trainers, either from the U.S. or Allied nations. Karzai recognizes and is grateful for the central role of U.S. security assistance in developing the Afghansecurity forces. He will welcome reaffirmation of our support for eventual Afghanself-sufficiency and independence in the security and law enforcement fields; however, the army will continue to depend for some years on Coalition enablers such as close air support and intelligence assets.

--------------------------------------------- --------
Survey of Security in Afghanistan by Region
--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶13. (SBU) RC-East remains focused on a balanced COIN approach synchronizing operations to protect the populace and push the insurgents out while pursuing mutually reinforcing efforts in development and governance assistance; the Embassy, USAID and CJTF-101 are coordinating more closely than ever USG efforts in RC-East. The Commanders, Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding is critical to delivering quick, effective assistance projects, which, in coordination with USAID and local officials, supports both locally identified needs and longer term development goals. In RC-South, the number and lethality of IED attacks is up dramatically; significantly, in some areas the number of IEDs reported by the public to ANSF or ISAF forces is also up, reflecting public support for the Government. The approximately 2300 Marines of the recently departed 24th MEU carried out successful operations in the Garmsir District in Helmand. The insertion of other U.S. forces into the South could have a positive impact on Karzai,s confidence and quiet concerns about whether the presidential election can be safely held.

¶14. (SBU) RC-West and RC-North remain relatively quiet, although RC-West has become less stable in the past few months. A rash of kidnappings in Herat, combined with a series of insurgent attacks, including at least one that upset public access to basic needs, had resulted in a widespread lack of confidence in local governance. The GIRoA apparently recognized the danger of leaving this key region that borders Iran (and will eventually be linked to Khaf, Iran by rail service) open to growing insurgent movements and the appeal of a parallel source of governance. MoI Minister Atmar has just sacked a number of senior security officials in Herat in response to this popular unrest.

-------------------------
Afghan-Pak relations
-------------------------

¶15. (S) There,s been a sea change in bilateral ties since Musharraf,s exit. Karzai and Zardari have warm relations, which has spread to other parts of the bilateral civilian-side relationship. We also see promising signs of cooperation on the security side ) increased coordination and communication between the respective security forces along certain parts of the border, and a November meeting in Islamabad between NDS Director Saleh and ISI Director General Pasha. The two governments also convened a largely symbolic but positive &mini-jirga8 meeting in October. Continuing - though reduced - infiltration from the FATA and the recent Mumbai attacks have done little, however, to diminish Afghanistan,s ongoing distrust of the Pakistan Army and conviction that ISI is supporting rather than countering terrorism.

¶16. (U) We very much look forward to your visit.
DELL


2009/03/09BERLIN345.html
09BERLIN345 2009-03-24 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Berlin

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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3656
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1001
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2024
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0399
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000345

NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN M. KOENIG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2034
TAGS: GM MARR NATO PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL MEETING
WITH CHANCELLOR MERKEL ON THE MARGINS OF THE NATO SUMMIT

BERLIN 00000345 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


¶1. (S/NF) Chancellor Merkel will be focused on a productive,
substantive meeting when you visit Baden-Baden April 3.
Germany holds the greatest untapped potential in Europe for
our transatlantic agenda; unlocking it will take sustained
effort by the Administration, and the payoff will not be
immediate. What is most on Merkel,s mind is her political
future, six months before national elections, with her poll
numbers wobbling and her coalition increasingly
dysfunctional. Germany,s capacity to act is constrained by
(1) the short-term demands of domestic politics (about which
we can do little), (2) the slow pace of change in public
support for a German leadership role (a focus of our
engagement), and (3) the constant demands of the economic
crisis. Your meeting provides an opportunity to map out key
priorities with Germany for the remainder of Merkel,s
current term and beyond.

---------------------------------
Merkel,s Own Crisis -- Leadership
---------------------------------

¶2. (S/NF) Merkel is methodical, rational, and pragmatic --
qualities that propelled her to stratospheric levels of
public support early in her tenure, when she presided over a
recovering economy and a successful presidency of the
European Union. The past year has been less kind, and the
almost exactly equal split in the German electorate between
left and right is re-emerging as elections approach. Merkel
now faces a &Gordian knot8 of rising unemployment, economic
crisis, and domestic political dissatisfaction at a time when
she can least afford a wrong move. The effectiveness of
Merkel,s &Grand Coalition8 government is declining as her
Christian Democrats (CDU) and their Social Democratic (SPD)
partners begin in earnest their campaigns for the September
2009 election. The Chancellor,s edge over the rival SPD,
led by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, is
diminishing. When cornered, Merkel can be tenacious but is
risk averse and rarely creative. This suggests she will
remain a very circumspect Ally until the election.

¶3. (C/NF) The collapse of German exports and industrial
activity has shocked Chancellor Merkel and her advisors.
They had thought Germany would escape the worst of the world
recession thanks to its competitive position in emerging
markets. In the New Year, Merkel and Finance Minister Peer
Steinbrueck (SPD) rushed a relatively robust stimulus program
through the Bundestag that is timed to counter a surge in
unemployment just before the September elections. Like most
Germans, they doubt further deficit spending will generate
lasting growth, and fear too large a stimulus may cause
stagflation at home and dangerous new global imbalances.
Merkel and Steinbrueck remain bitter at the brush-off they
allegedly received during the last administration when they
advocated tighter financial oversight. Tougher regulations,
they insist, are essential to restore confidence in the
banking system and get credit flowing again, thus creating
the pre-conditions for a sustainable recovery.

¶4. (C/NF) Hoping to escape responsibility for the economic
crisis, Merkel has issued public critiques of U.S. recovery
policy that exaggerate the differences between Washington and
continental Europe. In fact, Germany faces many of the same
difficult choices as the U.S. The Chancellor is expected to
put forward a further stimulus package later this year. Her
government has bailed out big banks while holding firm on
state aid to ailing firms like Opel. The conventional wisdom
in Germany is that Opel could be rescued with minimum state
aid if only it could be separated from GM, but in fact there
is no viable business plan for the firm to stand on its own.
The Chancellor is surrounded by bad options: an
interventionist approach would further alienate economic
conservatives in her CDU (who are already defecting in droves
to the free-market FDP); if she does nothing, Steinmeier and
the SPD will harvest the goodwill of centrist voters for
trying to save Opel. Merkel has not been above shifting
responsibility to the USG and General Motors, which she and

BERLIN 00000345 002.2 OF 002


the German media unfairly blame for bleeding Opel dry. In
the end, Merkel,s government will likely be forced to prop
up at least parts of the automaker.

--------------------------------------------
Increasing Political Caution during Campaign
--------------------------------------------

¶5. (S/NF) Merkel and Steinmeier are pragmatists; on foreign
policy, in particular, there is more that unites them than
divides them. But the centrifugal forces of the election
campaign and the growing mistrust between the CDU and SPD
make it increasingly difficult for them to agree on any big
ideas about Germany,s role in the world or its relations
with the United States. Buffeted by events, Merkel is
struggling to define a convincing vision for &her8 Germany;
&competence8 is the sole component at this point. She is
blessed that Steinmeier, her principal competitor, faces even
greater difficulties. His party has lost its bearings in the
Grand Coalition and is plagued by internal divisions.
Steinmeier himself is a technocrat and a latecomer to
electoral politics -- his shortcomings on stage are
significant. Steinmeier has tried to make up ground on
Merkel by publicly identifying himself with the new U.S.
Administration. However, his ability to deliver on policy
initiatives without the Chancellor,s political support is
limited.

¶6. (C/NF) Afghanistan is an example. Merkel has been
cautious throughout her chancellorship and has doggedly
resisted real or perceived pressure for Germany to take on a
larger military role. She and Steinmeier both have supported
the Comprehensive Approach, but the Chancellor,s CDU, in the
face of public skepticism, is reluctant even to consider
increasing police or civilian support. Steinmeier and the
SPD have been more forward-leaning, but they cannot deliver
on their own. You should emphasize that at the moment the
U.S. is not seeking significant additional military forces
from Germany, but that every member of the international
community will need to do much more (e.g., training security
forces and providing civilian assistance) if we are to be
successful.

---------------------------------------
Policy Opportunities on Russia and Iran
---------------------------------------

¶7. (C/NF) Germany should play a central role with the U.S.
in defining a coordinated western Russia policy that resets
the relationship without retreating from our values. The
winter gas crisis made Germans rethink Russia,s reliability
as a supplier, but the lack of alternatives and the
desirability of gas as a clean energy source have left the
government resigned to dependency on Russia in the
near-to-medium term. On energy as well as Georgia, neither
Merkel nor Steinmeier has identified areas where German
policy steps could help create a more persuasive set of
incentives for Russia to integrate further into rules-based
relationships and institutions. Meanwhile, Germany is
concerned about threats to economic and social stability in
Central and Eastern Europe, but prefers EU and IMF approaches
to limit its share of the bill.

¶8. (C/NF) Both Merkel and Steinmeier welcomed your Nowruz
address to the Iranian people and government. They support
the U.S. investment in the diplomatic track and agree that
Germany and the EU need to invest in the economic pressure
track. Germany,s close ties to Israel include an imperative
to defend Israel,s right to exist and to play an active role
in international non-proliferation efforts toward Iran.
Merkel will be looking to the meeting to gain a better
understanding of how you see the USG Iran policy unfolding
and what role we need Germany to play.

¶9. (U) Mr. President, Mission Germany is honored to support
you on your first overseas trip as President, and we look
forward to welcoming you in Baden-Baden.
Koenig


2009/03/09KABUL467.html
09KABUL467 2009-03-02 13:01 2010-12-02 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kabul

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P 021338Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7574
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000467

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 07/07/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: NEGATIVE INFLUENCE OF CERTAIN KARZAI ADVISORS

REF: KABUL 139

Classified By: CDA Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. Individuals formerly close to President Karzai attribute blame for Karzai’s recent unpredictable behavior to the influence of a trio of Palace advisors. Critics say Palace Chief of Staff Mohammad Daudzai, Education Minister Farooq Wardak, and Information and Culture Minister Abdul Karim Khoram provide misleading advice and conspire to isolate Karzai from more pragmatic (and pro-Western) advisors in a purposeful effort to antagonize Western countries, especially the United States. These three share a common link to the mujahideen-era Hezb-e-Islami organization, stoking suspicions, particularly among non-Pashtuns, that their efforts are part of a larger conspiracy. But in a rumor-driven country such as Afghanistan, assumptions can far outstrip reality. There is a wide consensus that these three currently have Karzai’s ear, but allowances have to be made for Afghanrumor mongering and Karzai’s own conspirational outlook.

Karzai’s Advisor Bubble
----------

¶2. (C/NF) Many Karzai supporters, some who have been with the president since his transitional administration and 2004 presidential campaign, have expressed frustration over their lack of direct access to Karzai. They say Chief of Staff Daudzai has restricted access to the president and prevented other Palace staff from meeting alone with Karzai. When petitioners do receive meetings, Daudzai is always present. MPs also complain Karzai is less accessible than he was two years ago, and repeatedly ignores their meeting requests. Many former allies have either withdrawn their support for his re-election or have held off on publicly committing to his campaign (reftel).

¶3. (C/NF) Palace Chief of Policy Sebghatullah Sanjar said Daudzai feeds the president misinformation and highlights negative coverage of his government, turning Karzai against former allies and influencing his opinions of people he has not yet met. Sanjar said Daudzai began to cut off Karzai’s one-on-one meetings with other Palace staff in 2008, though Sanjar succeeded in seeing the president without Daudzai twice in the last two months. Sanjar and others say Daudzai is Karzai’s most influential advisor on Afghanistan’s foreign policy and reconciliation initiatives. Many believe Daudzai is steering the president into closer ties with Iran, Russia, and Taliban leaders.

¶4. (C/NF) Sanjar describes Karzai as a “lonely and alone man” who suspects his inner circle is leading him in the wrong direction, but does not know who else to trust. The president pays significant attention to the mostly negative media coverage of his government, perpetuating his suspicions that enemies are “out to get him.” Daudzai and Khoram have convinced Karzai to take a harder line against his critics, regardless of whether they are traditional rivals or allies providing constructive criticism. Sanjar suggests this advice is a factor in Karzai’s emotional reactions to civilian casualty incidents and his publicized dialogue with Russia. Former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah claimed Daudzai and Farooq Wardak know how to manipulate Karzai’s thought process and tendency to make emotional decisions based on unvetted information. Abdullah also asserts that Karzai is increasingly paranoid, and prone to a conspirational outlook on life, leading him to blame all problems on others and unable to see his own role in mistakes.

¶5. (C/NF) FM Spanta objects to Daudzai’s conduct on limiting access, including for Spanta, and to Daudzai’s policy influence. They have a cool relationship. Palace Deputy Chief of Staff Homayra Etemadi affirms the observations of others on Daudzai’s ill influence over Karzai. She distrusts her boss, and has recommended the Embassy consider carefully what kinds of information it shares with Daudzai. MFA Chief of Protocol Hamid Sidiq is convinced that Daudzai, who once served as Afghanistan’s ambassador to Tehran, is working to advance Tehran’s interests ahead of the United States’ vis-a-vis the Palace. Sidiq reported that Daudzai recently overruled an MFA decision to turn down a meeting request to Karzai by an 8-person delegation of Iranian television officials. Earlier that day the Palace had limited an official Canadian delegation to five members to see Karzai.

¶6. (C/NF) Information Minister Khoram and Education Minister Wardak get their fair share of criticism as well. Social moderates like Lower House MP Shukria Barakzai (Kabul, Pashtun), Upper House MP Rida Azimi (Parwan, Tajik), and former Wardak Governor Abdul Jabbar Naeemi blame Khoram for Karzai’s increasingly conservative stands on social issues
KABUL 00000467 002 OF 002
and Wardak for the president’s hesitance to publicly criticize the Taliban and other insurgent groups. United Front members and other contacts are incensed that Karzai criticizes the United States and other Coalition partners after civilian casualty incidents, but only issues muted statements through his press office or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after deadly insurgent attacks, such as the Feb. 11 attacks on government ministries in Kabul.

The Hezb-e-Islami Connection
----------

¶7. (C/NF) Daudzai, Khoram, and Wardak were members of Hezb-e-Islami (HI) in the 1980s, during the mujahideen campaign against Soviet forces. The majority-Pashtun HI’s later rivalry with the Tajik-centric Jamiat-e-Milli and other resistance groups has left a legacy of ethnic-based tension among mujahideen today. None of the three advisors is a member of Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan, the political party that broke with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in order to re-join Afghanpolitics. However, many Tajiks and other non-Pashtuns maintain their suspicions that every promotion or appointment of a former HI member or current HIA member is part of a conspiracy of “Pashtunization” of the government driven by Daudzai, Wardak, and Khoram.

¶8. (C/NF) HIA Chairman Arghandewal suspects Daudzai manipulates Karzai’s political views, but denies any connection between his party and the three advisors. Arghandewal, who serves as a tribal advisor to the Karzai, has not had a one-on-one conversation with the president in more than nine months, rendering him an “advisor who does not give advice.” He said HIA members are frustrated by the public’s association of them with the Daudzai-Wardak-Khoram bloc, since the three have no current ties to the party and were only minor figures in the mujahideen years. Arghandewal, Hekmatyar’s chief financial officer for several years, said he may have met Daudzai or Khoram in passing during the 1980s, but only became aware of their HI connections after their current rise to prominence.

Conspiracy or Projection?
----------

¶9. (C/NF) In Afghanistan, all criticism and personal attacks should be taken with a grain of salt and examined carefully for underlying and ulterior motives. That said, the criticism of Karzai’s inner circle spans the ideological spectrum and includes detractors from all major ethnic groups. By all accounts, Karzai’s access to one-time loyalists has been more limited over the past year. But those who feel loyalty to or pity for the embattled president may be projecting their frustrations away from Karzai and on to the nearest target, his advisors. Others, mostly ethnic northerners inclined to distrust any Pashtun leader’s motives, see the Hezb-e-Islami connections of Daudzai, Wardak, and Khoram as all the proof they need to substantiate their conspiracy theories. But Hezb-e-Islami members tend to be among the most educated Afghanmujahideen, and thus the fact that they may be in positions of technocratic power today - close to Karzai or not - is understandable in a government with a thin pool of competency to draw from.

¶10. (C/NF) For the impartial observer, it is difficult to determine whether these three advisors do indeed have their own agenda or whether Karzai’s reliance on their counsel is a reflection of his own political leanings. What is clear, however, is that the characterizations of Karzai’s emotional and psychological state by his Afghancritics reported here are by and large consistent with our own observations and dealings with him. DELL


2009/06/09STATE62395.html
09STATE62395 2009-06-16 21:09 2010-12-02 20:08 SECRET//NOFORN Secretary of State

R 162145Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC// 0000

S E C R E T STATE 062395

NOFORN

EO 12958 DECL: 06/16/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, RO
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: ROMANIA

REF: STATE 18770

Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C)

¶1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Romania (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to Romania (paragraph 2).
¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on Romania and sets forth a list of priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Romania. The priorities may also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
¶B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
¶C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD,s issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.

¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting ) including on Romania:
¶A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community’s collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC. State reporting officers are encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as information becomes available.
¶B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to Romania: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet “handles”, internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.

¶3. (S/NF) Romanian NHCD - priority issues:
¶A. National Leadership and Governance 1) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4) 2) National Leadership (LEAD-3H) 3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-4H) B. Financial Stability, Energy Security, and Societal Challenges 1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-5) 2) Energy Security (ESEC-3H) 3) Money Laundering (MONY-5H) 4) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H) C. Foreign Relations 1) Black Sea, Balkans, and Other Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H) 2) Russia (FPOL-4H) 3) European Union (FPOL-4H) 4) The United States (FPOL-4H) 5) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H) D. National Security 1) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H) 3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H) 4) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-4H) 5) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H) 6) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H) E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)

¶4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:

¶A. National Leadership and Governance
1) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4). Policies, plans, and efforts to develop, protect, and strengthen independent and effective judiciary, including advocates, opponents, obstacles, and progress. Government, non-public and public views about, and indications of, impact of corruption and crime on governance, internal development, financial stability, intelligence and security services, weapons security, military readiness, and foreign investment. Details about organized crime groups, including leadership, links to government and foreign entities, drug and human trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, and computer-related crimes, including child pornography. Details about cyber crime. Government plans and efforts to combat cyber crime. Details about drug trafficking, including trends, types of drugs, production, identification of trafficking groups and individuals, money laundering, and smuggling methods and routes. Government counter-drug control and enforcement plans, organizations, capabilities, and activities. Government efforts to cooperate with international partners to control illicit drug trade. Illegal acquisition of government documents, such as passports and driver licenses. Links between organized crime groups, cyber criminals, and terrorists. Details about law enforcement organizations and capabilities, including procedures, capabilities, challenges, and plans to remedy obstacles to swift and equal justice. Plans and efforts of law enforcement organizations to use biometric systems.
2) National Leadership (LEAD-3H). Objectives, strategies, efforts, authorities, and responsibilities of national leaders. Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts. Identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors, supporters, and opponents. Decisionmaking procedures, including differences under varying circumstances. Relations among national government entities, including president, premier, ministers, national security and defense council, intelligence and security services, legislature, prosecutor general, and judiciary. Corruption among senior officials, including off-budget financial flows in support of senior leaders. Sources of funding for political candidates, and government plans and efforts to ensure funding transparency. Public support for or opposition to administration, as well as government strategies and tactics to increase, maintain, and exercise authority. Assessment, vulnerability, personality, financial, health, and biometric information about current and emerging leaders and advisors.
3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-4H). Government and public commitment to, and plans and efforts to protect and strengthen, representative government, rule of law, freedom of press, religious freedom, private ownership, and individual liberties. Policies and efforts regarding political, judicial, economic, social, and educational reform. Plans and programs to manage perceptions, including through media manipulation. Popular attitudes about Romania,s evolving political, philosophical, and regional identity. Identification, roles, goals, and composition of significant societal groups, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Developments within political parties and blocs. Details about internal workings of major political parties. Strength and vitality of political parties. Information about opposition and extremist groups, including domestic and foreign support.

¶B. Financial Stability, Energy Security, and Societal Challenges
1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-5). Plans and efforts to respond to global financial crisis. Public response to financial challenges. Leadership concerns about, and efforts to avoid, economic collapse. Opposition, extremist, and fringe group plans and efforts to exploit financial crisis to achieve objectives. Plans and efforts regarding economic cooperation with the US, EU, Group of Eight, and international financial institutions, including World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Paris Club. Plans and efforts to pursue economic reform, including among monetary and fiscal policies. Plans and efforts to develop national infrastructure, and private sector and market institutions, including financial system. Plans and efforts to adopt international investment norms, protect intellectual property, and support entrepreneurs, especially in small and medium businesses. Plans and efforts to attract and retain foreign investment. Plans and efforts to protect foreign investors from government corruption and inefficiencies. National and regional economic conditions, including real output, domestic and foreign investment, foreign trade, capital flight, monetization, and gray economy. Plans and efforts to limit capital flight and barter. Economic policy decisionmaker identities, philosophies, roles, interrelations, and decisionmaking processes. Role of private businessmen in economic planning. Published and non-published national budget, including oversight and associated banks and financial institutions. Details about major financial institutions. Plans and efforts to comply with IMF agreements. Plans and efforts regarding Euro adoption.
2) Energy Security (ESEC-3H). Policies, plans, and efforts to diversify energy sources and develop, rehabilitate, or expand energy infrastructure, including investment in capacity, efficiency, storage, nuclear power, flex-fuel, or other sources of alternative energy. Details about financing strategies, and openness to foreign investment. Willingness, plans, and efforts to develop and implement unified Europe energy security strategy. Declared and secret energy agreements with Russia, Iran, other Caspian basin countries, and others. Details about national energy policymakers, key commercial figures in the sector, and their relations with other national leaders. Views about and responses to Russian plans and efforts regarding Romanian dependence on Russian energy. Factors, including corruption and foreign influence, affecting government decisionmaking on key energy issues. Energy imports, including sufficiency, impact on economy, and influence on bilateral relations. Organized crime involvement in energy sector.
3) Money Laundering (MONY-5H). Government plans and efforts to implement anti-money laundering legislation, enforcement, and prosecution. Money laundering, including methods, techniques, transactions, locations, and associated individuals, organizations, and institutions. Use of shell corporations and non-financial intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, and casinos, as well as related bank accounts to launder criminal proceeds. Links between money laundering groups and terrorists. Drug traffic involvement in money laundering. Use of money laundering as an influence-gaining measure.
4) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H). Information about, and government policies and efforts regarding, religious and ethnic minorities, especially Hungarians, Roma, and Turks. Public attitudes toward minorities. Indications of human rights abuses. Details about demography, including birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, incidence of infectious diseases, and migration. Plans and efforts to respond to declining birth rates, including through promotion of immigration.

¶C. Foreign Relations
1) Black Sea, Balkans, and Other Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts regarding relations with Black Sea and other regional neighbors. Plans and efforts to jointly respond to challenges regarding counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and illegal migration. Plans and efforts regarding cooperative agreements, especially Black Sea FOR, Harmony, Enhanced Black Sea Security Proposal, and Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone. Romanian participation in US-sponsored programs designed to promote regional security cooperation, healthy civil-military relations, and effective management of military resources. Plans and efforts regarding Russian influence in the region, especially on politics, energy, and other domestic issues. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors on energy security. Details about disputes and rivalries with neighbors. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Romanian minorities in neighboring countries. Relations with, and military deployments in, the Balkans. Plans and efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, especially Macedonia. Plans and efforts regarding Moldova and Kosovo. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Ballistic Missile Defense.
2) Russia (FPOL-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts regarding relations with Russia, especially on strategic issues, such as energy, security, transportation, and trade. Details about personal relations between Romanian leaders and Russian officials or businessmen. Senior leadership, intelligence officials, and ministerial-level vulnerabilities to Russian influence. Efforts to cooperate with or oppose Russia in support of, or opposition to, US policies. Leadership and public views about relations with Russia. Government and public attitudes about Russia,s strategic objectives in the region, and Romania,s vulnerability to Russian coercion and influence.
3) European Union (FPOL-4H). Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts regarding the European Union (EU). Evidence of, and thoughts about, increasing reliance upon EU, and diminishing reliance upon US, regional leadership. Leadership and public views about levels of influence among European states, including relations between states and EU institutions as well as emergence of a preeminent state or a core alliance in Europe. Evidence of Romanian mismanagement of EU funding, and government efforts to ensure transparent management of foreign aid. Details about formal and informal alliances between Romania and other EU states, including plans and efforts to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors, EU members, and non-state actors to influence EU policies. Plans and efforts, including investment strategies, regarding European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Plans and efforts regarding EU expansion. Plans and efforts regarding specific EU policies and decisions.
4) The United States (FPOL-4H). Policies, strategies, and efforts concerning relations with the US. Expectations regarding diplomatic, security, and economic relations with the US. Leadership and public perceptions about US regional policies, presence, and activities. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US positions in international fora.
5) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts to pursue national objectives in international fora, such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Plans and efforts regarding leadership opportunities in international organizations. Details about relations with China and nations that are hostile to US interests.

¶D. National Security
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H). Plans, efforts, and ability to maintain defense spending for force modernization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interoperability, meeting NATO-required spending levels and force goals, and defense capability initiative implementation. Strategy and efforts to win public support for such spending. Plans and efforts to fulfill commitments to NATO, including manpower and equipment for out-of-area operations. Actions to accommodate NATO procedures and methods. Government and public confidence in NATO Article 5 security guarantees. Attitudes toward stationing or long-term deployment of NATO or US forces on Romanian soil, NATO commands in Romania, and out-of-country deployments of Romanian forces. Plans and efforts regarding NATO enlargement, including strategic concepts and future roles of the alliance. Government, including military, intelligence, and security service willingness, ability, and efforts to protect US and NATO classified information. Awareness of and concern about foreign penetration. Implementation and strengthening of personnel-vetting procedures. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding EU defense and security cooperation, including ESDP; views and intentions regarding any conflict between ESDP and NATO obligations.
3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H). Details about threat assessment, including agreement and disagreement among civilian and military leaders. Perceptions about, and response to, cyber warfare threat. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Willingness and capability to participate in NATO, EU, and other multilateral relationships, including out-of-area operations, multinational peacekeeping force in Southeast Europe, and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Policies and efforts regarding access, overflight, and transit of US military forces and equipment. Disposition, readiness, and mission of military forces. Plans and efforts regarding force structure, military reform, and modernization, including future roles, strengths, and compositions of military services. Details about military cooperation with other nations. Details about defense industry, including plans and efforts to cooperate with foreign nations and actors. Weapon system development programs, firms, and facilities. Types, production rates, and factory markings of major weapon systems. Decisionmaking regarding acquisition of US or other nation weapon systems. Military and paramilitary manpower, structure, budget and expenditure by service and function, mission, doctrine, tactics, order of battle, command and control, equipment, maintenance, training, exercise participation, support for international peacekeeping operations, professionalism, non-commissioned officer development, health care, pay, housing, loyalty, and morale. Civil-military relations. Perceptions about, and commitment to, intelligence sharing agreements with the US. Indications of national-level denial and deception program, including doctrine, targets, goals, organizations, and activities. Location, mission, organization, associated personnel, funding, development, and use of underground facilities and other hardened structures, including for protection of command and control networks, civil and military leaders, and critical resources. Details about, and transfer of, advanced engineering techniques to harden key facilities, including by use of specialty concretes. Details about dual use of underground civil infrastructure. Plans and efforts to help other states develop underground facilities and other hardened structures.
4) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-4H). Commitment, plans, efforts, and ability to manage a secure military export regime, including details about monitoring end user activities and imposing penalties for violations. Organizational readiness and capability of border police and customs officials to control borders. Plans and efforts to adhere to international control regimes. Plans and efforts to implement legislation and enforce effective export licensing regimes. Willingness and efforts to cooperate with the US to prevent proliferation. Foreign use of Romania as weapons transshipment point. Details about weapons transportation, including associated firms, agents, modes, methods, routes, nodes, schedules, and communications. Details about organizations, groups, and individuals engage in sales of weapons or technologies to states that are hostile to US interests or non-state entities. Plans and efforts to circumvent antiproliferation treaties and arrangements.
5) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H). Government counterterrorism policies, plans, capabilities, and efforts. Government and public support for or opposition to US efforts, including military operations, in the war on international terrorism. Government willingness, capability, and effort to establish and protect legislative framework to combat terrorists; control borders; detain terrorists; seize terrorist-associated bank accounts; share intelligence; and protect weapons, associated facilities, and energy and other critical infrastructure against terrorist attack and intrusion. Terrorist plans to attack US and other persons, facilities, or interests. Terrorist plans and efforts to acquire or transship chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Terrorist identities, motives, objectives, strategies, locations, facilities, command structures, links to other groups or states, associations with humanitarian or medical groups, use of forged and/or modified travel documents, telecommunication methods and modes, transportation, funding, finance and business operations, security, recruitment, and training. Indications of foreign entity, public, or local support for terrorists. Details about terrorist involvement in illicit drug and other criminal trade.
6) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H). Information to support US contingency planning, including for noncombatant evacuation, and humanitarian and medical relief operations. Current status, vulnerability of, and plans to modify, critical infrastructures, especially transportation, energy, and communications. Civilian and military medical and life science capabilities and infrastructures. Military medical research and development, including new vaccines, therapeutics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear medical defense. Information, including statistics, about infectious diseases, such as avian influenza, tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome, hepatitis A, and tickborne encephalitis. Locations and levels of chemical and radiological contamination of food, water, air, and soil. Locations and types of industrial facilities with chemicals stored onsite. Descriptions and locations of potential evacuation sites, police and fire stations, hospitals, hotels, and diplomatic facilities. Plans and capabilities of government and NGOs to support, including provision of security for, relief operations. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding detained, captured, and arrested US persons, including prisoners of war and missing in action.
¶E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). Current specifications, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, networks, and technologies used by civilian and military government authorities, including intelligence and security services. Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled telecommunications equipment and technology. Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.
CLINTON


2009/06/09STATE62397.html
09STATE62397 2009-06-16 21:09 2010-12-02 20:08 SECRET//NOFORN Secretary of State

R 162148Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC// 0000

S E C R E T STATE 062397

NOFORN

EO 12958 DECL: 06/11/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, SI
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: SLOVENIA

REF: STATE 18774

Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).

¶1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Slovenia (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to Slovenia (paragraph 2).
¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on Slovenia and sets forth a list of priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Slovenia. The priorities may also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
¶B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
¶C. (S/NF) Important information responsible to the NHCD often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD,s issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.

¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting ) including on Slovenia:
¶A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community’s collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC. State reporting offiers are encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as information becomes available.
¶B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to Slovenia: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet “handles”, internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.

¶3. (S/NF) Slovenia NHCD outline -- priority issues:
¶A. Foreign Relations and Energy Security 1) Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H) 2) European Union (FPOL-4H) 3) Energy Security (ESEC-4H) 4) The United States (FPOL-4H) 5) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H) B. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal Challenges 1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-4H) 2) Money Laundering (MONY-5H) 3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H) C. National Security 1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H) 2) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H) 3) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H) 4) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 5) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H) D. National Leadership and Governance 1) National Leadership (LEAD-4H) 2) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4H) 3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-5H) E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)

¶4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:
¶A. Foreign Relations and Energy Security
1) Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts regarding relations with regional neighbors, including Russia. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors on energy security. Details about disputes with neighbors, especially Croatia. Relations with, and military deployments in, the Balkans. Plans and efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Plans and efforts regarding Moldova and Kosovo. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Ballistic Missile Defense.
2) European Union (FPOL-4H). Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts regarding the European Union (EU). Leadership and public views about levels of influence among European states, including relations between states and EU institutions as well as emergence of a preeminent state or a core alliance in Europe. Details about formal and informal alliances between Slovenia and other EU states, including plans and efforts to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors, EU members, and non-state actors to influence EU policies. Plans and efforts regarding European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Plans and efforts regarding EU expansion. Plans and efforts regarding specific EU policies and decisions.
3) Energy Security (ESEC-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts to diversify energy sources and develop, rehabilitate, or expand energy infrastructure, including investment in capacity, efficiency, storage, nuclear power, flex-fuel, or other sources of alternative energy. Details about financing strategies, and openness to foreign investment. Willingness, plans, and efforts to develop and implement unified Europe energy security strategy. Declared and secret energy agreements with Russia, Caspian basin countries, and others. Details about national energy policymakers, key commercial figures in the sector, and their relations with other national leaders. Views about and responses to Russian plans and efforts regarding Slovenian dependence on Russian energy. Factors influencing government decisionmaking on key energy issues. Details about personal relations between Slovenian leaders and Russian leaders and businessmen. Energy imports, including sufficiency, impact on economy, and influence on bilateral relations. Organized crime involvement in energy sector.
4) The United States (FPOL-4H). Policies, strategies, and efforts concerning relations with the US. Expectations regarding diplomatic, security, and economic relations with the US. Leadership and public perceptions about US regional policies, presence, and activities. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US positions in international fora.
5) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts to pursue national objectives in international fora, such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Plans and efforts regarding leadership opportunities in international organizations. Details about relations with China, Iran, and nations that are hostile to US interests.
¶B. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal Challenges
1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-4H). Plans and efforts to respond to global financial crisis. Public response to financial challenges. Opposition, extremist, and fringe group plans and efforts to exploit financial crisis to achieve objectives. Details about major financial institutions. Plans and efforts regarding economic cooperation with the US, EU, Group of Eight, and international financial institutions, including World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Paris Club. National and regional economic conditions, including real output, domestic and foreign investment, foreign trade, capital flight, monetization, and gray economy. Plans and efforts to pursue economic reform, including among monetary and fiscal policies. Plans and efforts to limit capital flight and barter. Economic policy decisionmaker identities, philosophies, roles, interrelations, and decisionmaking processes. Role of private businessmen in economic planning. Published and non-published national budget, including oversight and associated banks and financial institutions. Plans and efforts to comply with IMF agreements.
2) Money Laundering (MONY-5H). Government plans and efforts to implement anti-money laundering legislation, enforcement, and prosecution. Money laundering, including methods, techniques, transactions, locations, and associated individuals, organizations, and institutions. Use of shell corporations and non-financial intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, and casinos, as well as related bank accounts to launder criminal proceeds. Links between money laundering groups and terrorists. Drug traffic involvement in money laundering. Use of money laundering as an influence-gaining measure.
3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H). Information about, and government policies and efforts regarding, religious and ethnic minorities. Public attitudes toward minorities. Indications of human rights abuses. Details about demography, including birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, incidence of infectious diseases, and migration. Plans and efforts to respond to declining birth rates, including through promotion of immigration.
¶C. National Security
1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H). Plans, efforts, and ability to maintain defense spending for force modernization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interoperability, meeting NATO-required spending levels and force goals, and defense capability initiative implementation. Strategy and efforts to win public support for such spending. Plans and efforts to fulfill commitments to NATO, including manpower and equipment for out-of-area operations. Actions to accommodate NATO procedures and methods. Government and public confidence in NATO Article 5 security guarantees. Attitudes toward stationing or long-term deployment of NATO or US forces on Slovenian soil, NATO commands in Slovenia, and out-of-country deployments of Slovenian forces. Plans and efforts regarding NATO enlargement, including strategic concepts and future roles of the alliance. Government, including military, intelligence, and security service willingness, ability, and efforts to protect US and NATO classified information. Awareness of and concern about foreign penetration. Implementation and strengthening of personnel-vetting procedures. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding EU defense and security cooperation, including ESDP; views and intentions regarding any conflict between ESDP and NATO obligations.
2) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H). Details about threat assessment, including agreement and disagreement among civilian and military leaders. Perceptions about, and response to, cyber warfare threat. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Willingness and capability to participate in NATO, EU, and other multilateral relationships, including out-of-area operations, multinational peacekeeping force in Southeast Europe, and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Policies and efforts regarding access, overflight, and transit of US military forces and equipment. Disposition, readiness, and mission of military forces. Plans and efforts regarding force structure, military reform, and modernization, including future roles, strengths, and compositions of military services. Details about military cooperation with other nations. Details about defense industry, including plans and efforts to cooperate with foreign nations and actors. Weapon system development programs, firms, and facilities. Types, production rates, and factory markings of major weapon systems. Decisionmaking regarding acquisition of US or other nation weapon systems. Commitment, plans, efforts, and ability to manage a secure military export regime, including details about monitoring end user activities and imposing penalties for violations. Foreign use of Slovenia as weapons transshipment point. Details about weapons transportation, including associated firms, agents, modes, methods, routes, nodes, schedules, and communications. Military and paramilitary manpower, structure, budget and expenditure by service and function, mission, doctrine, tactics, order of battle, command and control, equipment, maintenance, training, exercise participation, support for international peacekeeping operations, professionalism, non-commissioned officer development, health care, pay, housing, loyalty, and morale. Civil-military relations. Perceptions about, and commitment to, intelligence sharing agreements with the US. Indications of national-level denial and deception program, including doctrine, targets, goals, organizations, and activities. Location, mission, organization, associated personnel, funding, development, and use of underground facilities and other hardened structures, including for protection of command and control networks, civil and military leaders, and critical resources. Details about, and transfer of, advanced engineering techniques to harden key facilities, including by use of specialty concretes. Details about dual use of underground civil infrastructure. Plans and efforts to help other states develop underground facilities and other hardened structures.
3) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H). Government counterterrorism policies, plans, capabilities, and efforts. Government and public support for or opposition to US efforts, including military operations, in the war on international terrorism. Government willingness, capability, and effort to establish and protect legislative framework to combat terrorists; control borders; detain terrorists; seize terrorist-associated bank accounts; share intelligence; and protect weapons, associated facilities, and energy and other critical infrastructure against terrorist attack and intrusion. Terrorist plans to attack US and other persons, facilities, or interests. Terrorist plans and efforts to acquire or transship chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Terrorist identities, motives, objectives, strategies, locations, facilities, command structures, links to other groups or states, associations with humanitarian or medical groups, use of forged and/or modified travel documents, telecommunication methods and modes, transportation, funding, finance and business operations, security, recruitment, and training. Indications of foreign entity, public, or local support for terrorists. Details about terrorist involvement in illicit drug and other criminal trade.
4) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
5) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H). Information to support US contingency planning, including noncombatant evacuation, and humanitarian and medical relief operations. Current status, vulnerability of, and plans to modify, critical infrastructures, especially transportation, energy, and communications. Plans and efforts regarding Pan-European transport corridor. Civilian and military medical and life science capabilities and infrastructures. Military medical research and development, including new vaccines, therapeutics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear medical defense. Information, including statistics, about infectious diseases, such as avian influenza, tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome, hepatitis A, and tickborne encephalitis. Locations and levels of chemical and radiological contamination of food, water, air, and soil. Locations and types of industrial facilities with chemicals stored onsite. Descriptions and locations of potential evacuation sites, police and fire stations, hospitals, hotels, and diplomatic facilities. Plans and capabilities of government and NGOs to support, including provision of security for, relief operations. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding detained, captured, and arrested US persons, including prisoners of war and missing in action.
¶D. National Leadership and Governance
1) National Leadership (LEAD-4H). Objectives, strategies, efforts, authorities, and responsibilities of national leaders. Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts. Identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors, supporters, and opponents. Decisionmaking procedures, including differences under varying circumstances. Relations among national government entities, including president, premier, ministers, national security and defense council, intelligence and security services, legislature, prosecutor general, and judiciary. Corruption among senior officials, including off-budget financial flows in support of senior leaders. Sources of funding for political candidates, and government plans and efforts to ensure funding transparency. Public support for or opposition to administration, as well as government strategies and tactics to increase, maintain, and exercise authority. Biographic, personality, health, biometric, financial, assessment, and vulnerability information about current and emerging leaders and advisors.
2) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts to protect and strengthen independent and effective judiciary, including advocates, opponents, obstacles, and progress. Government and public views about, and indications of, impact of corruption and crime on governance, internal development, weapons security, military readiness, and foreign investment. Details about organized crime groups, including leadership, links to government and foreign entities, drug and human trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, and computer-related crimes, including child pornography. Details about drug trafficking, including trends, types of drugs, production, identification of trafficking groups and individuals, money laundering, and smuggling methods and routes. Government counter-drug control and enforcement plans, organizations, capabilities, and activities. Government efforts to cooperate with international partners to control illicit drug trade. Illegal acquisition of government documents, such as passports and driver licenses. Links between terrorists, organized crime groups, and cyber criminals. Indications of fraud or corruption in implementation of private property restitution policies. Details about law enforcement organizations and capabilities, including procedures, capabilities, challenges, and plans to remedy obstacles to swift and equal justice. Plans and efforts of law enforcement organizations to use biometric systems. Plans and efforts to combat intellectual property rights crime.
3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-5H). Government and public commitment to, and plans and efforts to protect and strengthen, representative government, rule of law, freedom of press, religious freedom, private ownership, and individual liberties. Policies and efforts regarding political, judicial, economic, social, and educational reform. Plans and programs to manage perceptions, including through media manipulation. Identification, roles, goals, and composition of significant societal groups, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Developments within political parties and blocs. Details about internal workings of major political parties. Strength and vitality of political parties. Information about opposition and extremist groups, including domestic and foreign support.
¶E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). Current specifications, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, networks, and technologies used by civilian and military government authorities, including intelligence and security services. Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled telecommunications equipment and technology. Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.
CLINTON


2009/07/09KABUL1767.html
09KABUL1767 2009-07-07 13:01 2010-12-02 21:09 SECRET Embassy Kabul

VZCZCXRO6511
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1767/01 1881329
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071329Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0009
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001767

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI ON THE STATE OF US-AFGHAN RELATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. In a series of meetings this week, I
discussed with President Karzai a number of issues, including
Karzai's concerns with the future of US policy on
Afghanistan, and his opinions on where US policy here had
failed. The meetings were cordial, but raised certain
concerns for me about the status of the US-Afghan
relationship, both in the lead up to the election and over
the long term, should Karzai win reelection. Karzai's
comments reinforce my belief that our relationship must be a
two-way partnership of obligations and responsibilities. We
must also convince Karzai to put his backing behind
democratic institutions and professionalized security forces
are better equipped to lead Afghanistan into the future,
rather than Karzai's preference for tribal structures and
informal power networks. This cable summarizes the content
of these four recent meetings, as well as a subsequent
conversation with Interior Minister Atmar. End Summary.

¶2. (S/NF) I met with Karzai on four occasions this week: on
June 30 with COMISAF Gen. McChrystal and most of Karzai's
national security team, and three times on July 1, xxxxxxxxxxxx, and
finally with CODEL Ellsworth. Karzai maintained a calm
demeanor throughout, but at several times displayed views
that troubled me with their potential implications for
US-Afghanrelations. I also called on Atmar on July 2.

Kandahar Incident
----------

¶3. (S/NF) At the June 30 meeting with Karzai and his
national security advisors, Gen. McChrystal and I briefed
Karzai on a June 29 incident in which a USG-funded, equipped,
and mentored paramilitary force attacked a Kandahar
courthouse. The incident resulted in the deaths of several
AfghanNational Police officers. Karzai had earlier received
phone calls from high-level US officials regretting the
incident, so was calm and did not display the type of emotive
anger he has shown following civilian casualty incidents. In
the later one-on-one meeting with me, I reminded Karzai that
he had selected and introduced this paramilitary unit's
recruits to the USG in 2002, a fact that he had conveniently
omitted in larger group settings.

¶4. (S/NF) Karzai insisted that units operating outside of
the Afghanarmed forces must be brought under the legitimate
control of the Afghangovernment. Gen. McChrystal and I
agreed that both counterterrorism paramilitary units and
private security companies (PSCs) require more rigorous
oversight and be brought under the eventual control of the
Afghangovernment. PSCs required stronger regulations, yet
the government should also adopt more transparent licensing
procedures.

US Policy on Afghanistan
----------

¶5. (S/NF) Karzai declared in all four meetings that he
believed the US was not speaking clearly to Afghans on its
goals in Afghanistan. Karzai contended that in 2002 the US
had stated a clear purpose for being involved in Afghanistan
but had lost its purpose over the past six years. As he has
in past meetings with us, Karzai either stated his belief in
or repeated rumors questioning the US commitment to a strong
partnership with Afghanistan.

¶6. (S/NF) Karzai reported Pakistani intelligence officials
had alleged to Afghanofficials that the US intended to
divide Pakistan and weaken Afghanistan in order to pursue its
fight against terrorist groups. At the same time, Karzai
accused Iran of trying to weaken Afghanistan by supporting
the presidential campaign of Abdullah Abdullah in order to
promote a decentralization agenda that would strip power from
the central government to give to sub-national actors over
whom Iran believed it would have more control.
Incredulously, Karzai appeared to accept so-called rumors
that the US and Iran were working together to support
Abdullah against him.

¶7. (S/NF) I pushed back strongly on this misinformation in
the June 30 meeting with Karzai's national security team,
reiterating to Karzai that there was no overt or covert US
program to support any presidential candidate. I then asked
Karzai if he took me at my word on this issue. Karzai,
perhaps not wanting to back down in front of his advisors,
said that he did not. Karzai said the US had actively
encouraged Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani, and Zalmay Khalilzad to
run for the presidency. At one point Karzai joked that I
should "consult my (above) buddies" on national security
issues. I repeated that the US had no favored candidates in

Kabul 00001767 002 of 003


the race and the formal setting of the meeting was not a
proper forum to make such inappropriate comments. He was
embarrassed and helpfully shifted the conversation to another
topic. I also urged Karzai to move away from conspiratorial
thinking and instead focus on bringing ideas for the future
into his campaign. Introducing a clear platform now will put
him in a better position to move forward if he wins
reelection.

US Mistakes in Afghanistan
----------

¶8. (S/NF) Karzai and I held a one-on-one meeting shortly
before meeting CODEL Ellsworth. Karzai agreed with my
suggestion to make a better effort to present the case for
continued and productive US engagement in his meetings with
USG visitors from Washington. However, as the CODEL meeting
began, Karzai reverted to old form and launched into a
familiar review of the many instances where he believed the
US had miscalculated its policies in the region. In summary:
The US had failed to formulate an effective post-2001 policy
on Pakistan, had pulled out of southern Afghanistan
(particularly Helmand) too soon and given too much
responsibility to ill-equipped and casualty-averse NATO
allies, had failed to effectively engage with and pay respect
to the importance of tribal leaders in Afghansociety, and
had allowed tribal leader networks to be decimated by
insurgent attacks. I spoke up then, observing that I had
visited Helmand several years ago before other NATO forces
took over military operations there and witnessed signs that
governance and security were declining under then-Gov. Sher
Mohammed Akhundzada.

Atmar on Karzai's Paranoia
----------

¶9. (S/NF) I told Interior Minister Atmar at our July 2
meeting that with his conspiratorial behavior, Karzai would
run the risk of leaving USG interlocutors with the impression
that we have accomplished very little here and that the
Afghangovernment believed most of the failures lay with us.
This is not a dialogue that will lead to an effective
partnership. The US has been clear in its past shortcomings
in Afghanistan, but we have yet to see Karzai admit to the
serious shortcomings in his administration.

¶10. (S/NF) Atmar agreed with the importance of Karzai
presenting himself as a better international partner. He
also detailed three existing paranoias that affected Karzai's
worldview: (1) Karzai did not understand US policy in the
region and suspected ulterior motives in our relationship
with neighboring countries; (2) he suspected the US was
contemplating a short-term strategy in Afghanistan that would
result in our disengagement within the next two years; and
(3) the US was intent on dumping Karzai and supporting
another candidate. A fourth emerging paranoia was of a US
plot to divide and weaken Pashtuns on both sides of the
Afghan-Pakistani border. Despite these paranoias, Atmar
assured me that Karzai had confidence in his personal
relationship with me and recognized the need to meet more
frequently to work through his misperceptions of US policy
and intentions.

Our Relationship with Karzai
----------

¶11. (S/NF) In these meetings and other recent encounters
with Karzai, two contrasting portraits emerge. The first is
of a paranoid and weak individual unfamiliar with the basics
of nation building and overly self-conscious that his time in
the spotlight of glowing reviews from the international
community has passed. The other is that of an ever-shrewd
politician who sees himself as a nationalist hero who can
save the country from being divided by the
decentralization-focused agenda of Abdullah, other political
rivals, neighboring countries, and the US. In order to
recalibrate our relationship with Karzai, we must deal with
and challenge both of these personalities.

¶12. (S/NF) The danger of long-term damage to our
relationship with and thus our influence over Karzai ) who
for now is the clear favorite to win the election ) is real,
but not irreversible. We need to carefully ensure that the
distance between us and Karzai does not grow over the
remaining weeks before the election. Karzai has invited me
for a series of one-on-one meetings in the near future.
According to Atmar, Karzai recognizes the importance of a
closer dialogue. I will use this opportunity and others to
re-focus our dialogue on several points that can improve our
mutual understanding, including:

¶13. (S/NF) We need to seriously examine the issue of armed
groups that currently operate outside of the purview of

Kabul 00001767 003 of 003


official Afghangovernment control. The activities of
paramilitary units and PSCs, combined with civilian
casualties, night searches, and others issues related to the
presence of foreign forces, play into the manifestation of
Afghans' anger that they are not in control of their own
country. Karzai claims only to be a vessel for his peoples'
anger. All hubris aside, he is expressing a legitimate
concern of his constituents. These problems will be a
barrier to moving forward in other areas of our relationship
until we have properly addressed them.

¶14. (S/NF) At the same time, we must convince Karzai that
the US-Afghanrelationship is a two-way street of obligations
and responsibilities. While we accept our own
responsibilities, Karzai must accept and act on our
expectation that he elucidate a clear vision for how he
intends to lead Afghanistan over the next five years in a way
that encourages democratization, promotes economic
development, and recognizes the poisonous effects corruption
has had on his government's ability to win the trust and
respect of its people. If reelected, it is my hope that a
Karzai who no longer needs to run for reelection will be
better positioned and in a healthier frame of mind to pursue
this agenda, as well as a meaningful national reconciliation.

¶15. (S/NF) I will work now to lay the foundation for
improved trust and advances on the two key themes outlined
above. I will work in tandem with Gen. McChrystal on both of
these fronts. On the discussion of shared responsibilities,
I will begin a frank, collaborative (and perhaps, at times,
confrontational) dialogue with Karzai. No alternative
approach is now evident. Karzai's current vision for
Afghanistan's future relies too strongly on warlords, tribal
chiefs, and other personalities of the past who would be
difficult to reconcile with our commitments to build strong
government institutions and professional security forces.
Eikenberry


2009/08/09KABUL2523.html
09KABUL2523 2009-08-25 09:09 2010-12-02 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kabul

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EO 12958 DECL: 08/25/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: S/SRAP HOLBROOKE’S AUG 22 MEETING WITH SRSG KAI
EIDE AND DSRSG GALBRAITH ON ELECTION SCENARIO PLANNING

Classified By: Amb. Timothy M. Carney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary. Ambassadors Holbrooke, Eikenberry, and Ricciardone discussed post-election day scenarios with SRSG Kai Eide, DSRSG Galbraith, and UNDP two days after election day. They agreed that candidates would most likely use rationales of fraud and Pashtun disenfranchisement to discredit the outcome of elections. UNDP’s Margie Cook expressed confidence the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) could together effectively detect fraud and invalidate ballots where necessary. Participants agreed that the IEC, UN, and international partners should all strive to remain silent when it came to predictions or probabilities of various outcomes. There was shared concern about the specter of a disgruntled candidate preemptively declaring victory and sparking civil unrest. End Summary.

¶2. (C) On August 22, Ambassadors Eikenberry, Holbrooke, and Ricciardone met with UNAMA SRSG Kai Eide, DSRSG Peter Galbraith, and UNDP Chief Electoral Advisor Margie Cook. The focus of the meeting was scenario planning for the outcome of the election results. Principals exchanged views on the outcomes that were likely in terms of the two key candidates. They noted that the two rationales that would likely be used by the leading candidate camps to challenge the legitimacy of the elections would be fraud and the disenfranchisement of Pashtuns. While there are various accounts of voter turnout in Pashtun areas, the general view is that the numbers were far lower than in the rest of the country.

¶3. (C) S/SRAP Holbrooke, evaluating the prospect of the election being stolen through fraudulent behavior, expressed concern that this would undermine the legitimacy of the government and paralyze it from carrying out the priorities the government urgently needs to address. Ms. Cook noted that fraud had already been detected, including in the Pul-e-Charkhi area of Kabul where ballot boxes had been stuffed days before the elections. UNDP and IEC have already decided to nullify these ballots, she reported. She expected fraud occurred in a number of insecure areas of the country. Ms. Cook reassured the group that there were seven different trigger points in the IEC’s tally process to detect fraud and expressed confidence that this process could quarantine and make void fraudulent ballots, even those from insecure areas. She expressed confidence that the ECC would have the will to disqualify a large percentage of votes, even if there would be significant political consequences.

¶4. (C) The principals agreed that it was important not to say anything publicly about the probability of either Hamid Karzai or Abdullah Abdullah securing the “50 plus one” percentage of votes necessary for a first round win. There was general concern about one of the campaigns preemptively declaring victory and potentially setting off a chain of disruptive events as witnessed in Iran, Kenya, or Zimbabwe. There was particular concern that one of the candidate’s supporters might orchestrate protests and unrest in the major provincial centers. There was concurrence about the importance of stressing to all of the major candidates that they should not make announcements claiming victory until the results were announced by the IEC and that they would respect the process. Ambassador Holbrooke noted that he would stress this point with all three candidates.

¶5. (C) The meeting participants also agreed that it was important to ensure the Chairperson of the IEC not make any predictions about the outcome of the elections until the preliminary results were announced. It was agreed that Ambassador (Ret.) Tim Carney would visit Dr. Ludin to reinforce the point that he should stay on message for the sake of integrity of the process. (Note: Amb. Carney delivered this message on August 24. End Note.) Ms. Cook expressed concern that IEC Chairman Ludin had indicated to the press that he would start providing some details of results elections on August 22 and she opined it would take at least until August 25 for enough information to be collected to make a correct preliminary partial announcement. The IEC now plans to announce partial preliminary results, perhaps of ten percent of the tally, late afternoon of August 25. EIKENBERRY


2009/12/09DOHA733.html
09DOHA733 2009-12-21 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Doha

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KWBG EAGR QA
SUBJECT: VISIT OF QATAR'S PRIME MINISTER TO WASHINGTON
JANUARY 4-5

DOHA 00000733 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

¶1. (S) Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (who serves
concurrently as Foreign Minister) of Qatar will visit
Washington beginning January 4 to continue the strategic
consultations that Qatar and the USG have pursued since June,
when Near Eastern Affairs Assistant Secretary Feltman first
proposed them in Doha. As part of those consultations,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud and
Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohamad Al-Rumaihi
visited Washington last fall.

¶2. (S) The Prime Minister travels to Washington with the aim
of laying the groundwork for visits in the first half of 2010
by Qatar's Heir Apparent and the Amir. We believe he will be
prepared to discuss the gaps between the USG and GOQ on
Middle East peace and counterterrorism cooperation, as well
as to discuss setting the stage for joint cooperation on
Iran, Iraq and other regional issues.

¶3. (S) Suggested talking points for meetings with the PM:

-- We thank you for bringing with you to Washington a
commitment to fund the PA. Your decision to do so is
extremely important to us. We view it as a clear gesture of
friendship to us and of a commitment to partner with us on
Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, just as the United States and
Qatar have partnered on Darfur.

-- As your ally and friend, we hope we can look to you to
increase your cooperation with us on counterterrorism. We
want to work particularly closely with you and enacting
policies and programs that deter financial flows to Hamas and
the Taliban.

-- In this context, we applaud your work with the IMF on
making needed legal and procedural changes to curtail
financing to terrorists. We are ready to help you with
technical support and training once the IMF and Qatar have
worked out an action plan.

-- We especially value consultations with you on Iran. We
recognize your national need for a working relationship with
Iran, given the natural gas reserves you share with Iran.
How best do you think we can persuade Iran to give up its
military nuclear aims without military confrontation?

-- We understand that you are close to announcing a decision
to open an Embassy in Baghdad, but that much depends on
resolving the issue of Iraq's debts to Qatar. Is there
anything we can do to help?


-- We encourage you to recognize an independent Kosovo, as
Saudi Arabia and others have now done. We certainly
appreciate your votes in favor of Kosovo in the IMF and World
Bank. They are important precursors to formal recognition,
but when will you take that final step?

-- On Yemen, we know that President Saleh asked Qatar to stop
its mediation between the central government and Huthi
rebels. Given your past involvement there, what thoughts do
you have on bringing about stability on the Arabian
Peninsula?

-- We applaud Qatar's decision to make food security a
priority, not just for itself but for the entire Arab world.
Food security is a priority for the USG, as well, and we
share Qatar's view that it must be addressed through a
combination of commerce, investment, technical assistance,
technology transfer, and direct aid.

Addressing the Fatah-Hamas Split and Funding the PA
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶4. (S) Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim (HBJ) has told NEA A/S
Feltman that he will come with a financial commitment to fund
the Palestinian Authority. This is an extremely important
gesture by Qatar to the United States. He will also be
prepared to discuss with Secretary Clinton and others Qatar's
view of Hamas, continued contacts with whose leaders it sees
as key to bringing about a stable and enduring Middle East
peace. We expect HBJ to share what other steps Qatar is
prepared to take in support of the Palestinian Authority (PA)
and, in particular, Mahmoud Abbas, whose continued leadership

DOHA 00000733 002.2 OF 003


of the PA Qatar's leaders support. HBJ is likely to bring
with him new ideas to reconcile Hamas and Fatah. Given
Qatar's history of mediation efforts HBJ will no doubt
suggest that Qatar can play a helpful role. Qatar's
restoration of normal operations of the Israeli Trade Office
in Doha would also give testimony to Qatar's willingness to
help achieve U.S. objectives, but we do not expect the
Qataris to take this step absent some significant gesture
from the Israelis, such as much less restricted access to
Gaza for Qatar's humanitarian efforts.

¶5. (S) Qatar almost certainly will not be willing to break
off ties or dialogue with Hamas. If asked to do so, we think
HBJ will explain that the Amir gave his word to both Hamas
and Fatah that he would financially support the winner of
democratic elections in Palestine. Hamas won those
elections, which the Bush Administration pressed the Amir to
support actively. The Amir believes that it would be
dishonorable to isolate Hamas after he convinced its leaders
to participate in elections that were backed by the United
States.

Greater Cooperation on Counterterrorism Needed
--------------------------------------------- -

¶6. (S) It is important to make clear to HBJ that cooperation
between the United States and Qatar on counterterrorism
issues in general needs to be greatly improved. Officials
should make known USG concerns about the financial support to
Hamas by Qatari charitable organizations and our concerns
about the moral support Hamas receives from Yousef
Al-Qaradawi. It is also essential to stress that high-level
Qatari political support is needed, if financial flows to
terrorists are to stop.

¶7. (S) An International Monetary Fund (IMF) employee began
advising Qatar's Financial Intelligence Unit in October (in a
relationship expected to last three full years) on making the
necessary legal and procedural changes to address the 49
areas in which international experts have recommended changes
to Qatar's procedures. We assess that the FIU is serious
about making technical changes that will enhance Qatar's
reputation as a global financial center, but we project that,
absent political support from the top, the IMF/Qatari
partnership will fall short in achieving its goals.

Need for Close Consultations on Iran
------------------------------------

¶8. (S) Qatar shares a mammoth natural gas field with Iran.
As a result, Qatar carefully maintains with Iran a high tempo
of top-level contacts , which have increased since the
protests following Iranian presidential elections). Qatar
does this because it is convinced that such a close
relationship with Iran is key to safeguarding trillions of
dollars in potential wealth. We are convinced that Qatar
will not be dissuaded from maintaining those ties.

¶9. (S) That said, Qatar's leaders -- while careful not to say
it publicly -- do not trust Iran; and Qatar does not want
Iran to have nuclear weapons.

¶10. (S) Qatar's relationship with Iran is important to us
for another reason. Qatar hosts the forward headquarters of
CENTCOM and allows us to use Al-Udaid Air Base for
unrestricted air operations over Iraq and Afghanistan. We
pay no rent for these facilities, and the Qataris have funded
about 60 percent of the improvements to Al-Udaid since our
partnership on that base began. While few, least of all
Qatar, want a military confrontation with Iran, the USG no
doubt would want to use these Qatari facilities in any
kinetic operations against Iran. Right now, we anticipate
that Qatar would refuse to allow Qatari soil to be used to
attack Iran, short of some sort of permanent USG security
guarantee to Qatar, to include its offshore natural gas field
shared with Iran.

Finding a Way Forward on Iraq
-----------------------------

¶11. (S) For several months, Qatar has expressed frustration
with the current government of Iraq, which it views as too
Shi'a in orientation for its liking, but appears now to be
prepared to consider investment offsets, provided by the
Government of Iraq, but owned by Qatar, as a means for Iraq

DOHA 00000733 003.2 OF 003


to repay the GOI's debt owed Qatar. That would be an avenue
for the resumption of a political relationship, to include an
HBJ visit to Baghdad and the opening of a Qatari Embassy in
Iraq. We should encourage Qatar's outreach to Baghdad and
also encourage Iraq's government to shore up its relations
with Doha.

Recognizing Kosovo
------------------

¶12. (C) MFA Assistant Minister Mohamad Al-Rumaihi told
Ambassador December 20 that Qatar's IMF and World Bank votes
in favor of Kosovo show Qatar's true sympathies on
recognizing Kosovo. The Russian President, however, has
asked Qatar to "go slow" in announcing recognition, he said.
Out of sensitivity to Russian concerns, Al-Rumaihi said,
Qatar has done so. He encouraged Secretary Clinton to ask
HBJ about the timing of Qatar's eventual recognition, noting
that that Qatar had been approached by organizers of a UK
project about using its good offices with the Government of
Kosovo to protect Kosovo's Christian heritage once Qatar
formally recognizes its independence.

Cool to Yemen's Approach on the Huthi
-------------------------------------

¶13. (S) Having attempted to mediate between Huthi rebels in
Yemen and the central government there (before President
Saleh put an end to Qatar's involvement), Qatar believes the
Huthi tribes have legitimate grievances that the central
government must address in dialogue and negotiations. It can
be expected that HBJ will discourage a military approach to
solving the Huthi problem and claim that the role of Huthi
elements in supporting terrorism in the guise of Al-Qaida is
overstated.

Food Security
-------------

¶14. (U) Qatar will host March 3-4, 2010 an international
conference focused on food security in the Arab World. IFAD
(International Fund for Agricultural Development) is a
co-host, as is the Islamic Development Bank. The conference
will have a set of ambitious goals, to include a conference
declaration establishing a permanent secretariat to address
the food security issues of the poorer states of the Arab
League. According to officials of Texas A&M's Borlaug
Institute, this will be the first such conference on regional
food security issues hosted by an Arab government in the 50
years the institute has been active in the Middle East and
North Africa.

¶15. (SBU) In Embassy Doha's judgment, Qatar's food security
policies and strategies reflect the rapidly growing intent by
the Amir and Crown Prince to make food security a key
national priority for Qatar, not just in terms of Qatar's own
food security needs, but in terms of the food security needs
of the Arab region. (HBJ supports having an active food
security policy, as long as it has a strong commercial focus.)

¶16. (SBU) That judgment stems from our conversations with
Qatar government officials:

-- While QNFSP's short-term focus is on the State of Qatar
and building the domestic agricultural sector to diminish
reliance on imports, the strategic goal of QNFSP is to export
the technologies developed in Qatar to countries throughout
the MENA region, and other areas with arid climates.

-- Toward that end, some research results will be part of the
public domain and available to everyone. Some technology
transfer to poorer MENA nations will be donor-based, through
the activities of the offices of the State Minister for
International Cooperation. The third component of Qatar's
strategic goal of exporting QNFSP technology will be more
commercially based, and will employ public/private
partnerships.

LeBaron


2009/12/09KABUL4070.html
09KABUL4070 2009-12-19 16:04 2010-12-02 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kabul

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TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: THE NEW CABINET: BETTER BUT NOT BEST

Classified By: Ambassador Ricciardone reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: President Karzai sent most of the cabinet list to the Parliament on December 19 with the notable exception of National Directorate for Security (NDS) Chief Saleh. Although we judge many of the ministers are acceptable and qualified, this list represents only a modest upgrade in Karzai’s cabinet talent. It appears Karzai chose ministers based on compromises between the wishes of the international community and the traditional powerbrokers to whom he is beholden to, including Dostum, Mohaqqeq, Ismail Khan, Fahim Khan, Khalili and Sayyaf. Despite the promises to former President (and Abdullah backer) Rabbani, Karzai gave him no positions - increasing the possibility of a more powerful opposition. End Summary.

¶2. (U) First Vice President Fahim Khan announced the following list at the Parliament on December 19: REMAINING:
--Defense - Abdul Rahim Wardak. --Interior - Mohammad Hanif Atmar. --Finance - Mohammad Omer Zakhiwal. --Communication - Engineer Amirzai Sangin. --Justice - Sarwar Danish. --Education - Ghulam Farooq Wardak. --Water and Energy - Al-Haj Mohammad Ismail Khan. --Women’s Affairs - Hosun Bano Ghazanfar. --Public Health - Dr. Sayed M. Amin Fatimie. --Agriculture - Asif Rahimi. --Parliamentary Affairs - Mohammad Anwar Jekdalek. --Counternarcotics - General Khodaidad.
REPLACEMENTS:
--Economy - Dr. Anwari Al-Haq Ahadi. --Culture - Sayed Makhdum Raheem. --Higher Education - Obaidullah Obaid. --Commerce - Ghulam Mohammad Elaqi. --Transportation - Dr. Mohammadullah Batash. --Haji & Islamic Affairs - Enayatullah Baligh. --Public Works - Engineer Mirza Hussain Abdullahi. --Mines - Wahidullah Shahrani. --Rural Rehabilitation & Development (MRRD) - Wais Barmak. --Labor and Social Affairs - Mohammad Ismail Munshi. --Border and Tribal Affairs - Hamid Gailani. --Refugees - Enayatullah Nazeri.
NOT ANNOUNCED:
--Foreign Affairs --NDS --Urban Development

-------------------------------
Analysis: We Can Work With Most
-------------------------------

¶3. (C) The following list includes some background information on each of the selections, to include which political powerbroker supported the candidate, third-country influence (if any), or party affiliation.
REMAINING:
--Defense - Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak (Pashtun). He was a mujahadeen commander during the Soviet occupation, and later spent over two decades in the Washington, D.C. area. He has political connections to Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani. Although some say his family has profited from defense contracts, he is considered competent and cooperative with U.S. interests.
--Interior - Mohammad Hanif Atmar (Pashtun). He earned his Master’s degree in International Relations and Post-war Development from York University in the UK. He is allegedly a British citizen, and may renounce his citizenship if pressed by the Parliament. He was a loyalist to the Soviet Union-backed government, and his leg was severely injured in an anti-government mujahadeen attack. Many Karzai-supporters do not trust him, particularly the former Northern Alliance. He maintains some political connections with former Interior Minister Jalali and Ashraf Ghani. Karzai told us in early December that “Atmar was hanging on by a thread” because many powerful former mujahadeen like Sayyaf and Ismail Khan did not trust him. The British joined us in supporting him. He is one of the intellectual stars of the cabinet.
--Finance - Mohammad Omer Zakhiwal (Pashtun). He has Canadian citizenship, and most think he is willing to renounce his citizenship if the AfghanParliament insists. He is associated with Hezb-e-Islami, although not the
KABUL 00004070 002 OF 005
Arghandewal branch. He is close to President Karzai and raised funds for him during the campaign, at times using methods that are not illegal here but not in concert with Western standards. We consider him a skilled technocrat who effectively promotes the economic development of Afghanistan; he is the closest of the “technocrats” to Karzai.
--Communication - Engineer Amirzai Sangin (Pashtun). He earned his Bachelor’s degree in Electronics and Communications from the Southern London University. He belongs to the AfghanMillat party and is known to enjoy a close relationship with the Karzai family. He has a well-deserved reputation for competence.
--Justice - Sarwar Danish (Hazara). He is a prolific writer and has published fifteen books on Islamic Jurisprudence, and other legal issues. He is from Daikundi Province, and was born into a pious and religious family. He studied in numerous countries to include Iraq, Syria and Iran. The Wahdat party has told us he is the candidate of Second Vice President Khalili. We have found him approachable, competent, and relatively dedicated to rule of law and human rights.
--Education - Ghulam Farooq Wardak (Pashtun). We consider him an effective minister. However, the press reported widely that he misused his public office and power over schools to support Karzai in the 2009 presidential elections. He is beholden to the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan party led by Arghandewal, although he claims he no longer is affiliated. He is close to the President and has been an insightful interlocutor on politics.
--Water and Energy - Al-Haj Mohammad Ismail Khan (Tajik). This former warlord is known for his corruption and ineffectiveness at the Energy Ministry; the worst of Karzai’s choices. Presidential Chief of Staff Omer Daudzai told us December 17 that a strong deputy minister would be appointed and he gave us the CV of a western-trained candidate who will manage the ministry. He said some of the water responsibilities could be transferred to Agriculture as another “work around.” The establishment of a national power company had already taken away some responsibilities from this position. Our repeated interventions directly with Karzai and his supporters, including a last-minute intervention via Mojaddedi, did not overcome Karzai’s deeply personal bonds with Khan. Others think Khan is a signal to the former jihadis that Karzai still stands by them, despite international pressure.
--Women’s Affairs - Hosun Bano Ghazanfar (Uzbek). She was supported by the primarily Uzbek Junbesh political party, although they admitted that they did not think she should “count” against their promised four positions. Her performance has disappointed us and female political leaders. Her wealthy and influential family lends her political strength; they own the Ghazanfar Bank, import oil from Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran, and reportedly gave large contributions to Karzai’s campaign. She may have been supported by Dostum.
--Public Health - Dr. Sayed M. Amin Fatimie (Pashtun). He is a former doctor and enjoys the support of Upper House Speaker Mojaddedi, and the families associated with Zahir Shah. We consider him one of the most competent and effective ministers. He is a medical doctor and studied in Germany, Pakistan, and the U.S. He was a doctor and professor in various mujahedeen and international organizations during the 80s and 90s.
--Agriculture - Asif Rahimi (Tajik). We find him articulate and competent, but that he does not always deliver on his ambitious goals. He oversaw one of the most successful AfghanGovernment development initiatives, the National Solidarity Program. He is rumored to be associated with Sayyaf, but is close to Zakhilwal.
--Parliamentary Affairs - Mohammad Anwar Jekdalek (Pashtun). He obtained this position due to his close personal relationship with President Karzai and has proven a valuable Embassy contact. He is a mediocre minister and relatively unknown. He was a former mujahadeen and former chairman of the AfghanOlympic Committee. He survived the Serena Hotel terrorist attach by reportedly dodging a bullet by leaping into a locker in the hotel’s gym. He is associated with Fahim Khan.
--Counternarcotics - Gen. Khodaidad (Hazara) will remain for now, although Presidential Chief of Staff Omer Daudzai told Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone December 17 that this ministry would later be dissolved into the Agricultural and Interior
KABUL 00004070 003 OF 005
ministries. He holds graduate degrees from the Indian National Defense Academy. He has been a very good partner for U.S. counternarcotics efforts.
REPLACEMENTS:
--Economy - Dr. Anwari Al-Haq Ahadi (Pashtun). He was the Finance Minister and remains the head of the pro-Pashtun AfghanMillat party. He married Fatima Gailani, the daughter of Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani, the influential Afghanspiritual leader. He received degrees from the American University of Beirut, and later a doctorate in political science from Northwestern University. He resigned to pursue a presidential bid, but then pulled out shortly after his powerful father-in-law decided to support President Karzai instead. His run as Finance Minister received mixed reviews. He studied in Iran in the 1970s and now professes hostility to the current Iranian regime.
--Culture - Sayed Makhdum Raheen (Tajik). His family is associated with Zahir Shah. Many MPs claim he is too liberal after he was caught on television attending a dance party. He has little support, and may not receive the approval of the conservatives in the Parliament.
--Higher Education - Former Kabul University Medical School Chancellor Obaidullah Obaid (Tajik). Supported by Marshall Fahim. Reportedly competent.
--Commerce - Ghulam Mohammad Elaqi (Hazara). He was the Central Bank Chairman in the 1990s, and former Chamber of Commerce President until 2008. He was allegedly accused of corruption in 2001. His nomination was supported by Mohaqqeq, although he also has a relationship with competing Hazara powerbroker Khalili. Khalili appointed him as a secondary representative at the 2001 Bonn conference. He reportedly owns a factory in Tashkent used to export special bags made from sheep stomach that are used frequently by heroine smugglers to prevent detection. Also, reportedly he took about $1.5 million from small businessmen in Afghanistan in 1995 to open a trading company, but instead absconded with the funds.
--Transportation - Dr. Mohammadullah Batash (Uzbek). He was previously the Junbesh Party Chairman, and was one of the four names the Junbesh party gave Karzai. He is from Kunduz, and is rumored to maintain a political connection with Dostum. He received his PhD in the former Soviet Union.
--Haji & Islamic Affairs - Enayatullah Baligh (Tajik). He is from Kapisa and is an influential prayer leader at Kabul’s main mosque. He was a professor at the Kabul University. He is beholden to Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf.
--Public Works - Engineer Mirza Hussain Abdullahi. He obtained his PhD in Engineering at the University of Hawaii. He is beholden to Khalili, and supported by current Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA) Director Mudaber. According to Daudzai, he was “channeled through Mohaqqeq,” and was not one of Mohaqqeq’s original choices. His choices were ruled out because they were not qualified.
--Mines - Wahidullah Shahrani (Uzbek). He is the former Minister of Commerce, and his family is from Badakhshan. We consider him one of the most competent ministers. Although an Uzbek, he has no affiliation with the Junbesh party, according to Junbesh Party Chair Nooroolah. His father was once Minister of the Hajj. His family is close to the Karzai family, and he is a UK permanent resident educated in Pakistan and the UK.
--Rural Rehabilitation & Development (MRRD) - Wais Barmak (Tajik). He is currently the deputy in this ministry, and is associated with Marshall Fahim. Daudzai complained about this choice, noting that Barmak was Panjshiri, but he gets high marks for his management of the National Solidarity Program.
--Labor and Social Affairs - Mohammad Ismail Munshi (Turkmen). He is one of the Deputy Chairmen of the Junbesh party. He is associated with Dostum.
--Border and Tribal Affairs - Hamid Gailani (Pashtun). He is a moderate Pashtun and currently is the Deputy Speaker of the Upper House of the AfghanNational Assembly. He obtains most of his political power from his respected father, Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani. Although pro-Karzai in the last election, he can be highly critical of the AfghanPresident. He maintains a good relationship with the Embassy.
--Refugees - Enayatullah Nazeri (Tajik). He is from Parwan
KABUL 00004070 004 OF 005
Province and studied law and political science at the Kabul University. He was a respected civil servant and is viewed as relatively apolitical; he served in the Najibullah, Rabbani, Taliban, and the post-Bonn interim governments. He was the first Minister of Refugee Affairs from 2002-3. His nomination was supported by Fahim Khan.

-------------
NOT ANNOUNCED
-------------

¶4. (C) President Karzai has made no announcement about his advisors, his Chief of Staff, the Foreign Affairs Minister, NDS, the OAA, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), the National Security Advisor, and the Minister for Urban Development. Presidential Chief of Staff Omer Daudzai told Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone on December 17 that FM Spanta would stay on until after the January 28 London conference; he implied that the current NSA Rassoul will likely take his place. Spanta would have a difficult time obtaining Parliamentary approval due to his dual (German) citizenship, his name on the list of corrupt officials given to the Parliament by the Deputy Attorney General on December 16, and because Spanta received a vote of no confidence in the Parliament in the past. NSA and IDLG were not announced today because those positions do not require Parliament’s approval. Daudzai said the IDLG Ministry would remain with Jelani Popal (Pashtun), who is considered to be a technocrat.

¶5. (C) It was unusual that NDS Saleh was not announced with the others, as both Karzai and his Chief of Staff have told us on numerous occasions that he would stay on. At one point, Sayyaf was reportedly applying significant pressure on Karzai to give the job to the previous Border and Tribal Affairs Minister Assadullah Khalid, who is exceptionally corrupt and incompetent. Karzai told Ambassador Eikenberry that a new Construction Ministry (taking functions from Urban Development and Public Works) would be created and given to the current Governor of Nangarhar Gul Aqa Sherzai. Sherzai has indicated separately to us that he plans to stay on as governor, which may be why the Urban Development Minister was left off the list. (Daudzai told us Yusuf Pashtun, a former Urban Development Minister, will become the next Minister of Urban Development.)

¶6. (C) The Parliament debated extensively whether or not President Karzai had the right to divide, add, or change Ministries without their approval. Lower House Speaker Yunus Qanooni and former presidential candidate Bashardost noted in the plenary on December 19 that the approval of one-third of the Parliament was required to reorganize ministerial functions according to the constitution, although after he received a call from the Presidential Palace during the plenary Qanooni said splitting ministries was acceptable. Taj Ali Saber, Karzai’s nomination for the new Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, was not allowed to be presented to the Parliament for this reason (this used to be part of the Labor and Social Affairs Ministry).

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Analysis: Political Debts and Balance
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¶7. (C) Of the selections announced to date, 13 of the 24 are holdovers. Former President Rabbani was engaged in intensive negotiations with Karzai for weeks but got none of his supporters a ministry - which may lead to a stronger opposition if he rejoins Abdullah’s movement. One UNAMA analyst noted that Rabbani’s faction had tried hardest for the two security ministries (Defense and Interior) but that Karzai had shown “strength” in keeping the two ministers in place. Karzai did not feel himself bound to a “coalition” or powersharing arrangement with Rabbani, who clearly overshot in his post-election negotiations.

¶8. (C) The biggest initial winners include first Vice President Fahim, who delivered significant numbers of Tajik voters and according to our estimates received five seats for his supporters. Dostum, whose Uzbek supporters pushed Karzai’s victory, comes in second with three positions. Other winners include Mohaqqeq (Karzai split the Hazara vote with Bashardost) with two; the prestigious Gailani family - 2.5 (Ahadi, Hamed Gailani’s brother in law, is “half Gailani, half AfghanMillat”); AfghanMillat - 1.5; Khalili - 1; Ismail Khan - 1; Mojaddedi - .5 (Fatimie is considered “half Mojaddedi, half the former King Shah family”); Shah Family - 1.5; Hezb-e-Islami - 2; and Sayyaf - 1. Atmar, Rahimi, Shahrani and Khodaidad were not considered to be any particular groups’ candidate, although all receive some international support.
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EIKENBERRY


2010/01/10KABUL131.html
10KABUL131 2010-01-16 15:03 2010-12-02 21:09 SECRET Embassy Kabul

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000131

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: SEVEN MORE MINISTERS APPROVED -- TEN REJECTED

REF: KABUL 0021

Classified By: Ambassador Eikenberry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S) Summary: The AfghanLower House (Wolesi Jirga - WJ) has voted to accept 7 of 17 Cabinet nominees presented in President Karzai’s second tranche of candidates. The Parliament has not yet decided if it will recess until mid-February, or continue until the new Cabinet is complete. Presidential Palace Chief of Staff Daudzai told us January 12 that this was the desired outcome -- a political calculation to allow Karzai to back out of campaign promises with traditional powerbrokers. The political winners of the vote include Pashtun and Tajik conservatives and jihadis, as well as a Counternarcotics Minister associated with the drug mafia. Meanwhile, neither the two strongest female candidates nor any of the Uzbek and Hazara candidates passed muster. Many MPs claimed they voted down candidates because they were “weak nobodies,” connected to warlords, did not offer sufficient significant “donations” to their 2010 Parliamentary elections campaigns, or due to ethnic affiliations. End Summary.

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WJ Votes on the Second Tranche of Cabinet Nominees
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¶2. (U) On January 16, the WJ voted to approve seven of 17 Cabinet nominees presented in Karzai’s second tranche of candidates. Ten nominees were rejected. Some ministerial candidates, like the MRRD Minister, gained exactly the minimum 113 votes required, while the Counternarcotics Minister received the highest number of votes at 162. Of a total of 249 MPs, 223 were present for the vote. The Literacy Ministry was not included on this latest list because Karzai has not formally created the new ministry and the WJ has not approved it. The President decided to keep the Martyred and Disabled as part of the Labor and Social Affairs Ministry. Four more positions that require confirmation but have not yet been submitted are the heads of the intelligence service, the Central Bank, and the Red Crescent Society, as well as the Attorney General. These positions are traditionally submitted after the completion of the ministerial approval process.

¶3. (U) Those candidates approved in the second tranche included the Foreign Affairs Minister, Justice, Hajj and Religious Affairs, Economy, Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), and the Labor, Social Affairs and Martyred Minister. Vote tallies and short biographic notes are in paras 10 and 11. The Parliament has not yet decided if it will recess until mid-February, or continue until the Cabinet is complete. They will meet again on January 17 and will likely decide at that point.

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Palace: “We Wanted Them To Be Rejected”
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¶4. (S) Presidential Palace Chief of Staff Omer Daudzai told D/Ambassador Ricciardone January 12 that the palace purposefully introduced weak candidates associated with some of the traditional powerbrokers so that the Parliament would reject them. Daudzai only expected about five nominees to pass. He claimed this approach allowed Karzai to back out of campaign promises to some of these former warlords, and instead, nominate more candidates that were loyal to Karzai. Daudzai claimed Karzai had asked him to refrain from campaigning for ministers, and that Karzai was pleased that the tone of the powerbrokers in meetings to discuss cabinet nominations had already “improved” since the first cabinet list, as the warlords were more willing to accept Karzai’s suggested cabinet nominations. Daudzai believed the third list would be “stronger.”

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Political Winners and Losers
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¶5. (S) The political winners of the vote include Pashtun and Tajik conservatives, as well as a Counternarcotics Minister associated with the drug mafia. The winners also included one AfghanMillat/former King Zahir Shah candidate (Foreign Affairs), two candidates associated with former warlord and fundamentalist Ustad Rasoul Sayyaf (Hajj and Justice), one Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan candidate (Economy), and three candidates either associated with former warlords Marshal Fahim or Professor Rabbani’s Jamiat party (MRRD, Labor and Social Affairs, and Counternarcotics.) Meanwhile, the two strongest female candidates were not approved, nor were the three candidates associated with Dostum and the Uzbek Junbesh
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party (Health, Transport, and Communications.) The three Hazara candidates (Commerce, Public Works, and Urban Development) and the one pro-Iran candidate (Higher Education) also failed.

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Vote Motivations Remain Numerous
--------------------------------

¶6. (SBU) The WJ’s display of strength both on January 2 and January 16 no doubt reflected a variety of motives, including candidates’ qualifications, blow-back from executive dominance, political and financial gain, as well as a desire to avoid warlord candidates and certain ethnicities (reftel A). Several MPs told us this cabinet list was full of “weak nobodies” lacking the political stature to be effective ministers.

¶7. (SBU) The WJ also sought to assert itself after years of executive dominance, in particular in the first round of cabinet voting. At least three cabinet ministers had received WJ votes of no confidence in the past five years, yet Karzai kept them in office as acting ministers, in some cases for several years. Also, when the WJ overrode Karzai’s veto of the Media Law, which required the Executive to obtain the WJ’s approval of the head of the main government-supported media outlet RTA, the Executive sent the case to the Supreme Court and quietly had Karzai’s version approved during the busy presidential elections period.

¶8. (S) Understandably, MPs wanted to maximize their leverage for both political and financial gain. The cabinet approval process is one of the rare occasions when the WJ is in a position of power. MPs tell us this is the time when MPs can obtain significant “donations” to their 2010 Parliamentary elections campaigns. Al-Haj Moeen Marastyal (Pashtun, Kunduz) told us January 14 that MPs prefer second and third lists of cabinet nominees so they can receive second and third envelopes of cash. He claimed the Counternarcotics Minister was distributing to MPs record amounts, from 8,000 - 15,000 USD per MP.

¶9. (S) Some MPs have voted against warlord candidates, and opposed or supported others depending on ethnic affiliations. Notably, unlike in the first round of cabinet voting, some traditional powerbrokers are now attempting to disassociate themselves from the candidates. However, influential former warlord Sayyaf’s Political Advisor admitted to us January 12 that most of these candidates are in fact associated with the powerbrokers, and indeed Rabbani had his candidates, as did Sayyaf. They did not want to admit it for fear that this would cause their candidates to fail the approval process.

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Short Bios And Vote Tallies
---------------------------

¶10. (S) Approved:
--Minister of Foreign Affairs Zalmay Rassoul. Pashtun. AfghanMillat Political Party affiliation, but also associated with the former king Zahir Shah’s family. Kabul. He received his Doctorate in Medicine degree from Paris, France. He is a competent National Security Advisor, although not the most influential or outspoken member of the previous cabinet. However, he is likely to perform about as well as the incumbent. He speaks Pashtu, Dari, English, French, Italian and Arabic. Yea: 132 Nay: 82 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 9
--Minister of Justice Habibullah Ghuleb. Tajik. He was nominated by the infamous Northern Alliance warlord MP Ustad Abdurab Rasoul Sayyaf, and his Islamic Call Political Party. Parwan. PhD in Sharia Law. He was nominated for the 9th Supreme Court Justice slot in 2006, but Parliament rejected his nomination. Yea: 115 Nay: 99 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 9
--Hajj and Religious Affairs. Dr. Mohammad Yusuf Niazi. Pashtun. Sayyaf’s Islamic Call Party. Nangarhar. PhD in Islamic Studies. He worked in the Justice sector during the time of the former King Zahir Shah. Yea: 132 Nay: 80 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 10
--Economy Ministry
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Haji Abdul Hadi Arghandewal. Pashtun. He is the head of the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan Party (HIA). BA in Economics. He is also currently one of Karzai’s Tribal Advisors. His exposure to the West -- he lived in the U.S. for a few years and still has family in California -- has made him a notable moderate on economic and social issues in a party whose membership gravitates to conservative Islamic beliefs. He was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s financial officer for much of the 1980s. He has modernized the party and renounced the use of violence, and broke with Hekmatyar in the late 1990s. However, many in the party base remains predominantly loyal to Hekmatyar, and he no doubt remains in some contact with him. He is perhaps the best face that HIA could put forward. He speaks Dari, Pashtu and English. Yea: 121 Nay: 94 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 8
--Rural Rehabilitation and Development Ministry Jarullah Mansoori. Tajik. He is associated with influential MP Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and his Jamiat party according to many MPs, but Rabbani’s son Salahuddin told us January 11 that he is a candidate of Marshal Fahim. Badakhshan. MA in Political Science. Former Deputy Director in the AfghanEnvironmental Agency. He comes from a religious family that some local staff consider fundamentalist. We have heard from multiple interlocutors that he performed poorly at a relatively low-level position in the little known Environmental Agency. An Embassy local staff member who worked with Mansoori as an interpreter told us that Mansoori often cheated the most vulnerable; he never paid a local tea vendor he used to frequent, and even stole fuel from his modest father. Yea: 113 Nay: 102 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 7
--Labor, Social Affairs and Martyred - Amena Safi Afzali. Female. Tajik. Rumored to be associated with Rabbani’s Jamiat Party, associated with Fahim Khan and Rabbani. Herat. BA in Biology from Kabul University. She was a delegate at the constitutional Loya Jirga. Member of AfghanIndependent Human Rights Commission. She taught Biology at Kabul University, and fled to Iran during the Russian invasion. Her husband, a well-known jihadi fighter, was killed by the Russians. Yea: 117 Nay: 94 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 11
--Counternarcotics - Zarar Ahmad Moqbel. Tajik. Associated with First Vice President and former warlord Marshal Fahim. Parwan. BA in Education from Parwan University, although many express doubt that he completed his degree. Former Minister of Interior. He was removed from office due to his reputation for ineffectiveness and allegations of corruption, according to ISAF. He is perhaps the worst of the candidates. Former Deputy Interior Minister and MP Helaludin Helal claimed to us January 11 that Moqbel was supported by the drug mafia, to include Karzai’s younger half-brother Ahmed Wali Karzai and Arif Khan Noorzai. He joined the jihad against the Soviets in 1988, and later served as the Kabul police chief; he also worked at Afghanistan’s Embassy in Tehran. He speaks Dari, Pashtu and English. Yea: 162 Nay: 56 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 5

¶11. (C) Rejected
--Higher Education Ministry Dr. Muhammad Hashim Hesmatullahee. Kazilbash. Many MPs allege he was nominated by the Iranians; in the past he has helped MPs with Iranian visas. Shia. Kabul. BA in Literature from the Kabul University, MA from Tehran’s Tabatabai University in Journalism. He has been a lecturer at the Journalism Department at the Kabul University since 2004, and served as the head of the Union of AfghanJournalists. He speaks Dari, Pashtu and English. Yea: 100 Nay: 108 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 12
--Public Health Ministry Dr. Suraya Dalil. Female. Uzbek. Former warlord General Dostum and the Junbesh Political Party. Jowzjan. She obtained her MA from Harvard in Public Health in 2003, and is particularly dedicated to maternal health issues. She used to work with UNICEF, Doctors Without Borders, and the International Organization for Migration. Many MPs told us she did not receive many votes because she was seen in the
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medio without a head scarf, while others were convinced she was a Communist. Yea: 86 Nay: 116 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 17
--Public Works Ministry Engineer Bashir Lalee. Hazara. He was supported by Khalili and Mohaqqeq. Bachelors in Construction. Ghazni. His father was a former Minister of Mines under Zahir Shah. Yea: 78 Nay: 129 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 16
--Commerce Ministry Mohammad Hadi Hakimi. Hazara. He is associated with influential Hazara former warlord Haji Mohammad Mohaqqeq and his branch of the Wahdat party. Ghazni. He received his Law Degree in Canada and his BA in International Commerce in Iran. He refused his nomination, however, on January 11 citing family issues. MPs claimed to us that in addition to his worries about losing his Canadian citizenship, he did not want to become a weak minister with two masters, Karzai and Mohaqqeq. Yea: 69 Nay: 127 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 15
--Transportation Ministry Abdul Rahim Ouras. Turkman. Former warlord General Dostum and the Junbesh Political Party. Faryab. Phd in Construction. No one in the Transportation Ministry appears to knows him, and neither do their contacts, including the Acting Minister of Transport Alami. Many MPs told us he performed poorly during the question and answer period of his approval hearing January 11. Other MPs told us he has good work experience, but it will be difficult for him to overcome the Dostum stigma and obtain enough MP votes. Yea: 87 Nay: 123 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 13
--Women’s Affairs Ministry Palwasha Hassan. Female. Pashtun. Some think she is associated with Pir Gailani. Kabul. Bachelor of Science from a University in Pakistan. MA in Post Conflict Recovery from the York University in the UK. She established the AfghanWomen’s Education Center, and co-founded the AfghanWomen’s Network. The Embassy considers her a very good selection -- the United States Institute of Peace highly recommends her. She speaks Pashtu, Dari, Urdu and English. Some MPs claimed Hassan did not pass because she was had strong relationships with outspoken liberal elements in the Parliament, something the former mujahadeen and conservative MPs could not tolerate. Yea: 56 Nay: 150 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 19
--Refugee Affairs Ministry Eng. Abdul Rahim. Tajik. He is associated with Marshal Fahim and influential MP Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and his Jamiat party, although Rabbani no longer supports Rahim’s candidacy according to Rabbani’s son and several Tajik MPs close to Jamiat. This has caused Rahim to reconsider his candidacy, for fear that without Rabbani he will not get enough votes. Badakhshan. BA in Engineering from the Kabul-based Polytechnic University. He served as a representative of Jamiat for 10 years with assignments in China, Washington, and Islamabad, under Rabbani. He has also served as Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Indonesia. Most criticize this selection, since he has no relevant background, but instead has an affiliation with traditional Afghanpowerbrokers and former commanders. MP Helal claimed that when Rahim was the first Commerce Minister in Karzai’s government, he was removed due to corruption allegations. He speaks Dari, Pashtu and English. Yea: 82 Nay: 128 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 13
--Tribal and Border Affairs Ministry Arsala Jamal. Pashtun. Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan. Khost. Bachelor of Economics from the University of Malaya. He served as the Khost Governor from 2006 - 2008, but resigned and moved back to Canada in 2008 after the at least six assassination attempts. Canadian citizen. He was an active memberion Institute in Pakistan and Balkh University. Yea: 105 Nay: 104 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 14 EIKENBERRY
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uncorroborated rumors of corruption. He speaks Pashtu, Dari and English. Yea: 94 Nay: 116 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 13
--Urban Development Ministry Engineer Sultan Hussein Hasari. Hazara. Associated with Second Vice President Khalili and his branch of the Wahdaation of Danish Architects, he has worked on projects in Iran and Afghanistan; he has also been a visiting lecturer in these countries. Yea: 80 Nay: 128 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 15
--Communications Ministry Abdul Qadoos Hamidi. His nomination was announced on January 10. Jowzjan. Dostum and the Junbesh party. He has a Bachelors and Masters Degree from Kabul University in communications and technology. He was the Deputy Minister of Mines, and lectured at the Information Institute in Pakistan and Balkh University. Yea: 105 Nay: 104 Abstain/blank/spoiled: 14 EIKENBERRY


www.SedayeZanan.org
2010-12-04

Source: WikiLeaks.org